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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
As a response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia intensively pursued 
corporate governance reforms. However, the reforms were found to be unsatisfactory; 
some factors, such as specific business characteristics, were considered as contributing 
to the ineffectiveness of the reforms. Therefore, Indonesia provides an interesting 
setting to examine the effectiveness of the implementation of the Anglo-American 
corporate governance model in an emerging economy context.   
 
This study focuses on one Anglo-American corporate governance mechanism that has 
been actively promoted in Indonesia, namely, the audit committee. The objectives of the 
study are three-fold: (1) To examine the association between public listed companies 
with specific business characteristics (namely family control, politically connected 
independent commissioners, and foreign institutional investors) and their  level of 
compliance with audit committee rules; (2) To examine whether the compliance, which 
also indicates the level of audit committee effectiveness, is associated with restatements 
of financial statements, and; (3) To examine the influence of family control on the 
association between audit committee effectiveness and restatements of financial 
statements. 
 
This study is divided into two interrelated research stages: a study on the determinants 
of compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules (Research Stage 1), 
and a study on the association between audit committee effectiveness and restatements 
(Research Stage 2). Research Stage 1 employs short balanced panel data that, in total, 
cover 828 company-year observations for the period 2006-2008. The method of analysis 
used is feasible generalised least squares (FGLS), as the presence of heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation are noted in the data. Meanwhile, Research Stage 2 utilises cross 
sectional data, namely, 158 restating companies for the period 2006-2012 matched with 
158 control companies for the same period. The method of analysis is matched pair 
logistic regression.   
 
The results of Research Stage 1 indicate that different types of family control have 
different effects on the level of compliance of public listed companies with audit 
committee rules. Family-controlled companies with family members on boards are less 
likely to comply with audit committee rules. In contrast, companies controlled through 
family shareholding but without family involvement in their daily business activities are 
more likely to comply with audit committee rules. Additionally, public listed companies 
with politically connected independent commissioners are less likely to comply with 
audit committee rules. As expected, public listed companies with large, genuine foreign 
institutional investors are more likely to comply with audit committee rules. Meanwhile, 
the results of Research Stage 2 reveal that audit committee effectiveness is not 
significantly associated with restatements of financial statements. This implies that the 
presence of an audit committee might be just cosmetic or symbolic.  However, the use 
of restatements of financial statements as a proxy for financial reporting quality might 
contribute to the insignificance of audit committee effectiveness because this proxy 
might not be appropriate in the Indonesian environment.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 
Sebagai respons krisis kewangan Asia tahun 1997, Indonesia secara intensif melakukan 
pembaharuan urus tadbir  korporat secara intensif. Walau bagaimanapun, pembaharuan 
telah didapati masih tidak memuaskan. Beberapa faktor, seperti ciri-ciri perniagaan 
tertentu, dianggap sebagai menyumbang kepada ketidakberkesanan pembaharuan. Oleh 
itu, Indonesia mempunyai persekitaran yang menarik untuk mengkaji keberkesanan 
pelaksanaan model tadbir urus korporat Anglo-Amerika di sebuah negara membangun.  
 
Kajian ini menumpukan kepada satu mekanisma tadbir urus Anglo-American yang 
dipromosikan secara aktif di Indonesia, iaitu jawatankuasa audit. Objektif kajian ini 
adalah tiga peringkat: (1) untuk mengkaji perkaitan antara persekitaran perniagaan 
Indonesia dan pematuhan syarikat tersenarai awam dengan peraturan jawatankuasa 
audit, (2) untuk memeriksa sama ada tahap pematuhan, yang juga menunjukkan tahap 
keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit, dikaitkan dengan kualiti laporan kewangan, dan (3) 
untuk mengkaji pengaruh kawalan keluarga pada persatuan antara keberkesanan 
jawatankuasa audit dan kualiti laporan kewangan.  
 
Kajian ini memberi tumpuan kepada satu mekanisme tadbir urus korporat Anglo-
Amerika yang telah dinaikkan pangkat secara aktif di Indonesia, iaitu jawatankuasa 
audit. Objektif kajian ini adalah tiga kali ganda: (1) untuk memeriksa hubungan antara 
syarikat-syarikat tersenarai awam dengan ciri-ciri perniagaan tertentu (iaitu kawalan 
keluarga, politik yang berkaitan, pemilikan asing) dan tahap pematuhan syarikat-
syarikat tersebut dengan peraturan jawatankuasa audit; (2) untuk mengkaji sama ada 
pematuhan, yang juga menunjukkan tahap keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit, dikaitkan 
dengan penyataan semula penyata kewangan, dan; (3) untuk mengkaji pengaruh 
kawalan keluarga pada hubungan antara keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit dan 
penyataan semula penyata kewangan.  
 
Kajian ini terbahagi kepada dua peringkat penyelidikan saling berkaitan: satu kajian ke 
atas penentu pematuhan syarikat awam tersenarai dengan peraturan jawatankuasa audit 
(peringkat kajian 1), dan kajian mengenai hubungan antara keberkesanan jawatankuasa 
audit dan penyataan semula penyata kewangan (peringkat kajian 2 ). Peringkat kajian 1 
menggunakan data panel pendek yang seimbang, secara total, meliputi 828 syarikat-
syarikat tahun pemerhatian bagi tempoh 2006-2008. Kaedah kajian yang digunakan 
adalah kuasa dua umum terkecil (FGLS), kerana terdapatnya heteroskedasticity dan 
autokorelasi di dalam data. Sementara itu, peringkat kajian 2 menggunakan cross 
sectional data, iaitu 158 syarikat menyatakan semula penyata kewangan untuk tempoh 
2006-2012 dipadankan dengan 158 syarikat kawalan dalam tempoh yang sama. Kaedah 
analisis menggunakan pasangan padanan regresi logistik (matched pair logistic 
regression). 
 
Keputusan peringkat kajian 1 menunjukkan bahawa jenis kawalan keluarga yang 
berbeza mempunyai kesan yang berbeza pada tahap pematuhan syarikat tersenarai 
awam dengan peraturan jawatankuasa audit. Syarikat yang dikuasai keluarga dengan 
ahli keluarga di dewan pengarah kurang cenderung untuk mematuhi peraturan 
jawatankuasa audit. Sebaliknya, syarikat yang dikuasai melalui pegangan keluarga 
tetapi tanpa penglibatan keluarga dalam aktiviti perniagaan harian mereka lebih 
cenderung untuk mematuhi peraturan jawatankuasa audit. Selain itu, syarikat-syarikat 
 v 
tersenarai awam dengan pesuruhjaya bebas berkaitan politik kurang cenderung untuk 
mematuhi peraturan jawatankuasa audit. Seperti yang dijangka, syarikat-syarikat 
tersenarai awam dengan pelabur institusi asing tulen besar lebih cenderung untuk 
mematuhi peraturan jawatankuasa audit. Sementara itu, keputusan peringkat kajian 2 
menunjukkan bahawa keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit tidak memunyai perkaitan yang 
signifikan dengan penyataan semula penyata kewangan. Ini bermakna bahawa 
kehadiran jawatankuasa audit mungkin hanya kosmetik atau simbolik. Walau 
bagaimanapun, penggunaan penyataan semula penyata keuangan sebagai proksi kualiti 
laporan kewangan mungkin menyumbang kepada ketidaksetaraan kepada keberkesanan 
jawatankuasa audit kerana proksi ini mungkin tidak sesuai dalam persekitaran Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This opening chapter provides a general overview of this study. It begins with a 
discussion of the study‟s research background in Section 1.2, highlighting the 
ineffectiveness of corporate governance reforms in Indonesia. The weak enforcement of 
corporate governance reforms in the country emphasizes the importance of the issue of 
compliance. In addition, the section also focuses on the key Indonesian business 
characteristics that might be perceived as obstacles to corporate governance reform in 
the country. This leads to a brief discussion of research gaps in the existing literature. 
Section 1.3 begins with an explanation of the reasons for selecting compliance with 
audit committee rules as the main research focus. This is followed by a discussion on 
the use of restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality. The section ends with 
the presentation of the research problems. Section 1.4 presents the study‟s research 
objectives. In Section 1.5, five research questions are identified, based on the 
Indonesian business environment and gaps in the existing literature. Section 1.6 presents 
the study‟s research methodology and research process. This is followed by Section 1.7, 
which presents some important contributions of this study to the existing literature. The 
chapter ends with a description of the organisation of the contents of the remaining 
chapters.    
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
International donors, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, actively promote the Anglo-American corporate governance model to East Asian 
countries. The introduction of the Anglo-American model is part of their global agenda, 
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which seeks the liberalisation of the financial markets in developing countries as stated 
in the Washington Consensus
1
. The Washington Consensus prescribes market 
deregulation, fiscal austerity and privatisation in developing countries (Robinson and 
Hadiz, 2004), while corporate governance reform is included as one of the policies in 
the augmented Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2001). The goals of the corporate 
governance reforms are to ensure that emerging markets adhere to the principles of a 
neoliberal open market economy, and to protect the interests of institutional investors 
based on market-centric systems such as those in the US (Soederberg, 2003). The 
policies in the Washington Consensus are imposed on governments in developing 
countries across the world through loan agreements offered by the IMF and the World 
Bank (Hooper, 2002).   
 
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 provided a conduit for the IMF and the 
World Bank to promote the Anglo-American corporate governance agenda. Some 
characteristics of the Asian business environment, such as poor corporate governance, 
high concentrated ownership with control in the hands of families, and close 
relationships between government and business (cronyism), were blamed as being the 
root problems of the crisis (Singh and Zammit, 2006). In response to the crisis, the IMF 
advised affected countries to reform their corporate governance landscape. The IMF 
prescribed the Anglo-American model as a solution, as it is believed to have a superior 
ability to efficiently allocate resources and monitor corporate behaviour (Singh and 
Zammit, 2006; Sam, 2007). Corporate governance reform was one prerequisite for 
affected countries in East Asia to be able to access the assistance provided by the IMF 
and the World Bank. Consequently, several crisis-affected countries such as South 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia commenced the structural reform of their corporate 
                                                 
1
 The Washington Consensus is a term referring to economic policies implemented in developing 
countries. The term was invented by John Williamson (Robinson and Hadiz, 2004). 
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governance systems with the assistance of the IMF, the World Bank, and other 
international donors, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In short, the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 served as a means for the spread of the Anglo-
American corporate governance model into Asian countries (Loftus and Purcell, 2008). 
 
Indonesia, which was more severely impacted than other crisis-affected countries, 
implemented corporate governance reforms guided by the IMF. As stated in the Letter 
of Intent (IMF, 2000), the IMF mandated certain policy actions in corporate governance 
reform for Indonesia. These included the establishment of a national committee for 
corporate governance, the adoption of corporate governance reform strategies, 
amendments of company law, improvements in accountability and disclosure, and 
improvements to regulatory oversight and enforcement. As an integral part of the IMF-
led multi-donor rescue package, the ADB also provided a loan to help restructure the 
banking sector and improve financial and public sector allocation of resources by 
strengthening governance, increasing disclosure and transparency of financial 
information, and reinforcing the financial sector's legal and regulatory framework (ADB, 
2006). 
 
There were concerns about the implementation of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model in Indonesia. Scholars argued in academic literature that the 
corporate governance reforms in Indonesia were ineffective. For example, Patrick 
(2001) argued that Indonesia already had quite good prudential and other laws and 
regulations but lacked effective implementation. Similarly, Lindsey (2004) argued that 
Indonesian corporate governance reform lacked coordination and effective 
implementation.  Dercon (2007) claimed that the efforts of Indonesia to promote good 
corporate governance by giving much attention to issues such as creating committees 
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for corporate governance, publishing national and sector codes, amending and enacting 
numerous law or rules, seemed ineffective. 
 
Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of corporate governance reform in Indonesia 
was noticeable from the low ranking of Indonesia in most surveys of corporate 
governance implementation in Asia conducted by international organizations. For 
example, surveys conducted by independent brokerage and investment group Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), in cooperation with the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (ACGA), consistently placed Indonesia in the bottom rank. The criteria to 
evaluate the quality of corporate governance included corporate governance rules and 
practices, enforcement, the political and regulatory environment, accounting and 
auditing standards, as well as the overall corporate governance culture. These surveys 
were conducted on eleven countries in Asia, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, India, 
Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Philippines, and Indonesia. Among 
the 11 countries surveyed, Indonesia has continuously occupied the bottom place since 
2003. A slight improvement occurred in 2010 when the Indonesian corporate 
governance quality score increased by three points (CLSA, 2010) and Indonesia was 
placed ahead of the Philippines. However, the enforcement aspect remained the worst 
amongst all elements. This meant that Indonesia was quite good in terms of rules or 
standards, but lacked effective implementation. This finding is consistent with the view 
of some scholars regarding the ineffectiveness of corporate governance reform in 
Indonesia. 
 
In addition to the IMF, the World Bank also concluded that corporate governance 
implementation in Indonesia lagged behind other countries in Asia and the South 
Pacific Region (World Bank, 2010). The World Bank and the IMF assessed the 
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compliance of the Indonesian corporate governance framework against the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance under the Reports on Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC) Financial Services Assessment Program (World Bank, 2010). Two 
assessments were done in Indonesia, in 2004 and in 2010. The results indicated that, in 
some respects, the Indonesian corporate governance framework was not substantially 
different from the OECD principles. In addition, Indonesia‟s score in 2010 improved 
from the ROSC carried out in 2004, and it closed with the regional pacesetters –
particularly Malaysia, Thailand and India (World Bank, 2010). However, the adherence 
to corporate governance regulations remained a problem; this is consistent with the 
2010 CLSA survey.  
 
As discussed above, the corporate governance reform initiative in Indonesia is an 
example of the transplantation of the Anglo-American model. The Indonesian 
government has introduced a range of corporate governance reforms aimed at 
implementing the Anglo-American model, however the reforms have not produced 
satisfactory progress as there have been serious problems in their implementation. 
Therefore, this study examines the factors that influence the compliance of companies 
with corporate governance regulations in Indonesia, and whether the implementation of 
the corporate governance mechanism has produced desired results.   
 
Scholars in finance and accounting argue that specific characteristics of the Indonesian 
business environment are not appropriate for the implementation of the Anglo-
American corporate governance model. The Anglo-American corporate governance 
model is a market-based system with characteristics such as dispersed ownership, 
transparent disclosure, strong shareholder rights, highly liquid capital markets, active 
takeover markets and well-developed legal infrastructure (Khan, 1999). In contrast, the 
 6 
business system in Indonesia is relationship-based (guanxi), with commercial activities 
dominated by overseas Chinese and Chinese families (Daniel, 2003). The relationship-
based system is associated with highly personal networks, cronyism, high concentrated 
family ownership and special relationships between the family business and political 
power (Daniel, 2003; Dieleman and Sachs, 2006). Politician-bureaucrats and families 
tend to block or subvert corporate governance reform as it might expose the special 
relationship between families (as owners of the domestic conglomerates) and the 
politician-bureaucrats (Rosser, 2005).  
 
The effect of the specific Indonesian business environment (i.e., family control, 
collusion between politician-bureaucrats and owners of the domestic conglomerates, 
and with foreign investors) on compliance with corporate governance regulations has 
not been widely examined in prior studies. The main reason is that most of these prior 
corporate governance studies employed agency theory (DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault, and Reed, 2002; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Bédard and Gendron, 2010). 
The use of the agency theory as the main theory in corporate governance studies has 
resulted in such studies focussing solely on the agency problems between shareholders 
and management. Most prior studies examined some factors related to agency costs (e.g., 
agency cost of equity, agency cost of debt) and board characteristics (Piot, 2004).  In 
fact, the agency problem in a developing country in Asia is different from that in a 
developed country as the agency problem in a developing country occurs between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders; it is a type 2 agency problem 
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Jiang, 2008; Jaggi, Leung, and Gul, 2009; Chen, 
Li, and Shapiro, 2011). In addition, corporate governance practice, which consists of 
interrelated mechanisms, is also affected by various actors (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, 
and Wright, 2004). As a result, the pertinent institutional factors in emerging economies 
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(family control, foreign ownership and collusion between businesses and politicians) 
have been ignored in prior studies.   
 
In recent literature, several scholars (e.g., Filatotchev, 2007; Aguilera, Filatotchev, 
Gospel, and Jackson, 2008; Ahrens, Filatotchev, and Thomsen, 2011) advocate that 
corporate governance research needs to employ an “open system” approach that enables 
an examination of the interdependence between the organisational environment and 
corporate governance practice. The use of this approach overcomes the inability of the 
agency theory to accurately compare and explain the diversity of the corporate 
governance arrangements across different institutional settings (Aguilera et al., 2008).  
In addition, other scholars (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and 
Wright, 2008; Bédard, and Gendron, 2010) argue the need for corporate governance 
studies to employ multiple theories, such as institutional theory, resource dependence 
theory and managerial hegemony. The use of multiple theories will provide a useful 
basis for reconciliation of the conflicting findings in the existing agency-based 
corporate governance studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Ahrens et al., 2011).   
 
Drawing from the above discussion, it is clear that a research gap exists with respect to 
examining the impact of specific business characteristics (i.e., family control, foreign 
ownership, and collusion between businesses and politicians) on compliance with 
corporate governance regulations in Indonesia by using multiple theories and examining 
the interaction of corporate governance practices and specific business characteristics. 
The research questions and research objectives are presented in the next sections. 
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1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM  
The audit committee is among the Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms 
introduced in Indonesia. The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of 
directors, is comprised mainly or wholly of non-executive or independent directors, and 
has responsibility for the oversight of financial reporting and auditing activities (Spira, 
1999; Collier and Zaman, 2005). The board of directors delegates these oversight duties 
to the audit committee.  
 
The audit committee has been widely accepted in many countries as a common 
mechanism of corporate governance. The first concept of an audit committee was 
introduced by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1940 as a response to the 
McKensson & Robbins scandal (Joshi and Wakil, 2004). In a further development, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) urged listed companies to establish audit 
committees to protect investors (Collier, 1996). Some corporate governance reforms, 
such as the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999) recommendations and Sarbanes-
Oxley Act or SOX (2002), strengthened the roles and responsibilities of the audit 
committee in public-listed companies. At present, several professional and regulatory 
committees have recommended the adoption of audit committee structures and have 
advocated expanding audit committee roles (Turley and Zaman, 2004). However, the 
implementation of audit committees in Indonesia is relatively new, having only started 
in 2000. This clearly lags behind other countries such as Malaysia, which implemented 
such requirements as early as 1993 (Kuppusamy, Nazim, and Shanmugam, 2003).   
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To strengthen the implementation of the audit committee in Indonesia, the BAPEPAM-
LK
2
 issued two rules related to audit committees: guidelines for audit committee 
formation (BAPEPAM, 2004), and disclosure of audit committee membership and 
activities (BAPEPAM-LK, 2006). However, there is limited evidence concerning the 
extent of the compliance of public listed companies with these rules and the 
effectiveness of their audit committees. The audit committee is an Anglo American 
corporate governance mechanism, which has been widely adopted in Western countries 
such as the US and the UK. Indonesia, however, has specific business characteristics 
(i.e., family control, foreign ownership, and collusion between businesses and 
politicians) that are different from those of Western countries. As discussed in the above 
section, the specific business environment might serve as an obstacle to the 
implementation of the audit committee. Corporate governance mechanisms are not seen 
as being universally applicable, but they become effective in particular combinations of 
institutional and business settings (Jensen, 1993; Davis and Useem, 2002; Filatotchev, 
2007). Each public listed company might have a different bundle of corporate 
governance mechanisms that is systematically dependent on institutional factors. In the 
adoption of the Anglo-American corporate governance model, public listed companies 
in Indonesia might consider the cost-benefit of the new mechanism and its interaction 
with the existing mechanism. Hence, it might be possible that the level of compliance of 
public listed companies with audit committees is varied. In addition, as stated by some 
scholars, the establishment of an audit committee might be perceived to be more for 
cosmetic purposes, in order to project a positive image rather than to actually monitor 
firm activity (Spira, 1998; Cohen et al., 2004; Haron, Jantan, and Pheng, 2005). 
Therefore, it is possible that the compliance of Indonesian public listed companies with 
audit committee rules in the early period of implementation (which is documented in 
                                                 
2
 BAPEPAM merged with the Directorate General of Financial Institutions into a single unit, namely, 
BAPEPAM-LK in 2005. The abbreviation BAPEPAM will be used in this study for events before 2005, 
whereas BAPEPAM-LK will be used for events from 2005 and onwards.  
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formal company documents such as annual reports) either does not reflect the real 
practice, or is just symbolic. Thus, public listed companies in Indonesia might establish 
audit committees solely to comply with BAPEPAM-LK rules.  
  
In the extant literature, most prior studies on compliance with audit committee rules and 
its determinants have been undertaken by researchers in voluntary regimes such as the 
UK, Australia and New Zealand, whereas prior studies in mandatory regimes such as 
Indonesia are rare. In general, scholars in mandatory regimes such as the US are not 
interested in examining the determinants of compliance as law enforcement in the US is 
strong and results in a high level of compliance (see Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal, 
2002; Pandit, Subrahmanyam, and Conway, 2005). As such, researchers in the US are 
concerned with examining voluntary audit committee attributes rather than mandatory 
requirements. Notwithstanding, a study concerning the determinants of compliance in a 
mandatory regime is important for emerging economies such as Indonesia where legal 
enforcement is weak, and where specific business characteristics may possibly influence 
compliance.  
 
In the extant literature, there are also limited prior studies that simultaneously examine 
the factors affecting compliance and its association with accounting outcomes such as 
financial reporting quality. The study done by Braiotta and Zhou (2008) is the only one 
that is fairly similar to this study. The study simultaneously examines determinants of 
firms‟ compliance with the European Union‟s 8th Directive on Company Law, and the 
impact of compliance on financial reporting quality. The level of compliance is 
indicated by the changes in the number of audit committee members or the replacement 
of an audit committee member with another member to satisfy regulatory requirements. 
In other words, Braiotta and Zhou (2008) focus on whether a firm aligns the 
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membership of its audit committee to meet the requirements. In addition, they examine 
determinants of compliance that are mostly based on agency theory, such as the 
proportion of independent directors, the financial expertise of audit committee members 
and leverage. In terms of the impact of compliance on financial reporting quality, they 
use earnings management as a proxy. The present study differs from Braiotta and Zhou 
(2008) in three aspects. First, the compliance level of companies in this study is 
indicated by an audit committee index that consists of several audit committee attributes, 
namely, membership, job duties, and disclosure. Second, this study focuses on 
determinants of compliance that have not been widely examined by prior studies and 
that are relevant to the Indonesian business environment. These include family control, 
foreign ownership, and collusion between businesses and politicians. Third, this study 
employs restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality. Thus, this study extends 
Braiotta and Zhou (2008) to simultaneously examine the determinants of compliance 
with audit committee rules, and the effects of compliance on financial reporting quality.  
 
This study selects restatement as a proxy for financial reporting quality. There are four 
key considerations underlying the selection of this proxy. First, only a limited number 
of studies in developing countries use restatements as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality (see Abdullah, Yusof, and Nor, 2010; Zhizhong, Juan, Yanzhi, and Wenli, 2011), 
whereas restatements are a popular proxy in the US. In fact, restatements occur not only 
in developed countries such as the US, but also in developing countries such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Second, compared to earnings management, restatements are a 
more valid proxy, as restatements are actual events that indicate a visible form of   
impaired financial reporting quality (Cao, Myers, and Omer, 2010; DeFond, 2010). In 
addition, restatements are categorised as demonstrating very low financial reporting 
quality, lower than the quality demonstrated by earnings management (Pomeroy and 
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Thornton, 2008).  Third, most members of audit committees in Indonesia usually state 
that their duty is to review the financial statements issued by the company (see Table 
6.1 in Chapter 6). However, in ASEAN countries, the role of the audit committee as 
stated in the annual report needs to be verified, as corporate governance information 
presented in the documents of public listed companies often does not reflect actual 
practice (Chuanrommanee and Swierczek, 2007). Hence, restatements provide a means 
to check whether audit committees have performed their roles as stated in the annual 
reports because restatements are actual events that indicate a visible form of impaired 
financial reporting quality.   
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
Based on the above discussion of the problem statement, the objectives of this study are 
as follows: 
a. To examine the association between public listed companies with specific 
business characteristics (namely family control, politically connected 
independent commissioners, and foreign institutional investors) and the level of 
compliance of these companies with audit committee rules. 
b. To examine whether the compliance, which also indicates the level of audit 
committee effectiveness, is associated with restatements of financial statements.   
c. To examine the influence of family control on the association between audit 
committee effectiveness and restatements of financial statements.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study addresses five research questions. The research questions were developed 
based on gaps in the extant literature, and on specific Indonesian business 
characteristics.  
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Different types of family control 
Most Indonesian companies have high concentrated ownership with ultimate control in 
the hands of families that own business groups (Husnan, 2001; Achmad, Rusmin, 
Neilson, and Tower, 2009; Rusmin, Tower, Achmad, and Neilson, 2011). The families 
hold the control of companies by owning the majority percentage of outstanding shares. 
Besides using ownership, families retain control of companies through management: 
family members are often members of the board of directors, act as board 
commissioners, or both. The head of the board of commissioners often represents the 
controlling party of the company, or someone very close to the controlling shareholders 
(Husnan, 2001, Hanani, 2005).   
 
The presence of family members on boards might serve as an effective mechanism to 
reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The combination of control and ownership in 
the hands of a family aligns the interests of shareholders and management, thus 
decreasing agency problems that arise as a result of conflict between the managers and 
shareholders (this is a type 1 agency cost). This is in line with the convergence-interest 
hypothesis proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Consequently, family-controlled 
companies might be less concerned with the implementation of Anglo-American 
corporate governance mechanisms such as board independence and the audit committee, 
which are basically intended to solve the type 1 agency cost. It has been evidenced that 
family control weakens the effectiveness of Anglo-American corporate governance 
mechanisms (Chau and Leung, 2006; Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Rusmin et al., 2011).    
 
Most family-controlled companies in Indonesia do not have a separation between 
ownership and control. However, some large business groups (conglomerates), such as 
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the Salim group, separated ownership and control in many of their subsidiaries after the 
East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (Hanani, 2005). This business group hires 
professional executives who are non-family members, to be members of the board of 
directors, members of the board of commissioners, and to run their subsidiaries. The 
appointment of non-family executives might increase potential agency costs, as their 
appointment causes a separation of the owner from the management that is one driver of 
agency costs (Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma, 2003). Prior studies have examined 
whether the presence of family control and the absence of family ownership (e.g., 
Kabbach De Castro and Crespi Cladera, 2011) or different levels of family ownership 
(e.g., Chau and Leung, 2006) impact corporate governance. The effect of this type of 
family control on compliance with audit committee rules and other corporate 
governance regulations has not been covered by prior studies. Thus, this study proposes 
the following research question: 
RQ1: Do family-controlled public listed companies with family members on the boards, 
and family-controlled public listed companies with professional management 
have a different effect on the compliance of the company with audit committee 
rules? 
 
Collusion between businesses and the political elite  
Another business characteristic that is common in Indonesia is collusion between big 
businesses (conglomerates) and the political elite (Husnan, 2001). The controlling 
shareholders maintain a special relationship with elite politicians in order to get some 
kind of protection or special treatment (Husnan, 2001). To maintain the special 
relationship, controlling family shareholders often give small portions of free shares to 
politicians or retired bureaucrats. Another method is by appointing such individuals to 
the board of directors or board of commissioners. These are known in the literature as 
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politically connected directors (Chen, Fan, and Wong, 2006; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 
2007).  In Indonesia, some public listed companies appoint politicians or current/retired 
bureaucrats as independent commissioners (Zaini, 2002). The presence of such 
politically connected independent commissioners, which is more pronounced in East 
Asian companies than in Western companies, is in line with the resource dependence 
theory (Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Chan, 2001). The politically connected 
independent commissioner may be a means of providing the company with a special 
relationship with elite politicians in order to get some kind of protection or special 
treatment (Husnan, 2001). 
 
The collusion between businesses and politician-bureaucrats tends to block or subvert 
corporate governance reform, as reform might expose the special relationship between 
families as owners of the domestic conglomerates, and the politician-bureaucrats 
(Rosser, 2005). Corporate governance reform may be threatening to some segments of 
business as it has the potential to expose the existence of collusion, corruption, and 
nepotism within family and politician-bureaucrat dominated companies. In addition, 
based on the agency theory, a politically connected independent commissioner might 
not perform his oversight duty effectively, since most often lack the prerequisite skills, 
experience, and education required to be an independent commissioner and chairman of 
the audit committee. Hence, this study proposes the following research question: 
RQ2: Does the presence of politically connected independent commissioner on the 
board of a public listed company affect the company‟s compliance with audit 
committee rules? 
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Foreign institutional investors 
Foreign institutional investors have been shown to play a role in improving corporate 
governance in emerging economies (Anderson, Jandik, and Makhija, 2001; Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Ananchotikul, 2006). The presence of foreign institutional 
investors might lead to changes in management and corporate governance practices 
within companies in emerging economies through the imposition of their own company 
policies, internal reporting systems and principles of information disclosure (OECD, 
2002). International financial institutions (i.e., the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB) 
and Western governments support governance reforms as part of their agenda for the 
liberalisation of emerging markets, and to protect the interests of Western institutional 
investors (Soederberg, 2003). 
 
Subsequent to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, family ownership is still 
dominant, although the number of shares owned by foreign investors is increasing. As 
evidence, foreign equity ownership of public listed companies on the IDX has steadily 
increased to more than 60 percent during the period 2004-2011 (BAPEPAM-LK, 2011). 
Caution needs to be exercised, however, in interpreting the increasing foreign 
ownership phenomenon because some of the foreign investors may actually be off-shore 
companies owned by Indonesians (World Bank, 2010).   
 
Prior studies have examined the effect of foreign institutional investors on compliance 
with the corporate governance code (i.e., Ananchotikul, 2006; Bianchi, Ciavarella, 
Novembre, and Signoretti, 2010). However, all such prior studies use the percentage of 
common shares held by foreign investors as a measure of foreign institutional 
ownership. This may not be appropriate considering the specific Indonesian business 
environment where foreign institutional investors might actually be Indonesian offshore 
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companies. Hence, the measurement must look at both the authenticity and the size of 
share ownership. Thus, this study proposes the following research question: 
RQ3: Do foreign institutional investor attributes (i.e., ownership size and authenticity) 
affect a public listed company‟s compliance with audit committee rules? 
 
Decoupling compliance from practice 
In addition to the issue of compliance, another important issue of corporate governance 
in the Indonesian context is whether companies decouple compliance from practice.  
Many have observed that corporate governance in emerging economies often resembles 
the same in developed countries but in form only and not in substance (see Peng, 2004; 
Chuanrommanee and Swierczek, 2007; Sam, 2007).  Hence, in this context, it is posited 
that Indonesian listed companies may exhibit a high level of compliance with audit 
committee rules solely to meet the requirements of the stock exchange, and that such a 
level of compliance presented in formal documents might not indicate actual practice. In 
other words, the presence of an audit committee is often only for cosmetic purposes 
(Cohen et al., 2004; Haron et al., 2005).  
 
To detect whether the establishment of the audit committee is for cosmetic purposes or 
not, this study examines the association between the compliance of the public listed 
company with audit committee rules, and financial reporting quality. As noted by some 
scholars (e.g., Klein 2002a; Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau 2004; Archambeault, 
DeZoort, and Hermanson, 2008), the role of the audit committee is to reduce agency 
costs by overseeing the financial reporting process. In other words, the audit committee 
can improve financial reporting quality by overseeing the financial reporting process 
(Bédard and Gendron, 2010). Thus, better financial reporting quality indicates higher 
audit committee effectiveness. Apart from that, strengthened financial reporting quality 
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is considered by the regulators as a desired effect of the audit committee (Bédard and 
Gendron, 2010).  Therefore, this study proposes the following research question:  
RQ4: Does the level of compliance with audit committee rules by public listed 
companies result in an effective audit committee, as indicated by a negative 
association with restatements of financial statements? 
 
Interaction of the audit committee 
Several scholars (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Bédard, and 
Gendron, 2010) argue that studies on audit committees need to explore the interaction 
of the audit committee with other corporate governance mechanisms, as opposed to 
simply examining the effect of each individual characteristic. This is because the 
effectiveness of corporate governance is dependent on the effectiveness of a bundle of 
corporate governance mechanisms rather than the effectiveness of one mechanism 
(Ward, Brown, and Rodriguez, 2009). As a result, the operation of a single or multiple 
corporate governance mechanisms is not isolated or independent of others: the 
mechanisms are interrelated and substitute or complement each other as a related 
“bundle” of practices. In the context of the environments of emerging economies, 
research on audit committee effectiveness needs to examine the interaction of audit 
committee attributes and certain corporate governance characteristics such as family 
ownership (Bédard and Gendron, 2010), since  this informal institution might play a 
greater role in shaping corporate governance than the formal Anglo-American 
mechanism (Young et al., 2008).  Therefore, the following research question is 
proposed: 
RQ5: Does family control affect the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and restatements of financial statements? 
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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study consists of two interrelated research stages. Research Stage 1 is a study of 
the determinants of a public listed company‟s compliance with audit committee rules, 
while Research Stage 2 is a study of the association between audit committee 
effectiveness (measured by compliance with audit committee rules) and restatements (as 
a proxy for financial reporting quality). The dependent variable in Research Stage 1, the  
audit committee compliance index, serves as one independent variable in Research 
Stage 2.   
 
This study is situated in the positivist paradigm (Chua, 1986). It starts with hypotheses 
development based on several underpinning theories (agency theory, a bundle of 
corporate governance theory, and institutional theory) for  Research Stage 1. Meanwhile, 
hypotheses development in Research Stage 2 is based on and agency theory and a 
bundle of corporate governance theory. Archival research is well suited for this study as 
both stages of research explore the issue of association. The study uses archival data 
from annual reports, company announcements to the IDX, the Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD) and other reliable sources. The study then employs the 
quantitative research approach to test the hypotheses. As each stage has different 
objectives, data types, and samples, the study employs a different method of data 
analysis in each stage. Research Stage 1 employs short balanced panel data that covers a 
total of 828 company-year observations for the period 2006-2008. The appropriate 
method of analysis for this type of data is panel data analysis. Meanwhile, Research 
Stage 2 utilises cross sectional data, namely, 158 restating companies for the period 
2006-2012 matched with 158 control companies for the same period. The method of 
analysis in this stage is matched pair logistic regression, which has been widely used by 
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prior studies on restatements. Furthermore, this study employs some sensitivity analyses 
in both stages to check the robustness of the results.  
 
This study examines the endogeneity issue in investigating both the determinants of a 
public listed company‟s compliance with audit committee rules, and the effect of such 
compliance on financial reporting quality. As advocated by some scholars (e.g., 
Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007; Van Lent, 2007; Wintoki, 
Linck, and Netter, 2007; Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2009; Carcello, Hermanson, and 
Ye, 2011a), research on corporate governance needs to give attention to the endogeneity 
issue. To date, only a few prior studies investigate endogeneity both in the study of    
compliance issues (see Rainsbury, Bradbury, and Cahan, 2008; Da Silveira, Leal, 
Carvalhal-da-Silva, and Barros, 2010) and the study of restatements (see Carcello, Neal, 
Palmrose, and Scholz, 2011b; Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorty, and Wright, 2011; Lisic, 
Neal, and Zhang, 2011).  
 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study makes several contributions to the extant corporate governance literature, 
namely: 
1. The study employs multiple theories (i.e., bundle of corporate governance theory 
and institutional theory) to complement agency theory. This enables the study to 
examine unique variables, such as family control, politically connected 
independent commissioners, and the authenticity of large foreign institutional 
investors that have not been tested by prior studies. Furthermore, the use of 
multiple theories also enables the reconciliation of conflicting findings in prior 
studies in examining the interrelation among corporate governance mechanisms 
(Turley and Zaman, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2008).  
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2. This study provides evidence that corporate governance mechanisms in the 
company are interrelated with each other and are affected by various actors, 
which is in line with the suggestions of some scholars (e.g., Turely and Zaman, 
2004; Cohen et al., 2008; Aguilera, Desender, and Kabbach de Castro, 2011).  
Furthermore, the study provides evidence that informal institutional features, 
such as family control, foreign institutional investors and business-political 
relationships, play a greater role in shaping corporate governance in the 
company when law enforcement is weak. 
 
3. The study provides evidence of the different effects of two types of family 
control on compliance: family-controlled companies with family members on 
the boards of directors, commissioners, or both, and family-controlled 
companies with professional management and no family members on the boards.   
In the extant literature, prior studies have either explored the effect of the 
presence of family control and absence of family ownership (e.g., Kabbach De 
Castro and Crespi Cladera, 2011), or have compared different levels of family 
ownership (e.g., Chau and Leung, 2006). The different effects of the two types 
of family control on corporate governance have not been examined by prior 
studies.   
 
1.8 CHAPTER ORGANISATION  
The remaining chapters are organised as follows:  
 
Chapter 2:  Corporate Governance Reforms in Indonesia  
 
This chapter discusses corporate governance reforms in Indonesia, including audit 
committee reforms and the obstacles and progress of the reforms. The chapter begins 
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with a general overview of corporate governance, including a definition, the mechanism, 
the model, the implementation approach of the code of corporate governance and the 
efforts and problems in the bringing the Anglo-American model to East Asian 
economies. The chapter then presents an overview of corporate governance reforms in 
Indonesia, covering Indonesian government initiatives ranging from the establishment 
of committees to the amendment of laws and regulations. The chapter ends with a 
presentation of both the obstacles to reform, and an update on the progress of 
implementation of the reforms. 
 
Chapter 3:  A Review and Synthesis of Extant Literature 
The chapter provides thorough discussions on the prior studies related to compliance 
with audit committee rules and its determinants, and prior studies focusing on the 
association between audit committee attributes and financial reporting quality. The 
discussions are followed by the identification of several research gaps. Research 
questions are then proposed based on the Indonesian corporate governance reform 
experience.   
 
Chapter 4: Research Framework and Hypotheses Development 
This chapter commences with the identification of the theories underpinning the study, 
namely, a bundle of corporate governance theory, agency theory, institutional theory, 
and resource dependence theory. This is followed by a discussion of the need for a 
comprehensive audit committee index, and the selection of restatements as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality. The chapter highlights the study‟s research framework, 
which is divided into two stages: determinants of a public listed company‟s compliance 
with audit committee rules (Research Stage 1), and the effect of such compliance on 
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restatements (Research Stage 2). The testable hypotheses for both research stages are 
developed in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
This chapter espouses the study‟s research paradigm and research method. In line with 
the research stage of the study, the presentation of the research method is also divided 
into two different sections, as each research stage employs different samples and 
methods of analysis. Therefore, discussion of the research method for each research 
stage includes details on sampling, method, variables measurements, source of data, and 
method of analysis.  
 
Chapter 6: Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents the study‟s results and discusses its findings. As there are two 
main issues in the study, the findings are presented in two main sections. The first 
presents the results of Research Stage 1, while the second presents the results of 
Research Stage 2. The presentation results of each research stage include descriptive 
statistics, multivariate statistics, and sensitivity analyses. As both research stages are 
interrelated, the presentation of the discussion of the results of both stages is placed in 
the same section.  
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The start of the chapter presents a summary of the study, including its key findings. This 
is followed by a discussion of the implications of the study for knowledge, investors, 
and policy makers in Indonesia. The chapter also discusses the study‟s limitations, as 
well as suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN INDONESIA  
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a discussion on corporate governance reforms in Indonesia. The 
chapter commences with an overview of corporate governance, including the definition 
of corporate governance, the corporate governance model, the approach to 
implementing corporate governance, and audit committees. Considering their relevance 
to this study, the issues and obstacles related to the implementation of the Anglo-
American corporate governance model in East Asia are also discussed in the chapter. 
This is followed by a discussion of corporate governance reform in Indonesia that 
encompasses key initiatives undertaken by the Indonesian government. One of these 
includes the establishment of committees to oversee the amendments of laws and 
regulations. The next section discusses audit committee reforms and their comparison 
with international rules. The end of the chapter discusses the obstacles to the 
implementation of such reforms, along with the progress of corporate governance 
reform that provides the motivation for this study.  The chapter ends with a conclusion.    
 
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OVERVIEW 
The need for corporate governance arises from the existence of agency problems in 
modern companies, as well as incomplete contracts between principals (controlling 
shareholders) and management (Hart, 1995). Modern publicly traded companies are 
characterised by the separation of ownership and control. This separation leads to 
various manifestations of the agency problem in which parties in possession of control 
over a firm (i.e., CEOs), can extract private benefits of control at the expense of firm 
value accruing to shareholders (Li and Broshko, 2006). In other words, shareholders and 
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managers have different interests and objectives: shareholders want to maximise the 
return on their investment, while managers with discretion in managing companies may 
be more interested in building empires. This is called the agency problem, and it occurs 
not only between shareholders and managers, but also between shareholders and 
creditors, and controlling and minority shareholders (Zhuang, 1999). Thus, corporate 
governance can be expected to reduce agency problems among shareholders, and 
between managers and shareholders by limiting private benefits and expropriation by 
controlling owners (Bruno and Claessens, 2010). However, the agency problem alone 
does not provide sufficient justification for corporate governance (Hart, 1995). The 
standard principle-agent model supposes that it is costly to write a complete contract. 
However, in practice, contracting costs may be large as many transaction costs need to 
be included (Hart, 1995). That is why the parties will not write comprehensive contracts. 
The existence of an incomplete contract requires a governance mechanism to deal with 
decision making for matters that have not been specified in the contract.  
 
2.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance  
There is no consensus about the boundaries of the subject of corporate governance in 
the literature (Babic, 2003). Depending on one‟s view of the world, there are many 
definitions of corporate governance (Gillan, 2006), with different authors/institutions 
providing definitions based on their own perspective (Babic, 2003).  Claessens (2006) 
separates corporate governance definitions into two categories. The first category 
includes definitions of corporate governance that are concerned with a set of 
behavioural patterns. It includes issues such as how the board of directors operates, the 
role of executive compensation in determining firm performance, the relationship 
between labour policies and firm performance, and the role of multiple shareholders. An 
example of this definition is provided by Pass (2006), who defines corporate 
 26 
governance as that which deals with the duties and responsibilities of a company‟s 
board of directors in managing the company and its relationships with the company‟s 
shareholders and stakeholders. Similarly, the OECD (2004) defines corporate 
governance as the way in which boards oversee the running of a company by its 
managers, and how board members are in turn accountable to shareholders and the 
company. This first category of definitions is appropriate for studies of single countries 
or firms within a country (Claessens, 2006). Meanwhile, the second category of 
corporate governance definitions is concerned with the regulatory framework, such as 
the rules under which firms operate, and the rules coming from sources such as the legal 
system, the judicial system, and financial and labour markets. For example, Weimer and 
Pape (1999) define corporate governance as a country-specific framework of legal, 
institutional and cultural factors shaping the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert 
on managerial decision making. Similarly, the Cadbury Committee (1992) defines 
corporate governance as a set of rules that define the relationship between shareholders, 
managers, creditors, the government, employees and other internal and external 
stakeholders in respect of their rights and responsibilities, or the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled. This second category of definitions is more 
appropriate for comparative studies. 
 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance Models 
Most corporate governance discussions focus on two dichotomous corporate 
governance models: the Anglo-American model, and the Continental European model 
(Khan, 1999; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The Anglo-American model is also known 
as the “shareholder” system, the market-outsider system, or stock-market capitalism, as 
it prioritises the equity market (Weimer and Pape, 1999). The model was developed 
with the belief that self-interest and decentralised markets can function in a self-
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regulated and balanced manner (Cernat, 2004). In other words, the Anglo-American 
model is shaped by the idea that the capital market is a market for corporate control 
(Koslowski, 2009). The Anglo-American model is found in countries such as the US 
and the UK, where ownership and debt are dispersed. Meanwhile, the Continental 
European model is also labelled as the relational-insider system, the stakeholder system, 
or the bank-led governance system (Khan, 1999; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The 
Continental European model is based on the participation of stakeholder groups in 
corporate governance through representation on advisory boards (Koslowski, 2009). 
This model prevails in Germany, Japan and some other countries. However, after the 
East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, there is interest in other corporate governance 
models for East Asia, especially the family-based corporate governance model (Khan, 
1999). This model recognises the existence of family-based firms that operate in a 
relationship-based system (Khan, 1999). 
 
These three corporate governance models have different characteristics. As depicted in 
Table 2.1, Khan (1999) presents the differences among the three corporate governance 
models. This is an extension of Berglof‟s work (1997) that only presents the differences 
between the Anglo-American model and the German-Japanese model. The main 
characteristic of family-based governance is high concentrated ownership and control 
by the family. The dominant control by the family has implications for corporate 
funding sources and shareholder protection, as family-controlled companies tend to 
finance the company using internal resources. However, external sources of finance, 
such as banks, will be used if internal resources are insufficient. As a result, the equity 
market is often small and illiquid. In addition, shareholder protection is also not a major 
concern, and the market does not serve as a corporate control mechanism. In contrast, 
the Anglo-American model emphasises the protection of shareholder value, promotes a 
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liquid equity market, and finds more dispersed ownership. The family-based 
governance model shares several similarities with the German-Japanese model. In both 
models, ownership is concentrated, shareholder protection is weak, and the equity 
market is relatively illiquid. The difference is that banks and large families are 
important in the German-Japanese governance model. The family-based governance 
model is also slightly similar to the Latin corporate governance model proposed by 
Weimer and Pape (1999). The Latin governance model, as practised by France and Italy, 
is a variant of the German model, with dominant holdings by the state, families, or 
industrial groups (Rama, 2007). 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Corporate Governance Systems 
 
 Type of corporate governance system 
 Equity Market Based 
System (EMS) 
Bank-Led System (BLS) Family-Based System (FBS) 
Share of control-oriented 
finance 
Low High High initially, but may vary as family 
groups get bank and equity financing 
from outside 
Equity markets Large, highly liquid Not necessarily small, but less 
liquid than EMS 
Small, less liquid 
Share of all firms listed on 
exchanges 
Large Not necessarily small Usually small 
Ownership of debt and equity Dispersed Concentrated Concentrated 
Investor orientation Portfolio-oriented Control-oriented Control-oriented for family groups 
Shareholder rights Strong Weak Weak for outsiders 
Creditor rights Strong Strong for close creditors but 
applied according to a 
“contingent governance 
structure” (Aoki) 
Strong for close creditors; 
Weak for arm‟s length creditors 
Dominant agency conflict Shareholders vs. 
Management 
Banks vs. management; workers 
may be important stakeholders as in 
Aoki‟s model of the Japanese firm 
Controlling vs. minority investors 
Role of the board of directors Important Limited, but less so than in the 
case of FBS 
Limited 
Role of hostile takeovers Potentially important Quite limited Almost absent 
Role of insolvency/bankruptcy Potentially important Potentially important, but possible 
systemic crisis may postpone 
bankruptcies 
Potentially important 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
 Type of corporate governance system 
 Equity Market Based 
System (EMS) 
Bank-Led System (BLS) Family-Based System (FBS) 
Monitoring of non-financial 
enterprises (NFE) 
  Information asymmetry and agency 
costs rise with the growth of firms, 
making monitoring more costly 
Self-monitoring   Initially, self-monitoring is effective 
because of non-separation of owner 
and management. Later stages present 
monitoring problems as agency costs 
rise due to separation of owner-
managers and outside financiers 
  
Source: Adapted from Khan (1999).  
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2.2.3 Approach to the Implementation of Corporate Governance Regulations  
Having corporate governance rules in itself is insufficient: the rules must be 
implemented effectively. In general, there are three approaches to the implementation of 
corporate governance regulations: voluntary, mandatory, and comply and explain 
(Anand, 2005). The voluntary approach refers to the adoption of corporate governance 
practices or standards in the absence of a legal requirement to do so. In contrast, the 
mandatory approach – also known as the rules-based approach – requires listed 
companies to comply with stringent corporate governance legislation. This mandatory 
approach prescribes a certain set of sound corporate governance practices, and imposes 
penalties for non-compliance. It follows the “one size fits all” assumption and allows 
the state to establish minimum standards to which companies must adhere (Anand, 
2005; Li and Broshko, 2006; Zadkovich, 2007). The “comply and explain” approach is 
considered partially mandatory (Anand, 2005). This approach is well known as a 
principles-based approach, and it allows companies the choice to comply with certain 
provisions. Companies are, however, required to state how they have applied the 
principles and to explain the reason(s) for non-compliance (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). In other words, this approach is characterised by a company‟s voluntary 
compliance with the code provisions, and mandatory disclosure as to whether it is 
complying with the code; if the company is not complying, it must explain why (Arcot 
and Bruno, 2007). 
 
There are two underlying considerations under the “comply and explain” approach, 
namely, flexibility, and the role of the capital market in assessing the adequacy of a 
company‟s corporate governance practices (MacNeil and Li, 2006). Flexibility is based 
on the judgment that it is impossible to adopt “one size fits all” that requires all listed 
companies to adopt all provisions in the corporate governance code. The level of 
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compliance with the corporate governance code varies depending on company 
characteristics such as size and ownership structure (Anand, 2005). Meanwhile, the role 
of the market in monitoring compliance assumes that the market has a mechanism to 
penalise non-compliance through a lowering of share prices, or that it can accept non-
compliance (which may be justified considering the circumstances). The investors serve 
as judges of the effectiveness of a firm‟s corporate governance policies (Li and Broshko, 
2006). However, this underlying assumption places the onus on the investors (who are 
often uninformed and maintain small investment positions) to decide whether a firm‟s 
corporate governance policies are sufficient (Li and Broshko, 2006). 
 
Table 2.2 provides a snapshot of the implementation of the three approaches in several 
countries. The “comply and explain” approach seems to be the most popular in 
implementing corporate governance codes. Although, this approach was first adopted in 
the UK, it has been widely adopted by most Commonwealth countries. In contrast, the 
mandatory approach has been adopted by relatively few countries, such as Philippines, 
the US, and Vietnam. In the US, a well-known example of regulation – other than 
through a corporate governance code – is the SOX (2002), which was enacted to 
respond to some corporate failures. Both local and foreign companies must comply with 
the SOX (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The philosophy of the SOX is that 
corporate governance needs stringent regulatory oversight rather than market or 
corporate self-regulation (MacNeil and Li, 2006). However, the mandatory approach of 
the SOX is criticised by some scholars, as compliance with it might be costly for small 
companies (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Zhang, 2007; Smith, 2007). Costs might 
arise for a company from monitoring and assessing its own practices, implementing new 
governance structures, producing disclosures and reports, and distributing disclosure 
information (Zadkovich, 2007). As a result, the number of small companies with high 
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inside ownership going private has been higher in the post-SOX period compared to the 
pre-SOX period (Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 2007). Meanwhile, the number of countries 
adopting the voluntary approach is relatively high compared to those adopting the 
“comply and explain” approach. Indonesia is included in the group of countries that has 
adopted the voluntary approach for implementation of its code of corporate governance.  
 
Table 2.2 Approach to Corporate Governance Code Implementation  
 
Voluntary Comply and Explain Mandatory 
Belgium Australia Philippines 
Brazil Austria United States 
China Bangladesh Vietnam 
Denmark Canada  
France Finland  
Iceland Germany  
India Hong Kong  
Indonesia Italy  
Lithuania Malaysia  
Macedonia Mauritius  
Mexico Netherlands  
Peru Pakistan  
Poland Singapore  
Russia Slovakia  
South Africa Slovenia   
South Korea  Spain   
Switzerland  Sweden  
 Thailand   
 Turkey   
 United Kingdom  
      
Source:  Anand (2005), OECD (2007). 
 
2.2.4 Corporate Governance and the Audit Committee 
The audit committee is one of the internal mechanisms of corporate governance.   
Conceptually, an audit committee is defined as a sub-committee of the main or 
supervisory board that is comprised mainly or wholly of non-executive or independent 
directors, with responsibility for the oversight of financial reporting and auditing 
activities (Spira, 1999; Collier and Zaman, 2005). The presence of an audit committee is 
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associated with the oversight function of the board of directors. As suggested by agency 
theory, the board of directors has an oversight role that usually involves monitoring the 
CEO and other top executives, approving the corporation‟s strategy, and monitoring 
control systems (DeZoort et al., 2002). As these are complex responsibilities, the board 
of directors delegates its oversight duties to the audit committee.  
  
The audit committee was born in the US. According to Joshi and Wakil (2004), the 
concept of an audit committee was first introduced by the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) in 1940. As a response to the McKensson & Robbins scandal, the NYSE‟s 
board of governors suggested that external auditors be selected by a committee of 
external directors rather than by management. Thereafter, the SEC recommended that 
the boards of directors of public companies form auditing sub-committees of non-
officer board members to ensure auditor independence (Fichtner, 2010). A series of 
corporate scandals in the late 1960s led to the SEC‟s renewed interest in the audit 
committee (Collier, 1996). In 1972, the SEC urged listed companies to establish audit 
committees to protect investors (Collier, 1996). The Commission set out formal 
regulations requiring listed companies to state the names of audit committee members, 
or to state that the board did not have an audit committee (Fichtner, 2010).  
 
Over the next few years, there was a trend to improve the roles and responsibilities of 
the audit committees of public listed companies. Significant efforts widely discussed in 
the literature include the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) recommendations on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999), and the enactment 
of SOX (2002). The BRC was sponsored by the NYSE and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) in the late 1990s with the aim of making recommendations 
for improving the effectiveness of audit committees (Carcello et al., 2002; Fichtner, 
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2010). These recommendations focused on strengthening the independence of the audit 
committee, improving audit committee effectiveness, and improving the mechanisms 
for discussion and accountability among the audit committee, outside auditors, and 
management (Joshi and Wakil, 2004; Fichtner, 2010). The recommendations were 
subsequently adopted as listing requirements by exchanges in the US, including the 
American Stock Exchange, the NYSE, and NASDAQ (Rowland, 2002). The trend of 
adopting the BRC‟s recommendations as listing requirements spread to exchanges 
outside the US, including the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the Thailand Stock 
Exchange and the Jakarta Stock Exchange (Fichtner, 2010). 
 
Further significant reform saw the enactment of the SOX in 2002 in response to a series 
of corporate scandals in the US involving Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia 
Communications, Qwest, and Global Crossing. These scandals led to public in the US 
questioning about audit committee roles and responsibilities in the oversight of a 
company‟s overall financial reporting process (Myers and Ziegefuss, 2006). As a result, 
the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee were intensified enormously with 
the enactment of the SOX. Among other things, the SOX required the auditor of a 
company to report directly to the audit committee concerning certain critical matters 
relating to the company‟s financial reporting process. The SOX also enhanced the audit 
committee‟s oversight responsibility, as compared to the BRC (1999). For example, the 
audit committee shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of the work of the external auditor (Section 301 of the SOX, 2002).  The audit 
committee must pre-approve non-audit services, establish fraud reporting and whistle-
blowing procedures, and has the authority to engage independent counsel and other 
advisors as may be deemed necessary to perform its oversight duties.   
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To date, the audit committee has been widely adopted by exchanges around the world. 
Table 2.3 presents a list of the 40 largest capital markets in the world that have adopted 
the audit committee as a mandatory requirement. The number of major capital markets 
requiring an audit committee increased significantly after the enactment of the SOX. As 
depicted in Table 2.3, there are only nine capital markets that do not have a mandatory 
requirement for an audit committee.  
 
Table 2.3 Audit Committee Requirements of the 40 Largest Capital 
Markets 
 
Capital markets with mandatory audit committee 
requirement  
(date of implementation) 
Capital markets with no 
mandatory audit 
committee requirement 
Canada (1975) Portugal (2006) Brazil 
Nigeria (1990) South Africa (2006) Iran 
Hong Kong (1999) Russia (2007) Ireland 
Thailand (1999) Finland (2008) Italy 
India (2000) France (2008) Japan 
Indonesia (2000) Netherlands (2008) Norway 
Korea (2000) Romania (2008) Saudi Arabia 
Argentina (2001) Sweden (2008) Switzerland 
Mexico (2001) United Kingdom (2008) Venezuela 
United States  
(SOX, 2002) 
Belgium (2009)  
Spain (2002) China (2009)  
Turkey (2002) Czech Republic (2009)  
Australia (2004) Denmark (2009)  
Colombia (2005) Germany (2009)  
Austria (2006) Greece (2009)  
 Poland (2009)  
 
Source: Fichtner (2010) 
 
2.2.5 Promoting Anglo-American Corporate Governance in East Asia  
The IMF and the World Bank have actively promoted the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model as an appropriate corporate governance model for developing 
countries. The introduction of the Anglo-American model to East Asian countries by the 
IMF and the World Bank cannot be separated from their global agenda for financial 
37 
 
market liberalisation in developing countries. This economic policy, well known as the 
Washington Consensus, prescribes market deregulation, fiscal austerity and 
privatisation in developing countries (Robinson and Hadiz, 2004). Economic policies in 
the original Washington Consensus included fiscal discipline, reorientation of public 
expenditures, tax reform, financial liberalisation, unified and competitive exchange rates, 
trade liberalisation, openness to direct foreign investment, privatisation, deregulation, 
and secure property rights. However, an expanded list of policies and corporate 
governance reforms are included in an augmented policy model (Rodrik, 2001). In the 
augmented model, policies were expanded to include other aspects such as 
legal/political reform, regulatory institutions, corruption, labour market flexibility, 
WTO agreements, financial codes and standards, “prudent” capital-account opening, 
non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, social safety nets, and poverty reduction. The 
Washington Consensus policies are imposed upon governments in developing countries 
across the world through loan agreements offered by the IMF and World Bank (Hooper, 
2002).  
 
The goals behind the standardisation of corporate governance are to ensure that 
emerging markets adhere to the principles of a neoliberal open market economy, and to 
protect the interests of institutional investors based on market-centric systems, such as 
those in the US (Soederberg, 2003). Since 1999, the IMF and the World Bank have 
conducted a joint project, namely, Reports of the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC). The standards and codes stipulated in the ROSC represent an “internationally 
agreed standard” that is benchmarked against practices in a certain country (Soederberg, 
2003). In terms of corporate governance standards, the ROSC adopted the OECD 
principles of corporate governance that were drafted more in line with the Anglo-
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American corporate governance model (Roberts, 2004; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 
2006).  
 
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 created an entry point for the IMF to promote 
Anglo-American corporate governance. Weak corporate governance in East Asia was 
blamed for contributing to the crisis. Some studies sponsored by the World Bank 
indicated that East Asian corporations were characterised by high leverage, 
concentrated ownership, a high level of ultimate control by a few families, and 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Sato, 2004). As a solution, the IMF proposed 
structural reforms of corporate governance in the affected countries. In the corporate 
governance reforms, the IMF prescribed the Anglo-American model, as this model was 
perceived to have a superior ability to allocate resources and monitor corporate 
behaviour (Singh and Zammit, 2006; Sam, 2007). The undertaking of corporate 
governance reforms by East Asian countries that were affected by the crisis (such as 
Indonesia) became one of the prerequisites to obtaining financial assistance from the 
IMF and the World Bank.  
 
2.2.6 Problems in Implementing the Anglo-American Model in East Asia  
The efforts of international donors to promote the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model in East Asia met some obstacles. Certain characteristics in East Asia,  
such as different legal  systems (Iu and Batten, 2001; Rama, 2007;Yuka, 2010), the low 
level of stock market development (the IMF and the World Bank, cited in Singh and 
Zammit, 2006), different types of agency problems (Chen et al., 2011), high 
concentrated family ownership (Fan and Wong, 2002; Claessens and Fan, 2002),  and 
cronyism (Fan and Wong, 2002; Claessens and Fan, 2002) were considered obstacles to 
implementing the Anglo-American corporate governance model. Informal institutions 
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such as family control might play a greater role in shaping corporate governance than 
the formal Anglo-American mechanisms (Young et al., 2008). For example, the high 
concentration of ownership in the hands of families might result in ineffective internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Berglöf and Claessens, 
2006), as firms controlled by families often appoint family members to corporate boards 
to take care of family interests (Jaggi and Leung, 2007). This dominance by insiders 
raises doubts as to whether independent directors can be truly independent and provide 
an adequate degree of monitoring of the majority shareholders (Cheung and Chan, 
2004; Berglöf and Claessens, 2006). In addition, the family, as controlling shareholders, 
often maintains a connection to government officials to secure some kind of protection 
and special treatment (Husnan, 2001; Rosser, 2003). These officials often possess a lack 
of business experience or expertise in law, accounting, or finance. As a result, corporate 
governance in East Asia often resembles the outsider model (the Anglo-American 
model) in form but not in substance (Backman, 1999; Peng, 2004; Rosser, 2003; Sam, 
2007; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009), and corporate governance presented in company 
documents does not reflect actual practice (Chuanrommanee and Swierczek, 2007).  
 
2.3 INDONESIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS  
 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance Reform Agenda 
As explained in Chapter 1, the implementation of corporate governance reforms in 
Indonesia was triggered by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (Husnan, 2001; 
Daniri, 2005). The weaknesses of corporate governance practices, such as highly 
concentrated ownership structures, ineffective supervision by the board of 
commissioners, inefficiency and lack of transparency on the procedures to acquire 
company control, over-reliance on external funding and inadequate supervision by 
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creditors, were considered as contributors to the crisis (Daniri, 2005). In order to restore 
confidence in the economy, the Indonesian government agreed to receive financial 
assistance from the IMF, with corporate governance improvement included as one of 
the requirements in the IMF‟s Letter of Intent (Kurniawan and Indriantoro, 2000).   
 
The IMF offered a multi-donor rescue package to help Indonesia overcome the financial 
crisis. The donors included the IMF itself and the World Bank/ADB. In its Letter of 
Intent (IMF, 2000), the IMF mandated that Indonesia initiate certain policy actions with 
respect to corporate governance reform. These included the establishment of a national 
committee for corporate governance, the adoption of corporate government reform 
strategies, the amendment of company law, the improvement of accountability and 
disclosure, and the improvement and enforcement of regulatory oversight. In 1998, the 
ADB also introduced the Financial Governance Reforms Sector Development 
Programme (FGRSDP) loan to Indonesia. This loan was an integral part of the IMF‟s 
multi-donor rescue package. The FGRSDP focused on helping to restructure the 
banking sector and to improve the financial and public sector allocation of resources by 
strengthening governance, increasing the disclosure and transparency of financial 
information, and reinforcing the financial sector's legal and regulatory framework (ADB, 
2006).  
 
The corporate governance reform agenda in Indonesia is presented in Figure 2.1. The 
agenda was comprised of three levels of activities consisting of national policy, 
regulatory framework, and private initiatives.  
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Figure 2.1 Agenda for the Implementation of Corporate Governance Reforms  
 
     Source: Daniri (2005) 
 
 
2.3.1.1 National Policy 
Following the IMF‟s guidance, the Indonesian government established the National 
Committee on Corporate Governance (NCCG) in 1999, which aimed to recommend a 
national framework for the implementation of good corporate governance and develop a 
national strategy for reforming corporate governance. The NCCG published the 
Indonesian corporate governance code (the Code for Good Corporate Governance) in 
2000. In general, the Code adopted the OECD‟s principles of corporate governance 
(Kurniawan and Indriantoro, 2000; Daniel, 2003). The Code was revised in 2001 and 
2006 to accommodate changes in the business environment, as well as the revised 
OECD principles of corporate governance issued in 2004. In 2006, the NCCG was 
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replaced by the National Committee on Governance (NCG). Besides the national Code, 
the committee also produced corporate governance codes for specific industry sectors, 
including the code of corporate governance for banking (NCCG, 2004), and the code of 
corporate governance for insurance (NCG, 2006). The rationale for doing so was that 
each sector tended to have its own unique characteristics (NCG, 2006). In addition, the 
committee also produced guidance for the establishment of an effective audit committee 
(NCCG, 2002), and guidance for the establishment of the independent commissioners 
(NCG, 2004). 
 
All corporate governance codes in Indonesia are voluntary and the Code itself is not 
incorporated into regulation. The NCCG argued that the intention of formulating a 
corporate governance code of principles was to provide more flexible and constructive 
methods of raising corporate governance standards; self-regulation in market 
development was deemed more appropriate (NCCG, 2001). Accordingly, an ethics-
based approach was considered appropriate for the Indonesian environment. This 
approach is driven predominantly by the consciousness of business practitioners who 
operate their businesses not just with a short-term profit orientation but also to develop 
long-term relationships with their stakeholders (NCG, 2006). Consequently, the Code 
does not have any legal binding and serves only as a reference for companies and 
regulators in Indonesia (World Bank, 2010).  
 
The voluntary approach adopted by the Indonesian corporate governance code was 
heavily criticised by World Bank (World Bank, 2010). The voluntary approach does not 
require companies to state in their annual reports why they comply or do not comply 
with certain corporate governance provisions (World Bank, 2010). This purely 
voluntary approach is contrasted with the approach adopted in other countries. In 
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Australia and the UK, for example, public listed companies that do not comply with 
certain provisions of the corporate governance code are required to provide sufficient 
and reasonable explanations for their non-compliance. In addition, the regulatory 
authorities in Indonesia, in developing the regulations, adopted certain key provisions of 
the corporate governance code and made them mandatory. The regulator then monitors 
the compliance of companies with the regulation but not with the specific provision of 
the code of corporate governance covered by the regulation. This approach has not 
resulted in high compliance with the mandated provisions of the corporate governance 
code (World Bank, 2010). According to a 2008 survey by the Indonesian Institute for 
Corporate Directorship (IICD), only 28 percent of public listed companies provided a 
comprehensive statement regarding governance policies, while 48 percent of public 
listed companies disclosed some aspects of governance policies, and 24 percent of 
public listed companies did not disclose anything related to governance (World Bank, 
2010).   
 
2.3.1.2 Regulatory Framework 
The Indonesian government initiated intensive regulatory reforms by reviewing laws 
and regulations, as well as undertaking a judicial reform programme guided by the 
World Bank/ADB. To support corporate governance practices, the Indonesian 
government passed specific laws such as  UU No. 23/1999 concerning the central bank,  
UU No. 4/1998 concerning bankruptcy, UU No. 19/2003 concerning state-owned 
enterprises and UU No. 25/2007 concerning investment. In addition, certain laws –  
including company law, company registry law and capital market law – were amended, 
(Daniri, 2005). Among the amended laws, the capital market law is the most relevant to 
this study and is discussed next. 
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The capital market in Indonesia is currently regulated by UU No. 8/1995 regarding 
capital market organisation. This law provides the legal basis for capital market 
development in Indonesia. Figure 2.2 presents the Indonesian capital market structure 
based on the law. The top position is held by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which has 
the responsibility to determine general capital market policy. Below the MOF is the 
BAPEPAM, which is an administrative unit under the MOF and funded like other 
government units. The chairman of the BAPEPAM is appointed by the MOF. The 
position of the BAPEPAM has been criticised, as the agency is not financially 
independent and may be subject to government interference (Wells, 1999). In practice, 
the BAPEPAM-LK seems to be relatively independent from capital market players, but 
less independent from the MOF (World Bank, 2010). As stipulated in the law, the 
BAPEPAM has the responsibility to provide supervision, guidance, and regulation over 
the daily activities of the stock exchange. The stock exchange is not a fully independent 
organisation because it is strictly supervised by the BAPEPAM. For example, although 
the stock exchange has independent rule making authority, any rules it makes must be in 
line with the rules of the BAPEPAM. A rule proposed by the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX) must be submitted to the BAPEPAM for approval (BAPEPAM, 
1996a). As a result, the IDX acts mostly as an implementer of BAPEPAM decisions 
rather than being a decision-maker and regulator in its own right (Wells, 1999). The 
audit committee rule, which is the focus of this study, is an example of the implementer 
role of the Exchange: audit committee rules issued by the BAPEPAM have been fully 
adopted by the IDX and have become a mandatory requirement for all companies listed 
on the IDX.  
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At the time of this writing, UU No. 8/1995 is in the process of being amended
3
. The 
main purpose of the amendment is to provide a more solid legal foundation for the 
Indonesian capital market in order to protect the interests of investors, and market 
participants in general. Revisions are also being made to promote the establishment of 
an Indonesian capital market that is efficient, fair, and orderly. Among the important 
points of the draft amendment is the requirement for public listed companies to appoint 
audit committees, independent commissioners, independent directors, and a corporate 
secretary. In addition, the draft amendment also provides additional authority for the 
BAPEPAM-LK to suppress the embezzlement of funds from investors (fraud) in the 
capital market. 
 
In terms of judicial reform programmes, some programmes have been implemented, 
including the Commercial Court in 1997, and the Capital Market Arbitration Agency in 
2001. Indonesian regulators are continuing to review existing laws and regulations for 
conformity and synchronisation. 
 
2.3.1.3 Private Initiatives 
The implementation of corporate governance reform in Indonesia has also involved 
private initiatives. Some non-government organisations (NGOs) have assisted 
voluntarily in terms of providing education, training, ratings, research and advocacy. 
These NGOs include the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI), the 
Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD), the Indonesian Institute for 
Corporate Governance (IICG), the Corporate Leadership Development Institute (CLDI), 
the Indonesian Institute of Audit Committee (IKAI), and the Indonesian Society of 
Independent Commissioners (ISICOM).  
                                                 
3
 When this thesis was finalised in mid-2013, the process had not been completed. 
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Figure 2.2 Indonesian Capital Market Structure 
 
Source:  IDX (2010b) 
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2.3.2 Independent Commissioner and Audit Committee Requirements 
 
2.3.2.1 Independent Commissioners 
As the Indonesian legal system is derived from the Dutch legal system, Indonesian 
company law has adopted a two-tier model with slight modifications. A company 
incorporated in Indonesia has two boards, consisting of a board of commissioners and a 
board of directors. The board of commissioners, as the representative of the 
shareholders, has the duty of supervisor and advisor to the board of directors, whereas 
the board of directors has an executive role. However, the Indonesian two-tier system 
differs slightly from the Dutch system. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the board of 
directors and the board of commissioners are responsible to the annual general meeting 
of shareholders. Furthermore, the board of commissioners may suspend a director, but 
the decision must be confirmed by the annual general meeting of shareholders within 30 
days (World Bank, 2010). The Indonesian model limits the oversight of directors by the 
board of commissioners and provides the opportunity for controlling shareholders to 
place their members on the board of directors. In contrast, the two-tier system adopted 
in other countries, such as the Netherlands, provides authority for the board of 
commissioners to select directors. 
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Figure 2.3 Two-Tier System: Indonesian versus Dutch 
Source: Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2001) 
 
The need for independent commissioners in Indonesia was prompted by the IMF. In its 
Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 22 July 1999, the IMF requested public listed companies in 
Indonesia to appoint independent commissioners. As a follow up to the LOI, the 
BAPEPAM issued a circular letter (BAPEPAM, 2000) that recommended all public 
listed companies to establish independent commissioners and audit committees. 
Similarly, the Indonesian Code of Good Corporate Governance also recommended that 
each company establish independent commissioners and an audit committee. The 
mandatory era for independent commissioners was marked by the issuance of the 
decision letter of the board of directors of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX)
4
 No. Kep-
315/BEJ/06-2000. This was amended later by the decision letter of the JSX No. Kep-
339/BEJ/07-2001 concerning independent commissioners, audit committees, and 
corporate secretaries for public listed companies. This rule required that independent 
                                                 
4
 Jakarta Stock Exchange is the former name of the Indonesia Stock Exchange. On 1 December 2007, the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange merged with the Surabaya Stock Exchange and the new exchange was named the 
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commissioners should comprise at least 30 percent of all members of the board of 
commissioners. Independent commissioners were further regulated by the BAPEPAM 
decree No. 29/PM/2004. The decree, which is a focus of this study, regulated 
independent commissioners and the audit committee as well. In this decree, an 
independent commissioner is defined as: (i) he/she comes from outside the issuers or 
listed companies; (ii) he/she does not have any direct or indirect ownership in the 
issuers or listed companies; (iii) he/she is not affiliated with the issuers or listed 
companies, commissioners, directors or majority shareholders of the issuers or listed 
companies; (iv) he/she does not own any business or conduct any activity that directly 
or indirectly relates to the business activity of the issuers or listed companies.  
 
2.3.2.2 Audit Committee 
At the national policy level, the requirement for an audit committee is stipulated in 
Indonesia‟s corporate governance code. One provision of the Code recommends that a 
company establish an audit committee. A detailed discussion on the audit committee is 
found in the guidelines for the establishment of an effective audit committee issued by 
the NCCG in 2002. These guidelines are applicable to all sectors, however, both the 
code and the guidelines are voluntary.  
  
At the level of company sector regulation, the rules regarding the audit committee are 
governed by different government agencies, depending on the company type, as 
different company types have different regulators. For public listed companies, the audit 
committee is governed by the rules issued by the BAPEPAM-LK, which also governs 
the independent commissioners. For the banking sector, Bank Indonesia issues 
corporate governance regulations that cover audit committees for both listed and non-
listed banks. Meanwhile, the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises (MSOE) issues rules 
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concerning audit committees for state owned enterprises (SOEs). Unlike the Code, all 
these regulations are mandatory and use a rules-based approach that puts greater 
emphasis on regulatory enforcement than on voluntary compliance. Furthermore, the 
audit committee regulations of the BAPEPAM-LK and Bank Indonesia are applicable to 
all companies regardless of size (one size fits all), whereas the MSOE‟s regulations are 
applicable only to privatised SOEs, SOEs in the financial sector, and SOEs with a 
minimum asset size of one trillion rupiah. 
 
a. Development of Audit Committee Rules: Public Listed Companies 
The history of the audit committee for public listed companies in Indonesia began in 
2000, when the IMF (2000) recommended that listed companies in Indonesia establish 
audit committees. In response to the recommendation, the BAPEPAM (2000) issued a 
circular letter that recommended that all public listed companies establish independent 
commissioners and audit committees. The audit committee was further regulated by the 
decision letter of the board of directors of JSX, No. Kep-315/BEJ/06-2000. This was 
amended later by the decision letter of JSX No. Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001, dated 20 July 
2001 concerning independent commissioners, audit committees and corporate 
secretaries for public listed companies. The enactment of this rule marked the era of 
compulsory audit committees for public listed companies in Indonesia. The rule was 
included in paragraph C of Securities Listing Regulation No. I. A that outlined the 
general requirements for equity securities to be listed on the JSX. Public listed 
companies were required to fulfil these requirements by 31 December 2001 at the latest. 
Thus, implementation of the audit committee in Indonesia was initially voluntary and 
later mandatory, following the pattern of development in other countries.  
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In order to strengthen the regulation of audit committees of public listed companies, the 
BAPEPAM issued rules relating to the formation of audit committees as well as the 
mandatory disclosure of the membership and activities of audit committees in the 
annual report. In terms of audit committee formation, the BAPEPAM issued decree No. 
41/PM/2003, which was amended later by decree No. 29/PM/2004, with respect to 
guidelines relating to the establishment and working implementation of audit 
committees. Meanwhile, in terms of the mandatory disclosures of the audit committee, 
the requirement was regulated by the BAPEPAM-LK decree No. 134/BL/2006, which 
was also known as Rule No. X.K.6. By enactment of these decrees, the BAPEPAM 
circular letter (2000) and JSX rule (2001) became ineffective. Consequently, the rules 
were adopted as general requirements for equity securities to be listed on the IDX. 
Furthermore, since formation of an audit committee became compulsory for each public 
listed company, this rule also gave BAPEPAM the right to impose sanctions for any 
violations of the rule. The BAPEPAM required public listed companies to comply with 
the decree no later than December 2004. 
 
In some respects, the requirements of the BAPEPAM decree (2004) are quite similar to 
those of the JSX (2001). An example is the audit committee‟s membership structure. As 
depicted in Table 2.4, the membership requirements in both rules are similar in that all 
public listed companies must have an audit committee comprising at least three 
members, one of whom shall be an independent commissioner and concurrently the 
chairman of the audit committee, while the others shall be external independent parties 
at least one of whom shall have accounting and/or finance expertise. However, in terms 
of the job duties of the audit committee, there are some differences between the two 
rules. The main difference is that the BAPEPAM decree (2004) does not mention any 
duties of the audit committee relating to external auditors, whereas the JSX rules (2001) 
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specify the relationship between the audit committee and the external auditor.  
Furthermore, the BAPEPAM decree (2004) does not define a specific timeframe 
regarding the reporting of the audit committee to the board of commissioners, and 
submission of the board of commissioners‟ recommendations to the board of directors 
and stock exchange. 
 
Table 2.4 Comparison of BAPEPAM (2004) and JSX (2001) 
 
Requirements JSX (2001)  BAPEPAM 
(2004)  
Membership Consists of at least three members      
 Members shall be external 
independent parties 
    
 Chairman is an independent 
commissioner 
    
 One member shall have educational 
background in accounting or finance 
    
Job duties Examining the financial information that 
will be released 
    
 Reviewing company compliance with 
regulations and laws 
    
 Reviewing work of the internal auditor -   
 Reporting any risks facing company and 
risk management implementation 
-   
 Scrutinizing and reporting of any 
complaints 
-   
 To review the independence and 
objectivity of the public accountant 
  - 
 To review the adequacy of the audit 
conducted by the public accountant to 
ensure that all important risks have been 
considered 
  - 
 To review the effectiveness of the 
company‟s internal controls  
  - 
 To investigate any indication of a 
mistake in a resolution passed at a board 
of directors meeting, or an irregularity in 
implementing such a resolution. Such 
investigation can be conducted by the 
audit committee or any independent 
party appointed by the audit committee 
at the listed company‟s expense  
  - 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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In terms of audit committee disclosure in annual reports, the BAPEPAM-LK decree No. 
134/BL/2006 (also known as Rule No. X.K.6) amended the previous BAPEPAM rule 
(BAPEPAM, 1996b) and required the reporting of corporate governance, including the 
audit committee, in annual reports. According to this new rule, as a minimum 
requirement for disclosure, the audit committee report should provide the following:  (i) 
the name, position, and a short biography of audit committee members; (ii) the job 
description and responsibilities of the audit committee; (iii) the number of meetings 
held during the financial year and details of the attendance of each audit committee 
member; and (iv) a summary of the activities of the audit committee in the discharge of 
its duties for the listed company‟s financial year. The effective date of this rule was 7 
December 2006, and public listed companies were obligated to comply with the rule by 
including the required information in their annual reports for the year-ended 31 
December 2006. 
 
b. Development of Audit Committee Rules: Banking Sector 
There has been significant progress in the development of audit committee rules for the 
banking sector. The first audit committee requirement for the sector was introduced in 
1995, when Bank Indonesia regulated that each bank should have an audit committee. 
This requirement was considered the first initiative in Indonesia as there was no 
previous requirement for audit committees in Indonesia (Kurniawan and Indriantoro, 
2000). However, this audit committee requirement was considered ineffective in 
practice as many banks that had audit committees were liquidated or closed (Effendi, 
2005). As a result, this regulation was revoked by Bank Indonesia in 1999 and replaced 
with the requirement stipulated in PBI No. 1/6/PBI/1999 to establish a compliance 
director. This decision was criticised because the function of the compliance director 
was different from that of an audit committee (Kurniawan and Indriantoro, 2000; 
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Effendi, 2005). In 2006, Bank Indonesia issued PBI No. 8/4/PBI/2006 (amended later 
by PBI No. 8/14/2006) in relation to the implementation of corporate governance for 
banks. This rule also incorporated audit committee formation for banks.  
 
c. Development of Audit Committee Rules: State Owned Enterprises Sector 
In line with developments in other sectors, the MSOE also required SOEs to establish 
audit committees under Ministerial Decree No. 103/MBU/2002. The decree specified 
the organisation of the committee, requirements of audit committee members, and the 
committee‟s functions. 
 
Table 2.5 presents a comparison of audit committee rules between public listed 
companies, banks and SOEs. In some respects, there are many similarities among the 
rules. In terms of membership, all rules require a committee comprised of at least three 
members. Another similarity relates to audit committee functions: all rules require the 
audit committee to review financial information issued by the companies, and to review 
the work of the internal auditor. Apart from these aspects, the audit committee 
requirements between the company types are different. For example, SOEs and banks 
require audit committees to review the work of the external auditor, whereas the 
BAPEPAM is silent on this. Therefore, this study excludes banks and the SOEs from 
the sample as they have different audit committee requirements.  
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Table 2.5 Comparison of Audit Committee Rules in Indonesia 
 Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(BAPEPAM, 2004) 
Banks 
(PBI No 8/4/PBI/2006) 
Stated Owned Companies 
(SK Kep-103/M-MBU/2002) 
Membership Consist of at least three members.  Consist of at least three members. Consist of three members, at least 
one of whom is a commissioner. 
 Members shall be external 
independent parties. 
Majority of audit committee members to 
consist of independent commissioners and 
independent parties (at least 51%). 
Members are not employees of the 
company (must be independent 
parties). 
 Chairman is an independent 
commissioner. 
Chairman is an independent commissioner. Chairman is a commissioner.  
 One member shall have an 
educational background in 
accounting or finance. 
One member is an independent party with 
expertise in finance or accounting, while the 
others are independent parties with legal or 
banking expertise. 
Members are experts. 
 - Audit committee members must possess 
good integrity, character, and mores. 
- 
Job duties Examining the financial 
information.  
 
Assess adequacy of financial reporting 
process including consistency between the 
financial reports and prevailing accounting 
standards. 
Ensure that there have been 
satisfactory review procedures on all 
kinds of  information published to 
shareholders.  
 Reviewing company compliance 
with regulations. 
- - 
 Reviewing internal auditor‟s 
work. 
Monitoring and evaluation of the work of the 
internal and external auditors. 
Review the work of the internal and 
external auditors and provide 
recommendations on improvement 
of internal controls and their 
implementation. 
 Reporting  of risks and risk 
management implementation.  
- - 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
 
 Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
(BAPEPAM, 2004) 
Banks 
(PBI No 8/4/PBI/2006) 
Stated Owned Companies 
(SK Kep-103/M-MBU/2002) 
Job duties Scrutinizing and 
reporting of 
complaints. 
- - 
 Audit committee has 
charter. 
- - 
 - Audit committee shall give a recommendation for the 
appointment of the public accountant and the public 
accountant‟s office to the board of commissioners, 
then the recommendation is submitted to the general 
meeting of shareholders. 
- 
 - Monitor implementation of follow up actions by the 
board of directors on findings of the internal audit 
work unit, public accountant, and Bank Indonesia‟s 
supervision. 
- 
 - - Identify issues that require the attention 
of commissioners, and carry out other 
tasks given by the board of 
commissioners as long as they are still 
in the scope of duties and obligations of 
the board of commissioners. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
 
57 
 
2.3.2.3 Comparison of Indonesian Audit Committee Rules with International Rules 
 
Table 2.6 presents a general comparison of the BAPEPAM rules with those of Bursa 
Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, or KLSE), and two 
well-known audit committee recommendations, namely, the BRC (1999) and the SOX 
(2002). The selection of Bursa Malaysia is to provide a comparison with the audit 
committee rules of an exchange that is also located in an emerging economy. In 
comparison to the audit committee recommendations of the BRC and the SOX, the 
BAPEPAM rules have not included all important aspects of audit committee reforms 
called for in the recommendations. In general, only the audit committee membership 
requirements of the BAPEPAM rules (i.e., independence and its definition, minimum 
number of members) are quite similar to those of the BRC and the SOX. Other 
recommendations have not been included in the BAPEPAM rules. The striking 
difference is the absence of a mandatory audit committee function to deal with external 
auditors. In this respect, it seems that the BAPEPAM decrees are less stringent than the 
BRC and the SOX requirements. Meanwhile, Bursa Malaysia‟s rules are more 
comprehensive than those of the BAPEPAM. In terms of membership requirements and 
disclosure, the BAPEPAM rules and the Bursa Malaysia rules are not significantly 
different. However, in terms of functions, the Bursa Malaysia rules specify the audit 
committee‟s relationship with external auditors.  
 
Table 2.6 General Comparison of BAPEPAM Decrees with International Rules 
 
Sources Audit Committee 
Recommendations 
Bursa Malaysia 
rules 
BAPEPAM 
rules 
BRC 01 
SOX section 
301 
Defines independence (for audit 
committee members). 
Silent 
(not specifically 
mentioned) 
Yes 
BRC 02 
SOX section 
301 
Companies should have an audit 
committee; all members should be 
independent.  
Yes Yes 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
 
Sources Audit Committee Recommendations Bursa 
Malaysia rules 
BAPEPAM 
rules 
BRC 03 Audit committee should be 
composed of at least three members 
who are financially literate; at least 
one member has accounting or 
related financial management 
expertise. 
Yes Yes 
BRC 04 Audit committee should adopt a 
charter and reassess it annually. 
Yes, but not 
required to 
reassess it 
annually. 
Yes, but not 
required to 
reassess it 
annually. 
BRC 05 
SOX section 
407 
Proxy statements should disclose 
information about the audit 
committee. 
Yes Yes 
BRC 06 
SOX section 
202 
The outside audit engagement is the 
responsibility of the audit 
committee. 
Silent Silent 
BRC 07 Audit committee must communicate 
with outside auditors about 
independence issues (consulting 
assignments, etc.). 
Yes Silent 
BRC 08 External auditors should discuss the 
quality of the company‟s accounting 
policy with the audit committee. 
Yes Silent 
BRC 09 A letter from the audit committee to 
be included in the company‟s annual 
reports to shareholders.    
Yes Silent 
BRC 10 Auditors review quarterly reports 
before release. 
Yes Yes 
SOX section 
301   
Audit committee must provide 
procedures to receive, retain, and 
treat complaints, and provide 
procedures to confidentially handle 
employee complaints (whistle-
blower protection). 
Silent Receive 
complaints, 
but not 
required to 
set any 
procedure to 
handle them. 
SOX section 
201 
Audit committee pre-approves non- 
audit services provided by the public 
accounting firm. 
Silent Silent 
SOX section 
301 
Each audit committee shall have the 
authority to engage independent 
counsel or other advisors. 
Silent Silent 
SOX section 
301 
Audit committee is properly funded. Silent Silent 
 
Sources: Compiled by the author 
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2.3.3 Specific Features of the Indonesian Business Environment: Obstacles to 
Reform 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2.6, the implementation of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model in East Asia might not achieve the expected results. As seen above, 
Indonesia has actively reformed its regulations to support the Anglo-American 
corporate governance practice. The following section identifies certain key features in 
the Indonesian business environment that might serve as obstacles to the 
implementation of Anglo-American corporate governance. 
 
2.3.3.1 High Concentration of Family Ownership  
In Indonesia, the ownership of public listed companies is concentrated in the hands of 
families. This condition has not differed significantly between the pre- and post- East 
Asian financial crisis periods. In the pre-crisis period, the ownership of public listed 
companies was highly concentrated – particularly in the hands of a small number of 
families that owned groups of companies. Families retain control by keeping the 
majority percentage of outstanding shares. They enhance their control of companies 
through cross-shareholding and investing in shares among companies within the group. 
In addition, families prefer to finance expansion using debt instead of issuing stock in 
order to maintain their control (Husnan, 2001). In the post-crisis period, these 
conditions did not change much. As depicted in Table 2.7, concentrated ownership is 
still dominant in the post-crisis period (year 2000), and families remain as controlling 
shareholders of most public listed companies in Indonesia.  
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Table 2.7 Ownership of Public Listed Companies in Indonesia 
 
Ownership Pattern 
a
 Cut-off level 20% Cut-off  level 40% 
1996 2000 1996 2000 
Concentrated ownership     
Family/individual 78 58 70 49 
Indonesian corporation 3 5 2 5 
Foreign 8 13 9 13 
State 5 14 5 16 
Sub total 94 90 86 83 
Widely held 2 4 13 17 
Mixed     
Private 
b
 plus state 1 3 0 0 
Private 
b
 plus foreign 3 3 1 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Adapted from Sato (2004) 
Notes: 
a
 = data for top 100 companies; 
b
 = private=family/individual 
 
 
 
The high concentration of ownership in the hands of families tends to negatively affect 
implementation of the Anglo-American corporate governance model in Indonesia 
(Rusmin et al., 2011), and might render internal corporate governance mechanisms 
ineffective (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Berglöf and Claessens, 2006; Cheung and Chan, 
2004). There is also less incentive to list the company on the stock exchange (Daniel, 
2003). In addition, larger family-owned firms that collude with politicians resist the 
implementation of corporate governance measures in Indonesia (Rosser, 2003). Other 
challenges to the implementation of the Anglo-American corporate governance model 
in Indonesia are discussed next.  
 
 
2.3.3.2 Low Number of Public Listed Companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
 
The number of public listed companies on the IDX is low. As can be seen in Table 2.8, 
the number of IDX-listed companies did not increase significantly during the 1998-2000 
period. At the end of 2010, the number of public listed companies stood at 420. This 
number is much smaller than the number of listed companies in neighbouring ASEAN 
countries, such as Thailand (541) and Malaysia (956).  
61 
 
Table 2.8 Growth of Public Listed Companies on the IDX 
 
Year 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
Newly 
listed 
6 9 21 31 22 6 12 8 12 22 19 13 22 
Total 
PLCs 
288 277 287 316 331 333 331 336 344 383 396 398 420 
 
 Source: IDX (2004; 2010b) 
 
 
 
The low growth in the number of public listed companies on the IDX might indicate the 
reluctance of family-owned companies in Indonesia to go public. In fact, stock 
exchanges serve as promoters of the spread of corporate governance among public listed 
companies (Christiansen and Koldertsova, 2009), as they might push implementation of 
corporate governance through regulations. Therefore, the low number of public listed 
companies might hinder the progress of corporate governance implementation among 
Indonesian companies.  
 
 
2.3.3.3 Ineffectiveness of Boards of  Directors   
 
Ineffectiveness of boards of directors has been observed in Indonesia. The 
ineffectiveness has been considered to be related to the fact that family members are 
present on boards of directors, board of commissioners, or both. Large business groups 
(conglomerates) are frequently controlled by a single family with ownership 
concentrated in the hands of a founding patriarch and his sons, or by a subsidiary or 
investment holding company within the conglomerate (Brown, 2004). Family members, 
as controlling shareholders, dominate as members of the board of directors, board of 
commissioners, or both. The head of the board of commissioners often represents the 
controlling party of the company, or someone very close to the controlling shareholders 
(Husnan, 2001; Hanani, 2005). As evidenced by Tabalujan (2002), 59.8 percent of the 
259 public listed companies on the JSX had two or more family members on their 
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boards in 1997. The figure decreased slightly to 40.7 percent out of the 307 public listed 
companies in 2001. The presence of family on the boards may be due to the reluctance 
of families to trust people outside of their small circle of family and friends (Young et 
al., 2008). However, this dominance of families on boards raises doubts as to whether 
independent directors are truly independent and can provide adequate monitoring of the 
majority shareholders (Cheung and Chan, 2004; Berglöf and Claessens, 2006).  
 
In addition to the presence of family members on the boards, the ineffectiveness of 
boards of directors is caused by the common phenomenon in Indonesia of collusion 
between the company and officials or the political elite (Husnan, 2001; Brown, 2004). 
The family, as controlling shareholders, maintains a special relationship with elite 
politicians in order to get some kind of protection or special treatment, such as access to 
outside capital and preservation of monopolistic strategies (Husnan, 2001). To maintain 
this special relationship, family controlling shareholders often give a small portion of 
shares for free to elite politicians and bureaucrats (Brown, 2004). Another method is 
placing the elite politicians or bureaucrats on their boards (Husnan, 2001; Rosser, 2003). 
In this study, these are referred to as politically connected directors/commissioners. 
However, the elite politician/bureaucrat most often lacks business experience or 
expertise in law, accounting, or finance and, thus, this collusion might provide 
resistance to the implementation of good corporate governance principles (Rosser, 
2003). 
 
2.3.3.4 The Presence of Foreign Institutional Investors Related to Indonesians  
Although family ownership is still dominant after the East Asian financial crisis of 
1997-98, the number of shares owned by foreign investors has increased. Increasing 
foreign ownership has been observed since the end of 1997. At that time, the Indonesian 
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government removed the limit on foreign investment and foreign investors were 
allowed to buy up to 100 percent of the shares of listed companies (Husnan, 2001). 
Consequently, foreign investor interest in the IDX has increased year by year. It is not 
surprising that Sato (2004) found that foreign ownership rose from 8 percent to 13 
percent at the 20 percent cut-off level between 1996 and 2000. The boom in foreign 
investor interest in the IDX began in 2002 and 2003 (Robinson and Hadiz, 2004). Table 
2.9 presents the equity ownership composition of companies listed on the IDX from 
2004 to 2011. Foreign ownership decreased steadily during the 2004-2011 period. It 
seems that recent Indonesian government policy to restrict foreign ownership in some 
industries may have led to the downward trend of foreign ownership. However, 
compared with domestic ownership, the percentage of foreign ownership is still much 
higher. This means that foreign investors are still the dominant players in the IDX, as 
foreign ownership accounts for approximately two-thirds of IDX market capitalisation 
(World Bank, 2010). 
 
Table 2.9 Equity Ownership Percentages of Companies Listed on the IDX  
(December 2004-September 2011) 
 
Year Domestic (%) Foreign (%) 
2004 22.73 77.27 
2005 26.95 73.05 
2006 26.60 73.40 
2007 33.65 66.35 
2008 32.16 67.84 
2009 32.76 67.24 
2010 37.20 62.80 
2011 39.38 60.62 
                          
                           Source: BAPEPAM-LK (2011) 
 
  
Caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the increasing foreign ownership 
phenomenon because some of these foreign investors might, in actual fact, be offshore 
companies owned by Indonesians themselves (World Bank, 2010). Some of these 
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foreign investors might be special purpose entities (SPEs) owned by Indonesians. The 
SPE, or so-called “paper company”, is usually established in a “tax haven” such as the 
Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, or some other country that has a tax treaty with 
Indonesia.  
 
There are two possible reasons for the existence of SPEs owned by Indonesians. First, 
SPEs are used to conceal the identities of Indonesians as original debtors so they can 
purchase their loans from the loan asset sale program established after the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98. The significant drop in the exchange rate of the rupiah 
during the crisis caused many banks owned by Indonesian conglomerates to experience 
huge bad loans. In response to this situation, the Indonesian government established the 
Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) with two main functions: to lead the 
restructuring of the most illiquid and insolvent banks, and to manage the assets acquired 
(Kawai, 2000). In the first step, bad loans were transferred to the IBRA so that the 
troubled banks could continue performing their role in distributing loans to the public. 
In the next step, the IBRA sold unstructured and structured loans to the financial sector. 
Principally, original debtors were not allowed to repurchase the loans, however, many 
original debtors did so through third parties who were actually acting on their behalf. 
The original debtors often formed SPEs so that the ultimate owner was unknown due to 
the SPE‟s pyramid structure (Chua, 2008). Many of the SPEs registered to bid for the 
loans and many of them won the bids (Karim and Rakhmat, 2005). For example, 40 
percent of the shares of Indofood Tbk were acquired by First Pacific, a Hong Kong 
based investment arm of the Salim Group, which was the original debtor (Chua, 2008). 
 
Second, the use of the SPE by Indonesian shareholders is to obtain a tax reduction by 
“treaty shopping”. Treaty shopping is defined as “the practice of some investors of 
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„borrowing‟ a tax treaty by forming an entity (usually a corporation) in a country having 
a favourable tax treaty with the country of source – that is, the country where the 
investment is to be made and the income in question is to be earned” (Rosenbloom, 
cited in Hji Panayi and Avi-Yonah, 2010). For example, in order to get a tax reduction 
for a dividend, Indonesians might establish an SPE in a country that has a tax treaty 
agreement with the Indonesian government. The SPE buys shares of Indonesian listed 
companies, or becomes a foreign investor in the Indonesian listed company. Indonesian 
income tax law adopts the source principle to levy income tax on non-resident taxpayers. 
Article 26 of the Income Tax Law (UU No. 36/2008) stipulates that dividends and 
interest (including premiums, discounts, and other remuneration in respect of debt 
claims), paid by a domestic corporate taxpayer to a resident, are subject to 20 percent 
tax on the gross amount received or earned by the non-resident taxpayer. However, the 
tax treaty might reduce the rate. As depicted in Table 2.10, most tax rates can be 
reduced to 10 or 15 percent. The dividend received by the SPE is subject to tax of 10 to 
15 percent, which is lower than the normal domestic rate of 20 percent. In addition, the 
dividend might also be exempted from the tax if the SPE is established in a tax-haven 
country. Therefore, the SPE acts as a conduit that might not have any activity other than 
channelling income that would accrue to Indonesians.    
 
To date, Indonesia has tax treaty agreements with 50 countries (KPMG, 2009). Some of 
these countries, such as Hong Kong, Malaysia (Labuan) and Singapore, are categorised 
as tax haven countries, (Zoromé, 2007). Mauritius was previously included in the list 
but was deleted at the beginning of 2005, as the Indonesian Tax Office (ITO) 
discovered several frauds such as treaty shopping. 
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Table 2.10 Withholding Tax Rates Under Indonesian Tax Treaties 
 
Country Dividends Interest Royalties 
China 10 10 10 
Japan 10/15 10 10 
Luxembourg 10/15 10 10/12.5 
Malaysia 15 15 15 
Netherlands 10 10 10 
Seychelles 10 10 10 
United Kingdom 10/15 10 10/15 
       Source: Deloitte (2009) 
 
One main requirement to get a tax rate based on a tax treaty is that the non-resident 
taxpayer must obtain a certificate of domicile (COD) from the tax authority in the 
country of residence. However, this requirement was not supported with a clear 
definition of the beneficial owner, and the format of the COD was not standardised. 
Consequently, the ITO accepts all certificates of domicile issued by the relevant 
authority of a treaty partner in the format generally used by the foreign tax authority. 
Furthermore, there is no specific deadline to submit the COD to the ITO. In practice, the 
taxpayer gives the COD to the ITO after the transaction is finalised (KPPMASATU, 
2010). This weakness in the regulation was often misused by Indonesians to establish 
SPEs in other countries – particularly tax haven countries that had a tax treaty with 
Indonesia – using third parties acting on their behalf. Another method is to use a bank in 
those countries as a nominee. This is noted in the case of Bentoel International Tbk, 
which is owned by the Rajawali Group through its investment company (Bella Sapphire 
Ventures Ltd.) in Seychelles. See Appendix B for additional examples.  
 
In Indonesia, the identities of the ultimate owners of the SPEs in tax haven countries are 
generally preserved and not disclosed in formal documents such as annual reports. The 
identity of the actual owner is not readily available and requires some effort to obtain, 
even if it is traced back to the home base of the SPE, as tax haven jurisdictions are 
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characterised by a lack of transparency (OECD, 1999). In Indonesia, the requirement for 
disclosure of the ultimate shareholders is only regulated by Bank Indonesia (2003), 
which requires disclosure of the ultimate shareholders of institutional shareholders 
(including SPEs) in the annual reports of banks. Meanwhile, the BAPEPAM-LK rule 
requires disclosure of shareholders owning five percent or more of company shares. 
There is no requirement, however, to disclose the indirect/ultimate shareholders or 
control. As a result, most public listed companies just disclose direct shareholders 
(World Bank, 2010). 
 
In environments where relationship-based business is dominant, foreign institutional 
investors might play a role in enhancing the effectiveness of formal corporate 
governance mechanisms (Anderson et al., 2001; Ananchotikul, 2006). Foreign 
institutional investors come from outside domestic social networks in which the 
institutional norms of behaviour are generated, thus they might be more resistant and 
more likely to push for transparency and shareholder protection (Peng, 2003). Therefore, 
foreign institutional investors serve as exogenous pressure to introduce corporate 
governance practices that are socially legitimate or widely perceived as appropriate and 
effective (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). However, the presence of foreign 
institutional investors related to Indonesian or Indonesian offshore companies might 
reduce the effectiveness of foreign institutional investors as agents that push for 
implementation of corporate governance. These types of foreign institutional investors 
are not independent from the public listed company or may even be related to the family 
as controlling shareholders. As a result, they are not resistant to common corporate 
governance practices in Indonesia, since the ultimate owners are Indonesian. Therefore, 
these types of foreign institutional investors might not bring better corporate governance 
practice from their home country to Indonesia.  
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2.4 PROGRESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 
There were concerns about the implementation of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model in Indonesia. Scholars argued in the academic literature that 
corporate governance reforms in Indonesia were ineffective. For example, Patrick 
(2001) argued that Indonesia already had quite good prudential and other laws and 
regulations but lacked effective implementation. Similarly, Lindsey (2004) argued that 
Indonesian corporate governance reform lacked coordination and effective 
implementation. Dercon (2007) claimed that the efforts of Indonesia to promote good 
corporate governance by giving much attention to issues such as creating committees 
for corporate governance, publishing national and sector codes, amending and enacting 
numerous law or rules, seemed ineffective. These claims were also supported by several 
empirical studies (e.g., Daniel, 2003; Utama, 2003). Daniel (2003) found that, based on 
a pilot programme for strengthening corporate governance conducted by the ADB and 
the Jakarta Stock Exchange, only 8 companies (3.12 percent) were found to have 
acceptable corporate governance standards. Likewise, Utama (2003) found that, in 
general, the disclosures of the 104 public listed companies in 1998 were weak – even 
the mandatory disclosures.   
 
Further evidence of weak corporate governance in Indonesia is noticeable from the low 
ranking of Indonesia in most surveys of corporate governance implementation in Asia 
conducted by international organizations. Table 2.11 summarises the results of some 
international surveys of corporate governance conducted up until 2000. In all these 
surveys, Indonesia is placed at the lowest ranking among several Asian countries. The 
first survey, done by Booz-Allen and Hamilton in 1998 (Bisnis Indonesia, 11 September, 
2003), showed that the corporate governance index for Indonesia was 2.88, which was 
the lowest in East Asia compared to Thailand (4.89), Malaysia (7.72), Singapore (8.93) 
69 
 
and Japan (9.17). Another survey, done by Pricewaterhouse Coopers in 1999 in 
cooperation with the Singapore Stock Exchange (cited in Kurniawan and Indriantoro, 
2000), used institutional investors in Singapore as respondents. This survey also placed 
Indonesia in the lowest ranking for perceived standards of transparency and disclosure, 
accountability to shareholders, board processes, auditing and compliance. The 
McKinsey and Company survey in 2000, done in collaboration with the Global 
Corporate Governance Forum, obtained the opinions of global investors from the 
United States, Asia, Europe and other countries with regard to premiums that investors 
were willing to pay for well-governed companies. In this survey, Indonesia was ranked 
the lowest among several Asian countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan) for corporate governance practice. Interestingly, the investors were 
willing to pay up to 27% more for shares of companies in Indonesia with good 
corporate governance, which was the highest, compared to other Asian countries. 
 
Table 2.11 Corporate Governance Surveys in the 1990s 
 
No. Name of Survey Ranking 
1.  Booz-Allen and Hamilton (1998) Lowest rank among East Asian 
countries that also included 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and 
Japan. 
2.  Pricewaterhouse Coopers in cooperation 
with the Singapore Stock exchange 
(1999) 
Lowest ranking among countries 
in the Asia/Australia region. 
3. McKinsey and Company in cooperation 
with the Global Governance Forum 
(2000) 
Lowest rank among Asian 
countries that also included 
Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Similar results were also found in some recent corporate governance surveys conducted 
by the independent brokerage and investment group Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA), in cooperation with the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA). 
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These surveys assessed the quality of corporate governance practices in Asia Pacific 
markets. The criteria used to evaluate the quality of the corporate governance practices 
included corporate governance rules and practices, enforcement, the political and 
regulatory environment, accounting and auditing standards, as well as the overall 
corporate governance culture. As can be seen in Table 2.12, Indonesia has been 
continuously in last place, except for 2010 when Indonesia showed improvement and 
was ranked ahead of the Philippines. Further, Indonesia‟s corporate governance quality 
score increased by three points, possibly, indicating that corporate governance reform 
had started to make some progress.  
 
Table 2.12 Corporate Governance Quality Score  
 
 2010 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
Market R S R S R S R S R S R S 
Hong Kong 2 65 1 67 1 6.7 1 6.9 1 6.7 1 7.3 
Singapore 1 67 2 65 2 6.5 2 7.0 2 7.5 2 7.7 
India  7 49 3 56 3 5.6 3 6.1 3 6.2 3 6.6 
Taiwan 4 55 4 54 4 5.4 4 5.2 4 5.5 4 5.8 
Japan 3 57 5 52 5 5.2 - -  -  - 
Korea 9 45 6 49 6 4.9 5 5.0 5 5.8 5 5.5 
Malaysia 6 52 7 49 7 4.9 6 5.6 6 6.0 6 5.5 
Thailand 4 55 8 47 8 4.7 7 5.0 7 5.3 7 4.6 
China 7 49 9 45 9 4.5 8 4.4 8 4.8 8 4.3 
Philippines 11 37 10 41 10 4.1 9 4.6 9 5.0 9 3.7 
Indonesia 10 40 11 37 11 3.7 10 3.7 10 4.0 10 3.2 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2007 & 2010) 
and Daniri (2005). Notes: R= rank; S= corporate governance score quality in percentage. 
 
 
With regard to the elements of corporate governance quality in the survey, the 
enforcement aspect was the worst amongst all elements. For example, the 2010 survey 
showed an enforcement score of 28 percent, the lowest, compared to other countries 
(see Table 2.13).  However, the scores for corporate governance rules and practices and 
international generally accepted accounting principles (IGAAP), were relatively higher 
than the scores for other aspects. This means that, in terms of rules or standards, 
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Indonesia is quite good, and that the problem might be a lack of implementation due to 
the absence of strong law enforcement.  
 
Table 2.13 Market Categories Score (%) in 2010 
 
Market Total CG rules 
& 
practices 
Enforcement Political & 
regulatory 
IGAAP CG 
culture 
1.Singapore 67 65 60 69 88 53 
2.Hong 
Kong 
65 59 63 67 80 54 
3. Japan 57 45 53 62 75 53 
=4.Taiwan 55 50 47 56 78 46 
=4.Thailand 55 56 42 54 73 49 
6. Malaysia 52 49 38 60 80 32 
=7. India 49 46 36 54 63 43 
=7. China 49 47 36 56 75 30 
9. Korea  45 43 28 44 78 33 
10. 
Indonesia 
40 39 28 33 67 32 
11. 
Philippines 
37 35 15 37 75 25 
 
Source: Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2010) 
 
In cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank also concluded that corporate governance 
implementation in Indonesia lagged behind other countries in Asia and the South 
Pacific Region (World Bank, 2010). The two organisations assessed the compliance of 
the Indonesian corporate governance framework against the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance under the Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC) Financial Services Assessment Program (World Bank, 2010). Two assessments 
were done in Indonesia, in 2004 and 2010. The results indicated that, in some respects, 
the Indonesian corporate governance framework did not differ substantially from the 
OECD principles. In addition, Indonesia‟s score in 2010 had improved since the 
previous ROSC carried out in 2004, and had closed with regional pacesetters –
particularly Malaysia, Thailand and India (World Bank, 2010). However, adherence to 
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corporate governance regulations remained a problem, which was consistent with the 
2010 CLSA survey.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The development of corporate governance reveals an increasing trend to converge with 
the Anglo-American model. However, the implementation of this model in Asian 
countries has been criticised as inappropriate as it is applied in a different institutional 
and business environment in Asia. It is noted that important business characteristics in 
the Asian context, such as high concentrated family ownership and collusion between 
businesses and bureaucrats, may obstruct the implementation of the Anglo-American 
model. The weak law enforcement regime provides a motivation to examine why the 
mandatory adoption of the audit committee (an Anglo-American corporate governance 
mechanism) in Indonesia might not achieve the expected goal. In this regard, the 
determinants of compliance with corporate governance regulations and the question of 
whether compliance affects accounting outcomes provide interesting insight into the 
influence of the institutional setting in “transplanting” systems in emerging economies.  
 
In Chapter 3, the extant literature is divided into two main sections (determinants of 
compliance with audit committee rules, and the effect of audit committee effectiveness 
on financial report quality) and reviewed. The literature review covers prior studies in 
both developed countries and developing countries, particularly Indonesia. The review 
also identifies research gaps, and is followed by research questions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE EXTANT LITERATURE 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a review of extant literature related to the two main issues of the 
study: determinants of compliance with audit committee rules, and the effect of audit 
committee effectiveness on financial reporting quality. The literature review covers 
prior studies in both developed and developing countries and prior studies in Indonesia 
in particular. The organisation of the literature review follows the trend in audit 
committee research. During the phase when the establishment of audit committees was 
voluntary, researchers examined the determinants of audit committee formation. 
However, during the phase when audit committees were made mandatory, research 
shifted from a focus on the level of compliance with audit committee requirements to 
examine the possible association of audit committee characteristics and certain 
accounting consequences, such as financial reporting quality. Therefore, the first main 
section of this review (Section 3.3) discusses prior studies on audit committee 
compliance, and is divided into two sub-sections. Section 3.3.1 presents a review of 
prior studies concerning the level of compliance with audit committee rules, while 
Section 3.3.2 provides a review of prior studies concerning the determinants of 
compliance with audit committee rules. Meanwhile, the second main section of the 
literature review (Section 3.4) looks at prior studies on the association between audit 
committee characteristics and financial reporting quality. This second main section is 
also divided into two sub-sections: Section 3.4.1 presents prior studies in developed 
countries, while Section 3.4.2 presents prior studies in developing countries. The two 
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main sections are followed by the identification of several research gaps (Section 3.5), a 
section highlighting the research questions (Section 3.6), and conclusions (Section 3.7).  
 
3.2 THE COMPLIANCE WITH AUDIT COMMITTEE RULES AS THE FOCUS 
OF THE STUDY 
 
Among the corporate governance regulations issued by the Indonesian government, this 
study focuses on audit committee rules. As explained in Section 2.3.2.2, audit 
committees in Indonesia are relatively new (since 2000). In line with international 
trends, the Indonesian government, through regulatory bodies in the capital market (i.e., 
the BAPEPAM-LK and the IDX), has introduced audit committee reform by issuing 
numerous regulations. Indonesia‟s adoption of the audit committee (one of the Anglo-
American corporate governance mechanisms) was driven by international donors, 
namely the IMF and the World Bank. However, as discussed in Section 2.3.3, some 
unique business features in Indonesia might affect the country‟s implementation of 
Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, it is important to examine 
the level of compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules, as well 
as the circumstances associated with their compliance. In addition, as noted by several 
researchers (e.g., Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998; DeZoort, 1997; Haroen et al., 2005), the 
adoption of the audit committee may be primarily symbolic and more rhetorical than 
substantive. The effectiveness of audit committees in Indonesian public listed 
companies raises doubts as to whether the establishment of a committee might be 
cosmetic, merely to respond to rules issued by the BAPEPAM or the IDX. This sets the 
motivation for this study to examine audit committee rules and their implementation in 
the Indonesian setting.  
 
To detect whether the establishment of audit committees is for cosmetic purposes or not, 
this study examines the association between the compliance of public listed companies 
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with audit committee rules (which indicates audit committee effectiveness) and 
financial reporting quality. There are several reasons why the study selects financial 
reporting quality. First, financial reporting quality is selected as, theoretically, the audit 
committee plays a key role in reducing agency costs by overseeing the financial 
reporting process (Klein 2002a; Bedard et al., 2004; Archambeault et al., 2008). As 
noted by Bédard and Gendron (2010), the audit committee can improve financial 
reporting quality, either indirectly or directly (see Figure 3.1). Direct improvement is 
accomplished by overseeing the financial reporting process, while indirect improvement 
is accomplished through the audit committee‟s oversight of internal control and external 
auditing. Second, regulators consider strengthened financial reporting quality a desired 
effect of the audit committee (Bédard and Gendron, 2010). In addition, several literature 
reviews or meta-analyses done by some scholars (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 
2004; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; He, Labelle, Piot, and 
Thornton, 2009; Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Carcello et al., 2011a), provide evidence of 
rapid interest in the association of the audit committee with the quality of financial 
reporting. Third, most of the audit committees in Indonesia state that their duty is to 
review financial statements issued by the public listed companies, meaning that they 
have an oversight responsibility with regard to the financial reporting process. Having 
set the motivation for the study, the rest of this chapter explicates the extant audit 
committee literature, and identifies the research gaps justifying this study. 
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Figure 3.1 Audit Committee and Dimensions of Effectiveness 
 
 
Source: Bédard and Gendron (2010). 
 
3.3 SYNTHESIS OF PRIOR STUDIES ON THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE 
WITH AUDIT COMMITTEE RULES AND ITS DETERMINANTS  
 
The movement of countries toward the establishment of audit committees has attracted 
research on compliance issues. The details of such prior studies are summarised in 
Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix A. Table A.1 presents prior studies that examined 
compliance with audit committee rules in mandatory regimes, while Table A.2 presents 
prior studies with respect to non-mandatory regimes. Mandatory regimes are countries, 
such as the US, that mandate audit committee formation. Non-mandatory regimes are 
countries that do not mandate the establishment of the audit committee, as well as 
countries such as France, Germany, the UK, Australia and New Zealand that employ the 
comply and explain approach to compliance with corporate governance codes.  
 
3.3.1 Prior Studies on the Level of Compliance with Audit Committee Rules 
Prior studies on the level of compliance with audit committee rules have been done 
mostly in regimes such as the US and other countries that have a mandatory 
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requirement for audit committees. In the US, most of the prior studies were done in the 
period immediately after audit committee reforms such as the BRC (1999) and the SOX 
(2002). These include Carcello et al., 2002; Rezaee, Olibe, and Minmier, 2003; Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, and Neal, 2006; Pandit et al., 2005; Pandit, Subrahmanyam, and 
Conway, 2006; HassabElnaby, Said, and Wolfe, 2007; Lin, Kang, and Roline, 2009. 
These studies mostly examined the efficacy of the new requirements recommended by 
the BRC and the SOX. Some of these studies (e.g., Carcello et al., 2002; Carcello et al., 
2006; Pandit et al., 2006) solely examined the level of compliance in the post-audit 
committee reform period. Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Keinath and Walo, 2004; 
Pandit et al., 2005; Smith, 2006) compared the level of compliance in the pre-reform 
and post-reform periods. These prior studies mostly used descriptive statistics in their 
analysis. In general, the results indicated that the level of compliance of public listed 
companies in the US with new audit committee requirements was high. In other words, 
there was no variation across companies in their compliance with the mandatory audit 
committee requirement (see Carcello et al., 2002; Pandit et al., 2005). The mandatory 
requirement for the establishment of an audit committee by all types of public listed 
companies (one size fits all), supported by strong law enforcement, contributed to the 
high compliance. 
 
As in the US, prior studies in developing countries with mandatory regimes, such as 
India, Indonesia and Malaysia, were also done to ascertain the level of compliance of 
public listed companies with the new audit committee requirements issued by the stock 
exchange. As discussed in Section 2.2.4, some stock exchanges around the world have 
adopted mandatory audit committee requirements. The audit committee requirements 
attracted some scholars in developing countries (e.g., Sori, Mohamad, and Hamid, 2001; 
Utama and Leonardo, 2004; Haron et al., 2005; Puri, Trehan, and Kakkar, 2010) to 
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examine the compliance of public listed companies. For example, Sori et al. (2001) and 
Haron et al. (2005) examined the level of compliance of public listed companies in 
Malaysia with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange rules on audit committees. In 
Indonesia, Utama and Leonardo (2004) examined the adherence of public listed 
companies in Indonesia to IDX rules. Meanwhile, other scholars (i.e., Al-Mudhaki and 
Joshi, 2004; Puri et al., 2010; Chatterjee, 2011) investigated the level of compliance of 
Indian public listed companies with audit committee requirements. In general, these 
studies found a high level of compliance among public listed companies with audit 
committee formation requirements, such as a minimum number of members, member 
and chairperson independence, and the financial expertise of members. The 
effectiveness of the audit committees, however, was seriously questioned (see Sori et al., 
2001; Al-Mudhaki and Joshi, 2004; Utama and Leonardo, 2004; Sori, Deris, and Saad, 
2005; Sori, Mohamad, Saad, 2007; Chatterjee, 2011). The findings suggested that audit 
committees in developing countries were perhaps just complying in form, and not in 
substance. 
 
In non-mandatory regimes, prior studies on the level of compliance with audit 
committee rules are limited (e.g., Al–Twaijry, Brierley, and Gwilliam, 2002; Joshi and 
Wakil, 2004). Al–Twaijry et al. (2002) examined the level of compliance of public 
listed companies in Saudi Arabia with audit committee regulations recommended by the 
Saudi government. Likewise, Joshi and Wakil (2004) examined the level of compliance 
of public listed companies in Bahrain with the BRC recommendations. In both countries, 
most public listed companies formed audit committees as recommended by the 
regulator. Their compliance, however, seemed to be just to present a favourable 
appearance. This finding is consistent with that of other studies in developing countries. 
Meanwhile, other researchers in non-mandatory regimes, such as the UK, New Zealand 
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and Australia, were more interested in studying the determinants or incentives for audit 
committee formation rather than the compliance level. The absence of mandatory 
requirements for the establishment of audit committees in these countries provided an 
opportunity for researchers to focus on examining factors related to the formation of the 
audit committee by some companies.  
 
3.3.2 Determinants of Compliance with Audit Committee Rules 
Studies on the determinants of compliance with audit committee rules have been widely 
conducted by scholars in non-mandatory regimes rather than in mandatory regimes (e.g., 
Pincus, Rusbarsky, and Wong, 1989; Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993; Menon and  
Williams, 1994; Willekens, Bauwhede, and Gaeremynck, 2004; Chau and Leung, 2006; 
Rainsbury et al., 2008; Chen, Kilgore, and Radich, 2009;  Sharma, Naiker, and Lee, 
2009). Most of these studies examined the incentives that drove companies to 
voluntarily form audit committees. These prior studies largely relied on agency theory 
that argued that audit committees were formed to reduce agency costs (Turley and 
Zaman, 2004; Piot, 2004). Thus, these prior studies mostly employed factors related to 
agency costs (i.e., agency cost of equity, agency cost of debt), and board characteristics. 
The agency cost of equity included ownership percentage by directors (e.g., Pincus et al., 
1989; Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993), block holders (e.g., Utama and Leonardo, 2006; 
Rainsbury et al., 2008), and the percentage of shares owned by insiders (e.g., Piot, 
2004). Meanwhile, agency cost of debt included leverage represented by ratios such as 
the debt to asset ratio (e.g., Menon and Williams, 1994), long-term debt to size ratio 
(e.g., Pincus et al., 1989) and the total liabilities to size ratio (e.g., Bradbury, 1990). In 
terms of board characteristics, the most popular attribute was board independence (e.g., 
Pincus et al., 1989; Collier, 1993; Willekens et al., 2004; Rainsbury et al., 2008). As 
suggested by agency theory, a higher proportion of independent directors will be more 
80 
 
effective in monitoring a board of directors. This was confirmed by corporate 
governance reforms, such as the SOX (2002), that sought to strengthen the role of the 
board of directors as representatives of the shareholders by increasing the independence 
of directors (Finegold, Benson, Hecht, 2007). In addition to the board characteristics 
mentioned, other board characteristics were used in prior studies. These included board 
size (e.g., Carson, 2002; Klein, 2002a; Piot, 2004; Willekens et al., 2004), director 
ownership (e.g., Pincus et al., 1989; Bradbury, 1990; Rainsbury et al., 2008), CEO 
dominance (e.g., Collier, 1993; Chen et al., 2009) and director financial expertise (e.g., 
Davidson III, Xie, and Xu, 2004; Baxter, 2010). It should be noted that the 
characteristic of politically connected directors/commissioners, which is a common 
feature in Indonesia, has not been examined in the extant literature.  
 
Besides the determinants of audit committee formation,  some studies in non-mandatory 
regimes have examined the determinants of other aspects of the audit committee, such 
as audit committee meeting frequency (Sharma et al., 2009; Greco, 2011) and audit 
committee alignment caused by the 8
th
 European Directive  (Braiotta and Zhou, 2008). 
These studies also employed factors very similar to those used in the study of the 
determinants of audit committee formation, such as board independence, board size, 
firm size and leverage.  
 
In mandatory regimes, a few prior studies in both developed and developing countries 
have examined the determinants of compliance with audit committee rules (i.e., Klein, 
2002b; Haron et al., 2005; Braiotta and Zhou, 2006). In the US, Klein (2002b) 
investigated the economic determinants of the independence of the audit committee as 
mandated by the NYSE and the NASDAQ listing requirements. Other studies in the US 
(i.e., Braiotta, 2004; Braiotta and Zhou, 2006) have examined the effects of audit 
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committee reforms, such as the BRC and the SOX, on audit committee alignment. 
Meanwhile, other scholars in the US and Canada (i.e., Beasley and Salterio, 2001; 
Carcello et al., 2002) were more interested in examining the determinants of the 
voluntary aspects of the audit committee that exceed the minimum mandated 
requirements. For example, Carcello et al. (2002) investigated the voluntary disclosures 
of the audit committee in a mandatory setting in the US. While scholars in the US have 
not been interested in examining the determinants of audit committee compliance given 
that the compliance level of US public listed companies does not vary across companies 
(Carcello et al., 2002), such studies have been limited in developing countries, where 
law enforcement is weaker than in the US. For example, Haron et al. (2005) examined 
whether financial distress affected the compliance of listed companies with the audit 
committee rules of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.  
 
A few prior studies on audit committee rule compliance used an index consisting of a 
set of audit committee requirements (e.g., Braiotta, 2004; Haron et al., 2005; Utama and 
Leonardo, 2006; Rainsbury et al., 2008; Baxter, 2010). Except for Haron et al. (2005) 
and Utama and Leonardo (2006), most of these studies developed indexes that only 
emphasised the membership aspect of audit committees. For example, Braiotta (2004) 
developed an audit committee index consisting of audit committee membership as a 
benchmark for examining the compliance of non-US registrants with audit committee 
requirements in the US. Similarly, Rainsbury et al. (2008) developed an audit 
committee index that consisted of audit committee best practice membership guidelines 
in New Zealand. The Rainsbury approach was then used by Baxter (2010) to measure 
the audit quality of public listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
Meanwhile, a more comprehensive index was used by Haron et al. (2005) and Utama 
and Leonardo (2006). Haron et al. (2005) used an audit committee index extracted from 
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the audit committee rules of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. This index consisted of 
membership, job duties and disclosure. In another study, Utama and Leonardo (2006) 
developed two indexes (an audit membership index and job duties index) to examine the 
effectiveness of the audit committees of public listed companies on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange. A detailed comparison of the use of audit committee indexes by researchers 
is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
In terms of results, prior studies on the determinants of compliance with audit 
committee rules, both in mandatory regimes and non-mandatory regimes, have been 
inconclusive. For example, in the US, Braiotta and Zhou (2006) found that company 
size and leverage had a positive association with compliance with audit committee rules. 
In contrast, Klein (2002b) revealed that company size and leverage did not have any 
significant association with the independence of the audit committee. In non-mandatory 
regimes, Pincus et al. (1989) and Turpin and DeZoort (1997) found that company size 
had a positive significant association with audit committee formation. However, 
Bradbury (1990) and Menon and Williams (1994) found no significant association 
between company size and audit committee formation. In terms of the agency cost of 
debt, Collier (1993) and Adams (1997) found that leverage was associated with audit 
committee formation. In contrast, Pincus et al. (1989) and Turpin and DeZoort (1998) 
revealed no significant association. Regarding board characteristics, Rainsbury et al. 
(2008) and Baxter (2010) found that the proportion of independent directors on board of 
directors was associated with audit committee formation, whereas Piot (2004) did not 
find a significant association between the proportion of independent directors and audit 
committee formation in France. The inconsistent findings indicate that the dominance of 
the agency theory may have constrained the researchers to some extent from 
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considering other factors, such as the institutional and organisational context in which 
the audit committees operated (Turley and Zaman, 2004).  
 
The predominance of the Anglo-American agency theory may have led prior studies to 
ignore factors that are relevant in developing countries, such as family owners as 
controlling shareholders and politically connected directors. The agency problem in a 
developing country is different from that in a developed one. The agency problem in a 
developed country arises due to a conflict between the managers and shareholders 
(agency problem type 1), whereas the agency problem in a developing country is an 
agency problem type 2 and refers to the conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008; Jaggi et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011).   
Consequently, the factors associated with the agency problem type 1 are different from 
those of the agency problem type 2. The agency problem type 2 has characteristics such 
as high concentrated ownership, weak legal protection of minority shareholders, an 
inactive market for corporate control, and ineffective boards of directors (Young et al., 
2008).    
 
3.4 SYNTHESIS OF PRIOR STUDIES ON AUDIT COMMITTEES AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY  
 
A summary of prior studies that examined the association of audit committee attributes 
and financial reporting quality is shown in Table A.3 and Table A.4 in Appendix A. 
Table A.3 presents prior studies in developed countries, while Table A.4 presents prior 
studies in developing countries. These tables provide a broad picture of the research 
trend in both developed and developing countries, with an emphasis on audit committee 
attributes and some proxies of financial reporting quality used by prior studies.  
Therefore, these tables only present the audit committee attributes, the proxy of 
financial reporting quality, and the audit committee significant variable.  
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3.4.1 Prior Studies in Developed Countries 
In developed countries, most prior studies on the association of audit committee 
attributes and financial reporting quality were completed by researchers during the 
mandatory period of audit committee formation, rather than during the voluntary period. 
In the period of voluntary audit committee formation, few studies explored the 
association between audit committee attributes and financial reporting quality. Except 
for Beasley (1996) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), most of the prior studies 
in the voluntary era were done by researchers outside the US, in the UK, Australia, 
France, Spain and New Zealand (e.g., Koh, Laplante, and Tong, 2007; Osma and 
Noguer, 2007; Piot and Janin, 2007; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Rainsbury, Bradbury, and 
Cahan, 2009; Song and Windram, 2009). Since the mandatory implementation of the 
audit committee occurred later in Europe, the UK, New Zealand and Australia than in 
the US, some recent publications by researchers in these countries still focus on the 
effect of the voluntary establishment of the audit committee on financial reporting 
quality. On the other hand, studies concerning the effect of voluntary audit committee 
formation on financial reporting quality were done by US researchers in the 1990s, 
when the audit committee was not yet mandatory there (see Table A.3 in Appendix A). 
Since the year 2000, and particularly after the issuance of the BRC recommendations, 
there has been a growing volume of studies on the association between audit committee 
characteristics recommended by audit committee reforms, and financial reporting 
quality in the US (e.g., Anderson, Deli, and Gillan, 2003; Xie, Davidson III, and DaDalt, 
2003; Bédard et al., 2004; Li, Kao, and Bandyopadhyay, 2010; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and 
Navissi, 2010). These studies attempted to examine the efficacy of the 
recommendations of the audit committee reforms (i.e., BRC and SOX) on increasing 
audit committee effectiveness by using several proxies for financial reporting quality, 
such as earnings management, restatements and fraudulent financial statements. For 
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example, Abbott, Park, and Parker (2000) examined whether two key audit committee 
attributes mandated by the BRC, namely, independence and activity, reduced the 
likelihood of fraudulent or aggressive financial statement actions. In a further study, 
Abbott, Parker, and Peter (2004) examined whether audit committee attributes 
recommended by the BRC, such as independence, size, financial expertise and the 
number of meetings, were associated with financial misstatements.  
 
In line with strengthening the functions of audit committees, the number of attributes 
examined by prior studies has increased. In the voluntary period, the dominant audit 
committee attribute was the presence of an audit committee (e.g., Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2005). After the audit committee was 
made mandatory and its role was strengthened, researchers examined additional audit 
committee attributes, such as financial expertise, frequency and number of meetings, 
and committee size. More recently, prior studies have also focused on audit committee 
industry expertise (i.e., Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorty, and Wright, 2010; Cohen et al., 
2011). They examined whether audit committee industry expertise improved audit 
committee effectiveness in overseeing financial reporting. In terms of findings, the 
results of prior studies are inconclusive. For example, some studies (e.g., Abbott et al., 
2004; Archambeault et al., 2008) revealed that the proportion of independent directors 
on the audit committee was negatively and significantly associated with restatements. 
However, some studies (e.g., Lin, Li, and Yang, 2006; Romanus, Maher, and Fleming, 
2008) did not find such significant findings. The inconclusive results found in this 
literature review are consistent with the findings of prior literature reviews (e.g., Turley 
and Zaman, 2004; Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; Bédard and Gendron, 2010).  
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As noted by Turley and Zaman (2004), audit committee characteristics alone, which are 
drawn from the agency theory framework, are unlikely to improve financial reporting 
quality. Institutional and organisational contexts might influence the effectiveness of the 
audit committee since the committee does not operate in a vacuum. The researcher 
needs to consider the interaction of the audit committee and the company‟s other 
internal structures. In addition, they suggested that the personality of committee 
members, particularly the audit committee chair, is an important factor. In line with 
these suggestions, some recent studies have examined the interaction of the audit 
committee with other governance structures in the company, and have considered the 
personality of audit committee members as well. For example, Cohen et al. (2010) 
examined the association between audit committee member industry expertise and 
auditor expertise and restatements in the US. Subsequently, Cohen et al. (2011) 
investigated whether audit committee member industry expertise, combined with audit 
committee member financial expertise, contributed to a lower likelihood of restatements. 
Meanwhile, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) examined whether the interaction of the two different 
types of audit committee expertise (i.e., accounting and finance expertise) with some 
audit committee characteristics (e.g., independence, multiple directorships, tenure) was 
associated with earnings quality. In terms of CEO characteristics, Carcello et al. (2011b) 
investigated whether the chief executive officer‟s involvement in selecting board 
members reduced audit committee effectiveness. In another study, Lisic et al. (2011) 
investigated whether CEO power, which consists of a combination of several CEO 
attributes, moderated the association between audit committee financial expertise and 
restatements. In terms of the personality of audit committee members, some studies 
(e.g., Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui, 2007; Sun, Liu, and Lan, 2011; Thiruvadi and Huang, 
2011) examined the presence of female directors on audit committees. 
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Most of the prior studies employed single audit committee characteristics (e.g., the 
presence of an audit committee, independence, members with financial expertise). 
Although many aspects of audit committees were examined, prior studies examined 
these aspects separately. Only a few studies employed an audit committee index to 
measure the effectiveness of audit committees (e.g., Menon and Williams, 1994; Abbott 
et al., 2000; Rainsbury et al., 2009; Smaili and Labelle, 2009; Li et al., 2010; Sharma, 
Sharma, and Ananthanarayanan, 2011). Furthermore, the indexes of these studies 
focused merely on membership requirements. Menon and Williams (1994), who were 
followed by Abbott et al. (2000), used an index consisting of two elements: audit 
committee independence and the number of committee meetings. Similarly, other prior 
studies (e.g., Rainsbury et al., 2009; Smaili and Labelle, 2009; Li et al., 2010) 
developed an index consisting of two membership requirements, namely, audit 
committee member independence and the financial expertise of members.  
 
The index of Rainsbury et al. (2009) is considerably similar to the index in their prior 
study on compliance of public listed companies with audit committee best practice 
membership guidelines (i.e., Rainsbury et al., 2008). Meanwhile, Sharma et al. (2011) 
used an index that consisted of three membership requirements: committee member 
independence, financial expertise of members and independent committee chairman. 
The details of each index are shown in Table 3.1. 
 
In terms of a financial reporting quality proxy, studies in developed countries have used 
various proxies. The most popular proxy for financial reporting quality has been 
earnings management (see Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Yang and Krishnan, 
2005). The second most popular proxy has been restatements that have been examined 
by scholars in the US (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Baber, Kang, and Liang, 2005; Arthaud-
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Day, Certo, and Dalton, 2006; Archambeault et al., 2008; Romanus et al., 2008; 
Marciukaityte, Szewczyk, and Varma, 2009). Besides these proxies, some scholars have 
used other proxies of financial reporting quality, such as fraudulent financial reporting 
(e.g., Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides, 2000; Farber, 2005; Owens-Jackson, 
Robinson, and Shelton, 2009), aggressive accounting choices (e.g., Rainsbury et al., 
2009), perceived financial reporting quality (e.g., Felo, Krishnamurthy, and Solieeri, 
2003), conservatism (e.g., Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) and earnings 
informativeness (e.g., Petra, 2007). 
 
3.4.2 Prior Studies in Developing Countries 
Like the developed countries, most prior studies on the association of audit committee 
attributes and financial reporting quality in developing countries were conducted in the 
mandatory period rather than in the voluntary period. As depicted in Table A.4, only a 
few prior studies on the association between audit committee attributes and financial 
reporting quality were conducted in the voluntary period (i.e., Chen, Elder, and Hsieh, 
2007; Al-Abbas, 2009; Lo, Wong, and Firth, 2010; Zhizhong et al., 2011). These 
researchers come from developing countries where mandatory audit committee 
formation was recently introduced. These include Taiwan (2006), China (2009) and 
Saudi Arabia (2009).  On the other hand, researchers in other developing countries (i.e., 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand), where the implementation of 
mandatory audit committee formation occurred much earlier, focused on the efficacy of 
the attributes of the audit committee required by the regulator in increasing its 
effectiveness (see Table A.4). 
 
In terms of audit committee attributes, prior studies in developing countries differed 
slightly from those in developed countries. As can be seen in Table A.4, the most 
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prominent audit committee attribute in developing countries during the voluntary period 
was the presence of an audit committee; this is similar to prior studies in developed 
countries. However, several recent studies conducted in the mandatory period of the 
audit committee – particularly in Indonesia – still use the presence of the audit 
committee as the main variable of interest (e.g., Siallagan and Machfoedz, 2006; Siregar 
and Utama, 2008; Murhadi, 2010; Siagian and Tresnaningsih, 2011). Nevertheless, 
some prior studies in developing countries employed multiple attributes of audit 
committees. Some prior studies examined the audit committee attributes separately (e.g., 
Saleh, Iskandar, and Rahmat, 2007; Ismail, Iskandar, and Rahmat, 2008; Ibrahim, 
Raman, and Saidin, 2009; Lin, Hutchinson, and Percy, 2009; Wardhani and Joseph, 
2010). In recent publications, some prior studies in developing countries employed an 
audit committee index that consisted of several audit committee attributes. For example, 
Akarak and Ussahawanitchakit (2010) employed an audit committee index that 
consisted of the job functions of audit committees in Thailand. In Indonesia, some prior 
studies (e.g., Utama and Leonardo, 2006; Hermawan, 2009; Ika and Ghazali, 2012; 
Sarumaha and Hermawan, 2013) employed audit committee indexes as proxies for audit 
committee effectiveness. Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013) employed an audit 
committee effectiveness index developed by Hermawan (2009). This recent 
development indicates that audit committee research in developing countries tends to 
follow the audit committee research trend in developed countries. 
 
In terms of the interaction variable, a few recent prior studies in developing countries 
have examined the interaction of the audit committee with other corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, Ismail et al. (2008) examined the association of audit 
committee attributes with external auditors in the Malaysian environment. In Indonesia, 
Jaswadi et al. (2012) examined the interaction between the audit committee and the 
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board of directors, board of commissioners, and auditor. It can be concluded that the 
interaction between the audit committee and family ownership has not been examined 
by prior studies in developing countries. 
 
The proxies for financial reporting quality used by prior studies in developing countries 
also differ slightly from those in developed countries. From the view of the type of 
financial reporting quality proxy used, there is no difference between studies in 
developing countries and developed countries. As depicted in Table A.4., the studies in 
developing countries employed proxies such as earnings management, restatements and 
conservatism for financial reporting quality. However, in terms of the popularity of 
proxies used, there is a slight difference: the most popular financial reporting quality 
proxy used in developing countries was earnings management, which is similar to prior 
studies in developed countries. The difference is in the second rank: although 
restatements were ranked as the second most popular proxy in studies in the developed 
countries, they were not widely used by prior studies in developing countries. This 
proxy was only used by two prior studies (i.e., Abdullah et al., 2010; Zhizhong et al., 
2011), similar to the proxy of conservatism (i.e., Susiana and Herawaty, 2007; 
Wardhani, 2008). Meanwhile, other proxies were used in single studies. These included 
recipients of financial reporting awards (Ismail et al., 2008), accuracy of unaudited 
year-end quarterly accounts (Ibrahim et al., 2009), financial statement efficiency 
(Akarak and Ussahawanitchakit, 2010) and manipulation of transfer prices in related-
party sales transactions (Lo et al., 2010).  
 
Similar to the studies in developed countries, the results of prior studies on the 
association of audit committee attributes and financial reporting quality in developing 
countries were also inconclusive. For example, Jaggi and Leung (2007) revealed that the 
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presence of audit committees was negatively and significantly associated with earnings 
management in Hong Kong, whereas Siregar and Utama (2008) found an insignificant 
association in Indonesia. In another conflicting finding, Saleh et al. (2007) found that 
the proportion of independent directors on audit committees was negatively and 
significantly associated with annual earnings management in Malaysia, whereas a study 
done by Rahman and Ali (2006) revealed insignificant findings.  
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Table 3.1 Audit Committee Indexes Used in Prior Studies 
 
Element of index Studies on compliance with 
audit committee rules 
Studies on audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting 
quality 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Membership                
Independent member          -     - 
Financial expertise of member      - -   -      
Chairman is an independent director -  - - - - - - - - -  - - - 
Consists of at least three members -  - - - - - - - - - -    
Age of member                
Job Duties                
AC Charter -  - - - - - - - - - -   - 
Review financial report - -  - - - - - -  - -    
Review internal auditor work - -  - - - - - -  - -    
Review compliance with regulations - -  - - - - - -  - -    
Review risk management - - - - - - - - -  - -   - 
Interaction with external auditor - -  - - - - - -  - -    
Number of meetings - - - - -   - - - - -    
Disclosure                
AC activities disclosure -  - - - - - - - - - -  -  
AC meetings disclosure -  - - - - - - - - - -  -  
Voluntary disclosure - - - - - - - - - - - -   - 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
Notes: 1=Braiotta (2004); 2=Haroen  et al. (2005); 3=Utama & Leonardo
  
(2006); 4=Rainsbury et al. (2008); 5=Baxter (2010); 6=Menon & Williams (1994); 
7=Abbott et al. (2000); 8=Rainsbury et al. (2009); 9= Smaili & Labelle (2009); 10=Akarak & Ussahawawanitchakit (2010); 11=Li et al. (2010); 12=Sharma et al. 
(2011); 13=Zaman et al. (2011); 14=Ika &Ghazali (2012); 15=Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013).  
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3.5 GAPS IN THE EXTANT LITERATURE  
Based on the discussions in above sections, the following gaps in the extant literature 
have been identified.  
 
3.5.1 Lack of Prior Studies on the Determinants of Compliance with Audit 
Committee Rules in Mandatory Regimes  
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, most prior studies of the determinants of compliance with 
audit committee rules have been done by researchers in non-mandatory regimes, such as 
the UK, Australia and New Zealand, whereas prior studies in mandatory regimes, such 
as the US, are rare. It seems that scholars in mandatory regimes, such as the US, are not 
interested in examining the determinants of compliance as law enforcement has resulted 
in a high level of compliance. As evidenced, some scholars (i.e., Carcello et al., 2002; 
Pandit et al., 2005) revealed that the compliance of public listed companies with the 
mandatory audit committee requirement did not vary across companies in the US. As a 
result, researchers in the US have been more interested in examining voluntary audit 
committee attributes rather than mandatory requirements. Notwithstanding, studies on 
the determinants of compliance in mandatory regimes might be important for 
developing countries such as Indonesia, which is known to have good regulations, but 
where law enforcement is weak (Patrick, 2001; Lindsey, 2004; Dercon, 2007). Thus, the 
audit committee rules issued by the BAPEPAM do not guarantee a high level of 
compliance by public listed companies. Furthermore, the audit committee is an Anglo-
American corporate governance mechanism that might not be appropriate for the 
Indonesian environment, as Indonesia has different characteristics than Anglo-American 
countries. These characteristics include high concentrated ownership in the hands of 
families, collusion between businesses and politicians and weak legal enforcement.   
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3.5.2 Lack of Longitudinal Studies on the Determinants of Compliance with Audit 
Committee Rules  
 
From Table A.1 and Table A.2, studies using panel data for examining compliance with 
audit committee rules are limited. Most prior studies on audit committee compliance 
and its determinants employed cross sectional data. Even though some studies collected 
data for several periods, these studies used pooled regression in the data analysis (e.g., 
Willekens et al., 2004; Braiotta and Zhou, 2006). Meanwhile, as suggested by Turley 
and Zaman (2007), a longitudinal study, which focuses on the organisational and 
institutional context of audit committee operations, would enable examination of 
significant changes in the regulatory environment due to current structures and 
processes. In addition, panel data could be very useful for evaluating the impact of 
certain events or policies (Wooldridge, 2009). 
 
3.5.3 Limited Comprehensive Studies on the Determinants of Compliance and 
Their Effect on Financial Reporting Quality 
 
Studies that simultaneously examined the level of compliance with audit committee 
rules and its effect on financial reporting quality are limited. As depicted in Appendix A, 
most prior studies examined either the determinants of compliance, or the effect of 
compliance on financial reporting quality. Only Braiotta and Zhou (2008) 
simultaneously examined the determinants of compliance with audit committee rules, 
and the impact of compliance on financial reporting quality. In the first stage of their 
study, they examined the determinants of the compliance of European companies listed 
in the US with audit committee rules. In the second stage, they examined the impact of 
the compliance on financial reporting quality by using earnings management as a proxy. 
Meanwhile, this type of study is important in Indonesia. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
given Indonesia‟s weak legal enforcement, it would be interesting to know what factors 
are associated with the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee 
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rules. In addition, as noted by several researchers (e.g., Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998; 
DeZoort, 1997; Haron et al., 2005), the adoption of an audit committee may be 
primarily symbolic and more rhetorical than substantive. The establishment of the audit 
committee in the early periods tended to show a passive cosmetic compliance (Spira, 
1988). Thus, it is possible that the compliance of Indonesian public listed companies 
with audit committee rules in the earlier periods of implementation, as documented in 
formal company documents such as the annual reports, does not reflect real practice or 
is just symbolic. By simultaneously examining the determinants of compliance and the 
effect of the compliance on financial reporting quality, one is able to provide a more 
holistic picture of the implementation of audit committee rules in Indonesia.    
 
3.5.4 The Dominance of the Agency Theory Ignores the Institutional Context 
Most prior studies, with respect to both the determinants of compliance and the effect of 
the compliance on financial reporting, derived their variables based on the Anglo-
American agency problem (agency problem type 1), such as agency cost of equity, 
agency cost of debt and board independence. Given that the agency problem in a 
developing country is different from that in a developed country, the application of the 
variables drawn from the Anglo-American corporate governance studies to studies in 
developing countries might not be appropriate (Young et al., 2008). As a result, other 
relevant institutional factors in developing countries, such as family owners as 
controlling shareholders, foreign ownership, and collusion between businesses and 
politicians have been ignored by most prior studies. These factors are explicated further 
next.  
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3.5.4.1 Family Owners as Controlling Shareholders 
In the case of prior studies examining the association between audit committee 
attributes and financial reporting quality, studies related to compliance with audit 
committee rules are limited. Amongst the studies that examined compliance with 
corporate governance codes, very few examined the association of family control with 
the level of compliance. In terms of the determinants of compliance, Chau and Leung 
(2006) examined the effect of family ownership on audit committee formation in Hong 
Kong. They found that different levels of family ownership have different effects on 
audit committee formation. Meanwhile, Kabbach De Castro and Crespi Cladera (2011) 
revealed that firms with greater levels of family shareholding had lower compliance 
with the corporate governance code than firms with lower levels of family shareholding. 
In terms of the effect of family control on financial reporting quality, only a limited 
number of studies have explored the association between family ownership and some 
proxies of financial reporting quality, such as earnings management (e.g., Wang, 2006; 
Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Jaggi et al., 2009; Jiraporn and Dadalt, 2009), earnings 
manipulation sanctioned by SEC (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996) and restatements (e.g., 
Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Donoher, 2009).  
 
There are three approaches to indicate the influence of family. The first approach uses 
the founder-CEO as a proxy for family control. Some scholars (e.g., Dechow et al., 
1996; Abbott et al., 2004) argue that the CEO position held by the family founder might 
lead to less accountability to the board because the founder has large informational 
advantages about the company‟s control system. In addition, the founder might not 
appreciate the value of monitoring and may be unwilling to expend significant efforts 
on this function (Abbott et al., 2004). The second approach uses the presence of family 
members on boards as a proxy; this was originally used by Anderson and Reeb (2003). 
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This approach does not focus solely on the chairman of the board or the CEO and 
scholars usually look at the presence of one or more family members on the boards to 
determine whether or not family influence exists. In the third approach, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) suggested an alternative measurement using the total percentage of shares 
owned by the family. This measurement approach has been used by some prior studies 
in earnings management (e.g., Wang, 2006; Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Jiraporn and Dadalt, 
2009). 
 
In terms of results, the examination of the effect of family control on financial reporting 
quality has yielded inconclusive results. For example, Dechow et al. (1996) found that 
the presence of the founder-CEO was positively associated with earnings manipulation 
sanctioned by the SEC. Similarly, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Donoher (2009) 
revealed that the founder-CEO was positively associated with restatements. In contrast, 
Abbott et al. (2004) found an insignificant association between the founder-CEO and 
restatements.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the effect of family control on compliance with audit 
committee rules, or even the corporate governance code, has not been widely examined 
by prior studies. Thus, there are no prior studies that examine the effect of different 
types of family control (i.e., family is the controlling shareholder with family 
member(s) on the board of directors versus family is the sole controlling shareholder 
with no family member(s) on the board). In addition, the inconclusive findings of 
previous studies concerning the association between family control and financial 
reporting quality provide an interesting subject for further study. 
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3.5.4.2. Foreign Institutional Investors 
Foreign institutional investors are widely argued to be an alternative corporate 
governance mechanism in emerging countries (Andersen et al., 2001; Ananchotikul, 
2006). The participation of foreign institutional investors might lead to changes in 
management and corporate governance as they impose their own company policies, 
internal reporting systems, and information disclosure principles on acquired firms in 
developing countries (OECD, 2002). Firms with foreign participation are seen as agents 
of transformation in diffusing specific assets, knowledge and culture, including 
governance practices, in developing countries (Chevalier, Prasetyantoko, and Rokhim, 
2006). As foreign institutional investors come from outside the domestic social network 
from which the institutional norms of behaviour are generated, they are more likely to 
push for transparency and push governments in emerging economies to improve 
minority shareholder protection (Peng, 2003).   
 
The association between foreign institutional investors and corporate governance in 
emerging economies has been attracting research attention since the late 1990s. This is 
in line with the wave of corporate governance reforms in emerging economies that 
provide a favourable environment for international investment (such as better minority 
shareholder protection).  In general, prior studies on the role of foreign institutional 
investors with respect to corporate governance can be grouped according to two main 
research themes. The first theme covers studies that examined the determinants of 
decisions by foreign institutional investors to invest in emerging economies (e.g., 
Andersen et al., 2001; Chipalkatti, Le, and Rishi, 2007; Dam, Scholtens, and Sterken, 
2007; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Chien, 2008; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Leuz, 
Lins, and Warnock, 2010; Kim, Eppler-Kim, Kim, and Byun, 2010). The second theme 
includes studies that examined the impact of foreign institutional investor ownership on 
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firm performance. (e.g., Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; Douma, George, and  Kabir, 2006; 
Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Omran, 2009; Gürbüz, Aybars, and Kutlu, 2010). Meanwhile, 
other studies attempted to examine the effect of foreign institutional investors on other 
issues, such as the monitoring role (i.e., Khanna and Palepu, 1999), capital structure 
choice (i.e., Chevalier et al., 2006; Gurunlu and Gursoy, 2010), corporate governance 
quality (i.e., Evana, Andriyanto, and Marbun, 2007), the relationship between auditor 
opinion and probability of default (i.e., Ting, Yen and Chiu, 2008), the relationship 
between investment in research & development and product diversification, and 
executive compensation (i.e., Yoshikawa,  Rasheed, and Del Brio, 2010), and dividend 
policy (i.e., Jeon, Lee, and Moffett, 2010; Kim, Sul, and Kang, 2010). In terms of 
compliance studies, only two prior studies examined the association between foreign 
institutional ownership and compliance with corporate governance codes (i.e., 
Ananchotikul, 2006; Bianchi et al., 2010). Only one study, by Ananchotikul (2006), 
examined the role of foreign investors in emerging economies (i.e., Thailand), whereas 
Bianchi et al. (2010) examined the role of foreign institutional ownership on corporate 
governance practice in Italy. In terms of compliance with audit committee rules, no 
prior studies have examined the association between foreign institutional investors and 
compliance with audit committee rules.  
 
In addition, the studies that examined the role of foreign institutional investors have 
shown inconclusive findings. Most prior studies revealed that foreign institutional 
investors had a positive impact on corporate governance in emerging countries. For 
example, Khanna and Palepu (1999) found that foreign institutional investors were 
better than domestic institutional investors in the monitoring function in India. Likewise, 
Chevalier et al. (2006) found that Indonesian firms controlled by foreign investors were 
essentially more prudent in their financing policies than firms controlled by domestic 
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investors. In contrast, Ananchotikul (2006) revealed that foreign institutional investors 
(not industrial joint ventures) had a significant effect on corporate governance 
improvement, whereas foreign industrial owners (joint venture firms) with large 
shareholdings had a negative significant effect on corporate governance practice. In 
another study, Evana et al. (2007) found that there was no significant association 
between foreign ownership and the quality of corporate governance in Indonesia‟s 
public listed companies. 
 
In terms of measuring the foreign institutional investor variable, all prior studies used 
the percentage of common shares held by foreign investors, which might not be 
appropriate for the Indonesian environment. As noted by some researchers (i.e., 
Claessens, Djankov, Lang, 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002), East Asian firms, including 
those in Indonesia, are generally associated with a complicated pyramidal and cross-
holding ownership structure. Thus, it is possible that Indonesians might be the ultimate 
owners of foreign institutional investors (see Section 2.3.3). The aforementioned 
method of defining foreign ownership might have been responsible for the conflicting 
findings of prior studies in Indonesia. Clearly, it is vital to trace the ultimate ownership 
of foreign investors to ensure that only genuine foreign investors are included. 
 
3.5.4.3 Politically Connected Independent Directors/Commissioners 
Prior studies on the determinants of compliance with audit committee rules by public 
listed companies did not examine politically connected directors/commissioners as a 
variable of interest. Most prior studies on the determinants of compliance employed 
board characteristics such as board independence, CEO dominance (i.e., CEO duality) 
and board member financial expertise, based on agency theory. Therefore, the presence 
of politically connected directors/commissioners, which is not based on agency theory, 
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received little attention in prior studies. A company‟s selection of a politician as an 
independent director/commissioner might be intended to facilitate access to external 
networks, which is in line with the resource dependence theory. However, the 
independent director/commissioner has an oversight duty and his role has been 
strengthened. Thus, it would be interesting to know what role (if any) this type of 
independent director/commissioner plays in enhancing compliance with audit 
committee rules. 
 
3.5.5 Few Prior Studies Used an Audit Committee Index  
A few prior studies on both the determinants of compliance of public listed companies 
with audit committee rules, and the association between audit committee attributes and 
financial reporting quality, employed an index consisting of several audit committee 
attributes. In fact, an index was widely used by prior studies on compliance with 
corporate governance codes (e.g., Khanchel, 2007; Ananchotikul et al., 2008; Shaukat, 
2008), and prior studies concerning  the association of the corporate governance code 
and accounting outputs such as firm value (e.g., Kouwenberg, 2006; Garay and 
González, 2008; Henry, 2010), stock performance (e.g., Alves and Mendes 2004; 
Berthelot, Morris, and Morrill, 2010), and financial performance (e.g., Gürbüz et al., 
2010; Price, Roman, and Rountree, 2011). However, only a few prior studies on 
compliance with both audit committee rules, and the association of audit committee 
attributes with financial reporting quality, employed an index. Most prior studies tended 
to focus on a single audit committee attribute. In instances where studies investigated 
more than one audit committee attribute, two prior studies (at most) examined such 
attributes in separate models and not collectively. Except for the audit committee 
indexes developed by Ika and Ghazali (2012) and Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013), 
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other indexes were not comprehensive because they only covered either audit 
committee membership or audit committee duties (see Table 3.1).  
 
As suggested by Carcello et al. (2011a), research on corporate governance needs to 
include a richer set of corporate governance characteristics, as there are many 
governance characteristics that may affect the phenomenon being studied; omitting 
some of these characteristics might lead to a spurious conclusion. Meanwhile, audit 
committee reforms under the BRC and SOX have strengthened the role of the audit 
committee by adding requirements related not only to membership, but also to other 
aspects, such as duties and functions, disclosure and financing arrangements. In addition, 
some scholars (i.e., DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard, and Gendron, 2010) argue that the 
effectiveness of the audit committee depends on other elements as well, such as 
membership composition, authority, resources and process/diligence. That is why a 
comprehensive audit committee index needs to be developed for the study of audit 
committee effectiveness.  
 
3.5.6 Lack of Examination of the Interaction between Audit Committee Attributes 
and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4, a limited number of studies have examined the interaction 
between audit committee attributes and other corporate governance mechanisms. As 
suggested by some scholars (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Turley and Zaman, 2004; 
Bédard, and Gendron, 2010), audit committee studies need to explore the interaction of 
audit committees with other corporate governance mechanisms, as opposed to simply 
examining the direct effect of each individual characteristic. However, as of late, more 
studies (i.e., Cohen et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Carcello et al., 2011b; Lisic et al., 
2011) have begun exploring the effect of such interaction. Incidentally, these studies 
were conducted by researchers in the US; research on audit committee effectiveness 
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outside the US institutional setting, is needed to examine the interaction of audit 
committee attributes and other corporate governance characteristics (such as family 
ownership) in developing countries, (Bédard and Gendron, 2010).   
 
3.5.7 Lack of Studies on Restatements in Developing Countries 
Only a few studies concerning audit committee attributes and financial reporting quality 
in developing countries have employed restatements as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality (i.e., Abdullah et al., 2010; Zhizhong et al., 2011). Most prior studies in 
developing countries preferred to use earnings management, rather than other proxies 
such as restatements, as a proxy for financial reporting quality. Compared to the 
earnings management proxy, however, restatements have advantages. For example, 
DeFond (2010) criticized the use of abnormal accruals in earnings management studies, 
arguing that the accuracy of the prediction of the model is questionable. Restatements 
do not suffer from validity concerns since they are actual events.  
 
In this study, the above mentioned research gaps are addressed holistically, taking into 
consideration the institutional context of an emerging economy with its unique political 
economy. The related research questions are developed in the next section. 
 
3.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to contribute significantly to the improvement of Indonesian corporate 
governance practice, as well as extend the literature, the research questions have been 
formulated by matching the Indonesian business environment with the research gaps 
identified in Section 3.5. As discussed in the above sections, the implementation of 
corporate governance reforms in Indonesia has progressed rather slowly, and has been 
ineffective. Moreover, the corporate governance mechanisms in developing countries 
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such as Indonesia often resemble the mechanisms in developed countries in form but 
not in substance. Important institutional factors, such as family control, board of 
commissioner characteristics and foreign ownership, might influence the 
implementation of the reforms. Therefore, this study investigates compliance with 
corporate governance rules, and examines whether companies decouple the adoption of 
corporate governance rules and practices. This is an important issue in the context of 
Indonesia and most emerging economies. Meanwhile, several gaps have been identified 
in the extant literature, including: the dominance of agency theory and rising doubts as 
to its applicability in a different institutional setting, the absence of  studies on 
determinants of compliance in a mandatory regime, the absence of a comprehensive 
study that simultaneously examines the determinants of compliance and the impact of 
such  compliance on financial reporting quality, and the absence of a comprehensive 
measure of audit committee attributes in prior studies. Hence, based on the Indonesian 
business environment and the gaps in the extant literature, this study proposes five 
research questions which are depicted in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Research Questions 
 
Indonesian Business 
Environment 
Literature Gaps Research Questions 
 High family ownership. 
 Firms controlled by families 
often place family members 
on the board of directors, 
board of commissioners, or 
both. 
 Some family-controlled 
companies employ 
professional management. 
 Dominance of agency 
theory in prior studies 
ignores institutional 
factors in developing 
countries. 
Do family-controlled public  
listed companies with family 
members on the boards, and 
family-controlled public listed 
companies with professional 
management have a different 
effect on the compliance of 
the company  with audit 
committee rules? 
 High family ownership 
 The collusion between 
family-controlled companies 
and bureaucrats/officials by 
giving the latter board 
positions. 
 Dominance of agency 
theory in prior studies 
ignores institutional 
factors in developing 
countries.  
Does the presence of 
politically connected 
independent commissioner on 
the board of a public listed 
company affect the 
company‟s compliance with 
audit committee rules? 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
 
Indonesian Business 
Environment 
Literature Gaps Research Questions 
 Foreign investors are 
significant players in 
the IDX. 
 The presence of foreign 
institutional investors 
related to Indonesians. 
 Dominance of 
agency theory in 
prior studies ignores 
institutional factors 
in developing 
countries. 
Do foreign institutional investor 
attributes (i.e., ownership size 
and authenticity) affect a public 
listed company‟s compliance 
with audit committee rules? 
 The corporate 
governance 
mechanisms in 
developing countries 
are often embraced just 
in form and not in 
substance (for cosmetic 
purposes).  
 
 Few prior studies 
simultaneously 
examine the 
determinants of 
compliance and their 
effect on financial 
reporting quality. 
 Few prior studies 
employed a 
comprehensive 
measure of audit 
committee attributes.  
 The results of prior 
studies concerning 
audit committee 
attributes and 
financial reporting 
quality were 
inconclusive. 
Does the level of compliance 
with audit committee rules by 
public listed companies result in 
an effective audit committee, as 
indicated by a negative 
association with restatements of 
financial statements? 
 
 Family control might 
serve as an alternative  
corporate governance 
mechanism. 
 
 Prior studies on 
audit committee 
attributes and 
financial reporting 
quality were 
inconclusive. 
 Due to the 
dominance of 
agency theory, there 
is a lack of prior 
studies examining 
the association 
between the audit 
committee and 
institutional factors. 
Does family control affect the 
relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and 
restatements of financial 
statements? 
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As indicated in Table 3.2, answers to the research questions are intended to fill the 
literature gaps. These gaps include the dominance of agency theory that ignores relevant 
institutional factors in a developing country, limited examination of the interaction 
between the audit committee and other corporate governance mechanisms, and limited 
examination in a comprehensive study that simultaneously looks at the determinants of 
the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules, and the effect of 
compliance on financial reporting quality. In addition, this study also attempts to fill the 
remaining literature gaps that will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The development of corporate governance in Indonesia reveals a trend toward increased 
implementation of the Anglo-American model. However, the implementation of the 
Anglo-American model in Asian countries has been criticised because the institutional 
and business environment of Asian countries is different from the one that produced the 
model. It has been noted that important business characteristics in the Indonesia context, 
such as high family ownership levels and collusion between businesses and bureaucrats, 
may obstruct the implementation of the Anglo-American model. These business 
characteristics, along with a weak law enforcement regime, provide a motivation to 
examine why the mandatory adoption of the audit committee in Indonesia might not 
achieve its expected goal. In this regard, the determinants of compliance with corporate 
governance regulations provide an interesting insight because of the influence of the 
institutional setting in “transplanting” the Anglo-American model to emerging 
economies.  
 
This study intends to fill all the gaps in the extant literature; this is discussed further in 
the next chapter. The use of panel data and comprehensive audit committee indexes is 
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discussed in Chapter 5. The reasons for the use of restatements as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality are discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. The effects of the interaction 
between audit committee attributes and other corporate governance mechanisms are 
discussed in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, Chapter 6 presents endogeneity issues.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the underlying theories for this research, the development of a 
comprehensive audit committee index, justifications for the use of restatements as a 
proxy for financial reporting quality, the study‟s research framework, and the 
development of testable hypotheses. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 
discusses the underlying theories encompassing the bundle of corporate governance 
theory, agency theory, institutional theory, and resource dependence theory. Section 4.3 
provides the justification for developing a comprehensive audit committee index. 
Section 4.4 offers arguments for the selection of restatements as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality. Section 4.5 presents the development of testable hypotheses. As the 
study is categorised into two stages of research, namely, determinants of compliance of 
public listed companies with audit committee rules (Research Stage 1), and the effect of 
such compliance on restatements (Research Stage 2), the presentation of the 
development of testable hypotheses is presented in two sections. The research 
framework for both research stages is discussed in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 provides a 
conclusion to the chapter.  
 
4.2 UNDERLYING THEORIES OF THE STUDY 
As discussed in Chapter 2, most corporate governance studies have used a single theory, 
namely the agency theory, which is inadequate to depict corporate governance in all 
national contexts. It was posited in Chapter 3 that the results of prior studies on both the 
determinants of the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules, 
and the effect of such compliance on financial reporting quality, were inconclusive due 
 109 
to the predominant use of agency theory. Some scholars (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; 
Ahrens et al., 2011) have suggested that studies on corporate governance need to 
consider the use of alternative theories to provide a basis for reconciling conflicting 
findings in the existing agency-based studies. Chapter 3 also highlighted that the nature 
of agency conflict in developing countries is different from the nature of agency conflict 
in developed countries. Hence, corporate governance research in developing countries 
needs to consider elements such as the institutional factors that impact organisational 
action (Young et al., 2008). The agency theory also ignores the “social aspect” of 
networking, which is important outside the developed Western countries (McCarthy & 
Puffer, 2008). Therefore, several theories are employed in this study to complement 
agency theory. The following sections discuss the various theories used in this study, 
namely, bundle of corporate governance theory, agency theory, institutional theory and 
resource dependence theory.  
 
4.2.1 Bundle of Corporate Governance Theory 
The concept of the bundle of corporate governance theory assumes that the 
effectiveness of corporate governance is dependent on the effectiveness of a bundle of 
corporate governance mechanisms, rather than on the effectiveness of one mechanism 
(Ward et al., 2009). The concept was first advocated by Rediker and Seth (1995). In 
their study, the researchers concluded that a firm has a variety of corporate governance 
mechanisms to align the interests of shareholders and managers, and that a firm has 
flexibility in designing efficient combinations of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Furthermore, they argued that the level of a particular mechanism might be influenced 
by the levels of other mechanisms that simultaneously operate in the firm. This implies 
that corporate governance mechanisms are not seen as being universal applications, but 
that they become effective in a particular combination (Jensen, 1993; David and Useem, 
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2002; Filatotchev, 2007). In other words, single or multiple corporate governance 
mechanisms do not operate in isolation or independently of each other, but are 
interrelated and substitute or complement each other as related “bundles” of practices. 
In short, the corporate governance bundle concept provides an explanation as to why 
corporate governance mechanisms vary among firms (Aguilera et al., 2011).  
 
Based on the assumption of a corporate governance bundle, it is possible that certain 
corporate governance mechanisms might substitute for or complement each other (Ward 
et al., 2009). Complementarities refer to the corporate governance mechanisms in the 
corporate governance bundle that are aligned with one another to achieve effective 
corporate governance (Filatotchev, 2007). In other words, the presence or addition of 
one mechanism might strengthen another mechanism and lead to more effective 
governance (Aguilera et al., 2011). For example, the effectiveness of an independent 
director should be complemented by high shareholder involvement and strong legal 
protection for investors (Filatotchev, 2007). Meanwhile, one corporate governance 
mechanism acts as a substitute if the mechanism is replaced by another mechanism, 
while the overall functionality of the corporate governance system remains constant 
(Aguilera et al., 2011). For example, in the German and Japanese corporate governance 
systems, banks might serve as an effective monitoring mechanism that substitute for 
active market control (Aoki, 1994). In emerging markets, large non-management 
shareholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance 
mechanisms (Claessens and Fan, 2002). 
 
This study draws upon the bundle of corporate governance concept to establish a 
conceptual base to develop hypotheses for both the determinants of compliance with 
audit committee rules, and the effect of such compliance on financial reporting quality. 
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The audit committee is not an isolated corporate governance mechanism within a 
company, therefore this study assumes that compliance of public listed companies with 
audit committee rules, and its effect on financial reporting quality is affected by other 
existing formal and informal corporate governance mechanisms. These might include, 
among others, independent commissioner characteristics, size of the board of 
commissioners, foreign ownership, family control and audit quality.  
 
4.2.2 Agency Theory  
Agency theory is based on the notion that the separation between agents (management) 
and principals (shareholders or owners) will lead to some conflicts between the two 
since they are both assumed to act in their own self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Management actions may not always be in the best interests of shareholders, and 
may create agency problems such as excess spending, suboptimal investment decisions 
and information asymmetry – especially when a very opportunistic person is involved in 
the process. In other words, the agents (management) will not manage the company as 
diligently as the owners. In the literature, an agency problem that arises because of the 
divergence of interests between owners (principals) and management (agents) is known 
as an agency problem type 1. The agency problem type 1 is common in developed 
countries such as the US and UK because ownership and control are often separated and 
legal mechanisms protect the owners‟ interests. The institutional context in developed 
countries leads itself to relatively efficient enforcement of arm‟s-length agency 
contracts (Peng, 2003). 
 
In addition to divergent interests, agency problems arise when the principal-agent 
relationship is characterised by informational asymmetries and bounded rationality 
(Chua et al., 2003). Information asymmetry refers to the condition where the manager 
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has better information than the owner. Bounded rationality refers to behaviour that is 
intentionally rational, but limitedly so. The owner has limitations in foreseeing all future 
possibilities and in processing information, including identifying optimal actions. In 
such conditions, owners require protection (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and adequate 
monitoring mechanisms need to be established to protect shareholders from 
management conflicts of interest. The costs of all activities and operating systems 
designed to align the interests of managers with the interests of owners are called 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
 
In addition to agency problem type 1, there is also another type of agency problem 
known as agency problem type 2. Researchers are increasingly realizing that there is no 
single agency model that can adequately accommodate the conditions in all nations 
(Young et al., 2008). The institutional context in developing countries is different from 
that in developed countries, and includes high concentrated ownership and poor 
protection of minority shareholders. These conditions, combined with an absence of 
effective external governance mechanisms, leads to a conflict known as agency problem 
type 2 between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008; 
Jaggi et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011). In other words, the agency problem type 2 is an 
extension of agency theory that is applied to other types of relationships, such as the 
relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. An example of 
agency problem type 2 is expropriation, which refers to the transfer of value from 
minority shareholders to majority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The 
expropriation may include interrelated transactions, not paying out dividends, or 
transferring profits to other companies controlled by the majority shareholders. 
Claessens et al. (1999) have evidenced the expropriation of minority shareholders in 
East Asia, including Indonesia.   
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Corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors and the audit 
committee, are assumed to reduce agency costs (Cohen et al., 2008). The effectiveness 
of the board of directors as an internal corporate governance mechanism is enhanced by 
the inclusion of outside directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, the primary attribute 
of the board of directors is the independence of its members (Beasley 1996; Dechow et 
al., 1996; Cohen et al., 2008). In carrying out its oversight duties, the board of directors 
delegates its duties to the audit committee (DeZoort et al., 2002).  
 
4.2.3 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory posits that an organisation is part of a comprehensive set of 
organisational dynamics, including the institutional environments and the ceremonial 
structures that play a role within these dynamics (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Accordingly, institutions are considered to be the “rules of the game”, while the 
organisations are the “players” (North, 1991); both are influenced by the institutional 
environment in which they function (Doh and Guay, 2006). Environmental pressures 
create organizational isomorphism with the aim of seeking legitimacy within the 
environment (Salvato, 1999). The isomorphism causes the institutions to become 
similar over time, as the organisation adapts to become more similar to those around it 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The isomorphism is created through coercive, mimetic 
and normative mechanisms. Coercive isomorphism refers to the consequences of 
external regulatory-type pressures for organisational convergence. The normative 
pressure stems from professionalization and socialisation. Meanwhile, mimetic 
isomorphism refers to the tendency of social actors to imitate others that are viewed as 
successful and legitimate (Cohen et al., 2008).  
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Institutional theory is one of the theories recommended by some scholars as a 
complement to agency theory (Cohen et al., 2008). Agency theory, which focuses on the 
principal-agent problem, is considered to present a partial view of the world and ignores 
the complexity of organisations (Eisenhardt, 1989). The complexity of organizations 
and its effect on variations of corporate governance structures could be explained by 
institutional theory (Filatotchev, 2007). In addition, institutional theory suggests that 
some governance activities and structures may be primarily driven by a desire to foster 
legitimacy (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal, 2009). As a result, corporate 
governance structures, such as boards of directors and audit committees, may emphasise 
ceremonial and symbolic roles (Cohen et al., 2008). Therefore, this view might be 
relevant in the context of developing countries such as Indonesia, as corporate 
governance in developing countries often resembles the outsider model (the Anglo-
American model) in form, but not in substance.  
 
In the extant literature, audit committee studies that employed institutional theory are 
limited. For example, Fogarty and Kalbers (1998) revealed that agency theory variables 
do not have a strong relationship with audit committee effectiveness. They suggested 
that audit committees might exist for ceremonial purposes. Gendron, Bédard, and 
Gosselin (2004) found that audit committee meetings serve both a symbolic and 
substantive purpose. In a later study, Beasley et al. (2009) revealed that some audit 
committees play a substantive role in financial reporting oversight, whereas others 
merely play a ceremonial role. They found that neither agency theory nor institutional 
theory fully explains the result.   
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4.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory holds the view that the key success of organisations is 
contingent on their ability to acquire and control resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Organisations are, however, embedded in an environment comprised of other 
organisations, and they depend on those other organisations for the many resources that 
they need. In other words, organisations do not control all resources they need, and such 
resources are found in outside organizations (Salvato, 1999). The acquisition of 
resources by organisations is critical for their survival and is carried out through 
interaction with the subjects that control those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Hence, this theory focuses on the strategic actions taken by organisations to manage 
resource dependence in their environment (Salvato, 1999). Organisations are motivated 
to undertake such actions to minimise their loss of power due to a reliance on others for 
resources (Van der Zahn, Singh, and Singh, 2008).   
 
In the corporate governance context, resource dependence theory holds the view that 
various elements of corporate governance can act as critical resources for a firm 
(Udayasankar, 2008). For example, the board of directors is the corporate governance 
element that can provide resources for a firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Based on this 
theory, the board of directors acts as a means to access and manage scarce resources 
(Pfeffer, 1973), and to obtain legitimacy, such as contracts and financing (Young et al., 
2001). Thus, good corporate governance is achieved when board members are 
appointed for their expertise in helping a firm cope with environmental uncertainty 
(Cohen et al., 2008).  
 
From the resource dependence perspective, the primary role of the board of directors is 
less that of monitoring, and more inclined to being a provider of resources, including 
industry expertise, knowledge in facilitating corporate strategies, and enhancing access 
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to external networks (Cohen et al., 2008). Based on this theory, the expertise of board 
members is more important than their independence in achieving good corporate 
governance (Cohen et al., 2008). Thus, the valuable attributes of board members include 
industry expertise, expertise in helping to set corporate strategy, and providing access to 
external networks. For example, an independent director with financial expertise is 
likely to have a better ability to review financial reports than a fully independent 
director with no industry expertise. From this theoretical perspective, the role of the 
board is more relevant to Asian firms than their Western counterparts due to the 
predominantly relationship-based business environment in Asia (Young et al., 2001). It 
is generally accepted that personal contact is more important in Asia, due to the absence 
of strong contract law enforcement regimes and efficient markets.  
 
With regard to the audit committee, the resource dependence theory suggests that the 
role of the audit committee is to provide a source of advice and counsel to the board of 
directors, which is important in bringing valued resources to the firm (Daily, Dalton, 
and Canella, 2003). In addition, this theory recognizes that audit committee members 
provide resources, in terms of their expertise and knowledge that may improve the 
effectiveness of the audit committee. For example, the industry expertise of audit 
committee members might improve audit committee effectiveness, since the members 
have sufficient knowledge to assess business activities and the risk to the company to 
enable them to determine whether the company‟s accounting methods properly reflect 
the economic substance of transactions, and whether estimates are realistic (Cohen et al., 
2008). Another example is audit committee size: the theory views a larger audit 
committee as being more effective since it has more resources to address issues faced by 
the company (Rahmat, Iskandar, and Saleh, 2009). However, Cohen et al. (2008) 
contended that, from the resource dependence perspective, the audit committee‟s 
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oversight of financial reporting is less effective, and is replaced by the external auditor 
who plays a key role in ensuring sound financial reporting.  
 
The use of the above multiple theories enables this study to consider determinants of the 
compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules that are not derived 
solely from agency theory. As discussed in Chapter 3, the predominance of the Anglo-
American agency theory may have led prior studies to ignore factors relevant in 
developing countries. In addition, multiple theories are useful in examining the 
interrelationship among various actors (both internal and external) and corporate 
governance mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2008). Multiple theories might also be used to 
explain the conflicting findings of prior studies. Therefore, this study attempts to focus 
on certain relevant factors in developing countries, namely, family control, foreign 
institutional investors and politically connected independent commissioners. In addition, 
this study also addresses the issue of interaction among corporate governance 
mechanisms in both its examination of compliance, and the effect of compliance on 
financial reporting quality.  
 
4.3 AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEX  
 As identified in Section 3.5.5, a few prior studies have employed a comprehensive 
audit committee index in both audit committee compliance studies, and studies on the 
association between audit committee attributes and financial reporting quality. Most 
prior studies on audit committee effectiveness focused exclusively on individual audit 
committee members and their characteristics (i.e., financial expertise and independence). 
DeZoort et al. (2002) suggested that a more plausible measurement of audit committee 
attributes should include additional aspects, such as qualified members equipped with 
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the authority and resources to protect stakeholder interests through diligent oversight 
mechanisms. They defined an effective audit committee as follows: 
An effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority 
and resources to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable 
financial reporting, internal controls, and risk management through 
diligent oversight efforts. (p. 41) 
 
The above definition asserts that the ultimate goal of the audit committee is to protect 
shareholder interests, and that it can achieve this goal through the use of qualified 
members with adequate authority and resources to provide diligent oversight. According 
to DeZoort et al. (2002), there are four dimensions that determine audit committee 
effectiveness: composition, authority, resources, and diligence. They argued that 
composition, authority, and resources are the diligence process inputs that would result 
in an effective audit committee. Figure 4.1 depicts the audit committee effectiveness 
framework proposed by   DeZoort et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 4.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness (ACE) Framework 
 
      Source: DeZoort et al. (2002) 
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From the illustration, composition covers expertise, independence, integrity, and 
objectivity. The most common variable for composition in prior studies was member 
independence, followed by financial expertise and the experience of audit committee 
members. Authority is derived from the full board of directors, and legal and listing 
requirements. Prior studies have mostly examined audit committee authority mandated 
by regulations such as the SOX (2002). Resources include an adequate number of 
members, and access to management, and internal and external auditors. According to 
DeZoort et al. (2002), prior studies involving the resources component of audit 
committee effectiveness focused on audit committee size and support from the external 
and internal audit function. Diligence refers to incentive, motivation, and perseverance. 
In prior studies of the audit committee, the number of audit committee meetings became 
a popular proxy for diligence. As noted by DeZoort et al. (2002), diligence is extremely 
difficult to observe directly and, therefore, more innovative methods of observation are 
needed. For example, some prior studies used voluntary disclosure as a proxy for 
diligence (e.g., Turpin and DeZoort, 1998; Carcello et al., 2002).   
 
The audit committee effectiveness framework proposed by DeZoort et al. (2002) was 
extended by Bédard and Gendron (2010). As depicted in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3, 
Bédard and Gendron (2010) similarly proposed an audit committee effectiveness 
framework comprising four dimensions, namely, composition, authority, resources, and 
process. They replaced the dimension of “diligence” proposed by DeZoort et al. (2002) 
with the dimension of “process”. Process consists of meetings, agendas, questioning, 
relationships, power, and leadership. Basically, both diligence and process refer to the 
same thing, which is the effort or act needed to achieve audit committee effectiveness. 
Based on their review of prior studies, Bédard and Gendron (2010) found that the 
number of audit committee meetings was only one of the visible dimensions of process 
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examined by prior studies. This finding is consistent with that of DeZoort et al. (2002), 
which found that the number of meetings was a common proxy for diligence. The non-
public nature of the audit committee process and the predominance of archival data in 
prior studies caused difficulties in examining the other dimensions of process in prior 
studies (Bédard and Gendron, 2010). 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the measurement of audit 
committee effectiveness needs to consider certain dimensions such as composition, 
authority, resources and diligence/process. In addition, these dimensions are interrelated. 
Therefore, this study intends to employ a comprehensive audit committee index 
consisting of several dimensions that are in line with the audit committee effectiveness 
frameworks proposed by DeZoort et al. (2002), and Bédard and Gendron (2010). The 
audit committee index will serve as a measurement of the level of compliance of public 
listed companies with audit committee rules (Research Stage 1). In Research Stage 2, 
the audit committee index, which is the dependent variable in the first research stage, 
serves as a measurement of audit committee effectiveness.  
 
 
4.4 RESTATEMENTS AS A PROXY FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING 
QUALITY 
 
In this study, restatements are selected as a proxy for financial reporting quality. There 
are four key considerations underlying the selection of this proxy. First, as discussed in 
Section 3.5.7, a limited number of prior studies in developing countries have used 
restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality (e.g., Abdullah et al., 2010; 
Zhizhong et al., 2011), whereas restatements are the second most popular proxy in the 
US. In fact, restatements occur not only in developed countries such as the US, but also 
in developing countries such as Indonesia. As evidence, the percentage of listed 
companies in the US that announced annual financial restatements from 2002 to 2005 
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ranged from 3.7 percent to 6.8 percent (see GAO, 2006), while restatements decreased 
in 2007 (see Cheffers, Whalen,  and Usvyatsky, 2010; Roybark, 2010). Meanwhile, in 
Indonesia, the percentage of public listed companies that announced annual 
restatements from 2006 to 2012 ranged from 1 percent to 3 percent, while the 
percentage that announced interim restatements ranged from 1 percent to 7 percent.  
 
Second, compared to earnings management, restatements are a more valid proxy as they 
are actual events that indicate a visible form of impaired financial reporting quality (Cao 
et al., 2010; DeFond, 2010). The use of earnings management as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality has also been widely criticised (e.g., Hribar and Collins, 2002; DeFond, 
2010). Hribar and Collins (2002) argued that the measurement of accruals based on the 
balance sheet is potentially contaminated by measurement errors in accrual estimates, 
particularly if the partitioning variable used to indicate the presence of earnings 
management is correlated with the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions or 
discontinued operations. In addition, they also argued that estimation errors in balance 
sheet accruals can confound returns regressions where discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals are used as explanatory variables. Meanwhile, Defond (2010) 
argued that the accrual model, such as the Jones model or its modified version, suffers 
from an inherent limitation as the accuracy prediction of the model cannot be validated. 
This means that it is impossible to provide assurance as to whether the estimates of 
discretionary accruals are the results of management‟s opportunistic accounting choices, 
or just an artefact of the model.   
 
Third, most members of audit committees usually state that their duty is to review the 
financial statements issued by the company (Carcello et al., 2002). In ASEAN countries, 
however, the role of the audit committee as stated in the annual reports needs to be 
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verified, as corporate governance information presented in the documents of public 
listed companies often does not reflect actual practice (Chuanrommanee and Swierczek, 
2007). Since restatements are actual events that indicate a visible form of impaired 
financial reporting quality (Cao et al., 2010; DeFond, 2010), they provide a means to 
check whether or not audit committees perform their roles as stated in company annual 
reports. Fourth, restatements are categorised as indicating very low financial reporting 
quality – quality that is lower than earnings management (Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008). 
This means that the presence of restatements indicates lower financial reporting quality 
as compared to the presence of earnings management (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2 Tentative Ranking of Financial Reporting Quality Proxies 
 
 
      Source: Adapted from Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) 
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4.5 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This study attempts to fill one gap identified in Chapter 3, namely, the absence of a 
longitudinal study that simultaneously examines the determinants of the compliance of 
public listed companies with audit committee rules, and the effect of such compliance 
on financial reporting quality. Thus, the present research is separated into two stages: 
the determinants of the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee 
rules (Research Stage 1), and the effect of such compliance on financial reporting 
quality using restatements as a proxy (Research Stage 2). Research Stage 1 focuses on 
exploring the determinants of the compliance. Compliance, which is the dependent 
variable in Research Stage 1, is then examined in Research Stage 2 in order to 
determine its association with financial reporting quality. Therefore, a discussion 
concerning the development of testable hypotheses for both stages of research is also 
presented in two different sections (i.e., Section 4.5.1 and Section 4.5.2).  
 
4.5.1 Research Stage 1: Determinants of the Compliance of Public Listed 
Companies with Audit Committee Rules 
 
 
4.5.1.1 Family Control 
As discussed earlier, Asian company ownership is concentrated in the hands of families 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002). Typically, families use several methods 
to gain effective control in firms (Carney, 2005). In some cases, families may require a 
majority of voting shares in order to get effective control. In other cases, control of the 
company can be attained even with a low level of ownership through the establishment 
of pyramids and cross-holdings. In another context, families might use dual-class shares 
rather than majority stock ownership
5
.    
                                                 
5
 A pyramid occurs when the largest ultimate shareholder owns one corporation through another which he 
does not totally own. Cross-holdings occur when one firm has some shares in another firm in the chain of 
control. Dual-class shares are found in firms that have outstanding shares with different voting rights 
(Claessens et al., 2000). 
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The ownership structure could also act as a means to solve this divergence-of-interest 
problem and to mitigate agency costs. One distinctive feature of family governance is 
the unification of control and ownership by the family, also known as owner 
management. In affected firms, board members are often family members, close friends 
and close business associates (Young et al., 2001). As discussed in Chapter 2, it is 
common in the Indonesian environment to see family members on the board of directors, 
board of commissioners, or both. More often than not, the head of the board of 
commissioners represents the controlling party of the company, or someone very close 
to the controlling shareholders (Husnan, 2001, Hanani, 2005). As family ownership 
increases, the conflicts between managers and shareholders are likely to be reduced. 
This is called the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, or the alignment effect (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). However, the presence of family ownership or insider ownership 
also has costs associated with it that might offset the gains of convergence-of-interest. 
When family members on boards hold a substantial fraction of the firm‟s shares, they 
have sufficient voting power or influence to pursue their personal agendas (non-value 
maximising) without jeopardising their employment and remuneration. This is called 
the entrenchment hypothesis (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In addition, families in Asia 
often enhance their control of companies through the use of pyramids, cross listings, 
and deviations from “one share, one vote” rules that give them control rights 
significantly in excess of their cash flow rights (Claessens et al., 1999). As a result, 
family policies might result in the expropriation of the minority shareholders.   
 
Based on alignment theory, the presence of family members on boards might serve as 
an alternative mechanism to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Khan, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Wang, 2006). The presence of family members on boards means that combined control 
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and ownership rests with the family, thus aligning the interests of shareholders and 
management. Under this condition, the family has the incentive, power and knowledge 
to run the business. As the family is actively engaged in the daily activities of the 
company, there will be less information asymmetry, fewer conflicts, and fewer issues 
related to hierarchical organisation structures (Niemi, 2005). As a result, the occurrence 
of agency problem type 1, which occurs between the owner and management, decreases.   
 
The alignment effect might cause Anglo-American corporate governance to be less 
effective, as Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
independence and audit committees are intended to solve agency problems between 
owners and managements, or agency problem type 1 (Chen et al., 2011). However, as 
discussed above, combined family ownership and control reduces agency problems. In 
addition, the controlling family generally tends to maintain personal control rather than 
rely on formalised procedures to monitor the company (Daily and Dollinger, 1992). 
Consequently, family-controlled companies tend to be less concerned with Anglo-
American corporate governance. Moreover, families generally resist and are often 
reluctant to embrace radical changes (Chizema, 2011). Hence, family-controlled firms 
might not welcome the introduction of Anglo-American corporate governance 
structures, such as the audit committee, separation of the chairman and CEO and other 
mechanisms that are interpreted as an indication of loss of control (Storey, 1994; Maug, 
1996).  
 
As the interests of the owner and management converge, the assumption that family 
firms have low or no agency costs depends on the factor of altruism (Chua et al., 2003; 
Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004; Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma, 2005). The concept of 
altruism is drawn from the stewardship theory in the context of family firms, and can be 
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defined as unselfish concern and devotion to others without expected return (Corbetta 
and Salvato, 2004). Altruism is a distinctive characteristic of family firms that is not 
generally found in other enterprises (Dyer, 2003). Van den Berghe and Carchon (2003) 
contend that altruism in family firms has four benefits. First, altruism creates a self-
reinforcing system of incentives that encourages family members to be thoughtful and 
selfless to one another. Second, altruism gives rise to a sense of collective ownership 
among family members employed in the firm. Third, altruism reduces information 
asymmetry among family members. Finally, altruism encourages family members to 
create a unique loyalty and commitment to the firm that is longer than that found in 
many non-family managed firms. In short, altruistic behaviour through family ties might 
create a sense of togetherness and reciprocity that permeates throughout the firm, 
leading to reduced agency costs (Karra, Tracey, and Phillips, 2006). 
 
Hence, altruism might make family firms reluctant to adopt formal corporate 
governance; even if family firms adopt formal governance mechanisms, parental 
altruism can reduce their effectiveness (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Bucholtz, 2001). 
The founder‟s ability to discipline the family agent might be compromised because of 
the potential ramifications of such actions on familial relationships (Schulze et al., 
2001; Lubatkin, Ling, and Schulze, 2007). As family welfare is a common goal, the 
founder might avoid actions that suppress one family member‟s utility at the expense of 
another family member‟s utility that harms the family‟s total welfare (Schulze et al., 
2001).  
 
Based on entrenchment theory, family firms are less efficient because concentrated 
ownership creates incentives for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from 
other shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). One form of expropriation involves 
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placing less qualified family members, cronies, or close friends on boards. As evident in 
Indonesia,   family usually dominates boards as members of the board of directors, 
board of commissioners, or both (Husnan, 2001). The head of the board of 
commissioners often represents the controlling party of the company or someone very 
close to the controlling shareholders (Hanani, 2005). Under this condition, family firms 
might have inferior corporate governance because of ineffective monitoring of the board. 
Ineffective board monitoring might result in a less effective audit committee. In the 
context of this study, a less effective audit committee is indicated by the low 
compliance of family firms with audit committee rules. In short, family firms tend to 
implement weak corporate governance in order to provide a chance for entrenchment.   
 
Based the above explanation, this study proposes the following testable hypothesis: 
H1   Family-controlled companies with family members represented on the boards 
are less likely to comply with audit committee rules. 
 
 
Even if most family-controlled companies do not have a separation between ownership 
and control as hypothesized above, it is possible for family-controlled firms to hire 
professional executives, who are non-family members, to run their businesses. In 
Indonesia, some large business groups (conglomerates), such as the Salim group, 
separated the ownership and control of many of their subsidiaries after the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 (Hanani, 2005). The Salim group is a multinational 
enterprise that has large subsidiaries in various sectors both in Indonesia and 
internationally. Many of its subsidiaries are listed on stock exchanges, whereas the 
holding company remains private to retain flexibility (Dielemen and Sachs, 2006). 
Family member are present on the boards of large Indonesian businesses (the traditional 
cash cow), such as Indofood and Indocement, while other Indonesian businesses and 
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international businesses are entrusted to professional management (Dielemen and Sachs, 
2006).  
 
There are several plausible explanations as to why family firms employ non-family 
professional executives. First, the increasing size of firms requires more executives with 
higher levels of professionalism, external knowledge and expertise (Daily and Dollinger, 
1992; Klein and Bell, 2007). When family business increases family business owners 
might not have a successor, or the family successor may not be as talented as a non-
family professional executive (Chua et al., 2003;Lin and Hu, 2007). Second, the non-
family professional executive is needed by family business owners to prepare a family 
member of the next generation as a potential future family manager (Poza, Alfred, and 
Maheshwari, 1997; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Steier, 2004). Third, the non-family 
professional executive is needed by family business owners to serve as a mediator in 
case of family conflicts (Dyer, 1989).  
 
The appointment of non-family executives may then increase potential agency costs 
(Chua et al., 2003). As discussed in Section 4.2.2, agency costs arise when the 
principal-agent relationship is characterised by divergent interests, informational 
asymmetry and bounding rationality. In terms of divergent interests, the appointment of 
non-family executives results in a separation of owner and management, which is one 
driver of agency costs. The appointment of non-family executives, followed by the 
delegation of more authority to them, will result in the family firm increasingly 
resembling a non-family firm (Chua et al., 2003). The personal goals of non-family 
professional executives might differ strongly from those of family owners, as family 
owners usually have a stronger long-term orientation than non-family professional 
executives (Block, 2011). A non-family executive might tend to use this autonomy in 
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order to serve his/her own interests and goals that might not align with those of the 
family (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2004). Besides the potential divergence of 
interests, the presence of more non-family executives in the family business might 
increase information asymmetry (Chua et al., 2003). Chua et al. (2003) argued that 
larger numbers of non-family executives might also have a stronger impact on bounded 
rationality, as family owners have to monitor more people and more transactions in 
which family owners are not directly involved. In addition, the presence of non-family 
executives might also reduce altruistic behaviour in family firms. The absence of the 
family bond as a basis for reciprocal altruism will increase the incentive for non-family 
executives to act opportunistically (Chua et al., 2003). 
 
This study assumes that formal corporate governance mechanisms such as independent 
commissioners and audit committees in family-controlled companies are more effective 
when there is no family member present on the board of directors, board of 
commissioners, or both. There are three possible reasons for the reliance on formal 
mechanisms. First, as family members are absent from the day-to-day activities of the 
firm and serve as passive shareholders, the family would tend to insist on utilising 
formal mechanisms to protect its investment. Second, professional managers themselves 
are likely to rely on formal mechanisms to provide them with feedback on their 
performance. Finally, corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence 
and monitoring, might serve as a solution to family rivalry, especially in cases where 
the founder is not actively managing the firm (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, and 
Schoar, 2008). 
 
In the extant literature, the effect of this type of family control on corporate governance 
compliance has not been widely studied. Prior studies tended to compare the effects of 
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the presence and absence of family ownership (e.g., Kabbach De Castro and Crespi 
Cladera, 2011), or compare different levels of family ownership (e.g., Chau and Leung, 
2006). In the Indonesian environment, a prior study similar to the present study, was 
done by Utama and Leonardo (2006). Using audit committee effectiveness as the 
dependent variable, they found that the control of majority shareholders through 
ownership is not significantly associated with audit committee effectiveness. Further, 
they found that a higher representation of majority shareholders on the board of 
commissioners, and the appointment of the CEO and the chair of the board of 
commissioners by majority shareholders had a negative impact on audit committee 
effectiveness. These findings imply that, in Indonesia, the presence of family members 
on boards has a stronger negative influence on audit committee effectiveness than 
family control through ownership.  
 
Based on the above explanation, this study proposes the following testable hypothesis: 
H2   Family-controlled companies with non-family members represented on the 
boards are more likely to comply with audit committee rules. 
 
 
4.5.1.2   Politically Connected Independent Commissioners 
Indonesia‟s two-tier system results in companies having two independent boards: a 
board of commissioners and a board of directors. The existence and function of the 
independent commissioner on the board of commissioners are similar to those of the 
non-executive members of the board of directors under the one tier system. 
 
According to Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand (1996), the functions of the board of 
directors include resource dependence, service and control. As depicted in Table 4.1., 
there is a difference between the functions of the board of directors in East Asian and 
Western countries. The roles, such as service, monitoring and control are more 
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pronounced in Western companies, whereas resource dependence is more pronounced 
in East Asia companies. Several factors contribute to the difference. First, the economic 
system in East Asia, which is a relationship-based system, differs from the market-
based system in Western countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The relationship-based 
system, which is characterized by cronyism and low levels of transparency, works well 
in jurisdictions with weak corporate governance mechanisms, and where contracts are 
poorly enforced (Gul, 2006). In such a system, business opportunities arise as a result of 
personal ties with other business families and political powers. Therefore, business in 
the relationship-based model is associated with highly personal networks, special 
favours for both parties, and opaque transactions within and between companies, groups 
of individuals, and institutions (Dieleman and Sachs, 2006).  This is in contrast to the 
market-based system in which logic independent of personalities prevails. The business 
model in the market-based system is therefore associated with competition based on the 
choice of superior business strategies, on the rational allocation of resources and on 
adherence to certain internationally accepted rules (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Second, 
the legal environment in East Asia is less developed, thus, informal contacts are more 
effective in conducting business (Young et al., 2001). Third, most companies in East 
Asia have a high concentration of ownership in the hands of families. Family control 
enables families to run companies and maintain tight control over information, leading 
to a lack of transparency (Young et al., 2001). 
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Table 4.1 Board Functions 
 
Board Function Description Implementation 
Resource 
dependence 
Board members assist in providing 
access to critical firm resources 
that can include capital, 
competitive information, and 
reputation/legitimacy.  
Although this role is 
important in Western 
literature, it is emphasized 
relatively less than the other 
functions. However, this role 
is more pronounced in East 
Asian companies. 
Service Board members often serve as a 
sounding board for the CEO and 
offer valuable counselling and 
advice services. 
This function is less 
pronounced in East Asian 
boards as the management of 
businesses in East Asia is 
primarily family-based.   
Monitoring and 
control  
Board members serve as active 
monitors of shareholder interests. 
This function is less 
pronounced in East Asian 
companies than in Western 
companies.  
 
Source: Adapted from Young et al. (2001) 
 
 
Consistent with Young et al. (2001), the function of the board of directors in Indonesia 
seems to emphasize the resource dependence role. It can be seen in Indonesia that some 
of the independent commissioners who also sit on the audit committees, are former or 
current bureaucrats (government officials), or retired army personnel (Husnan, 2001; 
Zaini, 2002). The presence of this type of independent commissioner is in line with the 
resource dependence theory. The presence of this politically connected independent 
commissioner might be intended to provide the company with a special relationship 
with elite politicians in order to get some kind of protection or special treatment, such as 
access to outside capital and the preservation of monopolistic strategies (Husnan, 2001).  
 
This study assumes that the presence of politically connected independent 
commissioners might have a negative association with the compliance of public listed 
companies with audit committee rules. There are some reasons underlying this position. 
First, the politically connected commissioners might provide benefits to the company 
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due to their knowledge of and experience with government procedures, their insights 
into government actions, their ability to enlist government support of the firm‟s interests 
at the expense of competitors, or due to their ability to forestall government action 
inimical to the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). In the context of public policy, it is 
possible that the company might receive selective enforcement (Pittman, 1977) and that 
the IDX or the BAPEPAM-LK might be reluctant to enforce the implementation of 
audit committee rules against public listed companies with a politically connected 
independent commissioner. Second, most politically connected independent 
commissioners often lack the competency to perform an oversight duty. For example, 
Chen et al. (2006) found that most directors affiliated with various layers of government 
agencies in China did not possess business experience or expertise in law, accounting, 
or finance. In addition, they might not have had any prior work experience in finance or 
accounting, an educational background in accounting, or both. In another study, Young 
et al. (2001) found that some outside directors in Hong Kong and Taiwan were 
appointed to boards strictly to provide legitimacy, and that they often lacked the ability 
to provide advice and counsel management. Similarly, Zaini (2002) argued that 
politically connected independent commissioners in Indonesia lacked the skill, 
experience, and education required to be independent commissioners and audit 
committee members. Consequently, politically connected independent commissioners 
might not effectively perform the monitoring function. Third, Rosser (2003) argued that 
politicians/bureaucrats in Indonesia tend to block corporate governance reform, as they 
have an interest in maintaining the old system that enables them to hide the nature of 
their relationship with leading business groups, as well as to exploit SOEs.  
 
Based on the above argument, this study proposes the following testable hypothesis: 
H3   Public listed companies with a politically connected independent commissioner 
are less likely to comply with audit committee rules. 
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4.5.1.3 Foreign Institutional Investors  
In environments where relationship-based business is dominant, foreign institutional 
investors might play a role in enhancing the effectiveness of formal corporate 
governance mechanisms (Anderson et al., 2001; Ananchotikul, 2006). Foreign 
institutional investors might lead to changes in management and corporate governance 
by imposing their own company policies, internal reporting systems and principles of 
information disclosure on acquired firms in developing countries (OECD, 2002). Firms 
with foreign participation act as agents of transformation by diffusing specific assets, 
knowledge and culture (including governance practices), in developing countries 
(Chevalier et al., 2006). 
 
The role of foreign institutional investors in improving corporate governance practice in 
developing countries is in line with the institutional theory. In this context, foreign 
institutional investors serve as exogenous pressure to introduce corporate governance 
practices that are socially legitimate or widely perceived as appropriate and effective 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). The pressures from foreign institutional investors 
cause mimetic isomorphism among companies (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). In the 
context of the audit committee, this study assumes that foreign institutional investors 
consider audit committees to be effective Anglo-American corporate governance 
mechanisms in the oversight of financial reporting quality and auditing activities. As 
such, the audit committee has been widely adopted by exchanges around the world. 
Thus, foreign institutional investors might push public listed companies to comply with 
audit committee rules.  
 
Since foreign institutional investors come from outside the domestic social networks 
that generate the institutional norms of behaviour, they might be more resistant to 
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common Indonesian corporate governance practices and more likely to push for 
transparency and shareholder protection (Peng, 2003). While family ownership is high 
and provides an opportunity for expropriation, foreign institutional investors might play 
an effective monitoring role to avoid the possibility of the expropriation of the wealth of 
minority shareholders. As evidence, Lam, Sami, and Zhou (2012) revealed that foreign 
ownership prevents tunnelling activities that use dividends as a proxy. In short, foreign 
institutional investors might prevent or mitigate the presence of the agency problem 
type 2.  
 
The current study recognises that not all types of foreign institutional investors affect 
corporate governance. Even though foreign institutional investors are significant players 
in the IDX, some of these investors might be owned by or have a special relationship 
with Indonesians. Therefore, in exploring the role of foreign institutional investors, one 
needs to be cognizant as to whether their investment is genuine. In addition, the size of 
the investment also matters.  
 
This study pays particular attention to the genuineness of the foreign institutional 
investors when examining the effect of foreign institutional investors on corporate 
governance in Indonesia. As described in Section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2, most of the foreign 
investors might be Indonesian offshore companies that are established in tax heaven 
countries with the intention of hiding the identity of the beneficial owner, and for the 
purpose of tax avoidance. It is therefore important to trace the ultimate shareholders of 
foreign institutional investors, as the genuineness of foreign institutional investors 
becomes an important attribute that must be considered when examining their role in 
enhancing corporate governance in Indonesia. The genuineness of foreign institutional 
investors also implies that they are bodies independent from the company. As noted by 
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Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), an independent institutional investor is active in 
monitoring. Monitoring would not make sense for foreign institutional investors owned 
by Indonesians – particularly by families as controlling shareholders – as this type of 
foreign institutional investor is not independent from the company. In addition, such 
companies are not resistant to common Indonesian corporate governance practices, 
since the ultimate owners are Indonesian. As such, this type of foreign institutional 
investor might not bring better corporate governance practices from its country of origin 
to Indonesia.   
 
Besides the genuineness of the foreign institutional investor, another attribute that must 
be considered is the amount of shares owned by the investor. Typically, foreign 
investors with a large ownership stake have significant power to influence company 
policy and, thus, the incentive for monitoring (Chen et al., 2007). Empirical studies 
provide evidence of the role of large foreign shareholding on corporate governance in 
developing countries. For example, Chevalier et al. (2006) found that a high level of 
foreign ownership is likely to be positively related to better corporate governance 
practices. Similarly, Douma et al. (2006) found that foreign investors with a large 
ownership stake and long term involvement have a positive effect on financial 
performance. In contrast, Ananchotikul (2006) found that large foreign ownership 
stakes would not stimulate improvement in corporate governance. 
 
Based on the above argument, this study proposes the following testable hypothesis: 
H4 Public listed companies with a large genuine foreign institutional investor are 
more likely to comply with audit committee rules.  
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4.5.1.4 Control Variables 
 
a. Proportion of Independent Commissioners 
Based on agency theory, independent directors serve as a reliable mechanism to diffuse 
agency conflicts between managers and owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Independent 
directors are representatives of minority shareholders with respect to monitoring 
companies, and boards of directors with a higher proportion of independent directors 
will be more effective in monitoring the company. Independent directors serving on 
boards champion the implementation of sound corporate governance practices (Teen, 
2007). Recent corporate governance reforms, such as the SOX, seek to strengthen the 
role of the board of directors as representatives of shareholders (Finegold, et al., 2007). 
At present, the BAPEPAM (2004) requires at least 30 percent of the members of the 
board of commissioners (the body representing the interests of shareholders in 
Indonesian public listed companies) to be independent from the company. Furthermore, 
the chair of the audit committee is required to be an independent commissioner.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, prior studies that examined the association of the proportion 
of independent directors and compliance with audit committee rules produced mixed 
results. For instance, in the compliance literature, the proportion of independent 
directors was associated with audit committee formation (Pincus et al., 1989; Willekens 
et al., 2004; Chau and Leung, 2006; Chen et al., 2009; Baxter, 2010). In other studies, 
the proportion of independent directors was associated with reliance on the audit 
committee (Menon and Williams, 1994), audit committee independence (Klein, 2002b) 
and audit committee best practices (Rainsbury et al., 2008). On the other hand, some 
prior studies indicated the opposite result. For example, Piot (2004) reported that the 
presence of an audit committee was not associated with the proportion of independent 
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directors. Similarly, Webb (2008) reported that the percentage of outside directors was 
not associated with compliance with SOX, section 404. The predominance of agency 
theory as the main theory in prior studies might have caused the conflicting findings. 
Based on agency theory, the primary attributes of board directors is independence of its 
members (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 2008). In fact, some 
institutional factors that are not represented in simple agency theory might influence the 
effectiveness of independent directors.  
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2.1, Indonesian company law has adopted a two-tier board 
model consisting of a board of commissioners and a board of directors. The board of 
commissioners has the duty of supervisor and advisor to the board of directors, while 
the board of directors has an executive role. BAPEPAM (2004) requires at least 30 
percent of the members of the board of commissioners to be independent from the 
company and from the majority shareholders. These independent commissioners are 
similar to the independent directors in the one-tier model (Siregar and Utama, 2008). 
Thus, in the context of this study, the study assumes that the proportion of independent 
commissioners is associated with a public listed company‟s compliance with audit 
committee rules because the audit committee is a sub-committee headed by an 
independent commissioner. As the independent commissioner strongly influences the 
effectiveness of the audit committee, the study expects a positive association between 
the proportion of independent commissioners and the compliance of public listed 
companies with audit committee rules. 
 
b. Independent Commissioners with Financial Expertise 
Agency theory suggests that the presence of directors with financial expertise will 
increase the effectiveness of the audit committee. Financial expertise is needed to 
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anticipate the increasingly complex accounting and auditing issues facing the audit 
committee. Moreover, the audit committee is effective when its members understand the 
various financial and operational issues faced by the company‟s management (BRC, 
1999). The first requirement for directors to possess financial expertise was proposed by 
the BRC (1999). In a subsequent reform, SOX (2002) further regulated the financial 
expertise component for the audit committee by requiring the disclosure of the audit 
committee‟s financial experts (the SOX section 407).  
 
Recent studies provide empirical evidence that the presence of independent directors 
with financial expertise on audit committees improves the effectiveness of the 
committees. Audit committees with more financial experts are associated with outputs 
such as lower cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2004), less earnings 
management (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009; Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Bedard et al., 
2004), fewer restatements (Abbott et al., 2004), lower internal control weaknesses 
(Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou, 2007), high quality of earnings (Qin, 2007) and improved 
governance (DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005). Therefore, the current study expects a 
positive association between independent commissioners with financial expertise and 
the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules.   
 
c. Board of Commissioners Size 
There are two competing views in the literature on board size and its effectiveness. 
Some scholars (i.e., Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) advocated that larger 
boards may be less effective than smaller boards due to coordination problems in larger 
boards, and problems such as free riding. In contrast, some scholars argued that some 
firms require larger boards for effective monitoring (Yermack, 1996). A larger board 
also provides firms with greater expertise and access to resources, which is in line with 
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resource dependence theory (Ning, Davidson III, and Wang, 2010). A larger board 
might contain directors with diverse industry experience and education that will allow it 
to provide high quality advice to management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  Furthermore, 
larger boards might indicate that the complexity of governance issues requires delegates 
to serve on committees to improve board responsiveness and oversight (Rainsbury et al., 
2008).   
 
Prior study results mostly indicate that board size is significantly associated with the 
audit committee. For example, Beasley and Salterio (2001) revealed that larger boards 
were associated with the voluntary improvement of audit committee composition. Klein 
(2002b) found that audit committee independence increased with board size. In New 
Zealand, Carson (2002) found that board size was associated with audit committee 
formation. Subsequently, Webb (2008) found that the board size of companies that 
complied with the SOX was larger than that of non-compliant companies. Furthermore, 
Rainsbury et al. (2008) found that board size was positively related to audit committee 
best practices in New Zealand. The results of prior studies imply that larger boards 
might indicate that the complexity of governance issues requires an audit committee in 
order to improve board responsiveness and oversight.  
 
Following the results of prior studies in countries using a one-tier board model, a larger 
board of commissioners with more members with specific experience and expertise is 
expected to increase advisory and monitoring quality in the Indonesian context. 
Therefore, this study also expects a positive association between board of 
commissioners size and the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee 
rules. 
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d. Company Size 
In the extant literature, some scholars argued that large firms tend to have better 
corporate governance practices due to high agency costs, the economic scale of 
adoption and public scrutiny. Large firms may have more severe agency problems, 
because it is harder to monitor them, or because of the agency cost of free cash flows
6
 
(Khancel, 2007). Thus, agency costs need to be compensated for with stricter 
governance mechanisms (Ariff, Ibrahim, and Othman, 2001; Khanchel, 2007). One of 
the benefits from economies of scale is that large firms tend to be “early adopters” of 
corporate governance mechanisms (Pincus et al., 1989), as there is a fixed cost for large 
firms in implementing corporate governance mechanisms (Guriev, Lazareva, Rachinsky, 
and Tsouhlo, 2003). Moreover, larger companies are subject to more public and 
regulatory scrutiny than small firms, which leads to stronger corporate governance 
(Kale, Ciceksever, and Ryan, 2006).  
 
However, prior studies that used this variable provided mixed results. In terms of 
voluntary audit committee formation, some prior studies reported a positive association 
between firm size and audit committee formation (e.g., Pincus et al., 1989; Adams, 
1997; Turpin and DeZoort, 1998; Joshi and Wakil, 2004). In contrast, Bradbury (1990), 
Collier (1993), Menon and Williams (1994), among others, did not find any significant 
association. In other studies, company size was associated with voluntary audit 
committee disclosure (Carcello et al., 2002), compliance with SOX section 404 (Webb, 
2008), and compliance with audit committee rules (Braiotta and Zhou, 2006). However, 
in Indonesia, prior studies indicate that company size was not related to the compliance 
of public listed companies with JSX board governance regulations (Nuryanah, 2004), 
and to efficient earnings management (Siregar and Utama, 2008). Like the proportion of 
                                                 
6
 Free cash flow is defined as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have a positive 
NPV when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jensen, 1986). 
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independent commissioners, it seems that the different institutional and organizational 
contexts of each prior study might have resulted in the conflicting findings of those 
studies.  
 
Regardless of the inconclusive findings of prior studies, this study expects firm size to 
be positively associated with the compliance of public listed companies with audit 
committee rules. The current study assumes that larger firms have higher agency costs 
that must be compensated for by the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms 
such as the audit committee. Moreover, large companies also receive more scrutiny 
from the public, and this demands a high level of compliance with regulations. 
 
e. Audit Quality 
The high concentration of family ownership in Asian corporations raises the risk of 
expropriation of minority rights (Claessens
 
and Fan, 2002). Theory suggests that firms 
may voluntarily employ monitoring and bonding mechanisms to mitigate the concern of 
outside investors about being expropriated (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, 
the use of monitoring or bonding mechanisms might assure outside investors of the 
credibility of the accounting information (Fan and Wong, 2005). The external auditor is 
one of the monitoring or bonding mechanisms that is often employed by companies in 
emerging markets. An external auditor might serve as a monitoring device to alleviate 
type 2 agency costs (resulting from conflict between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders) that are difficult to mitigate using conventional corporate 
governance mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers (Fan and Wong, 
2005). In this context, the external auditor plays a key role in independently ensuring 
sound financial reporting that is in line with the resource dependence theory (Cohen et 
al., 2008). As evidence, Fan and Wong (2005) revealed that the external auditor (i.e., 
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one of the study period‟s Big 5 auditors) played a corporate governance role in Asia. 
They found that firms with high agency conflicts, indicated by their high concentration 
of control and a large separation of control and ownership, were likely to employ one of 
the Big 5 auditors. In addition, they found significant association between the audited 
company‟s ownership structure and choice of auditor only among small and high-risk 
audited companies where the threat of expropriation by ultimate owners was high.  
 
With regard to the audit committee, the external auditor might influence the 
effectiveness of the audit committee, and an effective audit committee might demand a 
high quality audit. The external auditor might encourage companies to form an effective 
audit committee because it is important for the audit firm to protect itself from 
allegations of inadequate auditing associated with business failure or fraud. The present 
Big 4 audit firms, a proxy for high quality audits, mostly recommend the establishment 
of audit committees, and might prefer to work for companies with audit committees to 
ensure easier communication between their auditors and the company (Joshi and Wakil, 
2004). From the side of the audit committee, independent and active audit committee 
members might demand a high level of audit quality (Abbott and Parker, 2000), as 
boards of directors assign audit committees to oversee the financial reporting process. 
The low quality of financial statements could damage the reputation of the audit 
committee and raise the risk of potential litigation (Zaman, Hudaib, and Haniffa, 2011). 
Being associated with the performance of high quality audits, the Big 4 audit firms are 
more likely to detect financial statement errors or fraud and provide a higher level of 
assurance to the audit committee than non-Big 4 firms. As a result, a high quality audit 
might protect the audit committee from non-monetary and reputational losses due to 
lawsuits or stock exchange sanctions (Abbott and Parker, 2000). 
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Prior studies on the association of audit quality and some aspects of the audit committee 
revealed inconsistent findings. In terms of voluntary audit committee formation, some 
prior studies in developed countries (e.g., Pincus et al., 1989; Collier and Gregory, 
1999; Carson, 2002; Willekens et al., 2004) found a strong association. Surprisingly, 
other studies in developed countries (Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993; Menon and 
Williams, 1994) provided contrary results. In more recent study, Rainsbury et al. (2008) 
indicated that the Big 5 auditors were not significantly associated with company 
compliance with the New Zealand Securities Commission guidelines. Meanwhile,  in a 
developing country environment, Joshi and Wakil (2004) revealed that companies in 
Bahrain that had established audit committees were audited by Big 4 audit firms. 
Further, Fan and Wong (2005) found a positive relationship between agency problems 
and the choice of Big 5 auditors in East Asia. It seems that prior studies in developing 
country provide a consistent result because firms in developing countries tend to have a 
higher incidence of agency problems and a greater demand for high quality financial 
statements. A high quality audit might reduce the incidence of agency problems and 
provide better quality financial statements. Thus, this study expects that the Big 4 firms 
are positively associated with the compliance of public listed companies with audit 
committee rules.  
 
f. Financial Loss 
The current study posits that financial loss is negatively associated with the demands of 
the audit committee. Shareholders of firms with a negative income might demand less 
scrutiny of the financial-reporting system because financial information is less value-
relevant for firms with losses (Klein, 2002b). In addition, financial distress may cause 
firms to invest less in the maintenance of proper internal control (Krishnan, 2005). As 
evidence, Klein (2002b) revealed that audit committee independence decreased when 
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firms reported consecutive losses. Therefore, the current study expects a negative 
association between financial loss and the compliance of public listed companies with 
audit committee rules 
 
g. Leverage  
With use of debt of financing, agency costs potentially arise because of a conflict of 
interest between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To 
mitigate agency costs, a debt covenant is written and the firm is required to provide 
audited financial statements and a certificate confirming compliance with the contract. 
Violating the debt contract is costly for the firm. In this situation, managers of the firm 
have a greater incentive to make accounting policy choices that manipulate their 
financial statements to avoid the cost of violating debt covenants (Baxter, 2010). 
Therefore, the directors have a responsibility to ensure the integrity of the financial 
statements provided to debt holders, and to monitor compliance with the debt covenant 
provisions (Rainsbury et al., 2008). On the other hand, debt holders also need to 
increase monitoring because of the conflicting interests of managers and debt holders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The conflicts are especially severe in firms with large free 
cash flows, where more cash is available than profitable investment opportunities. 
Monitoring might reduce the agency costs of free cash flows that are available for 
spending at the discretion of managers. Accordingly, the need for monitoring by both 
parties is addressed by establishing a monitoring mechanism such as the audit 
committee. As evidence, Adams (1997) and Braiotta and Zhou (2006) revealed that 
leverage is positively and significantly associated with compliance with audit 
committee effectiveness. However, some prior studies on audit committee compliance 
revealed that leverage is negatively associated with audit committee effectiveness (i.e., 
Rainsbury et al., 2008; Baxter, 2010). There are some possible reasons for this finding. 
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First, leverage can discipline managers and reduce agency costs (Mustapha and Ahmad, 
2011). Second, debt holders might directly monitor a firm without using an audit 
committee. In this situation, leverage might act as a monitoring mechanism in 
substitution for an audit committee (Rainsbury et al., 2008).  
 
The current study expects a negative association between leverage and the compliance 
of public listed companies with audit committee rules. Public listed companies in 
Indonesia are dominated by families as controlling shareholders. As families tend to 
finance their companies using internal resources and bank financing, and the bank is 
usually in the same business group as the family controlled companies (Husnan, 2001), 
leverage might not require an audit committee to mitigate the agency cost of debt. This 
study assumes that the families themselves, who are also creditors, have a dominant role 
in monitoring. Therefore, leverage is considered as a substitute for an audit committee. 
 
4.5.2 Research Stage 2: Audit Committee Effectiveness and Restatements 
 
4.5.2.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness  
Based on agency theory, one of the solutions for the agency problem is to apply good 
corporate governance practices, one of which is the establishment of an audit committee 
(Cohen et al., 2008).  As a committee under the board of directors, the audit committee 
exists to protect the interests of shareholders through its oversight responsibility in the 
areas of financial reporting, internal control, and external auditing activity (BRC, 1999; 
SOX, 2002; BAPEPAM, 2004). The audit committee is an independent committee in 
the company, since it acts for the board of directors which has the knowledge and 
expertise to ensure the integrity and reliability of financial reporting (Joshi and Wakil, 
2004). The audit committee may serve to reduce asymmetric information risk by 
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reviewing the quality of financial information for existing and prospective investors. 
Therefore, the study argues that the audit committee is negatively associated with 
restatements. 
 
In the extant literature, prior studies often investigated the association of audit 
committee attributes with certain proxies of financial reporting quality in order to 
identify the role of the audit committee in mitigating agency costs. The audit committee 
attributes included the presence of an audit committee, independent members, members 
with financial expertise, size, numbers of meetings and the existence of an audit charter 
(see Bédard and Gendron, 2010 for a complete review). As discussed in Section 3.5.5, 
most prior studies examined the attributes separately, while a few prior studies 
employed an audit committee index. However, a richer set of corporate governance 
characteristics is needed in research on corporate governance as there are many 
governance characteristics that may affect the phenomenon being studied, and omitting 
some of these characteristics can lead to spurious conclusions (Carcello et al., 2011a).  
Furthermore, some scholars (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard, and Gendron, 2010) 
have argued that the effectiveness of the audit committee must consist of some 
attributes, such as membership composition, authority, resources and process/diligence.  
 
In contrast to most prior studies, this study employs an audit committee compliance 
index as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness. As noted by Haron et al. (2005), the 
audit committee is effective if it fulfils all requirements stipulated in the rules and 
regulations. The first step towards achieving effectiveness should therefore be full 
compliance with the prevailing rules and regulations. The audit committee rules in 
Indonesia consist of a set of mandatory requirements (i.e., membership, job duties and 
disclosure) that are in line with international trends (see Section 2.3.2.3 in Chapter 2). 
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Following Haron et al. (2005), the current study assumes that a high level of compliance 
with audit committee rules indicates a high level of audit committee effectiveness. That 
is why this study employs an audit committee compliance index, consisting of certain 
audit committee attributes, as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness. This study 
argues that the use of a compliance index as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness is 
in line with the idea of some scholars who have suggested using a comprehensive index 
to measure audit committee effectiveness (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard, and 
Gendron, 2010). In addition, since the audit committee compliance index is measured 
based on formal documents such as annual reports, it enables the study to detect 
whether compliance is just symbolic or truly indicative of the substantive 
implementation of the audit committee. The way to do this is to examine the 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and restatements. 
 
Based on the above explanation, this study proposes the following testable hypothesis: 
H5   There is a negative association between audit committee effectiveness and 
financial restatements.  
 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Interaction between Audit Committee Effectiveness and Family Control 
As discussed in Section 3.5.6, some scholars (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Turley and 
Zaman, 2004; Bédard and Gendron, 2010) argued that studies on the audit committee 
need to explore the interaction of the audit committee with other corporate governance 
mechanisms, as opposed to simply examining the effect of each individual characteristic. 
This idea is consistent with the bundle of corporate governance theory. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.1, the concept of the bundle of corporate governance assumes that the 
effectiveness of corporate governance is dependent on the effectiveness of a bundle of 
corporate governance mechanisms, and not just one (Ward et al., 2009). This means that 
single or multiple corporate governance mechanisms do not operate in isolation from or 
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independent of each other, but are interrelated and substitute or complement each other 
as a related “bundle” of practices. In terms of the interaction of the audit committee with 
other mechanisms, Bédard and Gendron (2010) argued that research on audit committee 
effectiveness outside the US, such as in developing countries, needs to examine the 
interaction of audit committee attributes and certain corporate governance 
characteristics, such as family ownership. Therefore, the hypothesis in this section 
attempts to examine the effect of the interaction of family control and the audit 
committee on restatements. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.5.1.1, family control might reduce the effectiveness of the 
audit committee. This can be explained using two competing views: the alignment 
effect (the convergence-interest hypothesis), and the entrenchment effect. The 
alignment effect argues that combined control and ownership in the hands of the family 
might reduce type 1 agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The self-monitoring of the 
family serves as an affective corporate governance mechanism because the controlling 
family has an interest in the long-term viability of the firm‟s reputation (Wang, 2006). 
With regard to Anglo-American corporate governance, the family might also interpret 
the implementation of an Anglo-American corporate governance mechanism (such as an 
audit committee) as reducing its authority (Storey, 1994; Maug, 1996). As a result, the 
effectiveness of family control as an informal corporate governance mechanism might 
reduce the need for formal corporate governance mechanisms such as a board of 
directors and an audit committee.  
 
According to the entrenchment effect, family firms are less efficient because 
concentrated ownership creates incentives for the controlling shareholders to 
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expropriate wealth from other shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In other words, 
the family has an incentive to implement weak corporate governance in order to allow 
for expropriation. For example, a family often places family members on boards, 
causing ineffective monitoring of the board and audit committee. As evidence, Jaggi 
and Leung (2007) found that the effectiveness of the audit committee was significantly 
reduced when family members were present on corporate boards.    
 
Most prior studies examined only the effect of family control on restatements (e.g., 
Dechow et al., 1996; Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Donoher, 2009; 
Leone and Liu, 2010; Lisic et al., 2011). These studies employed the presence of the 
founder as CEO or board chair as a proxy for family control. They argued that that the 
presence of the founder as CEO or board chair reduces the effectiveness of the board‟s 
monitoring function, including that of the audit committee. However, the results of 
these prior studies were inconclusive. For example, some prior studies found that the 
founder as CEO or board chair was positively and significantly associated with 
restatements (i.e., Dechow et al., 1996; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Donoher, 2009). On 
the other hand, Abbott et al. (2004) and Lisic et al. (2011) did not find any significant 
association. The conflicting findings of prior studies provide a strong reason for the 
current study to examine the interaction of family control with other corporate 
governance mechanisms, namely, the audit committee.  
 
In the extant literature, only the previous study by Lisic et al. (2011) comes close to this 
study, as it developed a CEO power index that used the CEO founder as one of its 
elements. The study found that the negative association between an audit committee‟s 
financial expertise and restatements was moderated by CEO power. Meanwhile, outside 
the restatements research stream, Jaggi and Leung (2007) found that the effectiveness of 
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audit committees in constraining earnings management was significantly reduced when 
family members were present on corporate boards. This recent finding provides a 
convincing argument to examine family control and its interaction with formal 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the audit committee. 
 
Based on the above explanation, this study proposes the following testable alternative 
hypothesis: 
H6   The negative association of audit committee effectiveness and financial 
restatements is reduced when the company is controlled by family and the family 
members are present on the boards. 
 
 
 
4.5.2.3 Control Variables 
 
a. Proportion of Independent Commissioners 
Similar to the discussion regarding this variable in Research Stage 1, this study assumes 
that independent directors enhance the effectiveness of the board‟s monitoring function 
as suggested by agency theory. Thus, the study expects a negative association between 
the proportion of independent commissioners and financial restatements. 
 
b. Board of Commissioners Size  
As stated in Research Stage 1, there are two competing views on board size and 
effectiveness. Larger boards may be less effective than smaller boards due to 
coordination problems, free riding, and other problems (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). In contrast, some scholars have argued that some firms require larger 
boards for effective monitoring (Yermack, 1996; Adams and Mehran, 2002). Larger 
boards also provide firms with greater expertise and access to resources, which is line 
with resource dependence theory (Ning et al., 2010).  
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In the extant literature, most prior studies on the association between board size and 
restatements or fraud predicted a positive association. The results, however, were 
inconclusive: while Abbott et al. (2004) found a positive significant association between 
board size and restatements, other prior studies revealed an insignificant association 
between the two (e.g., Farber, 2005; Baber et al., 2005; Carcello et al., 2011b). 
 
In line with prior studies, the current study posits that smaller boards are more effective 
in monitoring the quality of financial reporting. In a smaller board, each member will 
have more responsibility for the quality of the financial statements and the board can 
discuss them more extensively. In contrast, the responsibility for monitoring financial 
reporting in larger boards is likely to become diffused, and detailed discussions on 
financial reporting quality would not be feasible (Vafeas, 2000). Thus, this study 
predicts a positive association between board of commissioners size and financial 
restatements.  
 
c. Leverage 
Some scholars (e.g., Richardson, Tuna, and Wu, 2002; Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds, 
2002; Romanus et al., 2008) have argued that firms with higher levels of outstanding 
debt have a greater incentive for issuing restatements. This argument can be explained 
using the debt-covenant hypothesis. The debt-covenant hypothesis predicts that firms 
are likely to choose accounting methods that decrease the likelihood of debt covenant 
violations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), as covenant 
violations are costly to the firm (Chava and Roberts, 2008). The high cost of covenant 
violations will provide a strong incentive for managers to make income increasing 
accounting choices (Dichev and Skinner, 2002). As a result, firms that are close to 
violating their debt covenants have an incentive to manage their earnings. Some prior 
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studies (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002) 
revealed a positive association between leverage or debt defaults and earnings 
management activities. In addition, highly leveraged firms also have a greater incentive 
to misreport because of the desire to obtain financing at a lower cost (Dechow et al., 
1996; Amoah, 2012). Therefore, this study posits a positive association between 
leverage and restatements. 
 
d. Profitability 
Firms with better performance will have fewer incentives to manage earnings, and vice 
versa (Romanus et al., 2008). The main motive for a change in accounting methods and 
earnings manipulation is to mask poor financial performance (Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 
2006). As evidence, some prior studies revealed that restating companies tended to be 
less profitable and had higher leverage than non-restating companies (Kinney and 
McDaniel 1989; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991). Thus, this study posits a negative 
association between profitability and restatements. 
 
e. Listing Age 
Listing age refers to the length of time that a firm‟s common stock has been publicly 
traded (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello and Nagy, 2004a; 2004b). It is assumed that older 
firms are less likely to restate their financial results than younger firms, since an older 
firm has a lengthy history as a listed company, and the quality of its disclosures tends to 
be higher than those of younger firms. There are some possible explanations for the 
argument. First, older firms have more experience and a learning process that reduces 
the possibility of restatements (Alyousef and Almutairi, 2010).  Second, firms are likely 
to face greater pressure when newly listed on the stock exchange (Carcello and Nagy, 
2004b). In the US, newly listed firms also encounter difficulty with the SEC‟s enforced 
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reporting requirements, and may not have established commensurate financial reporting 
controls (Beasley, 1996). Third, newly listed firms face pressure to boost their earnings 
and this might cause managers to issue restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 
2011b). Therefore, the current study expects a negative association between listing age 
and financial restatements.  
 
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the hypotheses developed for both Research Stage 1 
and Research Stage 2, and includes the theories underlying their development. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary of Hypothesis Statements 
 
Hypothesis Underlying theory Statement of hypothesis 
Research Stage 1:  Determinants of the compliance of public listed companies with 
audit committee rules 
H1 Agency theory; 
altruism; bundle of 
corporate governance 
theory. 
Family-controlled companies with family 
members represented on the boards are less 
likely to comply with audit committee rules 
 
H2 Agency theory; 
Altruism 
Family-controlled companies with non-family 
members represented on the boards are more 
likely to comply with audit committee rules. 
H3   Agency theory  Public listed companies with a politically 
connected independent commissioner are less 
likely to comply with audit committee rules. 
H4 Institutional theory Public listed companies with a large genuine 
foreign institutional investor are more likely 
to comply with audit committee rules.  
Research Stage 2: Audit Committee Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality 
H5   Agency theory There is a negative association between audit 
committee effectiveness and financial 
restatements. 
H6 Agency theory; 
bundle of corporate 
governance theory 
 
The negative association of audit committee 
effectiveness and financial restatements is 
reduced when a company is controlled by 
family and the family members are present on 
the boards. 
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4.6 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Even though Research Stage 1 and Research Stage 2 are interrelated, the research 
framework for each is presented separately. Figure 4.3 presents a diagrammatic 
representation of the research framework for Research Stage 1, while Figure 4.4 
presents the diagrammatic representation of the research framework for Research Stage 
2. There are two reasons for the separation. First, the several independent variables 
employed in the first stage are different from those employed in the second. For 
example, the independent variables of interest in Research Stage 1 are politically 
connected independent commissioners, family control and foreign institutional investors. 
Meanwhile, only family control is included as an independent variable of interest in 
Research Stage 2. Similarly, the control variables in Research Stage 1 differ slightly 
from those in Research Stage 2. For example, some control variables present in 
Research Stage 1 (audit quality, leverage, loss and company size), are not present in 
Research Stage 2. In contrast, listing age and return on assets, which are included as 
control variables in Research Stage 2, are not present in Research Stage 1. Second, each 
of the study‟s research stages uses a different type of data and method of analysis. In 
Research Stage 1, the data is short balanced panel data covering the period 2006-2008. 
The use of this data is to fill the gap of a lack of prior studies that employed panel data 
on the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules, as panel data 
is useful for policy analysis (Wooldridge, 2009). Consequently, the method of analysis 
for panel data includes statistical analysis such as fixed effects or random effects. For 
Research Stage 2 on the other hand, data is cross sectional, even though the period 
covers 2006-2009. The method of analysis uses matched pair logistic analysis, which 
has been widely used in studies on restatements. In short, the separate presentation is 
intended to facilitate an ease of understanding.  
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Figure 4.3 shows all the independent variables investigated by the study. The dependent 
variable is the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules, while 
the independent variables are politically connected independent directors, family control 
and foreign institutional investors. The use of these independent variables is to fill in the 
literature gap, namely, that the dominance of the agency theory ignores the institutional 
context. As discussed in in Section 3.5.4, most prior studies on the determinants of 
compliance with audit committee rules derived their variables based on the Anglo-
American agency problem (agency problem type 1), whereas the agency problem in a 
developing country is different from that in a developed country. As a result, some 
relevant institutional factors in developing countries, such as family owners as 
controlling shareholders, foreign ownership, and collusion between businesses and 
politicians have been ignored by most prior studies.  Other variables that have been 
widely used in prior studies (i.e., proportion of independent commissioners, financial 
expertise of independent commissioners, size of the board of commissioners, loss, 
leverage, audit quality and company size are placed as control variables.   
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Figure 4.3 Research Framework of the Study on the Determinants of Compliance 
of Public Listed Companies with Audit Committee Rules 
(Research Stage 1)  
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, the dependent variable in Research Stage 2 is restatements, 
while the independent variables are family control and the compliance of public listed 
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 158 
companies with audit committee rules that served as the dependent variable in Research 
Stage 1. The study assumes that the level of audit committee compliance also measures  
audit committee effectiveness. As noted by Haron et al. (2005), the audit committee is 
effective if it fulfils all the requirements stipulated in the rules and regulations; the first 
step towards effectiveness should therefore be full compliance with the prevailing rules 
and regulations. Meanwhile, the control variables are the proportion of independent 
commissioners, size of the board of commissioners, leverage, profitability and listing 
age. As this study has to consider the adequacy of the ratio of cases to variables that 
meet the requirements for logistic analysis, the control variables in Research Stage 2 are 
few, anticipating the limited number of restatements during the period of observation. It 
is noted that prior studies using restatements in developing countries often obtained a 
limited number of samples (e.g., Abdullah et al., 2010; Alyousef and Almutairi, 2010).   
 
In Research Stage 2, the study also examines the interaction between audit committee 
effectiveness and family control. This is intended to fill the literature gap of a lack of 
empirical investigations on the interaction of the audit committee and other corporate 
governance mechanisms. Audit committees alone are unlikely to improve financial 
reporting quality, and they evidently interact with other corporate governance 
mechanisms (DeZoort et al., 2002; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Bédard, and Gendron, 
2010).   
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Figure 4.4 Research Framework of the Study on Audit Committee Effectiveness 
and Financial Reporting Quality (Research Stage 2)  
 
 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presented the underlying theories behind the study, articulated the need for 
the use of an audit committee index and justified using restatements as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality. It also discussed the development of hypotheses derived 
from the underlying theories, and linked them to the research framework. Next, Chapter 
5 presents the research method adopted in each research stage. The discussion of 
research methods includes the research approach, sample, measurement of variables, 
data sources and method of analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology adopted for this 
study. The research paradigm employed in the study is presented in section 5.2. The 
discussion on the research methodology is divided into Section 5.3 and Section 5.4. 
Section 5.3 covers the study on the determinants of compliance of public listed 
companies with audit committee rules (Research Stage 1), while Section 5.4 deals with 
the study on the association of audit committee effectiveness and restatements 
(Research Stage 2). For each research stage, issues related to sample selection, variables 
measurement, data sources and method of analysis are discussed. The chapter concludes 
with Section 5.5. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
According to Chua (1986), there are three accounting research paradigms: positivist, 
interpretive and critical theory. Each of the paradigms (shown in Table 5.1) has a 
different ontology, epistemology and methodology. Positivism is a belief system that 
emerged from practices in the natural sciences. It assumes that subjects of research can 
be investigated objectively, and their veracity can be established with a reasonable 
degree of certainty (Brand, 2009). Its ontology assumes that reality is static and fixed, 
while its epistemology assumes that knowledge is objective. The positivist methodology 
involves testing the hypotheses, which is called hypothetico-deductivism. Hypotheses, 
which are claimed as general principles, are tested empirically by observation with 
statistical analysis (a quantitative method) to arrive at a generalization (Hooper, 2006). 
The interpretive paradigm, on the other hand, could be categorised as non-positivist as it 
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has views that are opposite to those of positivism. Ontologically, interpretivism views 
reality as subjective and changing, while its epistemological stand is that knowledge is 
subjective. In terms of methodology, this paradigm focuses on understanding particular 
situations by using qualitative methods to capture various interpretations of a 
phenomenon. Finally, the critical theory paradigm refers to a form of research that does 
not contend with the status quo (Brand, 2009). The difference between the interpretive 
and critical theory paradigms is that the interpretive paradigm involves research merely 
to understand, whereas the critical theory paradigm involves research that challenges 
(Crotty, 1998). However, the critical theory paradigm does not provide a particular 
method for research, only a process for evaluating and considering knowledge (Hooper, 
2006). In other words, the critical theory paradigm does not favour empiricism over 
qualitative methods, or vice versa; research in this paradigm may use both quantitative 
and qualitative methods. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of Research Approach 
 
Item Positivist Interpretive Critical Theory 
Ontology 
(what is the 
nature of 
reality?) 
Reality is static and 
fixed. The world is 
ordered according to 
an overarching 
objective truth. 
 
Reality is subjective 
and changing. There 
is no one ultimate 
truth. 
Reality may be 
objective, but truth 
is continually 
contested by 
competing groups. 
Epistemology 
(what is the 
nature of 
knowledge?) 
 Objective, 
generalisable 
theory can be 
developed to 
accurately describe 
the world.  
 Knowledge can be 
neutral or value-
free. 
 Knowledge is 
subjective. There 
are multiple, 
diverse 
interpretations of 
reality.  
 There is no one 
ultimate or 
„correct‟ way of 
knowing. 
 Knowledge is 
co-constructed 
between 
individuals and 
groups. 
 Knowledge is 
mediated by 
power relations 
and therefore 
continuously 
under revision. 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
 
Item Positivist Interpretive Critical 
Methodology 
(what is the 
nature of the 
approach to 
research?) 
 The aim is to 
discover what 
exists through 
prediction and 
control. 
 Theory is 
established 
deductively.  
 Uses scientific 
methods to develop 
abstract laws, to 
describe and to 
predict patterns.  
 Looks for causality 
and fundamental 
laws. 
 Focus on 
understanding. 
 Uses inductive 
reasoning. 
 Meaning is 
constructed in the 
researcher-
participant 
interaction in the 
natural 
environment. 
 Gathers diverse 
interpretations 
(e.g., grounded 
theory, 
ethnography). 
 Focus on 
emancipation. 
 Research is used 
to envision how 
things could 
change for the 
better.  
 Seeks 
representation of 
diverse and 
under-
represented 
views. 
 Characterised by 
continual 
redefinition of 
problems and 
cooperative 
interaction (e.g., 
action research). 
Methods 
(what 
techniques 
can be used 
to 
gather this 
information?) 
Tends to use 
quantitative 
methods, often 
including 
statistical testing of 
hypotheses (e.g. 
randomised controlled 
trials, questionnaires). 
Tends to use 
qualitative 
methods to capture 
various 
interpretations of a 
phenomenon (e.g. 
naturalistic 
observation, 
interviews, use of 
narrative). 
 May use both 
quantitative and 
qualitative 
methods, usually 
in a participatory 
way. 
 Often uses 
iterative research 
design (e.g., case 
studies, focus 
groups, 
participant 
observation). 
 
Source: Adapted from Bunniss and Kelly (2010) 
 
Among the three paradigms, positivism is the most dominant in accounting literature 
(Chua, 1986; Bisman, 2010). Positivist research also dominates the types of papers 
published in top tier US journals (Oler, Oler, and Skousen, 2010). Positivist research in 
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accounting assumes that the accounting world is knowable and characterised by 
constant relationships, thus, accounting theory must have the ability to predict and to 
explain (Hooper, 2006). Positivist research starts with hypotheses, which are deduced 
from accounting theory. This is followed by data analysis to determine whether the data 
support the hypotheses. Corporate governance studies have traditionally adopted agency 
theory the as the dominant theory that focuses exclusively on resolving conflicts of 
interest (agency problems) between corporate management and shareholders. 
Meanwhile, agency theory itself is derived from positivist theory and is considered the 
most influential accounting research approach in explaining and predicting (Hooper, 
2006). Typically, positivist researchers identify situations in which conflict between 
owners and management is present, and then describe the governance mechanisms that 
overcome the agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). Positivism was a dominant 
paradigm in prior studies on audit committees, which were marked by the wide 
adoption of agency theory followed by data analysis using quantitative methods (see 
Beasley et al., 2009).  
 
In line with mainstream corporate governance studies, this study is similarly situated in 
the positivist paradigm. As discussed in Chapter 2, the purpose of the presence of an 
audit committee is to reduce the agency problem, which is in line with agency theory. 
Thus, as discussed in Chapter 3, this study starts to develop hypotheses based on agency 
theory. Other theories, such as the bundle of corporate governance theory and 
institutional theory, are used as complementary theories. To test the hypotheses, the 
study employs the quantitative research approach. Quantitative research is the 
systematic scientific examination of quantitative phenomena and their properties and 
links. The aim of quantitative research is to create and utilise mathematical models, 
theories and hypotheses pertaining to natural phenomena (Cavana, Delahaye, and 
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Sekaran, 2001). To capture data, this study uses the content analysis approach using 
secondary data such as the annual reports of companies and other documentary evidence. 
Content analysis is a method of analysing documents that allows the researcher to test 
theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data. Therefore, data was hand-
collected via content analysis involving reading and finding information from annual 
reports, announcements of public listed companies to stock exchanges and other 
relevant resources.  
 
Archival research is well suited for this study, as both stages of research explore the 
issue of association. Research Stage 1 attempts to examine the association between 
specific Indonesian business characteristics (family control, foreign institutional 
investors, politically connected independent commissioners) and a corporate 
governance mechanism (the audit committee). Meanwhile, Research Stage 2 examines 
the association between a corporate governance mechanism (the audit committee) and 
financial reporting quality (restatements). As suggested by Carcello et al. (2011a),   
archival research is appropriate for analysing the association between corporate 
governance and outcomes. Furthermore, using an index that collects data from corporate 
archives in order to assess the compliance of companies with corporate governance 
rules was widely used by prior studies on corporate governance compliance.  
 
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN FOR RESEARCH STAGE 1: DETERMINANTS OF 
COMPLIANCE OF PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES WITH AUDIT 
COMMITTEE RULES  
 
 
 
5.3.1 Sample Selection 
This study uses panel data covering the 2006 to 2008 period. The starting year of 2006 
was chosen because the BAPEPAM-LK rule No. X.K.6 concerning the mandatory 
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disclosure of information related to audit committees took effect in that year. Thus, the 
mandatory disclosure requirement enables an examination of actual audit committee 
practices. There were a total of 1129 company-year observations during the 2006-2008 
period, however this initial sample was reduced due to the reasons shown in Table 5.2, 
and detailed next. 
 
First, banks and state owned enterprises were removed from the sample as they are 
subject to different corporate governance requirements (discussed in Chapter 2). In 
addition, these sectors have become targets for corporate governance reforms; Bank 
Indonesia strictly monitors the implementation of corporate governance reforms in the 
banking sector, while the Ministry of State Enterprises diligently supervises the 
implementation of such reforms at state owned enterprises. The tight monitoring done 
by these government agencies might serve as a monitoring mechanism substitute 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). As noted by Beasley and Salterio (2001), a regulatory 
agency might require firms to enhance the effectiveness of their boards and audit 
committees to enhance the ability of regulators to monitor firms on behalf of the state.  
As evidence, Nuryanah (2004) reports that the banking sector‟s level of compliance  
with the IDX‟s rule-related corporate governance requirements is higher than that of 
other sectors.  
 
Second, new public listed companies – those which were listed starting in 2007 and 
2008 – were removed from the sample, as the study used a balanced panel that required 
each company to have the same number of observations (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). In 
the case of companies newly listed in either 2007 or 2008, their data would be 
incomplete as three years of observations were not available.   
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Third, cross-listed companies – public companies listed not only on the IDX but also on 
other exchanges – were also removed from the sample. When a country‟s legal 
enforcement is weak, companies have an incentive to develop functional alternatives to 
assure that minority shareholder interests are protected (Cai, 2007). One alternative is 
for the company to voluntary “bond” itself. It is widely accepted in literature that cross-
listing is considered as a voluntary bonding mechanism to enhance corporate 
governance practice. Some prior studies revealed that cross listing increases investor 
confidence and monitoring that might reduce agency costs (Saliva, 2003), increases 
disclosure (e.g., Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, and Onumah, 
2007) and increases corporate governance ratings (e.g., Woejcik, Clark, Bauer, 2005). 
The elimination of cross-listed companies enables this study to focus on domestic 
factors, since a cross-listed company might have more incentive than a company only 
listed on the IDX to improve the effectiveness of its audit committee. During the 2006-
2008 period, 8 public listed companies providing 24 firm-year observations were cross-
listed.  
 
Fourth, public listed companies that were merged or delisted during the 2006-2008 
period were removed from the sample because this caused unbalanced panel data. Fifth, 
public listed companies with incomplete annual reports during the 2006-2008 period 
were also removed from the sample because the absence of annual reports of certain 
listed companies in the period caused unbalanced panel data. These selection procedures 
resulted in a final sample of 828 firm-year observations. A list of the public listed 
companies included in the sample is shown in Table B.1 (Appendix B). 
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Table 5.2 Sampling Selection Procedure 
 
Sample selection Number 
Total number of firm-year observations of IDX-listed companies 
from 2006 to 2008 
1129 
Less:  
Firm-year observations of listed banks during the 2006-
2008 period 
(69) 
Firm-year observations of listed state owned enterprises  
during the 2006-2008 period 
(27) 
Firm-year observations of companies listed after 2006 (41) 
Firm-year observations of cross-listed companies during 
the 2006-2008 period 
(24) 
Firm-year observations of delisted and merged 
companies during the 2006-2008 period  
(9) 
Firm-year observations of companies with incomplete 
annual reports during the 2006-2008 period  
(131) 
Final sample of firm-year observations of listed companies 
during the 2006-2008 period  
828 
 
 
 
5.3.2 Variables Measurement and Data Sources 
 
5.3.2.1 Audit Committee Compliance Index 
This study examines the compliance of public listed companies on the IDX with audit 
committee rules. To measure compliance, an index called the audit committee 
compliance index total (ACCIT) was developed for the study. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the use of self-developed compliance indexes in prior studies on compliance with audit 
committee rules was rare; it was more common in prior studies on compliance with 
corporate governance codes (e.g., Khanchel, 2007; Ananchotikul  et al., 2008; Shaukat, 
2008). 
 
The audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT) consists of audit committee 
requirements extracted from two recent BAPEPAM rules, namely, BAPEPAM (2004) 
regarding membership requirements and job duties, and BAPEPAM-LK (2006) 
regarding audit committee disclosure. This implies that the ACCIT could be divided 
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into two sub-indexes: an audit committee compliance index (ACCI2004) based on 
BAPEPAM (2004), and an audit committee compliance index (ACCI2006) based on 
BAPEPAM-LK (2006). As presented in Table 5.3, BAPEPAM (2004) consists of 10 
requirements, while BAPEPAM-LK (2006) consists of 3 requirements. Thus, a total of 
13 requirements have been extracted from the two rules. To measure the level of 
compliance, this study utilised a binary scoring system: if a company complied with a 
particular requirement, it got a score of 1, otherwise it scored 0. The level of compliance 
of a particular company was obtained from the sum of the scores of all the requirements.   
 
Data for measuring the ACCIT was collected from two sources: the annual reports of 
the public listed companies in the sample, and announcements made by the public listed 
companies to the IDX. The annual reports were used to collect audit committee data 
related to membership and job duties (ACCI2004). Data was sourced from the corporate 
governance section of the reports, and from other parts of the reports where information 
related to the audit committee was located. However, important information was 
sometimes not found in the reports due to low levels of disclosure. To overcome this 
lack of information, audit committee information was sourced from the announcements 
of public listed companies to the IDX. Since public listed companies in Indonesia are 
required to report any changes regarding their audit committee to the IDX, 
announcements of such changes should appear in the IDX‟s online interactive database. 
If the required information was not found in either the annual reports or the 
announcements to the IDX, the study assumed that the company did not comply with 
the requirement and the company was given a score of 0. For compliance with audit 
committee disclosure in annual reports (ACCI2006), information was sourced solely 
from the annual reports of the public listed companies in the sample. If there was no 
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audit committee disclosure in the annual report as required by BAPEPAM-LK (2006), it 
was assumed that the company did not comply and the company got a score of 0. 
 
In developing the ACCIT, the equal weight approach was used. This meant that each 
sub index (ACCI2004 and ACCI2006) had equal weight. The equal weight approach 
was chosen as it is transparent and relatively objective (Florou and Galarniotis, 2007).   
As noted by Van den Berghe and Levrau (2003), assigning different weightings to 
different governance dimensions would appear to be based on subjective judgment. In 
addition, the underpinning theory concerning which variables or dimensions are most 
important in evaluating governance quality is relatively weak (Florou and Galarniotis, 
2007; Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006). The equal weight approach was also used by some 
prior corporate governance studies (e.g., Alves and Mendes, 2004; Drobetz, Schillhofer, 
and Zimmerman, 2004; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Florou and Galarniotis, 2007; Abdul 
Wahab, How, and Verhoeven, 2007). Given the use of the equal weight approach, the 
formula to compute total compliance (ACCIT) is as follows: 
                                                        (ACCI2004 + ACCI2006) 
                                       ACCIT= 
                                                                            2 
 
             where  ACCI2004 =   1  ∑
10 
j=1 Xj   and  ACCI2006 = 1 ∑ 
3 
j=1 Yj 
                                           10                                             3 
                      
                   X = requirement of BAPEPAM (2004) 
                   Y = requirement of BAPEPAM-LK (2006) 
Using this formula, the maximum ACCIT score for each public listed company is 1, and 
the minimum score is 0. ACCIT scores for each company in the sample are depicted in 
Table B.1 (Appendix B). 
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Table 5.3 Weights and Data Sources of Components of the Audit 
Committee Compliance Index Total (ACCIT) 
 
No. Requirements Rules  Data 
source 
Weight 
 Structure, membership and 
independence 
   
1 Comprises at least three members   
 
AR; CAI  
2 Comprises at least one independent 
commissioner and other members 
shall be external, independent 
parties. 
 AR; CAI  
3 Chairman is an independent 
commissioner. 
 AR; CAI  
4 One member shall have an 
educational background in 
accounting or finance. 
BAPEPAM 
(2004) 
AR; CAI  
 Job duties    
5 Establish an audit committee 
charter. 
 AR; CAI  
6 Examining the financial 
information.  
 AR; CAI  
7 Reviewing the compliance of the 
company with regulations. 
 AR; CAI 50 % 
8 Reviewing the internal auditor‟s 
work. 
 AR; CAI  
9 Reporting of risks and risk 
management implementation.  
 AR; CAI  
10 Scrutinizing and reporting of 
complaints. 
 AR; CAI  
 Disclosure    
11 Name, position and brief profile of 
audit committee members. 
 AR  
12 Frequency of meetings and 
attendance of each member.  
BAPEPAM-
LK (2006) 
AR 50% 
13 Brief report of audit committee 
activities. 
 AR  
 
Notes: AR=annual report; CAI=company announcements to the IDX 
 
5.3.2.2 Genuine Large Foreign Institutional Investors 
In measuring this variable, this study focused on the top foreign institutional investors. 
This study categorized the foreign institutional investors as large if they had ownership 
of at least 20 percent. The use of a 20 percent cut-off level was consistent with prior 
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studies (e.g., Sato, 2004; Chevalier et al., 2006; Tribo, Berrone, and Surroca, 2007; 
Achmad et al., 2009).  
 
After defining the large foreign institutional shareholders, it was necessary to identify 
whether they were genuine. Identification of their authenticity was the most difficult 
part of the study‟s data collection process, as well as its most time consuming. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the foreign institutional investors of public listed companies 
often intentionally keep secret their ultimate owners, mainly for taxation purposes. 
Except for banks, there are no regulations in Indonesia requiring the disclosure of a 
company‟s ultimate shareholders (World Bank, 2010). The use of databases, such as 
Bloomberg, to trace the ultimate shareholder was not useful since Bloomberg 
categorised the suspected foreign institutional investors as “internal transaction” and, as 
such, no further information was available. Therefore, an innovative approach was 
required to trace the ultimate owners of the suspected foreign institutional investors. 
 
In the investigation of the authenticity of foreign institutional investors, large foreign 
institutional investors formed in tax haven countries, or countries with treaty 
agreements with Indonesia, were classified as “Indonesian offshore companies” or 
suspect foreign institutional investors. After this, the investigation followed the steps 
presented in Table 5.4. Four steps for tracing the ultimate owners of suspect foreign 
institutional investors are detailed in the table. In the first step, the investigation sought 
information from the public listed company‟s formal documents, such as its annual 
reports and announcements to the IDX. In the second step, the investigation sought to 
obtain information from reliable business magazines or newspapers. In the third step, 
information was collected from the business profile purchased from a regulatory agency 
in the foreign institutional investor‟s registered home country. In the fourth step, the 
 172 
investigation was required to make a judgement based on certain criteria, since the first 
three steps did not provide any information.     
 
Table 5.4 Steps in Tracing the Ultimate Owners of Suspect Foreign Institutional 
Investors 
 
Step Explanation 
Step 1  The study examines the public listed company‟s annual report and tries to 
find information related to the suspect foreign institutional investor. If 
there is no information in the report, the study attempts to find the 
information from the listed company‟s announcements to the IDX. To 
provide more information, company announcements filed since the period 
before the suspect foreign institutional shareholder became a shareholder 
in the company are examined. This is mostly from the year 2000 onward, 
since most companies started their debt restructuring during that time. 
Company announcements include announcements about any significant 
activities in the company, short prospectuses for certain corporate actions 
and monthly reports of share ownership prepared by the share registrar. 
Sometimes the minutes of annual general meetings of shareholders can be 
found in the IDX database, however not all public listed companies 
disclose their minutes. Minutes of AGMs may be helpful in finding 
information related to foreign institutional investors, as the minutes may 
report the name of the representative of the suspect foreign institutional 
investor that attended the meeting. With regard to the short prospectuses  
issued for certain corporate actions, sometimes the ultimate owner of 
foreign institutional investors can be found in the document. If no 
information can be collected from any of these sources, the study then 
moves to Step 2.     
Step 2 The study collects relevant information on the suspect foreign institutional 
investors from reliable business magazines/newspapers, both local and 
foreign. The business magazines include Tempo, Investor Daily, Viva and 
Forbes, and the newspapers are Kontan, Neraca and Bisnis Indonesia. 
Information is also collected from equity analyses prepared by market 
research analysts. If there is no available information from these sources, 
the study moves to Step 3 for Singaporean and Hong Kong foreign 
institutional investors, or to Step 4 for other foreign institutional investors.  
Step 3 This step is for suspect foreign institutional investors established in 
Singapore and Hong Kong. In these countries, a business profile of the 
registered company can be purchased from the company regulator. For 
Singaporean institutional investors, a business profile can be obtained 
from the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA). For 
Hong Kong institutional investors, a business profile can be bought from   
the Integrated Companies Registry Information System (ICRIS). 
Sometimes, the ultimate owner of the suspect foreign institutional investor 
still cannot be found, as the company uses the name of a company located 
in a tax haven country as a shareholder. In this case, the study moves to 
the last step in the procedure, Step 4.  
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Step Explanation 
Step 4 This step uses a judgment to define whether the ultimate owner of a 
suspect foreign institutional investor is Indonesian, since no relevant 
information was found in Steps 1 to 3. The judgment is based on the 
following criteria: 
a. The foreign institutional investor is established in a tax haven 
country, or a country that has a tax treaty agreement with 
Indonesia. The establishment of the foreign firm occurs only a few 
days/months before the firm became a shareholder of the listed 
company in Indonesia. This indicates that the establishment of the 
firm might be just for investment in Indonesia and for treaty 
shopping, as discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, sometimes the 
foreign investor has no relevant experience in the field of business 
of the Indonesian listed company. 
b. Even though the suspect foreign institutional investors has had a 
significant stake in the Indonesian listed company for a long 
period of time (such as more than 1 year), the management of the 
acquired listed company (board of directors and board of 
commissioners) remains completely unchanged. This is very 
unusual for a takeover, and indicates that the suspect foreign 
institutional investor might have a close relationship with the 
Indonesian controlling shareholders.  
c. Sometimes the entry of the suspect foreign institutional investor 
causes a change in management, however, the newly appointed 
director or commissioner is Indonesian. This provides an 
indication that the suspect foreign institutional investor might be 
owned by Indonesians.   
 
Source: Developed by the author 
 
Based on the above steps, this study managed to identify several foreign institutional 
shareholders that were owned by Indonesians. The complete list of the Indonesian 
offshore companies is shown in Table C.1 (Appendix C). The list includes Indonesian 
offshore companies in the form of special purpose interests, and also well-known banks 
that usually act as custodian banks on behalf of the Indonesian shareholders. The special 
purpose interests are formed in tax haven countries, while the banks, which act as 
nominees, usually operate in Singapore. Table 5.5 presents the location of the 
Indonesian offshore companies – excluding the banks, which act as custodians or 
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nominees. As can be seen, Singapore and the British Virgin Islands are the most 
favourite jurisdictions for Indonesian offshore companies. It seems that the advantages 
of forming Indonesian offshore companies in Singapore include the close proximity of 
Indonesia to Singapore, and the tax treaty agreement between the two countries. As a 
result, Indonesian offshore companies registered in Singapore enjoy lower tax rates on 
income earned from operations in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the British Virgin Islands 
offers some tax benefits, such as no dividend and interest tax, no royalty tax and no 
personal income tax (Deloitte, 2011). As discussed in Chapter 2, Indonesian offshore 
companies arguably do not enhance the corporate governance practices of listed 
companies in Indonesia. Therefore, public listed companies which had foreign 
institutional investors with large stakes (20 percent and above), and that were genuine 
(not Indonesian offshore companies or banks acting as custodians on behalf of 
Indonesians), were scored 1, otherwise 0.  
 
Table 5.5 List of Jurisdictions of Indonesian Offshore Companies 
 
No. Jurisdiction No. of Observations Percentage 
1 Singapore 16 29 
2 British Virgin Islands 16 29 
3 Hong Kong 7 13 
4 Mahe, Seychelles 4 7 
5 Labuan, Malaysia 3 5 
6 Cayman Islands 2 4 
7 Mauritius 2 4 
8 Samoa 2 4 
9 Cook Islands 1 2 
10 Charlestown, Nevis 1 2 
11 Jersey, Channel Islands 1 2 
12 Marshall Islands 1 2 
 Total 56 100 
  
 Source: Compiled by the author 
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5.3.2.3 Other Independent Variables of Interest 
Besides the authenticity of large foreign institutional investors, other independent 
variables examined in this study included family-controlled company with family 
members on the boards (FMLBOCD), family-controlled company with professional 
management (PROFBOCD) and politically connected independent commissioners 
(POLIC). All were measured using nominal scale.    
 
For the family-controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) 
variable, the public listed company was scored 1 if one or more family members sat on 
the board of directors, the board of commissioners, or both; it scored 0, otherwise. It is 
common in East Asia, including Indonesia, for controlling shareholders to control the 
company through pyramid structures and cross-holdings among firms (Claessens et al., 
2000). In pyramid structures, it is possible that the controlling shareholder controls the 
firm through a small stake (Bebchuk, Kraakman, Trianties, 2000). In this study, a 
family might control a company, with a small stake, through a pyramid structure. 
Therefore, the study did not determine a certain cut-off level of family ownership: as 
long as the family had ownership and it placed a family member on one or more of the 
boards, the combination of control and ownership was considered to be in the hands of 
the family. This measurement was consistent with prior studies (e.g., Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004; Wang, 2006; Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Jiraporn and Dadalt, 2009). The study 
simply relied on the annual report, IPO prospectus, monthly report of share ownership 
prepared by the share registrar, and other secondary resources such as Conglomeration 
Indonesia (1997) and Top Companies and Big Groups in Indonesia (1995), to identify 
the ownership percentage of families and family members who sat on the boards. If 
there was a change in ownership after the IPO, the study collected information from the 
short prospectuses and the announcements of public listed companies to the IDX.   
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In terms of the family-controlled company with professional management 
(PROFBOCD) variable, the public listed company was scored 1 if the company was 
controlled by a family holding ownership of 20 percent or more of the company and 
with no family members on the board; it scored 0, otherwise. The use of 20 percent as a 
cut-off point was to ensure that the family was actually the controlling shareholder with 
a large enough stake in the company. Like the FMLBOCD variable, data sources for the 
measurement of this variable consisted of the annual report (biographies of directors and 
commissioners, company ownership structure), the IPO and short prospectuses, the 
monthly report of share ownership prepared by the share registrar, and the 
announcements of the public listed company to the IDX. 
 
With regard to the politically connected independent commissioners (POLIC) variable, 
the pubic listed company was scored 1 if one or more of the independent commissioners 
were retired army officers or current or retired bureaucrats; it scored 0, otherwise. 
Bureaucrat refers to a person who is currently, or was formerly, an officer of a central 
government, local government or government agency. The data source for measuring 
this variable was the annual report of the company and, in particular, the profiles of the 
members of the board of commissioners. In addition to the names of the commissioners, 
the profile typically contained information on their age, gender, education, professional 
background, and employment history.  
 
5.3.2.4 Control Variables 
The financial expertise of independent commissioners (ICED) was measured using 
nominal scale. A listed company was scored 1 if the independent commissioner 
appointed as the audit committee chair had an educational background in accounting or 
was a CPA holder; it was scored 0, otherwise. This definition was consistent with the 
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BAPEPAM (2004), which required at least one member of the audit committee to have 
an educational background in accounting or finance. Obviously, this definition is 
narrower than the BRC (1999) and the SOX (2002), but it was adopted due to the lack 
of comprehensive disclosures on the backgrounds of commissioners in company annual 
reports. The measurement approach is similar to Bradbury et al. (2009). The 
information was collected from the biographies of commissioners contained in the 
annual reports of the listed companies. 
 
The proportion of independent commissioners (BOC) variable was measured by 
comparing the number of independent commissioners to the total number of 
commissioners on the board of commissioners, and calculating the percentage. The 
BAPEPAM rule (2004) defines an independent commissioner as a person who comes 
from outside the firm and is free from any business relationship with it. Board of 
commissioners size (BCS) variable was measured by counting the total number of 
commissioners on the board of commissioners. Company size (SIZE) was measured 
using the natural log of total assets. For audit quality (AUD), a company was scored 1 if 
it had been audited by one of the Big Four firms; it was scored 0, otherwise. To operate 
in Indonesia, foreign accounting firms, such as the Big Four, are obligated to partner 
with local public accounting firms. Financial loss (LOSS) was measured using nominal 
scale, and the listed company was scored 1 if there was negative income in the year of 
observation; it was scored 0, otherwise. Leverage (LEV) was measured as the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets and was used to control for the liquidity of the firm. The 
data sources for these variables included the annual reports of public listed companies 
and the Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD). A complete list of variables 
measured in the study is shown in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6 Summary of the Variables Measured in Research Stage 1 
 
Main Variables Measurement and Scoring 
GLFGR 1 if the top foreign institutional investor was genuine and 
large (ownership is at least 20 percent), 0 if otherwise. 
FMLBOCD 1 if at least one family member is a board member, 0 if 
otherwise. 
PROFBOCD 1 if the firm was controlled by family (ownership is at least 
20 percent) and was managed by a professional, 0 if 
otherwise. 
POLIC 1 if one or more independent commissioners was a retired 
army officer or current or retired bureaucrat, 0 if otherwise.  
Control Variables  
ICED 1 if an independent commissioner, as audit committee chair, 
had educational background in accounting or was a CPA 
holder, 0 if otherwise. 
BOC Number of independent commissioners divided by the total 
number of members on the board of commissioners. 
Control Variables  
BCS Number of members on the board of commissioners. 
AUD 1 if the listed company was audited by a Big 4 auditor, 0 if 
otherwise.  
LOSS 1 if the listed company had a negative net income in the year 
of obersvation, 0 if otherwise. 
LEV Debt ratio = total debt to total assets. 
SIZE Natural log of total assets at year-end. 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Research Models 
Based on the research framework and the hypotheses constructed in Chapter 4, multiple 
regression models were developed for testing the hypotheses. Two multiple regression 
models were developed to examine the relationship between the independent variables and 
compliance with audit committee rules. The data analysis used panel data analysis and the 
Stata version 11.1 software application. The specifications of the models are as follows: 
Model 1 
ACCITit  = β0it + β1FMLBOCDit + β2GLFRGit + β3POLICit + β4ICEDit + β5BOCit +  
               β6 BCSit + β7AUDit + Β8LOSSit + β9LEVit +  β10SIZEit + εit 
Model 2 
ACCITit  = β0it + β1PROFBOCDit + β2GLFRGit + β3POLICit + β4ICEDit + β5BOCit + 
β6 BCSit + β7AUDit + Β8LOSSit + β9LEVit +  β10SIZEit + εit 
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Where:  
FMLBOCD   = family-controlled company with family members on the boards 
PROFBOCD   = family-controlled company with professional management 
GLFRG   = genuine large foreign institutional investor 
POLIC = politically connected independent commissioners 
ICED  = independent commissioner with financial expertise 
BOC  = proportion of independent commissioners 
BCS  = board of commissioners size 
AUD  = audit quality 
LOSS   = financial loss  
LEV  = leverage  
SIZE    = company size 
ε  = error term  
The two models use similar variables to some extent, however Model 2 is different from 
Model 1 in that the variable of FMLBOCD in Model 1 is replaced by the variable 
PROFBOCD in Model 2. Model 1 was intended to test hypothesis H1, while Model 2 was 
used to test hypothesis H2.  
  
5.3.4 Method of Analysis 
 
5.3.4.1 Assumption of the Classical Linear Regression Model 
In using a classical linear regression model (CLRM), several assumptions known as the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions need to be fulfilled. The assumptions tested in this study 
were: (1) the number of observations in the sample must be greater than the number of 
regressors, and (2) the regressor values have sufficient variability (no multicollinearity), 
homoscedasticity or constant variance of ui (no heteroskedasticity) and no 
autocorrelation between the disturbances. The assumptions are suitable for cross-
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sectional analysis with random sampling, time-series and panel data as well 
(Wooldridge, 2009). It is also possible to use the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model, the fixed effects model and the random effects model for panel data, 
as those models are fundamentally based on the OLS in terms of estimation (Park, 
2009). The statistical properties of the OLS itself are based on the assumptions of the 
CLRM (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
 
a. Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity is related to the two assumptions of the classical linear regression 
model, namely, the number of observations in the sample must be greater than the 
number of regressors, and the regressor values have sufficient variability. 
Multicollinearity refers to the presence of “perfect” or exact linear relationships among 
some or all explanatory variables of the regression model (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). It 
means that there is more than one exact linear relationship. If a single linear relationship 
is present, this is called collinearity. The presence of multicollinearity affects the 
accuracy of the regression coefficient and standard errors in the regression. For example, 
if high multicollinearity is present, an estimation of the regression coefficient could be 
determined, but standard errors tend to be large. Meanwhile, perfect multicollinearity 
causes the regression coefficient to be indeterminate, and the standard error also cannot 
be defined (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
 
In this study, multicollinearity is detected using two methods, namely, Pearson„s 
correlation and the value of the variance inflation factor (VIF). According to Pallant 
(2001), the multicollinearity problem exists if the correlation coefficient between two 
regressors exceeds 0.70. Meanwhile, if the variance inflation factor (VIF) exceeds 10, it 
can be said that the variable is highly collinear (Ghozali, 2006; Gujarati and Porter, 
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2009). Some measures can be taken to remedy the multicollinearity problem. These 
include combining cross-sectional and time-series data, dropping collinear variables, 
transforming variables, adding new data and using other statistical techniques such as 
factor analysis of principal components (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
 
b. Heteroskedasticity  
The classical linear regression model also assumes that the disturbance (u) in the 
regression function is equal in variance. This is the homoscedasticity assumption. It 
means that the variation around the regression line (the line of the average relationship 
between Y and X) is the same across the X values (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
Symbolically, it can be written as follows. 
Var ( ui² ) = σ
2 
 
where u is the error term or disturbance, σ2 is the error variance or disturbance variance, 
and var stands for variance. Thus, heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of an 
unobservable error (u), which is conditional on independent variables, is not constant. 
Symbolically, it can be written as follows. 
Var ( ui² ) = σi
2  
 
The heteroskedasticity problem is more common in cross-sectional data than in time-
series data. While heteroskedasticity is present, the usual OLS estimators remain linear, 
unbiased and asymptotically normally distributed (in a large sample). However, the 
estimates of the parameters obtained by the OLS technique are not best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE) or not efficient (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). As the OLS standard 
errors are based directly on the variance, they are biased (not valid) for constructing 
confidence interval and t-statistics (Wooldridge, 2009). As a result, this causes invalid 
hypothesis testing.  
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The existence of heteroskedasticity for panel data can be detected using the likelihood 
ratio (LR) test. The test compares the model with both heteroskedasticity and 
homoscedasticity. The null hypothesis is homoscedasticity or constant variance. If the 
probability value (prob.) is lower than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected and 
heteroskedasticity is present (Wiggins and Poi, 2001; Baum, 2010). Using Stata, the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test can be performed with the command lrtest. 
 
There are two approaches to remedy heteroskedasticity. One is used when the σi
2 
is 
known and the other is used when σi
2 
is unknown (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Under the 
condition where σi
2
 is known, the approach uses generalised least squares (GLS) 
estimators – known as weighted least squares (WLS) estimators – for correcting 
heteroskedasticity. In the GLS method, the original variables are transformed in such a 
way that the transformed variables meet the assumptions of the classical regression 
model (Wooldridge, 2009). In practice, error variance (
 σi
2
) is rarely known (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009; Gujarati and Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
Where error variance (
 σi
2
) is unknown, there are two possible methods for overcoming 
heteroskedasticity. The first method is the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
method, also known as the Huber-White standard errors method, the Eicker-White or 
the Eicker-Huber-White standard errors method (Wooldridge, 2002). This method does 
not change the estimation procedure: the coefficient estimators are the same as those of 
the OLS, but their standard errors are different. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors method is valid for large samples because, with small sample sizes, the robust t 
statistics can have a distribution which is close to the t distribution produced by usual 
OLS standard errors (Wooldridge, 2009). In Stata, the heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors test can be performed using the vce (robust) command. The second 
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procedure to remedy heteroskedasticity uses the feasible generalised least squares 
(FGLS) procedure. Like the WLS estimators, this procedure changes the estimation 
procedure, which provides different estimates than the OLS. The estimation procedure 
in the FGLS starts with estimation of the model using OLS and then uses the OLS 
estimated residuals to construct an estimate of the error variance specification. In the 
next step, weighted least squares is applied. The FGLS could also be used to remedy 
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation as well (Greene, 2002; Wooldridge, 2009; Stata 
Press, 2009). In Stata, the FGLS procedure can be performed using the xtgls command, 
and applying the additional command (h) if  heteroskedasticity is present. 
 
c. Autocorrelation  
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), autocorrelation refers to “correlation between 
two time series”. A classical linear regression model assumes that the disturbance 
appearing in the regression function is not influenced by the existence of disturbance in 
any other observation. Symbolically, it can be written as follows. 
cov (ui, uj | Xi, Xj ) = 0  for i ≠ j 
where u is the error term (disturbance), i and j are two different observations, and cov 
means covariance. The presence of autocorrelation can be written, 
cov (ui, uj | Xi, Xj ) ≠ 0   for i ≠ j 
Autocorrelation is more common in time-series data than cross-section data. In time-
series data, autocorrelation is present when error terms at one date can be correlated 
with the error terms in the previous periods. Like heteroskedasticity, the presence of 
autocorrelation might cause the usual OLS estimators to remain unbiased, consistent, 
and asymptotically normally distributed, but no longer efficient. As a result, standard 
errors and t-statistics are not valid (Gujarati and Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009). In 
this study, the test for detecting serial correlation in the panel data used Wooldridge‟s 
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test (2002) because this method requires few assumptions and is easy to implement 
(Drukker, 2003). The null hypothesis (H0) tested in this technique is that there is no 
serial correlation (autocorrelation) in the model. If the probability value is significant (p 
<0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected or autocorrelation is present (Drukker, 2003). In 
Stata, Wooldridge‟s test can be performed using the xtserial command.  
 
 
Like heteroskedasticity, the existence of autocorrelation can be resolved by using the 
FGLS method of estimation, and the OLS with corrected standard errors (which is 
known as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, or HAC). 
Both FGLS and HAC can be used to overcome heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
The FGLS and HAC produce efficient estimators for a large sample. However,  
compared to FGLS, the HAC still uses OLS estimation but it corrects standard errors for 
autocorrelation using a procedure developed by Newey and West (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009) that uses OLS estimation with robust standard errors. This study employs FGLS 
to solve the autocorrelation problem. In Stata, FGLS can be performed using the xtgls 
command, with the additional command corr (ar1) if there is an autocorrelation in the 
model. Basically, the xtgls command can overcome autocorrelation across and within 
companies over time (Cameron and Trivendi, 2009; Stata Press, 2009).   
 
5.3.4.2 Panel Data 
 
The analysis of the determinants of compliance with audit committee rules involved an 
estimation procedure based on a panel data model. Panel data (or longitudinal data) 
refers to the observation of N unit cases along two (or more) time periods. In other 
words, panel data has both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions (Wooldridge, 
2009). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), panel data has several advantages: 
1. Panel data provides an increased precision of estimation because of the 
increased number of observations.  
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2. Panel data takes into account unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated 
with the regressors. Such unobserved heterogeneity might lead to omitted 
variable bias.  
3. Panel data provides the possibility of learning more about the dynamics of 
individual behaviour.  
In addition, panel data is useful for evaluating the impact of a certain event or policy 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Therefore, the study on compliance with audit committee rules 
employed panel data. There are three panel data models: the pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model, the fixed effects model and the random effects model.  
 
a. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Model  
The pooled regression model combines or pools cross-sectional and time-series data 
into one “grand” regression without making a distinction between cross-sectional and 
time-series data (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). As a consequence of pooling together all 
observations, this model ignores the heterogeneity or uniqueness that might exist among 
observations. In this model, the model„s parameters (the intercept and slope coefficient) 
are assumed to be equal (constant) across companies and stable over time. The 
heterogeneity of each subject is subsumed in disturbance term uit (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009). In practice, the assumption might be difficult to maintain, as unobservable 
heterogeneity (which is constant over time but varied among subjects), might exist in 
panel data. It is possible that αi (unobserved or heterogeneity) is correlated with one or 
more of the regressors that could induce autocorrelation. That condition violates the 
classical linear regression model assumption, namely, that there is no correlation 
between the regressors and the disturbance or error term. In Stata, the pooled OLS 
regression is executed using the command regress.  
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b. Fixed Effects Model and Random Effects Model 
The effects of unobserved heterogeneity can either be assumed as fixed parameters, 
(referred to as the fixed effects model), or random variables (referred to as the random 
effects model). In short, the differences between the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model can be seen in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7 Differences between the Fixed Effects Model and the Random Effects 
Model 
 
Items Fixed Effects  Random Effects  
Intercepts Varying across groups 
and/or times 
Constant 
Error variances Constant Varying across groups 
and/or times 
Slopes Constant Constant 
Estimation LSDV, within effect method GLS, FGLS 
 
Source: Park (2009) 
 
The fixed effects model assumes the same slopes and constant variance across entities 
or subjects, but the intercept may differ across individuals. This model argues that the 
error term is assumed to have a mean of zero, conditional on past, current and future 
values of the regressors or strong exogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In the model, 
an unobserved fixed effect, which is a time invariant characteristic of an individual or 
group, could be correlated with any regressors. The fixed effects can eliminate the time 
invariant unobserved effect. There are two methods in the fixed effects model, namely, 
the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) and the within effect estimation method. In 
the LSDV method, the dummy variable technique is used to vary the intercept among 
subjects (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). This model is known as the one-way fixed effects 
model because it allows the intercept to differ between subjects. An extension of this 
model is also possible by allowing a time effect. This could be done by creating time 
dummies. In econometrics, such a model is known as a two-way fixed effects model 
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that takes account of individual and time effects. Meanwhile, the within effect 
estimation method uses differencing sample observations around their sample mean to 
eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. The first step of this method is computing 
“demeaned” or mean-corrected values (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The mean-corrected 
value of each subject could be computed by subtracting its mean value from the sample 
of mean values. The next step involves pooling all the mean-corrected values and 
running OLS regression. In Stata, the command for the fixed effects model is xtreg. 
 
The random effects model, which is known as the error correction model (ECM), refers 
to a model with a constant intercept and slopes, and an error variance that is varied 
across subjects or times. This model assumes that αi (unobserved effects) are 
uncorrelated with regressors (Wooldridge, 2009). In other words, αi (unobserved effects) 
are comprised of random variables that are distributed independently of the regressors 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Subjects have a common mean value for intercept, 
whereas differences among subjects are reflected by the variance of error terms (Park, 
2009). Thus, the differences between the fixed effects and the random effects models 
are based on whether the αi (unobserved effects) are linked to the explanatory variables 
(regressors). If αi (unobserved effects) are correlated to independent variables, it is 
appropriate to use the fixed effects model. On the other hand, when αi (unobserved 
effects) are uncorrelated to independent variables, the random effects model is 
appropriate. The estimation method in the random effects model is generalised least 
squares (GLS) when the variance structure is known, and feasible generalised least 
squares (FGLS) when the variance is unknown (Park, 2009). In Stata, the random 
effects model is executed by the command xtreg. 
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5.3.4.3 Model Selection  
This study estimated both regression models (Model 1 and Model 2) using the pooled 
OLS regression model, the fixed effects model and the random effects model. Several 
statistical tests, as explained below, were then performed to determine the appropriate 
model. Along with the test of model selection, tests for occurrences of multicollinearity, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation were also performed.  
Following is a description of several tests that must be performed to select the 
appropriate analysis model. 
 
a. The Likelihood-Ratio Test 
 
The Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test is used to decide which of the models – the OLS model 
(pooled regression), or the fixed effects model – is more appropriate for use in data 
analysis. This test compares the log-likelihood ratio (LR) between the two models, 
namely, the pooled regression (or “restricted”) model, and the fixed effects (or  
“unrestricted”) model. The LR value will follow the distribution of the chi-square (χ2). 
If the chi-square value is significant (p <0.05), the restricted model is rejected, and the 
unrestricted model is more appropriate model for data analysis, and vice versa (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009). In Stata, the LR test can be performed using the 
command lrtest. 
 
b. The Lagrange Multiplier Test 
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is used to examine both the OLS (pooled regression) 
model and the random effects model, and determine which of the two is more 
appropriate to use in data analysis. Similar to the LR test, this test compares the chi-
square (χ2) value of the two models. If the test value of the chi-square is significant (p 
<0.05), the pooled regression model is rejected, and the random effects model is more 
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appropriate for data analysis, and vice versa (Gujarati and Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 
2001). In Stata, the LM test can be performed with the command xttest0. 
 
c. Hausman Test 
The Hausman test is used to determine which of the models, the fixed effects model or 
the random effects model, is more appropriate for data analysis. The underlying idea of 
the Hausman test is to compare the fixed versus random effects under the null 
hypothesis that αi (unobserved effects) are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the 
model. Thus, this test compares two sets of estimators, one of which is consistent under 
both the null and the alternative (i.e., the fixed effects model), and another (i.e., the 
random effects model) which is consistent only under the null hypothesis (Greene, 
2002). The Hausman test value will follow the chi-square (χ2) distribution. If the test 
value of the chi-square is significant (p <0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected – meaning 
that αi (unobserved effects) are correlated, so the fixed effects model is preferred. In 
Stata, the Hausman test can be performed with the command hausman. 
 
5.4 RESEARCH DESIGN FOR RESEARCH STAGE 2: AUDIT COMMITTEE 
EFFECTIVENESS AND RESTATEMENTS 
 
 
5.4.1 Sample Selection 
The sample for this study consisted of firms that revised their annual or interim 
financial statements during the 2006-2012 period. The year 2006 was selected because 
audit committee disclosure in company annual reports was compulsory from 2006 
onward. 
 
In terms of financial statement types, this study used both interim and annual 
restatements. In some prior studies (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Archambeault et al., 2008), 
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interim restatements were removed from the sample based on the argument that it would 
be difficult to examine the relationship of audit committee effectiveness with interim 
reports when the external auditor was not involved in the reporting process. On the 
other hand, some prior studies (e.g., Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz, 2004; Myers, Myers, 
Palmrose, and Scholz 2005) employed both interim and annual restatements. They 
argued that restatements in both types of financial statements were equally important to 
investors and regulators. As evidence, Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) found 
that the market reaction to restatement announcements was no different for annual or 
quarterly misstatements. In line with this view, the current study considered that the 
interim and annual restatements were equally important in examining audit committee 
effectiveness. As stated in the BAPEPAM rule No. IX.I.5 regarding audit committee 
membership and job duties, the audit committee of a public listed company in Indonesia 
shall examine financial information issued by the company including, but not limited to, 
examining financial statements and financial projections. This requires the audit 
committee to examine both annual and interim financial statements.   
 
To find restating firms, this study searched the IDX interactive online database by 
typing keywords, such as “revise”, “restate” and “correct”. The search involved the 
period from 01 January 2007 to 30 June 2013, inclusive. Table 5.8 details the IDX 
database search results based on a search of the initial sample of 658 firms with 
restatements.  
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Table 5.8 Sample Detail 
 
Description Number 
Firms revising statements in the period 2006-2013, as  
identified from the IDX database   
658 
Less:  
(-) Annual report revisions (77) 
(-) Multiple restatements (21) 
(-) Bank sector (60) 
(-) State-owned enterprise (SOE) (19) 
(-) Unknown reason (65) 
(-) Restatement not within the GAO‟s definition of  
restatement 
 
 Problems in sending files          (124) 
 Wording correction           (86) 
 Additional disclosure in the notes of  the 
financial statements 
          (27) 
 Accounting policy change (7) 
 Mathematical correction                                                                                      (2)
Final restatements sample           158 
      Interim financial statements                98 
      Annual financial statements 60 
Control firms 158 
Total number of firms 316 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
As shown in the table, some restating firms were eliminated from the sample for various 
reasons. Some restating companies with annual report revisions were removed as the 
revisions were not the focus of the study
7
. In addition, firms that had multiple 
restatements were identified. Following prior studies (e.g., Srinivasan, 2005; Arthaud-
Day et al., 2006; Amoah and Tang, 2010), only the first restatements were included if a 
firm had the same type of financial statement restatements more than once in one year. 
This elimination was intended to avoid data redundancy, as the logistic regression that 
would be used in the data analysis required that a single case could only be represented 
once and must be in one group (Leech, Barret, and Morgan, 2008). Thus, data 
redundancy would violate the assumption. As with the study on the determinants of 
compliance with audit committee rules, banks and state owned enterprises were also 
                                                 
7
 The type of revision in the report was not related to financial statements. 
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removed from the sample of restating companies, as these sectors had different 
corporate governance requirements.  
 
The current study also excluded restatement announcements where the reasons for the 
restatements were unknown. It was important to know the reasons for the restatements 
because these were used to determine their materiality. The study followed GAO (2006) 
to classify material misstatements of financial information (see Table 5.9). As can be 
seen in Table 5.8., the number of unknown reasons for restatements was relatively high 
and occurred because the restating firms did not provide any information regarding 
them. The IDX requires restating firms to announce the restatement of their financial 
statements by filing form E012 for annual financial statements, and form E015 for 
interim financial statements. Unfortunately, these forms do not require the disclosure of 
the reason behind the restatement. As a result, not all restating firms disclosed the 
reasons behind their restatements. Some restating firms did not voluntarily disclose 
reasons because they may have been afraid that the restatements would damage their 
reputation. It should be noted that the category of unknown reasons includes some 
restating companies that were excluded from the sample due to missing data (caused by 
delisting) for the relevant time period.  
 
Once the reasons for restatements were identified, the study excluded sample firms with 
restatement reasons that did not meet GAO (2006) criteria. GAO (2006) criteria have 
been used by some prior studies in both the US (e.g., Flanagan, Muse, and 
O‟Shaughnessy, 2008; Burks, 2010; Chang, Wei, Wu, and Teng, 2010) and developing 
countries (e.g., Siregar and Bachtiar, 2005; Abdullah et al., 2010). As the GAO (2006) 
includes only announced restatements made to correct mistakes in the application of 
accounting standards, the current study excluded restatements due to normal business 
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activities, non-accounting errors, and restatements for presentation purposes. The study 
also excluded restatements due to stock splits in affiliated firms, changes in accounting 
policy, additional disclosures contained in the notes to the financial statements, wording 
corrections, mathematical corrections, and problems in sending files. Amongst the 
reasons for excluding restating companies from the sample, problems in sending files 
resulted in the highest number of exclusions. “Problems in sending files” refers to 
problems incurred by restating companies in sending their financial statements to the 
IDX through its IDXnet network system. The use of the network to send the statements 
is an IDX requirement but problems with the network often result in the receipt of 
incomplete or even duplicate files. After all exclusions, the final sample included 158 
restating firms with 60 annual restatements and 98 interim restatements. The sample 
detail for each year can be found in Table B.3 in Appendix B.  
 
Table 5.9 Restatement Category Descriptions 
No. Category 
Description 
Category Description 
1. Acquisition and 
merger 
Restatements of acquisitions or mergers that were 
improperly accounted for or not accounted for at all. 
These include instances in which the wrong 
accounting method was used, or losses or gains related 
to the acquisition were understated or overstated. This 
does not include in-process research and development, 
or restatements for mergers, acquisitions, and 
discontinued operations when appropriate accounting 
methods were employed. 
2. Cost or expense Restatements due to improper cost accounting. This 
category includes instances of improperly recognizing 
costs or expenses, improperly capitalizing 
expenditures, or any other number of mistakes or 
improprieties that led to misreported costs. It also 
includes restatements due to improper treatment of tax 
liabilities, income tax reserves, and other tax-related 
items. 
3. In-process research 
and development 
Restatements resulting from instances in which 
improper accounting methodologies were used to 
value in-process research and development at the time 
of an acquisition. 
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Table 5.9 (continued) 
 
No. Category 
Description 
Category Description 
4. Reclassification Restatements due to improperly classified accounting 
items. These include restatements due to improprieties 
such as debt payments being classified as investments. 
5. Related-party 
transaction 
Restatements due to inadequate disclosure or improper 
accounting of revenues, expenses, debts, or assets 
involving transactions or relationships with related 
parties. This category includes those involving special 
purpose entities. 
6. Restructuring, 
assets, or inventory 
Restatements due to asset impairment, errors relating 
to the accounting treatment of investments, timing of 
asset write-downs, goodwill, restructuring activity and 
inventory valuation, and inventory quantity issues. 
7. Revenue recognition Restatements due to improper revenue accounting. 
This category includes instances in which revenue was 
improperly recognized, questionable revenues were 
recognized, or any other number of mistakes or 
improprieties that led to misreported revenue. 
8. Securities-related Restatements due to improper accounting for 
derivatives, warrants, stock options and other 
convertible securities. 
9. Other Any restatement not covered by the listed categories. 
Cases in this category include restatements due to 
inadequate loan-loss reserves, delinquent loans, loan 
write-offs, or improper accounting for bad loans and 
restatements due to fraud, or accounting irregularities 
that were left unspecified. 
Source: GAO (2006). 
 
The incidence of restatements identified in this study is considered smaller than that of 
prior studies in the US (see Section 6.3.1.1 in Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion). The 
number of restatements, however, is not much different from, or is even higher than, the 
number in some prior studies in other developing countries. For example, Rasyid (2012) 
used a sample of 11 restating firms in a study in Indonesia. Abdullah et al. (2010) 
studied restatements in Malaysia with a sample of 31 restating firms for the period 
2002-2005. In Kuwait, Alyousef and Almutairi (2010) studied restatements with a 
sample of 46 restating firms. Similarly, Chang et al. (2010) employed 31 restating firms 
for a study in Taiwan.  
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Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Romanus et al., 2008; Amoah 
and Tang, 2010), the next step in the study involved the matching of restating firms with 
non-restating firms that were used as control firms. The primary advantage of using 
logistic regression with matched data is to control some variables other than the 
matched variables (Kleinbaum, 1994). The current study used one control for each case 
to create one to one matching. The criteria for the inclusion of firms in the control group 
included: the firms had no restatements, they had a similar financial year, they were 
listed only on the IDX (they were not cross listed), and they were classified in the same 
IDX industry sector and were closest to the restating firms in terms of year-end asset 
size. To obtain a list of control firms, the study generated a list of all listed firms and 
their asset sizes. Firms were categorized based on the two digit IDX industry sector 
code and on the year period. Then, one firm with the closest total asset size and 
complete data for the period of interest was chosen. If no control firms in the two digit 
industry sector met the size criteria, the restating firm was matched with a control firm 
in a one-digit industry sector. The procedure resulted in a total of 316 firms, consisting 
of 158 restating firms matched with 158 non-restating firms as a control group. The list 
of name of each restating company and its control company can be found in Table B.2.2 
and Table B.2.3 in Appendix B. 
 
5.4.2 Variables Measurement and Data Sources 
 
5.4.2.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
This study assumes that the audit committee is effective if it fulfils all requirements 
stipulated in the rules and regulations. The first step towards effectiveness should be full 
compliance with the prevailing rules and regulations (Haron et al., 2005). Thus, high 
compliance with audit committee rules also indicates high effectiveness of the audit 
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committee. That is why the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT) used as a 
dependent variable in Research Stage 1 serves as a measurement of audit committee 
effectiveness in Research Stage 2.  
 
The use of the ACCIT as a measurement of audit committee effectiveness causes this 
study to differ from most prior studies on audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality. As discussed in Chapter 3, most prior studies used a proxy for audit 
committee effectiveness that was comprised of a single audit committee characteristic, 
such as the presence of an audit committee, audit committee independence, audit 
committee size, number of audit committee meetings and audit committee expertise. If 
several audit committee aspects were used in prior studies, each aspect was examined in 
a separate analysis.  
 
In this study of restatements, the ACCIT score (which was obtained from the 
determinants of the study in Research Stage 1) was centred to avoid multicollinearity 
(see Aiken and West, 1991). As discussed in Chapter 3, hypothesis H6 required testing 
the interaction between the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT) and 
family-controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD). This 
interaction of independent variables might have created multicollinearity if the ACCIT 
had not been centred. Thus, centring was done by subtracting the audit committee 
compliance index total (ACCIT) score from its mean value.  
 
Compared to the audit committee index used in prior studies, the ACCIT is considered 
more comprehensive, as the index consists of several elements, such as membership, job 
duties and disclosure. Even though the elements of the index consisted merely of 
mandatory requirements extracted from BAPEPAM rules, the index seems to be a 
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combination of several elements that have been used by prior studies (see Table 5.10). 
Only two elements of the index (job duty of the audit committee to scrutinise 
complaints, and the disclosure of audit committee members‟ profiles) have not been 
used in the indexes of prior studies.  
  
This study assumes that all elements of the index match with all the dimensions of audit 
committee effectiveness proposed by DeZoort et al. (2002) and Bédard and Gendron 
(2010). As discussed in Chapter 3, both DeZoort et al. (2002) and Bédard and Gendron 
(2010) argued that audit committee effectiveness should consist of four interrelated 
dimensions: composition, resources, authority and diligence or process. In addition, 
according to scholars, these dimensions are interrelated (see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3).  
As depicted in Table 5.10, elements of the index represent the four dimensions. 
Membership requirements related to independence and expertise are a proxy for the 
composition dimension, and have been widely used by some prior studies. Meanwhile, 
the requirement for a minimum number of audit committee members is a proxy for the 
resources dimension. Authority dimension is represented by the job duties of the audit 
committee, as extracted from the BAPEPAM rule (2004). For the diligence or process 
dimension, the index uses mandatory disclosure rather than voluntary disclosure. 
DeZoort et al. (2002) suggested that voluntary disclosure could be used as an alternative 
proxy, as some prior studies in the US (i.e., Turpin and DeZoort, 1998; Carcello et al., 
2002) have used this proxy. It seems that voluntary disclosure is preferred, since 
mandatory disclosure in the US has limited the variability of disclosure rates across 
companies (see Carcello et al., 2002). However, unlike the US, the level of compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements in Indonesia varies across companies due to the 
weak legal enforcement regime. As evidenced by Utama (2003), the disclosure level of 
public listed companies in Indonesia, even for mandatory disclosure, is generally low. 
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Therefore, mandatory disclosure is considered viable as a proxy for the 
diligence/process dimension.   
 
 
5.4.2.2 Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, the BAPEPAM-LK rules are less stringent 
compared to those of other audit committee reforms, such as the BRC (1999) and the 
SOX (2002). As a result, the use of the BAPEPAM-LK rules requirements as an 
element of the measurement of audit committee effectiveness might not represent audit 
committee best practices. Unlike the BRC recommendations, for example, the 
BAPEPAM rule (2004) does not require audit committees to communicate with external 
auditors. Yet, according DeZoort et al. (2002), support from the external auditor is part 
of the resources component of audit committee effectiveness. Thus, to examine the 
robustness of the results of the use of the audit committee compliance index as a proxy 
for audit committee effectiveness, the study employed another index to measure audit 
committee effectiveness. In the extant literature from Indonesia, two prior studies, Ika 
and Ghazali (2012) and Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013), used a comprehensive index 
to measure audit committee effectiveness. Both studies employed an audit committee 
effectiveness index that consisted of mandatory and voluntary requirements. However, 
the current study chose to use Ika and Ghazali‟s index because their paper has already 
been published in an international journal (i.e., Managerial Auditing Journal), whereas 
the paper of Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013) has not. Ika and Ghazali (2012) employed 
an audit committee effectiveness index (ACEFEC) to examine the association between 
the audit committee and the timeliness of financial reporting. The study evidenced that 
audit committee effectiveness was negatively and significantly associated with financial 
reporting time lead. This finding implies that audit committee effectiveness is a 
significant factor influencing the timeliness of reporting in Indonesia.  
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As depicted in Table 5.10, the main differences between the audit committee 
compliance index total (ACCIT) and the audit committee effectiveness index 
(ACEFEC) are the elements in each. As previously discussed, the ACCIT consists of 13 
mandatory audit committee requirements extracted from the BAPEPAM regulations. 
On the other hand, the ACEFEC consists of both mandatory and voluntary audit 
committee characteristics. The ACEFEC‟s voluntary elements are related to the 
authority and diligence/process dimensions of audit committee effectiveness. In terms 
of the authority dimension, the audit committee shall review external auditing activity. 
Meanwhile, the diligence/process dimension includes the requirement to hold a 
minimum of four audit committee meetings per year, and the voluntary disclosure of the 
audit committee report. These voluntary audit committee characteristics are used in the 
audit committee effectiveness index developed by Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013), 
which also examined audit committee effectiveness in Indonesia. In short, this study 
assumes that the ACEFEC can be used to validate the results of the analysis using the 
ACCIT.  
 
Like the ACCIT score, the ACEFEC score was centred to avoid multicollinearity 
(Aiken and West, 1991). The centring was done by subtracting the ACEFEF score from 
its mean value.  
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Table 5.10 Elements of Audit Committee Effectiveness Indexes 
 
Requirements Dimension ACCIT ACEFEC Citations to prior studies 
Audit committee membership     
1. Audit committee shall consist of at least three 
members. 
Resources   Haron  et al. (2005);Yang and Krishnan (2005), 
Lin et al. (2006); Pucheta- 
Martinez and Fuentes (2007); Sarumaha and 
Hermawan (2013) 
2. Comprises at least one independent commissioner and 
other members shall be external independent parties.  
 
Composition   Menon and  Williams (1994); Abott et al. (2000, 
2004); Braiotta (2004); Bédard et al. (2004); 
Haron  et al. (2005); Utama and Leonardo
 
(2006); Rainsbury et al. (2008); Rainsbury et al. 
(2009); Baxter (2010).  
3. Chairman is an independent commissioner. Composition  - Haron et al. (2005). 
4. One member shall have an educational background in 
accounting or finance. 
Composition   Braiotta (2004); Haron  et al. (2005); Utama and 
Leonardo
a 
(2006); Rainsbury et al. (2008); 
Rainsbury et al. (2009); Baxter (2010); 
Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013) 
Audit Committee duties     
5. Listed company shall adopt audit committee charter. Authority   Haron et al. (2005). 
6. Audit committee shall examine the financial 
information that will be issued by the company, such 
as financial statements, projections and other financial 
information.   
Authority   Utama and Leonardo (2006); Akarak and 
Ussahawanitchakit (2010); Sarumaha and 
Hermawan (2013). 
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Table 5.10 (continued) 
 
Requirements Dimension ACCIT ACEFEC Citations to prior studies 
7. Audit committee shall examine the company‟s 
compliance with regulations. 
Authority   Utama and Leonardo (2006); Akarak and 
Ussahawanitchakit (2010); Sarumaha and 
Hermawan (2013). 
8. Audit committee shall examine the effectiveness of 
the company‟s internal controls. 
Authority   Utama and Leonardo (2006); Akarak and 
Ussahawanitchakit (2010); Sarumaha and 
Hermawan (2013) 
9. Audit committee shall scrutinize and report to the 
commissioner all complaints related to the company. 
Authority  - None 
10. Audit committee shall review external auditing 
activity. 
 -  Bedard et al. (2004); Sarumaha and Hermawan 
(2013) 
Audit committee disclosure     
11. Name, position, and brief profile of each audit 
committee member. 
Diligence/ 
process 
 - None 
12. Frequency of meetings and attendance of each 
member.  
Diligence/ 
process 
 - Haron  et al. (2005); Sarumaha and Hermawan 
(2013) 
13. Audit committee shall hold a meeting at least four 
times in a year. 
Diligence/ 
process 
-  Abbott et al. (2004); Sarumaha and Hermawan 
(2013) 
14. Brief report of audit committee activities. Diligence/ 
process 
 - Haron  et al. (2005) 
15. Audit committee shall report voluntary disclosures. Diligence/ 
process 
-  Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author   Notes: ACCIT=audit committee compliance index total; ACEFEC=audit committee effectiveness index.
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5.4.2.3 Other Variables 
The dependent variable was restatements measured using nominal scale. This dependent 
variable was recorded as 1 if a firm restated its financial statements during the 2006-
2009 period, and 0 otherwise. The measurement of other variables, which were used in 
Research Stage 1, followed a similar method. The family-controlled company with 
family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable was measured by the binary 
method, which recorded 1 if at least one family member sat on the board of directors, 
board of commissioners, or both, and 0 otherwise. The proportion of independent 
commissioners (BOC) was measured by dividing the total number of independent 
commissioners by the total number of members on the board of commissioners (Abbott 
et al., 2004; Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma, 2004; Beasley, 1996). Board of 
commissioners size (BCS) was measured by counting the number of members on the 
board of commissioners (Abbott et al., 2004; Farber, 2005; Baber et al., 2005; Carcello 
et al., 2011b). Leverage (LEV) was measured using a company‟s debt ratio (total debt to 
total assets) in the year of the restatement (Romanus et al. 2008). Meanwhile, listing age 
(AGE) was derived from the number of years that the firm had been listed on the stock 
exchange (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello and Nagy, 2004a; 2004b). Profitability was 
measured using return on assets (ROA) in the year of the restatement (Romanus et al., 
2008; Lisic et al., 2011; Zhizhong et al., 2011). Data for these variables were collected 
from annual reports and the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD). 
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Table 5.11 Summary of Variables Measurement for Research Stage 2  
 
Variables Acronym Measurements 
Dependent Variable   
Restatements RSTMT Dichotomous, with 1 if the firm restated 
its financial statements during the 2006-
2009 period and 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables   
Audit committee 
compliance index total 
ACCIT_c Sum of the total score of compliance with 
mandatory audit committee requirements 
(centred). 
Audit committee 
effectiveness index 
ACEFEC_c Sum of the total score of mandatory and 
voluntary characteristics of audit 
committee (centred). 
Family-controlled 
company  with family 
members on the boards 
FMLBOCD 1 if at least one family member was a 
board member, 0 if otherwise. 
Control Variables   
Proportion of independent 
commissioners 
BOC Number of independent commissioners 
divided by the total number of members 
on the board of commissioners. 
Size of board of 
commissioners  
BCS Number of members on the board of 
commissioners. 
Listing age AGE Number of years that the firm has been 
listed on the IDX. 
Profitability ROA Return on assets: total return to total 
assets in the year of restatement.  
Leverage LEV Debt ratio = total debt to total assets in 
the year of restatement. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
5.4.3 Method of Analysis 
Consistent with most prior studies on restatements (e.g., Abbot et al., 2004; Agrawal 
and Chadha, 2005; Lin et al., 2006; Archembault et al., 2008), this study used logistic 
regression to test the hypotheses. According to Leech et al. (2008), logistic regression is 
an appropriate method of analysis to predict an outcome from a set of predictor 
variables where the outcome (the dependent variable) is dichotomous (i.e., restating 
firms are given a value of 1 and non-restating firms are given a value of 0). Logistic 
regression allows the prediction of discrete variables by a mix of continuous and 
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discrete predictors. In this study, the logistic analysis was done using the Statistical 
Program for Social Science (SPSS) software, version 17.  
 
To test the hypotheses, the study used hierarchy logistic regression that enabled 
examination of the main effects and interaction effects in separate models. In using this 
method, independent variables were entered into the model based on a particular 
sequence. In the first model or first block, all main variables, including control variables, 
were entered into the logistic model. The first block analysed partial models that 
consisted of main independent variables without the interaction variable. The partial 
model is written as follows: 
           RSTMT = β0 + β1ACCIT_c + β2FMLBOCD + β3BOC + β4BCS + β5AGE + 
β6ROA + β7LEV + e i 
where: RSTMT = restatements;  ACCIT_c = audit committee compliance index 
total (centred); FMLBOCD = family-controlled company with family members 
on the boards; AGE = listing age; BOC = proportion of independent 
commissioners; BCS = board of commissioners size;  ROA = return on assets; 
LEV =  leverage. 
 
In the second block, the full model consisting of all independent variables in the first 
block and interaction variables (i.e., interaction between audit committee compliance 
index total (ACCIT_c) and family-controlled company with family members on the 
boards (FMLBOCD)) were entered into the logistic model. The full model is written as 
follows: 
RSTMT = β0 + β1ACCIT_c + β2FMLBOCD + β3ACCIT * FMLBOCD + 
β4BOC + β5BCS + β6AGE + β7ROA + β8LEV + e i 
where: RSTMT = restatements;  ACCIT_c = audit committee compliance index 
total (centred); FMLBOCD = family-controlled company with family members 
on the boards; AGE = listing age; BOC = proportion of independent 
commissioners; BCS = board of commissioners size;  ROA = return on assets; 
LEV =  leverage. 
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The same procedure of analysis was used for the use of the audit committee 
effectiveness index (ACEFEC) as a measure of audit committee effectiveness. The 
variable of ACCIT_c in the model was replaced by ACEFEC_c.   
 
Logistic regression is a popular method as it has very few assumptions (Leech et al., 
2008). Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not strictly require an 
assumption of multivariate normality and equal variance-covariance across groups (Hair, 
Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham, 2006). However, there are two conditions that 
should be fulfilled before running logistic regression (Leech et al., 2008). First, the 
dependent or outcome variable needs to be dichotomous, and a single case can only be 
represented once and must be in one group or the other. Second, logistic regression 
requires large samples in order to predict accurately. In terms of the adequacy of the 
sample size, there is no uniformity in the literature (Peng, Lee, and Ingersoll, 2002). For 
example, both Tabachnick and Fidel (2007) and Peng et al. (2002) recommend a 
minimum ratio of 10 to 1. Meanwhile, Leech et al. (2008) set a higher ratio of 20 to 1. 
To anticipate the low number of incidents of restatements, this study argues that it is 
preferable to use a ratio of 10 to 1 (Tabachnick and Fidel, 2007; Peng et al., 2002).   
 
Similar to other forms of regression, multicollinearity (i.e., high correlations among the 
predictors) is also a potential problem that may mislead the results of logistic regression. 
Therefore, the existence of multicollinearity must be assessed first before running the 
logistic regression. Since Tolerance and VIF scores are not available through the 
logistic regression command in SPSS, these values can be obtained from the linear 
regression command (Leech et al., 2008).   
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According to Peng et al. (2002), there are three key items that should be addressed 
adequately in presenting the logistic regression results: (1) the logistic model 
evaluation; (2) the statistical tests of individual predictors; and (3) goodness of fit 
statistics. The evaluation of the logistic model is assessed through the significance value 
of the chi-square (χ2) test, which is analogous to the F test in the OLS regression. In 
SPSS output, this test can be seen on the table labelled omnibus tests of model 
coefficients. If the significance value of the chi-square (χ2) is below 5%, it indicates that 
the overall model is significant when a number of independent variables are entered 
simultaneously, meaning that at least one predictor is significantly related to the 
outcome. As this study uses hierarchy logistic regression, an assessment is needed to 
determine whether adding the interaction variable in the full model improves the model 
significantly. This assessment can be done by computing the difference in the log-
likelihood (times -2) (Tabachnick and Fidel, 2007). The formula is as follows: 
∆ -2 Log likelihood = (-2 log-likelihood for smaller model) – (-2 log-likelihood 
for bigger model) 
The
 ∆ -2 Log likelihood is compared to the value of χ2 in the table based on its degree of 
freedom (df). Meanwhile, the statistical significance of individual regression 
coefficients is tested using the Wald chi-square statistic. The significant result of the 
Wald chi-square statistic indicates that an independent variable is reliably associated 
with outcomes. Like the OLS regression, the direction of the relationship can be seen 
from the sign of the original coefficient (Hair et al., 2006). A positive coefficient means 
increasing probability, whereas a negative value means decreasing predicted probability.   
 
Goodness of fit statistics are used to determine the fit of a logistic model to actual 
outcomes (Peng et al., 2002). In assessing of the goodness of fit statistics, there are three 
methods that can be employed: the Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) test, Cox and Snell R
2
 and 
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Nagelkerke R
2
 and classification accuracy. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit 
statistic measures the correspondence between the actual and predicted values of the 
dependent variable. In this case, a better fit of the model is indicated by a smaller 
difference in the observed and predicted classification that is notified by the non-
significance of the chi-square (χ2). In other words, if the chi-square (χ2) of the H-L test 
is above 5 percent, a logistic regression model fits to the data. The Cox and Snell R
2
 and 
Nagelkerke R
2
 are used to assess the variance of the dependent variable that can be 
predicted from the combination of the entered independent variables. These are similar 
to R
2
 in the OLS regression, and a higher value indicates a greater fit of the model. 
However, Cox and Snell R
2
 is limited as it cannot reach the maximum value of 1, so 
Nagelkerke R
2
 proposes a modification that has a range of 0 to 1 (Hair et al., 2006). 
Meanwhile, classification accuracy provides a correct prediction of a set of independent 
variables towards overall cases, which is also called the concordant pair. As stated 
earlier, logistic regression is able to determine the correct prediction of a set of 
independent variables towards each category of the dependent variable. Thus, this 
classification accuracy represents the level of predictive accuracy achieved by logistic 
regression.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explains the research methods employed in the two research stages. It 
explains the research paradigm in which the study is located, and its justification for 
using the quantitative approach. Issues related to sample selection, variables 
measurement, data sources and the method of analysis of each research stage have been 
explicated. The next chapter presents the results of the data analysis and the associated 
interpretations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
This chapter presents the results and discussion of the study findings. As there are two 
main issues in this study, the findings are presented in two main sections. The first main 
section, Section 6.2, presents the results from Research Stage 1. Section 6.2.1 discusses 
the results of the data analysis relating to the level of compliance of public listed 
companies. This is followed by a discussion of the preliminary analysis comprising the 
descriptive statistics, a test of normality and a test of multicollinearity in Section 6.2.2. 
In Section 6.2.3, the results of the hypotheses testing using panel data analysis are 
presented, together with several sensitivity analyses. In the second main section, Section 
6.3 presents the results from Research Stage 2. Section 6.3.1 presents the preliminary 
analysis, which consists of descriptive statistics and a multicollinearity test. The logistic 
regression results depicting the hypotheses testing are presented in Section 6.3.2. 
Several sensitivity analyses are presented in Section 6.3.2.1. As both stages of the study 
are interrelated, a discussion of the results from both is provided in Section 6.4. The 
chapter concludes with Section 6.5. 
   
6.2 RESULTS OF RESEARCH STAGE 1: DETERMINANTS OF 
COMPLIANCE OF PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES WITH AUDIT 
COMMITTEE RULES 
 
 
6.2.1 Level of Compliance 
Table 6.1 shows the compliance of Indonesia‟s public listed companies with each audit 
committee requirement for the 2006 to 2008 period. As envisaged, none of the 
requirements were fully complied with (100 percent) by all public listed companies 
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during the period under observation. Compliance with membership rules achieved the 
highest level compared to compliance with other audit committee rules. Compliance 
with membership rules remained high throughout the three years under observation,. 
This finding is consistent with Utama and Leonardo (2004), which also found high 
compliance with membership rules. This may be due to monitoring by the IDX and the 
BAPEPAM that puts emphasis on whether the audit committees of public listed 
companies conform to the membership requirements, as opposed to whether the audit 
committees carry out their functions. In the early stages of the mandatory 
implementation of the audit committee regulations, the IDX reportedly distributed a 
circular to each public listed company to inquire whether the company had adjusted its 
audit committee to comply with the new regulations. Most public listed companies 
replied that the establishment of their audit committee, including the audit committee 
charter, met the new BAPEPAM regulations. However, the IDX did not do any further 
investigation to ascertain whether the audit committee had been carrying out its 
functions as mandated by the regulations (see IDX annual report 2004). Another factor 
that may have contributed to the high rate of compliance with the membership rules is 
the similarity between the membership requirements stipulated in the BAPEPAM 
(2004), and the prior requirement (i.e., JSX, 2001). As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
membership requirements in both regulations included: the audit committee must have 
at least three members, the independent commissioner shall be the head of the audit 
committee, and an independent member and at least one other member must have 
knowledge in accounting and/or finance.  
 
The fact that the membership aspect had the highest level of compliance compared to 
the other aspects might present an early indication that the presence of the audit 
committee was for symbolic purposes. Public listed companies tended just to indicate 
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that their audit committees met the membership requirements, rather than showing that 
the committees did their assigned job. This finding is in line with institutional theory. 
As noted by Cohen et al. (2008), an implication of institutional theory is that the audit 
committee might emphasise a ceremonial role. Audit committee members tend to 
become similar to others within the same industry and are selected based on their 
credentials without considering their ability to effectively monitor management. As a 
result, the audit committee is adopted primarily to enhance external legitimacy but is 
not necessarily coupled with actual monitoring functions (Cohen et al., 2008; Beasley et 
al., 2009; Carcello et al., 2011a). The detailed compliance score of each public listed 
company can be seen in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
  
In terms of improvement in compliance, annual improvement rates varied among the 
different aspects of compliance. Using 2006 as a base year, the annual improvement rate 
for compliance with audit committee membership rules was relatively low, around 0 to 
3 percent. This might be because the level of compliance with membership rules in 
2006 was already relatively high, thus, improvement in subsequent years was low. 
Meanwhile, in terms of compliance with job duties and disclosure requirements, the 
annual improvement rates were relatively high: between 9 and 88 percent. However, as 
the level of compliance in 2006 was mostly low, the large increase in the percentage of 
compliance in subsequent years still did not bring compliance up to a satisfactory level. 
For example, the requirement for disclosure of the frequency of meetings and the 
attendance record of each member improved by 88 percent in 2008. However, the level 
of compliance in 2006 was just 17 percent, thus the improvement of 88 percent in 2008 
only produced a compliance level of 32 percent, which is unsatisfactory.  
 
Further analysis of the membership requirements found that audit committee 
membership ranged from 0 to 6 members, with the average being 3 members.  
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Regarding job duties, audit committee duties seemed focused mostly on examining 
company financial reports. This finding is consistent with the US study by Carcello et 
al., 2002. On the other hand, the audit committee‟s duty of scrutinising and reporting 
complaints had the lowest level of compliance compared to other committee 
requirements. In fact, the BAPEPAM (2004) rule for this aspect is less stringent than 
the SOX (2002) rule because the BAPEPAM (2004) rule does not require listed 
companies to establish any procedures to handle complaints. Another element of audit 
committee job duties that had a low compliance level was the requirement for an audit 
committee charter. During the 2006-2008 period, the level of compliance with this 
requirement ranged from 17 to 24 percent.  
 
In terms of mandatory disclosure requirements, compliance with the disclosure of the 
frequency of meetings and the attendance record of each member was low. Based on the 
review of company annual reports, most public listed companies tended to report that 
their audit committee held several meetings but they did not disclose specific details 
regarding frequency. This might indicate the symbolic nature of the audit committee; 
public listed companies might be reluctant to report the frequency of meetings as 
meeting frequency is often associated with audit committee diligence (DeZoort et al., 
2002; Bédard and Gendron, 2010). Based on the data provided by the 439 listed 
companies in the sample that disclosed the number of audit committee meetings, the 
average number of meetings held in a year was 7, with the number of meetings per 
company ranging from 0 to 48. The average number of meetings was higher than the 
BRC recommendation (1999) of at least four audit committee meetings per year, and 
higher than the numbers found by prior studies (i.e., Carcello et al., 2002; Haron et al., 
2005). The study by Carcello et al. (2002) revealed 3.54 meetings per year, while Haron 
et al. (2005) reported that Malaysian companies held an average of 4.8 audit committee 
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meetings per year. Regardless of the high number of meetings, it seems that compliance 
with disclosure requirements was relatively low compared to other audit committee 
requirements. A possible explanation is that the disclosure rule (BAPEPAM-LK, 2006) 
is more recent than the rules related to the establishment of audit committees 
(BAPEPAM, 2004), which consisted of membership and job duty requirements. 
Therefore, the low level of compliance with the disclosure requirement indicates that 
listed companies are making less effort to comply with recent rules. 
  
Table 6.1 Level of Compliance of Public Listed Companies with Audit Committee 
Rules 
 
Requirements Level of compliance (%) 
2006 2007  ∆ 2008 ∆ 
Structure, membership, and independence      
1. Comprises at least three members.  96 98 2 97 1 
2. Comprises at least one independent 
commissioner and other members shall 
be external independent parties. 
86 88 2 86 0 
3. Chairman is an independent 
commissioner. 
96 98 2 98 2 
4. One member shall have an educational 
background in accounting or finance. 
92 95 3 95 3 
Job duties      
5. Establish an audit committee charter. 17 20 18 24 41 
6. Examining the financial information.  81 89 10 90 11 
7. Reviewing the company‟s compliance 
with regulations. 
57 62 9 68 19 
8. Reviewing the internal auditor‟s work. 62 71 15 75 21 
9. Reporting of risks and risk management 
implementation.  
25 36 44 40 60 
10. Scrutinizing and reporting complaints. 8 10 25 11 38 
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Table 6.1 (continued) 
 
Requirements Level of compliance (%) 
2006 2007  ∆ 2008 ∆ 
Disclosure      
11. Name, position and brief profile of each 
audit committee member. 
42 54 29 60 43 
12. Frequency of meetings and attendance 
of each member.  
17 29 71 32 88 
13. Brief report on audit committee 
activities. 
58 67 16 71 22 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Table 6.2 presents the level of compliance by sector. As can be seen, the mean of the 
compliance level across sectors ranges from 0.508 to 0.632, while the mean of all 
samples is 0.567. The basic industry and chemicals sector had the highest compliance 
score (0.632), followed by the mining sector (0.628). Meanwhile, all other sectors had a 
mean compliance score of less than 0.600. For example, the finance (non-bank) sector, 
the agriculture and plantation sector, and the trade, service, and investment sector had 
moderate mean scores of 0.553, 0.552 and 0.547, respectively. The consumer goods 
industry sector had the lowest mean compliance score of 0.508.  Overall, the relatively 
similar mean scores across sectors may indicate the capacity of the study to eliminate 
particular factors – such as cross-listings, banks, and state-owned enterprises –
contributing to significant differences in compliance levels across industry sectors. 
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Table 6.2 Compliance Level by Industry Sector 
 
Sector No. Obs. Min Max Mean Std. 
dev. 
Agriculture and plantation 30 0 0.90 0.552 0.222 
Mining 27 0.25 0.95 0.628 0.278 
Basic industry and chemicals 123 0.00 1.00 0.632 0.198 
Miscellaneous industry 105 0.10 1.00 0.590 0.235 
Consumer goods industry 84 0.00 1.00 0.508 0.231 
Property, real estate and 
building construction 
90 0.20 1.00 0.572 0.204   
Infrastructure, utilities and 
transportation 
54 0.00 0.95 0.545 0.254 
Finance 114 0.00 1.00 0.553 0.223 
Trade, service, investment 201 0.00 0.95 0.547 0.247 
All 828 0.00   1.00 0.567 0.232 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
6.2.2 Preliminary Analysis 
 
 
 
6.2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section reports the descriptive statistics of all variables examined in this stage of 
research. It also reports on the existence of any violations of the assumptions underlying 
the statistical techniques used in the data analysis. The descriptive statistics include the 
mean, median, maximum and minimum values, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis. Unlike the mean, which can be affected by a few extremely high or low values, 
the median is a measure of central tendency and is not sensitive to outlying values. 
Standard deviation is essentially a weighted average of the deviations from the expected 
values. Skewness and kurtosis provide information concerning the distribution of the 
scores (Pallant, 2001). As different data types need different analysis, the descriptive 
statistics are presented for both categorical and continuous data. The descriptive 
statistics analysis was done using SPSS version 17.0. 
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Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics of categorical data consisting of: family-
controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD), family-
controlled company with professional management (PROFBOCD), genuine large 
foreign institutional investor (GLFRG), politically connected independent 
commissioner (POLIC), independent commissioner with financial expertise (ICED), 
audit quality (AUD) and financial loss (LOSS). As can be seen, 68 percent of 
companies in the sample were in the category of family-controlled company with family 
members on the boards (FMLBOCD). In more detail, companies with family members 
on the board of directors comprised 9 percent, companies with family members on the 
board of commissioners comprised 24 percent, and companies with family members on 
both boards comprised 35 percent. This finding is in line with the Sato (2004) study, 
which reported an insignificant difference in family control of companies before and 
after the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. In terms of family-controlled companies 
with professional management, the data indicated that only 14 percent of the family-
controlled companies were managed by professionals, whilst the rest were managed by 
the family itself. In terms of foreign institutional investors, only 23 percent of 
companies in the sample were considered to be genuine large foreign institutional 
investors (GLFRG). This means that the majority of the foreign institutional investors 
might not be large, might be owned by Indonesians, or might be both. In terms of 
politically connected independent commissioners (POLIC), only 21 percent of public 
listed companies had this type of commissioner. Similarly, only 25 percent of public 
listed companies in the sample had an audit committee chair who was a CPA holder, or 
who possessed an educational background in accounting. In terms of audit quality 
(AUD), most of the sample companies (62 percent) were audited by non-Big 4 audit 
firms. Meanwhile, a vast majority of companies in the sample (79 percent) did not have 
negative income (LOSS) in the year of observation. 
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Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables 
 
Variable Proportion (in percentage) Skewness Kurtosis 
Dummy  = 1 Dummy =0   
FMLBOCD 68 32 -0.785 -1.387 
PROFBOCD 14 86  2.107  2.445 
GLFRG 23 77  1.257 -0.421 
POLIC 21 79  1.417  0.007 
ICED 25 75  1.187 -0.593 
AUD 38 62  0.488 -1.766 
LOSS 21 79  1.408 -0.018 
 
Notes: FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members on the boards; 
PROFBOCD=family-controlled company with professional management; GLFRG= 
genuine large foreign institutional investor; POLIC=politically connected independent 
commissioner; ICED=independent commissioner with financial expertise; AUD=audit 
quality; LOSS=financial loss. 
 
 
The descriptive statistics for the continuous variables are presented in Table 6.4. The 
continuous variables in this study include audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT), proportion of independent commissioners (BOC), board of commissioners 
size (BCS), leverage (LEV) and company size (SIZE). The descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 6.4 include values for mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis. For the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT), the mean, median, and standard deviation were 0.567, 0.567 and 0.232, 
respectively. However, the mean value was only 0.567, indicating a low level of 
compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules. This finding is 
consistent with prior Indonesian studies (i.e., Utama and Leonardo, 2004). In terms of 
the proportion of independent commissioners (BOC), the mean, median, and standard 
deviation values were 0.41, 0.33 and 0.132, respectively. As the maximum value of this 
variable is 1, it seems that almost half of the board of commissioners (i.e., 41%) 
consisted of independent commissioners. This exceeds the minimum mandatory 
requirement of the BAPEPAM (2004), which requires at least one third of 
commissioners to be independent. In terms of the size of the board of commissioners 
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(BCS), the mean of the samples was 4.09 while board size ranged from 1 to 12 
members. With respect to leverage (measured as total debts divided by total assets), the 
mean, median, and standard deviation values were 0.55, 0.53 and 0.37, respectively. 
The maximum value of 3.8 – much higher than the mean value – indicates that some 
public listed companies might have high leverage, which is likely to occur since most 
public listed companies are controlled by families that prefer to expand the company by 
borrowing from banks rather than issuing shares. Meanwhile, the mean of company size 
was 13.512, which is quite similar to its median of 13.409.  
 
Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables 
 
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
ACCIT 0.567 0.567 0 1 0.232 -0.236 0.767 
BOC 0.405 0.330 0.16 1 0.132 1.856 4.623 
BCS 4.09 3.00 1 12 1.807 1.485 2.262 
LEV 0.554 0.530 0.004 3.800 0.365 3.223 18.981* 
SIZE 13.512 13.409 6.34 18.21 1.713 -0.040 0.436 
* kurtosis value exceeded critical value recommended  
 
Notes: ACCIT=audit committee compliance index total; BOC=proportion of 
independent commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; LEV=leverage; SIZE= 
company size. 
 
 
 
6.2.2.2 Assessing Normality 
 
Normality distribution of data is a requirement and the most fundamental assumption in 
using parametric tests in data analysis (Hair et al., 2006). Normal distribution is used to 
describe a symmetrical, bell shaped curve, which has the greatest frequency of scores in 
the middle, with smaller frequencies towards the extremes (Gravetter and Walnau, 2000 
cited by Pallant, 2001). A large variation from the normal distribution would cause 
statistical tests to be invalid because normality is required for F and t statistics (Hair et 
al., 2006). Therefore, screening continuous variables for normality is an important step 
in multivariate analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
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Hair et al. (2006) argued that multivariate analysis requires that the assumptions 
underlying the statistical techniques be tested twice: for a univariate analysis and for a 
multivariate model. In terms of normality, if a variable is multivariate normal, it is also 
univariate normal. In contrast, if two or more variables are univariate normal, they are 
not necessarily multivariate normal variables. Therefore, this study employed both 
univariate and multivariate analyses for normality. 
 
In terms of univariate analysis, this study utilised skewness and kurtosis for the 
normality distribution tests. Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a distribution. 
The normal distribution is symmetric and has a skewness value of zero. Positive 
skewness values indicate positive skew (scores clustered to the left at the low value), 
whereas negative skewness values indicate a clustering of scores at the high end (on the 
right-hand side of a graph). Meanwhile, kurtosis measures “the peakedness or flatness” 
of the distribution. Positive kurtosis values indicate that the observations are more 
clustered and have longer tails than those in the normal distribution, whereas negative 
kurtosis values indicate that the observations are less clustered and have shorter tails. If 
the distribution is perfectly normal, the skewness and kurtosis values will be 0, but this 
is an uncommon occurrence in the social sciences (Pallant, 2001). According Gujarati 
and Porter (2009), the normality assumption plays a critical role when dealing with 
small sample sizes (e.g., less than 100 observations), while a normal distribution 
assumption might be relaxed for large sample sizes. Therefore, as suggested by Kline 
(1998) and Hoyle (1995), the data is normal if the skewness value is less than 3, and the 
kurtosis value is less than 10.   
 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present the skewness and kurtosis values for each variable. Particular 
attention should be paid to the values for the continuous variables. As can been seen, 
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except for leverage, all the independent variables have kurtosis and skewness values 
that are below the recommended value for normality. The skewness and kurtosis values 
for leverage are 3.223 and 18.981, respectively, which are higher than the recommended 
value for normality. It was necessary to do a transformation of the leverage values in 
order to meet the normality assumption. As leverage had positive skewness, the 
transformation procedure used the square root method. The result of the transformation 
is presented in Table 6.5. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Transformation of the Leverage Variable 
 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
LEV 3.223 18.981 
SqrtLEV 0.572 3.860 
 
Notes: LEV=leverage; SqrtLEV=square root leverage  
 
The leverage (LEV) variable was transformed using the square root method and the new 
variable was named as SqrtLEV. As depicted in Table 6.5, the SqrtLEV variable has 
skewness and kurtosis values that are below the recommended values. 
 
As suggested by Hair et al. (2006), univariate normal variables are not a guarantee of 
multivariate normal variables. Thus, this study assumed that an examination of the 
multivariate normality of variables was also needed. This study employed the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for multivariate normality (Hair et al., 2006). The K-S 
test is a normality test of residuals of a linear regression model. The results of the K-S 
test are presented in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 
  Unstandardized Residual 
N 828 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 Mean 0.0000000 
Std. Deviation 0.20827566 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute 0.042 
Positive 0.035 
Negative -0.042 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.202 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.111 
             Notes: a. test distribution is normal; b. calculated from data 
 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the K-S test states that the actual distribution is equal to the 
expected distribution. As can be seen in Table 6.6, the probability associated with the 
test of normality (0.111) is greater than the level of significance (i.e., 0.05). Thus, the 
study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that the residuals are normally 
distributed. In conclusion, both the univariate and multivariate analysis for normality 
produced consistent findings. 
 
6.2.2.3 Test for Multicollinearity 
The test for multicollinearity among independent variables was conducted using a 
bivariate correlation analysis and a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis. The 
bivariate correlation analysis was done using the Pearson product-moment. The results 
of the bivariate correlation analysis are presented in Table 6.7, while the results of the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis are presented in Table 6.8.     
 
As can be seen in Table 6.7, all variables have a correlation value below 0.80, which is 
the cut-off value for the presence of multicollinearity. Among all correlations, the 
correlation between family-controlled company with family members on the boards 
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(FMLBOCD) and family-controlled company with professional management 
(PROFBOCD) had the highest significant correlation value of -0.528. The high 
correlation can be understood as the two variables measure a similar issue, which is the 
presence of family control of boards. However, the value of this correlation is still lower 
than the cut-off value of 0.80 so there is no need to drop one of the variables from the 
analysis. In short, the results of the correlation analysis suggest that the problem of 
multicollinearity is minimal.   
 
Some interesting significant correlations were found in the correlation matrix. As 
expected, the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT), as the main dependent 
variable, correlates with almost all independent variables. The exception is the 
correlation with family-controlled company with professional management 
(PROFBOCD), where the correlation is positive but not significant. It seems that the 
presence of professional management in a family-controlled company cannot fully 
promote compliance with audit committee rules, as the family‟s influence in the 
company remains dominant. In terms of the correlation among independent variables, 
the proportion of independent commissioners (BOC) is negatively and significantly 
correlated with family-controlled company with family members on the boards 
(FMLBOCD), whereas the correlation of this variable with family-controlled company 
with professional management (PROFBOCD) is positive and significant. This suggests 
that public listed companies have a higher proportion of independent commissioners 
when there are no family members on the boards.  
 
Another interesting finding is that the genuine large foreign institutional investor 
(GLFRG) variable has a negative and significant correlation with the family-controlled 
company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) and the family-controlled 
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company with professional management (PROFBOCD) variables. This means that 
foreign institutional investors are less likely to invest in family-controlled companies. 
Similarly, audit quality (AUD) also has a negative and significant correlation with 
family-controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) and 
family-controlled company with professional management (PROFBOCD). This implies 
that family-controlled companies are less likely to hire any of the Big 4 audit firms. On 
the other hand, audit quality (AUD) has a positive and significant correlation with the 
genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG), independent commissioner with 
financial expertise (ICED) and size of board of commissioners (BCS) variables. This 
means that public listed companies with foreign institutional investor ownership, with 
independent commissioners that possess accounting education or that are CPA holders, 
and with large boards of commissioners are likely to be audited by the Big 4 audit firms.  
 
The independent commissioner with financial expertise (ICED) variable has a positive 
and significant correlation with the family-controlled company with family members on 
the boards (FMLBOCD) variable. However, this variable has a negative and significant 
correlation with the family-controlled company with the professional management 
(PROFBOCD) and politically connected independent commissioner (POLIC) variables. 
It seems that companies with family members on their boards try to enhance the image 
of their audit committees by appointing independent commissioners that are CPA 
holders, or that have an accounting background. In addition, the presence of politically 
connected independent commissioners in public listed companies might be reduced by 
having independent commissioners with an accounting education or that are CPA 
holders on the board of commissioners.  
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Board of commissioners size (BCS) has a positive and significant correlation with the 
genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG), independent commissioner with 
financial expertise (ICED) and politically connected independent commissioner 
(POLIC) variables. However, board of commissioners size (BCS) has a negative and 
significant correlation with the proportion of independent commissioners (BOC). This 
means that public listed companies tend to expand the size of the board of 
commissioners to accommodate the presence of foreign institutional investors, 
politically connected independent commissioners and independent commissioners with 
an accounting education background, or that are CPA holders.  
 
The last interesting finding is that company size (SIZE) has a positive and significant 
correlation with several other variables, such as genuine large foreign institutional 
investor (GLFRG), politically connected independent commissioner (POLIC), board of 
commissioners size (BCS) and audit quality (AUD). This means that foreign 
institutional investors tend to invest in large public listed companies. Large public listed 
companies also tend to have large boards of commissioners and politically connected 
independent commissioners. Furthermore, large public listed companies are likely to 
hire the Big 4 audit firms. On the other hand, company size (SIZE) is negatively and 
significantly correlated with financial loss (LOSS), implying that large public listed 
companies are less likely to have financial losses (negative income). 
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Table 6.7 Correlation Analysis       
                                                               
 ACCIT FMLBOCD PROFBOCD GLFRG POLIC ICED BOC BCS AUD LOSS SqrtLEV SIZE 
ACCIT 1            
FMLBOCD -0.081
*
 1           
PROFBOCD 0.021 -0.528
**
 1          
GLFRG 0.142
**
 -0.332
**
 -0.113
**
 1         
POLIC -0.050 -0.042 0.041 -0.014 1        
ICED 0.140
**
 0.081
*
 -0.085
*
 -0.030 -0.206
**
 1       
BOC 0.116
**
 -0.097
**
 0.127
**
 0.019 0.038 0.066 1      
BCS 0.276
**
 -0.039 -0.010 0.143
**
 0.094
**
 0.186
**
 -0.122
**
 1     
AUD 0.284
**
 -0.086
*
 -0.124
**
 0.328
**
 0.056 0.130
**
 -0.032 0.268
**
 1    
LOSS -0.129
**
 -0.033 0.004 0.019 0.035 -0.083
*
 0.010 -0.098
**
 -0.110
**
 1   
SqrtLEV -0.074
*
 -0.054 0.073
*
 0.037 0.066 0.001 -0.081
*
 0.000 0.045 0.229
**
 1  
SIZE 0.331
**
 -0.050 0.038 0.107
**
 0.133
**
 0.060 0.015 0.513
**
 0.383
**
 -0.151
**
 0.050 1 
 
Notes: *, **  indicates significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels (2-tailed); FMLBOCD=family-controlled company  with family members on the 
boards; PROFBOCD=family-controlled company with professional management; GLFRG=genuine large foreign institutional investor; 
POLIC=politically connected independent commissioner; ICED=independent commissioner with financial expertise; BOC=proportion of 
independent commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; AUD=audit quality; LOSS=financial loss; SqrtLEV=leverage (transformed); 
SIZE=firm size. 
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In terms of VIF, as depicted in Table 6.8, presentation of the VIF value for each 
variable is divided based on the study models. Ghozali (2006) suggested that high 
collinearity is present if a VIF value is greater than 10. Since the VIF values for the 
regression models shown are all much lower than 10, it can be concluded that 
multicollinearity is not present in this study.  
 
Table 6.8 Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
FMLBOCD 1.147  
PROFBOCD  1.065 
GLFRG 1.275 1.160 
POLIC 1.090 1.089 
Control variable   
ICED 1.144 1.147 
BOC  1.064 1.074 
BCS 1.480 1.481 
AUD 1.339 1.353 
LOSS 1.101 1.101 
LEV 1.083 1.091 
SIZE 1.551 1.557 
 
Notes: FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members on the boards; 
PROFBOCD=family-controlled company with professional management; 
GLFRG=genuine large foreign institutional investor; POLIC=politically connected 
independent commissioner; ICED=independent commissioner with financial expertise; 
BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; 
AUD=audit quality; LOSS=financial loss; LEV=leverage; SIZE=firm size 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Panel Data Analysis 
As explained in Chapter 5, the study data consisted of short balanced panel data for the 
2006-2008 period. Chapter 5 also explained that three possible models can be used in 
the estimation of panel data, namely: the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model, 
the fixed effects model and the random effects model. Several tests must be performed 
to determine the appropriate model to use. In addition, several tests also must be 
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performed to check for violations of the assumptions of the classical linear regression 
model.   
 
This section presents the results of the panel data analysis, which was conducted in two 
steps. In the first step, the panel data was analysed using all three models (pooled OLS, 
the fixed effects model, and the random effects model). In the second step, the 
appropriate estimation model was selected. Once the appropriate model was selected, 
the classical linear regression model assumptions were then tested. The tests were 
intended to check whether heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems were present. 
For other classical linear regression assumptions (i.e., the normality and no 
multicollinearity assumptions), the results of the tests were identified in the preliminary 
analysis previously described in Section 6.2.2.2 and 6.2.2.3.  
 
The results of the estimations using the pooled OLS model, the fixed effects model and 
the random effects model for both models are shown in Table D.1 and Table D.2 in 
Appendix D. After estimating the models, tests to select the most appropriate model 
were performed. The results are presented in Table 6.9. As can be seen, the Likelihood-
Ratio (LR) tests provide evidence that the fixed effects model is more appropriate than 
the pooled OLS regression model for both models. The next test, the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test, also indicated that the random effects model was more appropriate 
than the pooled OLS regression model. Both results are in line with the short balanced 
panel data characteristics. Hence, the pooled OLS model was determined to be not 
appropriate. In the next step, the study used the Hausman test to select between the 
fixed effects model and the random effects model. Test results indicated that the fixed 
effects model was more appropriate than the random effects model. Although this was 
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the case, the study still needed to check for the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problems. 
  
Along with the model selection test, the study further examined the classical linear 
regression model assumptions needed for the panel data. As depicted in Table 6.10, the 
results indicated that both models contained autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
problems. As a solution, the study used the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) 
method (Greene, 2002; Wooldridge, 2009; Stata Press, 2009), and the fixed effects 
model was replaced by the FGLS. 
 
Table 6.9 Model Selection Tests 
 
Test  Model 1 Model 2 Decision 
Likelihood- 
Ratio (LR) 
LR chi2(275) 1333.19 1307.56 Fixed effects model is 
more appropriate than 
the pooled OLS model 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) 
chi2(1) 377.54 375.54 Random effects model 
is more appropriate 
than the pooled OLS 
model 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman chi2(10) 31.23 19.48 Fixed effects model is 
more appropriate than 
the random effects 
model 
Prob>chi2 0.0005 0.0345 
 
 
Table 6.10 Classical Linear Regression Model Assumption Tests 
 
Test  Model 1 Model 2 Decision 
Wooldridge test  
(Auto correlation) 
F(1, 275) 275.725 244.975 Autocorrelation is 
present Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Likelihood-Ratio test 
(Heteroskedasticity) 
LR 
chi2(275) 
739.56 559.64 Heteroskedasticity 
is present 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
Table 6.11 presents the estimation results using the FGLS method for both models. In 
Model 1, most coefficients of the independent variables meet the expectations. The 
family-controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) and 
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politically connected independent commissioner (POLIC) variables are negatively and 
significantly associated with the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT) 
variable. These findings support hypotheses H1 and H3. Meanwhile, as expected, 
genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) is positively and significantly 
associated with audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT). This finding supports 
H4 that genuine large foreign institutional investors are more likely to comply with audit 
committee rules.  
 
Model 2 was developed to test hypothesis H2 by replacing the family-controlled 
company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable with the family- 
controlled company with professional management (PROFBOCD) variable. The 
replacement was needed in order to determine the different effects of the two variables 
on the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT). As expected, the result 
indicated that family-controlled company with professional management (PROFBOCD) 
shows a positive and significant association with the audit committee compliance index 
total (ACCIT). This is in contrast to the family-controlled company with family 
members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable, which is negatively and significantly 
associated with the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT). The positive and 
significant association of the family-controlled company with professional management 
(PROFBOCD) variable with the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT) 
supports hypothesis H2. 
 
In terms of the control variables, all control variables except for financial loss (LOSS) 
showed a significant association with the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT) in both models. While the sign of the coefficient of financial loss (LOSS) was 
negative, as expected, the variable does not have a significant association.  
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Table 6.11 Results of Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Method of the 
Main Models 
 
Variable Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 
FMLBOCD - -0.040*** 
(0.000) 
    - 
PROFBOCD +       - 0.029** 
(0.021) 
GLFRG + 0.021** 
(0.026) 
0.038*** 
(0.000) 
POLIC - -0.023*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
Control Variable   
ICED + 0.031*** 
(0.000) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
BOC  + 0.086*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
BCS + 0.014*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
AUD + 0.065*** 
(0.000) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
LOSS - -0.006 
(0.269) 
-0.007 
(0.173) 
Sqrt 
LEV 
- -0.055*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054*** 
(0.000) 
SIZE + 0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
Constant  0.054* 
(0.069) 
0.027 
(0.326) 
Wald chi2(10)        1275.14 1284.73 
Prob > chi2  0.000         0.000 
Observation  828 828 
 
Notes: p-value in parentheses; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively; FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members 
on the boards; PROFBOCD=family-controlled company with professional 
management; GLFRG=genuine large foreign institutional investor; POLIC=politically 
connected independent commissioner; ICED=independent commissioner with financial 
expertise; BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; BCS=board of 
commissioners size; AUD=audit quality; LOSS=financial loss; LEV=leverage; 
SIZE=firm size. 
 
 
Sensitivity analyses were performed during the study to check the robustness of the 
results of the main models. The details of the sensitivity analyses are presented in the 
next section. 
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6.2.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis  
To check the robustness of the results, several sensitivity analyses were performed. 
These analyses involved the use of an alternative measurement of foreign institutional 
investors, adding a year dummy, and addressing endogeneity concerns. This section 
details each analysis. 
  
a. Use of an Alternative Measurement of Foreign Institutional Investors 
One of the features that distinguish this study from other prior studies is the 
measurement of the foreign institutional investor variable, which considers the aspect of 
the authenticity of foreign institutional investors. Given the Indonesian environment, it 
is important to measure the authenticity aspect because many foreign institutional 
investors are actually Indonesian offshore companies (World Bank, 2010). As presented 
in an earlier section, the genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) variable 
has a positive and significant association with the audit committee compliance index 
total (ACCIT), which supports hypothesis H4. For the sensitivity analysis, the study used 
a different measurement of foreign institutional investors that ignored the authenticity 
aspect. The measurement of foreign institutional investors was made by pooling the 
total percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors (FRGOWN). Even 
though this measurement has been widely used by prior studies (e.g., Sarkar and Sarkar, 
2000; Colpana, Yoshikawab, Hikinoc, and  Miyoshi, 2007; Chien, 2008), its use might 
produce a different result in the Indonesian environment because some of the shares 
might actually be owned by Indonesian offshore companies. Thus, compared to the 
genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) variable, the total percentage of 
shares held by foreign institutional investors (FRGOWN) variable was expected to 
provide a different result, namely, a less significant association of foreign institutional 
investors with the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT). Following is the 
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equation for Model 3, in which the genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) 
variable is replaced by the total percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors (FRGOWN) variable: 
Model 3 
ACCITit  = β0it + β1FMLBOCDit + β2FRGOWNit + β3POLICit + β4ICEDit + β5BOCit + 
β6 BCSit + β7AUDit + Β8LOSSit + β9LEVit +  β10SIZEit + εit 
 
The procedures for analysing the panel data for Model 3 were similar to those used with 
the other models (i.e., Model 1 and Model 2). The regression estimations based on three 
models (pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects) were computed, and this was 
followed by a selection model test and classical linear regression model assumption test. 
The results of the pooled OLS model, the fixed effects model and the random effects 
model are presented in Table D.3 in Appendix D. Like Model 1 and Model 2, the 
appropriate method for use with Model 3 was the feasible generalised least squares 
(FGLS), due to the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. As presented in 
Table 6.12, the fixed effects model was selected as the most appropriate method; 
classical linear regression tests did, however, indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation (see Table 6.13).    
 
Table 6.12 Model Selection Test 
 
Test  Model 3 Decision 
Likelihood-Ratio 
(LR) 
LR chi2(275) 1333.68 Fixed effects model is more 
appropriate than the pooled 
OLS model 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.000 
Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) 
chi2(1) 376.45 Random effects model is more 
appropriate than the  pooled 
OLS model 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.0000 
Hausman chi2(10) 32.30 Fixed effects model is more 
appropriate than the random 
effects model 
Prob>chi2 0.0004 
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Table 6.13 Classical Linear Regression Model Assumption Tests 
 
Test  Model 3 Decision 
Wooldridge test 
(auto correlation)  
F(1, 275) 274.083 Autocorrelation is present 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Likelihood-Ratio test 
(heteroskedasticity) 
LR 
chi2(275) 
710.95 Heteroskedasticity is present 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
 
 
Table 6.14 presents the results of the FGLS analysis of Model 3. In general, the findings 
were consistent with those of Model 1, in which the family-controlled company with 
family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable and the politically connected 
independent commissioner (POLIC) variable were negatively and significantly 
associated with the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT). This supports 
hypotheses H1 and H3. As expected, the replacement of the genuine large foreign 
institutional investor (GLFRG) variable with the total percentage of shares held by 
foreign institutional investors (FRGOWN) variable provided the opposite result. In 
Model 1, the genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) variable had a 
positive and significant association with the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT). In contrast, the total percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors (FRGOWN) variable in Model 3 is not significant; even the coefficient sign is 
a negative. In sum, this finding provides evidence of the inappropriateness of measuring 
foreign institutional investor ownership solely on the basis of the total percentage of 
shares owned without identifying the authenticity of the investors.  
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Table 6.14 Results of the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Method 
Using an Alternative Proxy for Foreign Institutional Investors  
 
Variable Exp. Sign Model 3 
FMLBOCD - -0.051*** 
(0.000)   
FRGOWN + -0.000 
(0.412)   
POLIC - -0.025*** 
(0.001)   
Control Variable  
ICED + 0.029***  
(0.000)   
BOC  + 0.077*** 
(0.000)     
BCS + 0.014*** 
(0.000)    
AUD + 0.069 *** 
(0.000) 
LOSS - -0.006 
(0.258)  
Sqrt 
LEV 
- -0.055*** 
(0.000)   
SIZE + 0.033*** 
(0.000)    
Constant  0.077***  
(0.010) 
Wald chi2(10)        972.42 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Observation  828 
 
Notes: p-value in parentheses; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively; FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members 
on the boards; FRGOWN=total percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors; POLIC=politically connected independent commissioner; ICED=independent 
commissioner with financial expertise; BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; 
BCS=board of commissioners size; AUD=audit quality; LOSS=financial loss; 
LEV=leverage; SIZE=firm size. 
 
 
b. Adding a Year Dummy 
To check the robustness of the results, the regression was re-estimated by adding year 
dummies as independent variables. A year dummy is used to accommodate unobserved 
heterogeneity that varies across time rather than across subjects such as technological 
changes and changes in government regulations and/or tax policies (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009). The time effect might affect the subjects in the same way, but it may be different 
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at different points in time. To avoid the dummy-variable trap (perfect collinearity), the 
number of years in the time dummy series should be smaller than the total time series. 
As the period of the study is only three years (2006-2008), the year dummy considers 
only two (2007 and 2008), while year 2006 serves as a base or reference.   
 
The steps for analysing data with the year dummy were similar to those used in 
analysing data without the year dummy. In the first step, all models were estimated 
using the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models (see Table D.1, D.2, and 
D.3 in Appendix D for detailed results). In the second step, the model selection and 
classical linear regression model assumption tests were conducted. As depicted in Table 
6.15, the final appropriate model was the random effects model. This model differed 
from the analysis without year dummy that found the fixed effects model to be the most 
appropriate model. However, similar to the models without a year dummy, a check of 
the data revealed autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems (see Table 6.16). As a 
solution, the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) method was employed, similar to 
the method of analysis used for models without a year dummy.  
 
Table 6.15 Model Selection Tests 
 
Test  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Decision 
Likelihood
- Ratio 
(LR) 
LR chi2(275) 1444.03 1440.79 1426.00 Fixed effects model 
is more appropriate 
than the pooled 
OLS model  Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lagrange 
Multiplier 
(LM) 
chi2(1) 434.75 434.49 433.45 Random effects 
model is more 
appropriate than the 
pooled OLS model  Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman  chi2(10) 16.85 15.75 9.96 Random effects 
model is more 
appropriate than the 
fixed effects model 
 Prob>chi2 0.1554 0.2028 0.6199 
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Table 6.16 Classical Linear Regression Model Assumption Tests 
Test  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Decision 
Wooldridge test  
(autocorrelation) 
F(1, 
275) 
175.553 177.659 160.271 Autocorrelation 
is  present 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Likelihood-Ratio 
test 
(heteroskedasticity 
LR 
chi2(275
) 
1546.68 679.02 1938.22 Heteroskedasti- 
city is present 
Prob > 
chi2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
Table 6.17 presents the FGLS regression test results with a year dummy. It must be 
noted that Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6 are extensions of the earlier models that 
added a year dummy as an additional independent variable. The results were considered 
robust, as all variables had similar findings to those obtained from the analysis without a 
year dummy (see Table 6.11). However, there were slight differences related to the 
significance level of the variables of concern. For example, the genuine large foreign 
institutional investor (GLFRG) variable in Model 1 (without a year dummy) shows a 5 
percent significance level, while the strength of the association increases in Model 4 
(with a year dummy), with a 1 percent significance level. In contrast, the significance 
level of the family-controlled company with professional management (PROFBOCD) 
variable increases from 5 percent (in Model 2 without a year dummy) to 10 percent (in 
Model 5 with a year dummy), indicating a weaker association. Similarly, the politically 
connected independent commissioner (POLIC) variable also has a weaker association in 
the analysis with a year dummy, than in the analysis without a year dummy: the level of 
significance increased from 5 percent to 10 percent. Meanwhile, the total percentage of 
shares held by foreign institutional investors (FRGOWN) variable has a negative and 
insignificant association, which is consistent with the results of the analysis that did not 
use a year dummy. The year dummies of 2007 and 2008 are positively and significantly 
associated with the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT) in all models (i.e., 
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Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6). This indicates that a longer period of implementation 
of audit committee rules might lead to better compliance with the rules. Meanwhile, all 
control variables presented findings similar to those found in the analysis of models that 
did not contain a year dummy. 
 
Table 6.17 Results of the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Method with 
a Year Dummy 
 
 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
FMLBOCD - -0.036*** 
(0.005)     
- -0.050*** 
(0.000)    
PROFBOCD + - 0.032* 
(0.094) 
- 
FRGOWN + - - -0.000  
(0.408)   
GLFRG + 0.034***  
(0.009)   
0.050*** 
(0.000) 
- 
POLIC - -0.021** 
(0.050)    
-0.020* 
(0.065) 
-0.022** 
(0.036)    
Control Variable    
ICED + 0.036*** 
(0.000)    
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.036*** 
(0.000)    
BOC  + 0.069** 
(0.031)    
0.074** 
(0.020) 
0.072** 
(0.027)     
BCS + 0.011***  
(0.000)   
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000)    
AUD + 0.063*** 
(0.000)    
0.065*** 
(0.000) 
0.070*** 
(0.000)    
LOSS - -0.002 
(0.789)    
-0.002 
(0.795) 
-0.003 
(0.693) 
Sqrt 
LEV 
- -0.037** 
(0.039)     
-0.037** 
(0.040) 
-0.042** 
(0.025)     
SIZE + 0.027*** 
(0.000)    
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
0.027*** 
(0.000)     
Year Dummy     
2007 + 0.045*** 
(0.000)    
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.045*** 
(0.000)    
2008 + 0.059***  
(0.000)   
0.060*** 
(0.000) 
0.060*** 
(0.000)    
Constant  0.1134*** 
(0.006)    
0.082** 
(0.041) 
0.128*** 
(0.002)    
Wald chi2(12)        533.35 544.16 521.33 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.0000 0.000 
Observation  828 828 828 
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Notes: p-value in parentheses; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively; FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members 
on the boards; PROFBOCD=family-controlled company with professional 
management; FRGOWN=total percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors; GLFRG=genuine large foreign institutional investor; POLIC=politically 
connected independent commissioner; ICED=independent commissioner with financial 
expertise; BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; BCS=board of 
commissioners size; AUD=audit quality; LOSS=financial loss; LEV=leverage; 
SIZE=firm size. 
 
 
c. Endogeneity  
One of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that the error term (u) 
has an expected value of zero (0) given any values of independent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Symbolically, it can be written as follows:  
 E(u|x1, x2,….xk) = 0  
If this assumption holds true, it means that the regressors are exogenous. Violation of 
the assumption is called endogeneity, in which the error term (u) has a correlation with 
the regressors. The presence of endogeneity causes the OLS estimation to be biased and 
inefficient (Schultz, Tan, and Walsh, 2010). According to Wintoki et al. (2009), there 
are three sources of potential endogeneity in corporate governance: dynamic 
endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity. Dynamic endogeneity means 
that the current value of the variable is influenced by its value in the preceding period. 
Simultaneity is present when two or more variables are jointly determined. Unobserved 
heterogeneity indicates that a relationship between two or more variables is affected by 
an unobservable factor.  
 
Some researchers in accounting have discussed the importance of paying attention to the 
endogeneity issue. For example, Larker and Rusticus (2007) discussed endogeneity in 
accounting research, while Van Lent (2007), and Chenhall and Moers (2007) discussed 
endogeneity in quantitative management accounting research. In corporate governance 
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studies, Wintoki et al. (2007) proposed the need to give attention to the dynamic 
relationship among a firm‟s characteristics that might create dynamic endogeneity. This 
dynamic endogeneity has been demonstrated by some prior studies of the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance (see Wintoki et al., 2007; 2009; Schultz 
et al., 2010). In studies on compliance with corporate governance codes, a few prior 
studies were concerned with endogeneity. For example, Rainsbury et al. (2008) 
examined endogeneity because of simultaneity. The study assumed that audit committee 
structure and board structure were jointly determined, and the study used a two-stage 
approach as a solution. However, the results indicated that the presence of simultaneity 
could not be proved. In another study, Da Silveira et al. (2010) examined endogeneity in 
a study on the determinants of Brazilian corporate governance quality using a 
generalised method of moments system (GMM-system), which was developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995). The study examined endogeneity because of simultaneity 
and dynamic endogeneity. An important finding was that corporate governance practice 
in a prior period significantly affects current corporate governance practice, thus 
dynamic endogeneity was proved.  
 
Following Da Silveira et al. (2010), the potential endogeneity problem in this study was 
tested using the GMM-system (Arellano and Bover, 1995). In particular, this study 
focused on examining potential dynamic endogeneity, as it was assumed that the level 
of compliance with audit committee rules in the preceding period would affect the level 
of compliance in the current period. The GMM-system was selected for the analysis of 
endogeneity because it is robust enough to deal with all forms of endogeneity: dynamic 
endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobservable heterogeneity (Schultz et al., 2010). Three 
other reasons for the use of the GMM-system are explicated as follows: 
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1. All the models in this study have an unknown heteroskedasticity problem, and 
the GMM estimator is efficient when unknown heteroskedasticity is present 
(Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003).  
2. In this study, reliable exogenous external instruments were not available due to 
an absence of prior studies. Under such conditions, it might be better to assume 
that all variables are endogenous (Franses, 2005). The GMM-system is suitable 
to deal with endogeneity in panel data as it uses the lags of the potential 
endogenous regressors as their own instrumental variables (Da Silveira et al., 
2010).    
3. The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is designed for panel data that has short 
periods (small T) and large observations (large N) (Mileva, 2007).    
 
In the GMM-system analysis, all models had the lag of the audit committee compliance 
index total (ACCIT t-1) added as regressors. All regressors were assumed endogenous 
and instrumented using their lags. The lagged variable was assumed to be a 
predetermined variable as its value was not determined in the current time period and 
was not correlated with an error term (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Rainsbury et al. 
(2008) and Da Silveira et al. (2010) also used lagged variables as instrumental variables. 
This study used one lag period for dynamic completeness, as the study only covered 
three periods in total. In Stata, the command for the Arellano-Bond GMM-system is 
xtabond2. 
 
The GMM panel model produces more consistent parameter estimates than those of the 
OLS when regressors are endogenous, or when endogeneity is present. In contrast, 
when the regressors are exogenous, the OLS model will produce parameter estimates 
that are more efficient than the GMM panel model (Schultz et al., 2010). Therefore, 
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before using the GMM model, it is necessary to test and to confirm the need for GMM 
as an additional analysis of the OLS regression. The test is called the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity. Principally, the DWH test is not an endogeneity 
or exogeneity of regressors test, but is perhaps best interpreted as a test of the 
consequence of employing different estimation methods on the same equation (Baum et 
al., 2003). The test statistic of the DWH test follows a chi-squared distribution with K 
degrees of freedom, where K is the number of regressors tested for endogeneity. For this 
study, the number of regressors for all the models was 10. The null hypothesis of the 
DWH test was that regressors are exogenous. In Stata, the command for this test is 
ivendog. As depicted in Table 6.18, the results of the DWH test for all models indicated 
that the null hypothesis could not be rejected, as the p-value was higher than 0.05. This 
means that the regressors in each model are exogenous. These insignificant findings 
imply that, in all models, the OLS regression model will provide more consistent 
parameter estimates than those of the GMM-system model. Therefore, the study 
assumed that the OLS model would be more appropriate than the GMM-system model 
because it would produce parameter estimates that are more efficient than those of the 
GMM-system. The results of the GMM-system analysis for all models can be found in 
Table D.1, D.2, and D.3 in Appendix D. 
 
 
Table 6.18 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test for the Endogeneity of Regressors 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistic 12.63279 13.90436 17.73957 
p-value 0.24493 0.17740 0.05952 
Degree of freedom 10 10 10 
 
 
The steps involved in the analysis of the OLS regression with lagged dependent 
variables were similar to the steps involved with other analyses. All models with lagged 
dependent variables were estimated by the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random 
 241 
effects models. Model selection tests and classical linear regression model assumption 
tests were then done. As can be seen in Table 6.20, while the fixed effects model was 
selected for all models, the classical linear regression assumption test indicated the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. As with the other analyses 
previously discussed, feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) was used to remedy 
those problems.  
 
Table 6.19 Model Selection Tests 
 
Test  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Decision 
Likelihood
-Ratio 
(LR) 
LR chi2(275) 996.19 992.79 997.73 Fixed effects model 
is more appropriate 
than the pooled 
OLS model  Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lagrange 
Multiplier 
(LM) 
chi2(1) 1.23 1.20 1.20 Pooled OLS model 
is more appropriate 
than the random 
effects model.   Prob > chi2 0.1336 0.1363 0.1365 
Hausman  chi2(11) 247.38 246.64 248.05 Fixed effects model 
is more appropriate 
than the random 
effects model.  
 Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
  
Table 6.20 Classical Linear Regression Model Assumption Tests 
 
Test  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Decision 
Wooldridge test  
(autocorrelation) 
F(1, 275) 275.725 244.975 274.083 Autocorrelation 
is  present Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Likelihood-Ratio 
test 
(heteroskedasticity) 
LR 
chi2(275) 
6396.38 7518.96 6236.94 Heteroskedasti- 
city is present 
Prob > 
chi2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
The results of the analysis using the lag dependent variable are presented in Table 6.21. 
Model 7, Model 8, and Model 9 are extensions of the original models and were derived 
by adding the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. As a consequence 
of the use of the lagged dependent variable in one period, the number of observations 
reduced from 828 to 552.  
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Table 6.21 Results of the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Method with 
the Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: p-value in parentheses; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively; FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members 
on the boards; PROFBOCD=family-controlled company with professional 
management; FRGOWN=total percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors; GLFRG=genuine large foreign institutional investor; POLIC=politically 
connected independent commissioner; ICED=independent commissioner with financial 
expertise; BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; BCS=board of 
commissioners size; AUD=audit quality; LOSS=financial loss; LEV=leverage; 
SIZE=firm size. 
 
 
 
As expected, the lag of the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT (t-1)) had a 
positive and significant association with the audit committee compliance index total 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
ACCIT(t-1) + 0.629*** 
(0.000) 
0.853*** 
(0.000) 
0.637*** 
(0.000) 
FMLBOCD - -0.010*** 
(0.000) 
- -0.015*** 
(0.000) 
PROFBOCD + - -0.005 
(0.551) 
- 
FRGOWN + - - 0.000 
(0.760) 
GLFRG + 0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
- 
POLIC - -0.033*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
-0.025*** 
(0.000) 
Control Variable    
ICED + 0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.044*** 
(0.000) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
BOC  + 0.053*** 
(0.000) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
BCS + 0.000 
(0.552) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.990) 
AUD + 0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.010** 
(0.011) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
LOSS - -0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.025*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
Sqrt 
LEV 
- -0.011** 
(0.021) 
0.014* 
(0.081) 
-0.015*** 
(0.007) 
SIZE + 0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
Constant  0.085*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.071*** 
(0.000) 
Wald chi2(11)        1.36e+07 244711.01 34963.70 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation  552 552 552 
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(ACCIT). This means that the level of audit committee compliance in the preceding 
period positively affects audit committee compliance in the current period. Except for 
family-controlled company with professional management (PROFBOCD), all other 
variables of concern, such as family-controlled company with family members on the 
boards (FMLBOCD), total percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors 
(FRGOWN), genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) and politically 
connected independent commissioner (POLIC) provided consistent findings. Family-
controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) showed a 
negative and significant association with the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT) in Model 7 and Model 9. Similarly, the politically connected independent 
commissioner (POLIC) variable also had a negative and significant association with the 
audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT) variable in Model 7, Model 8, and 
Model 9. Meanwhile, the results of the analysis of the total percentage of shares held by 
foreign institutional investors (FRGOWN) variable are in contrast to those obtained 
from the analysis of the genuine large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) variable; 
this is consistent with the results of the earlier analyses conducted. However, the 
analysis of the family-controlled company with professional management 
(PROFBOCD) variable provided a conflicting result: as can be seen in Model 8, this 
variable has a negative coefficient and insignificant association. Obviously, this result is 
contrary to the results of the earlier analyses (see Model 2 and Model 5). The presence 
of the lagged dependent variable, which reduced the sample to 552, may have caused 
different results for the family-controlled company with professional management 
(PROFBOCD) variable. In respect of the control variables, most results were consistent.  
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6.3 RESULTS OF RESEARCH STAGE 2: AUDIT COMMITTEE 
EFFECTIVENESS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY  
 
 
6.3.1 Preliminary Analysis 
 
 
6.3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 6.1 presents the trend of annual and interim restatements for the 2006-2012 
period. As can be seen, while the number of incidents of both annual and interim  
restatements fluctuated in the 2006-2009 period (ranging from 6 to 12 cases per year), 
there was no great difference in the numbers between the two types. The difference in 
the numbers only became substantial starting in 2011. The incidence of annual 
restatements increased in 2011, but decreased gradually in 2012. In contrast, the 
incidence of interim restatements increased dramatically, rising from 24 cases in 2011 
to 32 cases in 2012. 
 
Figure 6.1 Restatement Announcements Identified (2006-2012) 
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The numbers of restatements are considered low, and are consistent with those in prior 
studies in developing countries (e.g., Abdullah et al. 2010; Alyousef and Almutairi, 
2010; Chang et al., 2010). Compared with the US, the overall number of restatements 
seen in this study is much lower. However, the percentage of restatements made by 
listed companies in Indonesia is not much different from the percentage made by public 
listed companies in the US. As evidence, the percentage of US listed companies 
announcing annual financial restatements from 2002 to 2005 ranged from 3.7 percent to 
6.8 percent (see GAO, 2006). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the percentage of annual 
restatements from 2006 to 2012 ranged from 1 percent to 3 percent, while the 
percentage of interim restatements ranged from 1 percent to 7 percent. As depicted in 
Figure 6.2, the highest percentage of annual restatements, 3 percent, occurred in 2011. 
In terms of interim financial restatements, the highest percentage of restatements was 7 
percent and occurred in 2012.   
 
Figure 6.2 Distribution of Restatements by Year 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Based on Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, interim restatements have dominated the incidence 
of restatements in Indonesia, except in 2008. This is contrary to the US where annual 
restatements dominate the incidence of restatements. As evidence, Cheffers et al. (2010) 
found that the percentage of annual restatements was higher than the percentage of 
interim restatements in the 2001-2009 period. This study assumes that the high 
incidence of restatements of interim financial statements may be due to the absence of 
an audit role for external auditors (which might serve as an alternative corporate 
governance mechanism) in the issuance of interim statements, (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 
2013). In Indonesia, the IDX does not require the interim financial statements of public 
listed companies to be audited by external auditors. Therefore, the absence of a role for 
the external auditor might reduce the quality of the interim statements. In addition, the 
convergence of the implementation of new Indonesian accounting standards and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2011 might have contributed to 
the high number of restatements for that year. Meanwhile, annual restatements 
decreased in 2012, in contrast to the increase in interim restatements. One plausible 
explanation is that the study‟s period of observation ended on 30 June 2013 and annual 
restatements that occurred after that date were not included in the study sample. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 presents the sample distribution by industry sector. As can be seen, the 
service sector contributed the highest percentage of both annual and interim 
restatements. This finding is consistent with most prior studies in the US (e.g., Agrawal 
and Chadha 2005; Archambeault et al., 2008; Marciukaityte et al., 2009; Amoah and 
Tang, 2010), and also with prior studies in developing countries (e.g., Abdullah et al. 
2010; Alyousef and Almutairi, 2010). In terms of the industry sector with the lowest 
percentage of restatements, the miscellaneous industry sector contributed the lowest 
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percentage of interim restatements. Meanwhile, the consumer goods and agriculture 
sectors had the lowest percentage of annual restatements.  
 
Figure 6.3 Distribution of Restating Companies across Industry 
Sectors 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Figure 6.4 presents the distribution of restatements by prompter, which is the agency or 
party responsible for prompting the restatement. Parties that can prompt the restatement 
of financial statements include the listed company itself, an external auditor, the 
BAPEPAM, or the IDX. As can be seen from the figure, most restatements were 
initiated by the companies themselves. This is known as voluntary restatement. The 
finding that the majority of restatements were voluntary is consistent with prior studies 
(see Agrawal and Chadha 2005; GAO, 2006; Marciukaityte et al., 2009; Flanagan et al., 
2008). Voluntary restatements by a company might indicate the presence of a high 
quality of internal corporate governance by an audit committee and independent 
directors (Marciukaityte et al., 2009; Flanagan et al., 2008). With regard to external 
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initiators, there is a difference in the prompters of interim restatements and annual 
restatements. For restatements of interim financials, the IDX prompted 9 percent of 
restatements, the BAPEPAM initiated 8 percent, and external auditors prompted 1 
percent. With respect to the restatement of annual financial statements, the BAPEPAM 
prompted 25 percent, external auditors prompted 8 percent, and the IDX prompted 2 
percent. External auditors seem to play a greater role in the restatement of annual 
financials as opposed to interim financials because there is no requirement for external 
auditors to audit interim financial statements. Nevertheless, several listed companies 
required their external auditor to perform a limited review of their interim financial 
statements. 
 
Figure 6.4 Prompters of Restatements (2006-2012) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
This study follows the GAO study (2006) in classifying the reasons for restatements. As 
depicted in Table 5.9 in Chapter 5, there are nine reasons for restatement, including: 
revenue recognition, reclassification, cost/expense, related-party transactions, 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Interim Annual
Company
BAPEPAM
IDX
Auditor
 249 
acquisitions/mergers, securities-related, restructuring/assets/inventory, research and 
development, and other. As can be seen in Figure 6.5, interim financials were restated 
due to reclassification in 33 percent of cases. Restatements due to reclassification 
generally occur because companies make errors in the classification of items on their 
income statement, balance sheet, or cash flow statement. Revenue recognition (30 
percent) is the next most frequently identified reason for restatements, followed by other 
(17 percent), cost or expense (11 percent), related-party transactions (8 percent), and 
securities-related (1 percent). On the other hand, revenue recognition is the most 
frequent reason for the restatement of annual financials (30 percent). This finding is 
consistent with prior studies in the US that also identified revenue recognition as the 
most frequent reason for the restatement of annual financial statements (GAO, 2006; 
Marciukaityte et al., 2009; Flanagan et al., 2008). Various items contribute to 
restatements due to revenue recognition reasons, including calculation errors and the 
misapplication of accounting standards. Although revenue recognition is the most 
frequent reason for restating annual financial statements, other reasons are also 
significant, including reclassification (23 percent), related-party transactions (18 
percent), and cost or expense (17 percent). Meanwhile, acquisition or merger, securities-
related, and other, are less frequent reasons for the restatement of annual financials, at 7 
percent, 3 percent, and 2 percent, respectively. Related-party transactions constitute a 
relatively high percentage of restatements for both interim and annual financial 
statements. However, this reason has ranked low in some prior US studies (GAO, 2006; 
Marciukaityte et al., 2009; Flanagan et al., 2008). The characteristics of Indonesian 
public listed companies (i.e., they are mostly owned by families through pyramids and 
cross-ownership) might explain the higher percentage of restatements due to related-
party transaction in Indonesia, as compared to the US. 
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Figure 6.5 Restatements by Reason (2006-2012) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
The descriptive statistics consist of mean, standard deviation, and also the mean 
difference between the restating firms and their control firms (see Table 6.22).  In order 
to find an appropriate statistical technique for mean difference, it was necessary to 
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Table 6.22 Normality Test 
   
Variable Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Asymp. 
Sig. 
Interpretation 
BOC 4.584 0.000 not normal 
BCS 5.078 0.000 not normal 
AGE 1.272 0.079 normal 
ROA 6.981 0.000 not normal 
LEV 7.064 0.000 not normal 
ACCIT_c 1.656 0.008 not normal 
ACEFEC_c 3.078 0.000 not normal 
 
Notes: ACCIT_c=audit committee compliance index total (centred); ACEFEC_c= audit 
committee effectiveness (centred); BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; 
BCS=board of commissioners size; AGE=listing age; ROA=return on assets; 
LEV=leverage. 
 
 
As a rule of thumb, a variable is assumed normal if its significance level is greater than 
0.05 (Coakes, Steed, and Dzidic, 2006). Among the seven continuous variables, only 
listing age (AGE) is assumed normal; all other variables, namely, proportion of 
independent commissioners (BOC), board of commissioners size (BCS), return on 
assets (ROA), leverage (LEV), the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT_c), 
and audit committee effectiveness (ACEFEC_c) are not normal. Thus, the mean 
difference test for listing age (AGE) is a parametric test, namely, an independent t-test. 
The mean difference test for other continuous variables (BOC, BCS, ROA, LEV, 
ACCIT_c, ACEFEC_c) is a non-parametric test, namely, the Man-Whitney U test. 
Meanwhile, the categorical variable of family-controlled company with family members 
on the boards (FMLBOCD) is examined using the chi-square test for independence or 
relatedness.  
 
Table 6.23 shows the results of the mean, standard deviation, and mean difference tests 
for the restating sample firms and their matched control firms. The presentation is 
divided into two to show the results for the continuous and categorical variables. In 
terms of the main variable, the control companies (as expected) had higher mean scores 
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for the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT_c), and audit committee 
effectiveness (ACEFEC_c) than those of the restating companies. The mean scores of 
the ACCIT_c and ACEFEC_c variables for the control companies were 0.004 and 0.008, 
respectively, whereas the scores for these same variables among restating companies 
were -0.004 and -0.008, respectively. Unfortunately, the mean difference of the two 
audit committee effectiveness indexes is not statistically significant. The insignificance 
of the indexes (ACCIT_c and ACEFEC_c) might provide preliminary evidence that the 
audit committee does not play a role in preventing restatements, which  is consistent 
with prior studies in developing countries (e.g., Mohd-Saleh, Mohd-Iskandar, and 
Rahmat, 2005; Abdullah et al., 2010). Meanwhile, the family-controlled company with 
family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable presented some interesting 
findings. Coincidentally, the mean of the family-controlled company with family 
members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable for both restating companies and control 
companies was the same, at 75.9. As a result, the mean difference of this variable was 
not statistically significant. With regard to the variables for the control companies, only 
listing age (AGE) was statistically significant at a level of 0.000. As predicted, restating 
companies had lower mean scores than their matched sample companies. It seems that 
the longer a company has been listed on the IDX, the easier it is for it to meet reporting 
requirements. The table shows an insignificant difference between restating companies 
and control companies with respect to other control variables, such as BOC, BCS, ROA 
and LEV. For example, the mean score of the proportion of independent commissioners 
(BOC) variable for restating companies was lower than that for the control companies; 
the difference, however, is not statistically significant. This might provide initial 
evidence that independent commissioners are ineffective in their roles.  
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Table 6.23 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  Restating Firms Control Firms   
Continuous 
variables 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev T-stat. 
 
p-value 
AGE 10.894 7.014 14.327 5.886 4.713 0.000*** 
       
ACCIT_c -0.004 0.225 0.004 0.215 -0.315 0.753 
ACEFEC_c -0.008 0.184 0.008 0.183 0.737 0.462 
BOC 0.413 0.117 0.417 0.126 -0.038 0.969 
BCS 3.780 1.629 3.820 1.546 -0.594 0.552 
ROA 14.976 85.102 7.782 45.506 -0.469 0.639 
LEV 0.56 0.53 0.84 3.51 -0.31 0.754 
Categorical 
variables 
Proportion (%) Proportion (%)  
χ2 
 
 Dummy
=1 
Dummy
=0 
Dummy
=1 
Dummy
=0 
 
FMLBOCD 75.9 24.1 75.9 24.1 0.000 1 
N 158 158   
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent; ACCIT_c=audit committee compliance index total 
(centred); ACEFEC_c=audit committee effectiveness (centred); FMLBOCD=family-
controlled company with family members on the boards; BOC=proportion of 
independent commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; AGE=listing age; 
ROA=return on assets; LEV=leverage. 
 
 
6.3.1.2 Multicollinearity Test 
Before running the logistic analysis, it was important to check the data for 
multicollinearity. To test this, the study used bivariate correlation and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The bivariate correlation used the Pearson product-moment. As a 
rule of thumb, a correlation value exceeding 0.70 can lead to a misleading result of 
regression due to a collinearity problem (Pallant, 2001; Leech et al., 2008). As depicted 
in Table 6.24, some variables in both the upper and lower parts are significantly 
correlated. However, none of these correlations has a value greater than 0.70. In terms 
of the VIF, multicollinearity exists when the VIF value is greater than 10 (Ghozali, 
2005). As can be seen in Table 6.24, none of the VIF scores is greater than 10. In 
conclusion, based on the two tests, there is no multicollinearity among the variables.  
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Table 6.24 Correlation among Independent Variables 
                         
Variable BOC 
 
BCS 
 
AGE 
 
ROA LEV FMLBOCD ACCE_c VIF
a
 
BOC 1 -.076 0.082 -0.038 0.071 -0.308
**
 0.016 1.133 
BCS -0.076  1 0.163
**
 0.109 -0.088 -0.074 0.245
**
 1.094 
AGE  0.082  0.163
**
 1 0.011 0.012 -0.052 0.113
*
 1.045 
ROA -0.038  0.109  0.011 1 0.014 0.079 0.013 1.023 
LEV  0.071 -0.088  0.012  0.014 1 0.022 -0.032 1.016 
FMLBOCD -0.308
**
 -0.074 -0.052  0.079 0.022 1 -0.132
*
 1.158 
ACCIT_c  0.094  0.171
**
  0.123
*
 -0.042 0.026 -0.205
**
 - 1.087 
VIF
b
 1.131 1.122 1.043 1.020 1.015 1.140 1.085 - 
    
Notes: Lower part is bivariate correlation using ACCIT_c as a proxy for audit 
committee effectiveness, whereas upper part is bivariate correlation using ACEFEC as 
the proxy. VIF
a
=VIF scores using ACCIT_c as a proxy for audit committee 
effectiveness, whereas VIF
b  
is VIF scores using ACEFEC. **, * correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level and 0.05 level, respectively; ACCIT_c=audit committee 
compliance index total (centred); ACEFEC_c=audit committee effectiveness (centred); 
FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members on the boards; 
BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; 
AGE=listing age; ROA=return on assets; LEV=leverage. 
 
 
6.3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
A binary logistic regression analysis was done to address the research questions because 
the dependent variable (restatements) was binary. As discussed in Chapter 5, the study 
used hierarchical logistic regression to examine the main effects and the interaction of 
effects in separate models. The results of the logistic regression are presented in two 
main categories. The results of the logistic regression using the audit committee 
compliance index total (ACCIT) as a measurement of audit committee effectiveness are 
presented in the first main category, while the results of the logistic regression using an 
alternative measurement of audit committee effectiveness, namely, the audit committee 
effectiveness index (ACEFEC) are presented in the second main category. Each main 
category contains sub-categories, namely, a main analysis using all samples (316 cases), 
and a sensitivity analysis using reduced samples. The reduced samples consist of forced 
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restatements (72 cases) and annual restatements (120 cases). Because the hierarchical 
logistic regression covers main effects and the interaction of effects, there are 12 models. 
 
6.3.2.1 Evaluation of the Logistic Regression Models 
One of the two conditions that should be fulfilled before running logistic regression is 
that the sample size must be adequate (Leech et al., 2008). As stated in Chapter 5, it is 
preferable to use a ratio of 10 to 1 (Tabachnick and Fidel, 2007; Peng et al., 2002). As 
can be seen in Table 6.25, all of the models meet this requirement. Models 1 and 2, the 
main models, have a ratio of 35 cases to 1. Similarly, Models 7 and 8 also have a ratio 
of 35 cases to 1. Meanwhile, other models, which are intended as sensitivity analyses, 
also have a ratio of at least 10 cases to 1. To keep a ratio at least of 10 to 1, the 
proportion of independent commissioners (BOC) variable is not included in the 
sensitivity analyses because this variable shows insignificant results in the main models 
and even has a high p-value.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, in presenting logistic regression results, a study needs to 
assess: (1) the logistic model evaluation, (2) goodness-of-fit statistics, and (3) statistical 
tests of individual predictors. The following discussion presents the results of these 
assessments.    
 
In terms of the evaluation of the logistic regression model, the study used a chi-square 
(χ2) test, and the difference of their log-likelihood (times -2) for model comparison. The 
chi-square (χ2) test is analogous to the F test in an OLS regression. As can be seen in 
Table 6.21, except for models using a sample of forced restatements, all models have a 
significant  χ2 value at 1 percent. This means that these models are significant when all 
independent variables in each model are entered simultaneously. It also indicates that at 
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least one of the independent variables contributes to the prediction of the outcome (i.e., 
listing age or AGE). In terms of the models of forced restatements, the χ2 value is 
significant at 10 percent or even higher (i.e., Model 4). A higher level of significance 
indicates a weaker prediction of the outcome. As evidence, listing age (AGE) has a 
significant value of 5 percent, which is higher than that in other models.   
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Table 6.25 Logistic Analysis of Audit Committee Effectiveness and Restatements 
Dependent Variable: Restatements (REST) 
 
  Audit Committee Compliance Index Total (ACCIT) Audit Committee Effectiveness Index (ACEFEC) 
 Exp.
Sign 
Full sample Forced restatements Annual restatements Full sample Forced restatements Annual restatements 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  ß ß ß ß ß ß ß ß ß ß ß ß 
BOC - 0.19 
(0.850) 
0.14 
(0.889) 
- - - - 0.20 
(0.843) 
0.19 
(0.852) 
- - - - 
BCS + 0.026 
(0.731) 
0.02 
(0.788) 
-0.20 
(0.196) 
-0.28 
(0.107) 
0.27* 
(0.060) 
0.26* 
(0.073) 
0.04 
(0.647) 
0.03 
(0.683) 
-0.16 
(0.313) 
-0.23 
(0.184) 
0.28* 
(0.054) 
0.25* 
(0.093) 
AGE - -0.08*** 
(0.000) 
-0.08*** 
(0.000) 
-0.10** 
(0.012) 
-0.11** 
(0.011) 
-0.11*** 
(0.002) 
-0.10*** 
(0.003) 
-0.08*** 
(0.000) 
-0.08*** 
(0.000) 
-0.10** 
(0.015) 
-0.10** 
(0.013) 
-0.11*** 
(0.002) 
-0.10*** 
(0.004) 
ROA - 0.00 
(0.359) 
0.00 
(0.359) 
0.00 
(0.571) 
0.01 
(0..460) 
0.01 
.339 
0.01 
(0.300) 
0.00 
(0.362) 
0.00 
(0.359) 
0.00 
(0.492) 
0.01 
(0.375) 
0.01 
(0.322) 
0.01 
(0.313) 
LEV + -0.06 
(0.482) 
-0.06 
(0.486) 
0.06 
(0.920) 
-0.09 
(0.896) 
-0.12 
(0.764) 
-0.14 
(0.737) 
-0.07 
(0.492) 
-0.07 
(0.492) 
-0.06 
(0.926) 
-0.21 
(0.742) 
-0.15 
(0.712) 
-0.14 
(0.730) 
AUD - - - - - -2.46*** 
(0.000) 
-2.38*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - -2.44*** 
(0.000) 
-2.39*** 
(0.000) 
ACCIT_c - 0.09 
(0.874) 
0.53 
(0.656) 
1.47 
(0.289) 
7.56 
(0.107) 
0.06 
(0.951) 
1.18 
(0.337) 
-0.29 
(0.669) 
0.16 
(0.899) 
-0.63 
(0.695) 
2.92 
(0.342) 
-0.39 
(0.723) 
1.28 
(0.443) 
FMLBOCD + -0.06 
(0.845) 
-0.03 
(0.922) 
-0.90 
(0.216) 
-0.01 
(0.996) 
-0.17 
(0.721) 
-0.15 
(0.750) 
-0.08 
(0.781) 
-0.07 
(0.826) 
-1.26* 
(0.081) 
-0.93 
(0.216) 
-0.21 
(0.654) 
-0.22 
(0.650) 
ACCIT_c* 
FMLBOCD 
+ - -0.56 
(0.674) 
- -6.71 
(0.171) 
- -0.26 
(0.141) 
- -0.61 
(0.672) 
- -4.74 
(0.182) 
- -2.79 
(0.186) 
Constant  0.93 
(0.161) 
0.94 
(0.157) 
2.76 
(0.023) 
2.24 
(0.073) 
1.11 
(0.171) 
0.99 
(0.220) 
0.90 
(0.175) 
0.90 
(0.176) 
2.94** 
(0.016) 
2.94** 
(0.015) 
1.07 
(0.190) 
1.04 
(0.201) 
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Table 6.25 (continued) 
 
  Audit Committee Compliance Index Total (ACCIT) Audit Committee Effectiveness Index (ACEFEC) 
 Exp.
Sign 
(Full sample) (Forced 
restatements) 
(Annual 
restatements) 
(Full sample) (Forced 
restatements) 
(Annual 
restatements) 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
χ2   23.85*** 
(0.001) 
24.02*** 
(0.002) 
11.72* 
(0.068) 
13.70 
(0.57) 
30.57*** 
(0.000) 
32.81*** 
(0.000) 
24.00*** 
(0.001) 
24.18*** 
(0.002) 
10.73* 
(0.098) 
12.53* 
(0.085) 
30.68*** 
(0.000) 
32.47*** 
(0.000) 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
 414.224 414.047 88.092 86.109 135.791 133.547 414.066 413.887 89.100 87.287 135.669 133.890 
∆ -2 Log 
likelihood 
 - 0.177 - 1.983 - 2.244 - 0.179 - 1.813 - 1.779 
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 
test  
 7.247 
(0.510) 
7.844 
(0.449) 
2.486 
(0.962) 
10.383 
(0.239) 
12.100 
(0.147) 
8.125 
(0.421) 
12.393 
(0.135) 
11.890 
(0.156) 
5.586 
(0.693) 
8.292 
(0.405) 
14.302 
(0.074) 
4.946 
(0.763) 
Nagelkerke R
2
  0.097 0.098 0.200 0.231 0.300 0.319 0.098 0.098 0.184 0.213 0.301 0.316 
Classification 
accuracy (%) 
 60.8 61.4 69.4 73.6 70.8 70.8 60.8 60.4 65.3 70.8 70.8 68.3 
No. 
Observations 
 316 72 120 316 72 120 
Notes: p-value in parentheses; *, **, *** denote significance at the level of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively; ACCIT_c=audit committee compliance 
index total (centred); ACEFEC_c=audit committee effectiveness index (centred); FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family members on the 
boards; BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; AGE=listing age; ROA=return on assets; LEV=leverage; 
AUD=audit quality. 
 
 
 
 259 
Since the study uses hierarchical logistic regression, it is necessary to assess whether 
adding an interaction variable in each model significantly improves the model. For a 
comparison of the models, the difference in their log-likelihood (times -2) or ∆ -2 log 
likelihood was computed. As depicted in Table 6.25, the values of the ∆ -2 log 
likelihood in all models are insignificant. This means that adding an interaction 
predictor (either ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD or ACEFEC_c*FMLBOCD) into the models 
does not significantly improve them. As evidence, none of the interaction predictors are 
significant at a certain level.  
 
In terms of goodness of fit statistics, there are three criteria for evaluation, namely: 
Nagelkerke R
2
, classification accuracy and Hosmer and Lemeshow‟s goodness of fit 
statistic. The Nagelkerke R
2  
is useful in comparing two models that have the same data 
set. Thus, this study compared the main model‟s Nagelkerke R2 value with that of the 
interaction model. As can be seen in Table 6.25, the Nagelkerke R
2 
values range from 
0.091 to 0.319. The logistic analyses using all the samples had the smallest increase in 
the Nagelkerke R
2 
value compared to the other analyses. In contrast, the logistic 
analyses using the forced restatements sample provided the highest increase in the 
Nagelkerke R
2 
value than the other analyses. In terms of classification accuracy, there 
was no significant improvement in the interactions model. Some interaction models 
increased by a small percentage or even decreased. This result is consistent with the 
result of the ∆ -2 log likelihood described previously. In terms of the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow tests, all models had a significant value greater than 5 percent, indicating 
that the logistic models fit with the data.  
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6.3.2.2 Results of the Main Model Analysis 
The main models (Models 1 and 2) used the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT_c) as a measurement of audit committee effectiveness for the full sample. 
Model 1 consisted of the main variables, while Model 2 consisted of the main variables 
and the interaction variable (ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD).  
 
 In terms of individual predictors, the statistical significance of individual regression 
coefficients (i.e., ß) was examined using the Wald statistic (Hair et al., 2006). Based on 
Model 1 in Table 6.25, the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT_c) is not a 
significant predictor of restatements. The audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT_c) has a positive coefficient sign and the p-value is 0.8740, which is higher 
than any significance levels. This was unexpected. In Model 2, the audit committee 
compliance index total (ACCIT_c) also produced the same result, which is not 
significantly associated with restatements. As a result, hypothesis H5 in this study is not 
supported. Even though the duties of the audit committee are not restricted to only 
examining the financial statements, almost all audit committees in Indonesia state that 
their duty is to examine financial information (see Table 6.1). In line with the claims of 
other scholars (i.e., Chuanrommanee and Swierczek, 2007), it seems that the claims of 
corporate governance compliance presented in company documents do not reflect actual 
practice. In other words, the presence of audit committees in Indonesia might be just 
symbolic or for cosmetic purposes. As with the ACCIT_c variable, the family-
controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable also 
produced an insignificant result. Unexpectedly, the coefficient sign is a negative, and 
the p-values of this variable in Model 1 and Model 2 are 0.845 and 0.922, respectively, 
which are higher than the significance levels. In terms of the interaction variable, the 
results indicate that the interaction variable (ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD) is an insignificant 
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predictor. Unexpectedly, the coefficient is a negative. This means that family control 
strengthens the negative association between audit committee effectiveness and 
financial restatements. However, the p-value of this interaction variable is 0.674, which 
is higher than the significance level. The finding of this interaction variable is in line 
with the results of the individual predictors, which also indicate the insignificant 
predictors. This finding is also consistent with the insignificance of the ∆ -2 log 
likelihood, which is discussed in Section 6.3.2.1. Thus, hypothesis H6 is not supported. 
 
With regard to the control variables, only listing age (AGE) is significantly associated 
with restatements in both models. Listing age (AGE) has the lowest p-value (0.000) 
among all the predictors, meaning that it is the most significant predictor of 
restatements. As the main reason for restatements is deficiency in books or records (see 
Figure 6.5), it seems that older public listed companies tend to have better recording 
and/or record keeping. Older firms might also have long experience and learning 
processes that reduce the possibility of restatements. Meanwhile, other control variables 
have an insignificant association with restatements. An interesting finding regarding the 
insignificant control variables is that some control variables have coefficient signs that 
are the opposite of expectations. For example, the coefficient sign of the return on assets 
(ROA) variable is positive, which is contrary to expectations. This means that a higher 
return on assets (ROA) is associated with an increase in the probability of restatements. 
Another example is the proportion of independent commissioners (BOC) variable, 
which also has a positive coefficient sign. The positive sign means that a higher 
proportion of independent commissioners on the board of commissioners is associated 
with an increased likelihood of restatements. The insignificance of the proportion of 
independent commissioners (BOC) variable evidences the ineffectiveness of  
independent commissioners in Indonesia. This finding is consistent with prior studies on 
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financial reporting quality in developing countries (e.g., Hashim and Devi, 2008; 
Siregar and Utama, 2008; Thoopsamut and Jaikengkit; 2009; Abdullah et al., 2010). 
Meanwhile, board of commissioners size (BCS) has a positive coefficient sign as 
expected. Unfortunately, this variable is not significantly associated with restatements 
in both models.  
 
6.3.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Numerous sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess the robustness of the results of 
the main model. One analysis included the use of a reduced sample and an alternative 
measurement of audit committee effectiveness. The reduced sample included forced 
restatements, annual restatements and control of the effect of IFRS convergence. In 
another analysis, the study replaced the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT) with the audit committee effectiveness index (ACEFEC), as a measurement of 
audit committee effectiveness. The logistic regression analysis using the audit 
committee effectiveness index (ACEFEC) employed a full sample, forced restatements 
and annual restatements. The analysis also examined the likelihood of endogeneity.  
 
a. Forced Restatements 
 
To check the robustness of the results, the study used a reduced sample, namely, 
restatements prompted by outside parties. As depicted in Figure 6.4, the dominant 
initiators of restatements were the companies themselves. Restatements initiated by this 
type of prompter are considered voluntary restatements, whereas restatements prompted 
by external parties (such as stock exchanges and auditors) are categorized as forced 
restatements (Marciukaityte et al., 2009). Voluntary restatements might indicate 
relatively stronger internal control and oversight by management, boards and audit 
committees (Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004; Marciukaityte et al., 2009). In 
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contrast, forced restatements may signal the presence of poor internal control because 
mechanisms such as independent directors or audit committees were unable to detect the 
likelihood of misstatements. Therefore, the study predicts that the audit committee has a 
weaker role in forced restatements than in total restatements consisting of both 
voluntary and forced restatements.  
 
The results of the logistic regression analysis using the forced restatements sample are 
presented for Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 6.25. In general, the results are consistent 
with the prior analysis of Model 1 and Model 2. In terms of individual predictors, the 
audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT_c) has a positive coefficient sign and 
an insignificant association, which is consistent with the earlier analysis of Model 1 and 
Model 2. However, the p-values of the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT_c) are lower than their values in the prior analysis of Models 1 and 2. It seems 
that the audit committee might play a stronger role in detecting financial statement 
misstatements in forced restatements than in restatements in total. Hence, this finding is 
contrary to expectations. Meanwhile, the presence of family members on the boards 
(FMLBOCD) variable has a negative and insignificant association with restatements, 
which is consistent with the prior analyses of Model 1 and Model 2. The interaction 
variable (ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD) consistently has a negative and insignificant 
association with restatements. Interestingly, the p-value is lower than that in the prior 
analysis. This means that the interaction between audit committee effectiveness and 
family control might have a stronger effect in forced restatements than in total 
restatements. In terms of the control variables, listing age (AGE) had a significant 
association with restatements, which is consistent with prior results.  
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b. Annual Restatements 
In this study, the sample of restatements consisted of both annual restatements and 
interim restatements. The study could not examine the role of the external auditor in 
detecting restatements because, in Indonesia, interim financial statements are not 
required to be audited by the external auditor. In fact, external auditors might influence 
the effectiveness of the audit committee (Joshi and Wakil, 2004) and an effective audit 
committee is likely to demand a high level of audit quality (Abbott and Parker, 2000). 
In addition, some prior studies found that a Big Four auditor – as a proxy for audit 
quality – had a negative association with annual restatements (e.g., Chan, Farrell, and 
Lee, 2011; Schmidt and Wilkins, 2013). Therefore, the variable of audit quality (AUD) 
was added to the model. 
 
In general, the results of the logistic regression analysis of the variables of concern 
using annual restatements indicated findings that were consistent with the results of the 
prior analysis. For Model 5 and Model 6, the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT) is an insignificant predictor and has a positive coefficient. Meanwhile, the 
presence of family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable and the interaction 
variable (ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD) had a negative and insignificant association with 
restatements. Thus, the results of this analysis strengthen the results of the previous 
analysis. 
 
There were some interesting findings in terms of the control variables. Unlike in the 
prior analysis, three control variables were significantly associated with annual 
restatements, namely: board of commissioners size (BCS), listing age (AGE), and audit 
quality (AUD). The board of commissioners size (BCS) variable is significantly 
associated with restatements, even though its p-value is 0.10. This finding is different 
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from that of the prior analysis and might indicate that larger boards of commissioners 
are not more effective. Listing age (AGE) and audit quality (AUD) are negative and 
significant predictors, with p-values of 0.001. The significance of audit quality (AUD) 
indicates that external auditors, namely, the Big Four, play an important role in 
detecting financial statement misstatements in Indonesia.  
 
c. Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Effectiveness 
As discussed in Section 5.4.2.1 in Chapter 5, the use of the audit committee compliance 
index total (ACCIT), which was extracted from the BAPEPAM-LK rules requirements, 
might not represent audit committee best practices. This is because the index consists 
only of the mandatory audit committee requirements and ignores the voluntary 
requirements. Therefore, for this sensitivity analysis, the audit committee compliance 
index total (ACCIT) was replaced with the audit committee effectiveness index 
(ACEFEC) as a measurement of audit committee effectiveness. As with the ACCIT, the 
logistic regression analyses performed on the ACEFEC included the analysis of the full 
sample, forced restatements, and annual restatements. 
 
In general, the results of the logistic regression analysis using the ACEFEC were 
consistent with the prior analyses using the ACCIT. Audit committee effectiveness 
measured by the audit committee effectiveness index (ACEFEC), the presence of family 
members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable and the interaction variable 
(ACEFEC*FMLBOCD) were still not significantly associated with restatements in all 
types of samples. In terms of the control variables, the results also provided consistent 
findings. Listing age (AGE) was a significant predictor in all models, with a p-value of 
0.001. For annual restatements, audit quality was also significantly associated with 
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restatements. Therefore, these results strengthen the results of the prior analyses using 
the ACCIT variable. 
 
d. Control of the Effect of IFRS Convergence 
As depicted in Figure 6.1, the number of restatements increased significantly in 2011. 
This study argues that the increase might be due to the implementation of new 
accounting standards that converged with those of the IFRS, as Indonesia is gradually 
converging its local GAAP with IFRS, starting with minimising the significant 
differences between the two. As of 1 January 2009, the Indonesian Financial 
Accounting Standards Board revised some local standards in order to comply with the 
IFRS; some of these revised standards became effective at 1 January 2011 (Wirahardja, 
2010). Although restatements due to the application of accounting standards were 
removed from the sample, the remaining sample may still have been affected by the 
application of the new accounting standards. Therefore, the study eliminated 
restatements that occurred from 2011 onwards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 267 
Table 6.26 Results of the Logistic Regression Analysis for Restatements for the 
Period 2006-2010 
  Model 13 
Main Model 
Model 14 
Interaction Model 
Variable Predicted  
Sign. 
Coefficient Coefficient 
BOC - -0.368 
(0.800) 
-0.397 
(0.785) 
BCS + 0.076 
(0.435) 
0.071 
(0.469) 
AGE - -0.103*** 
(0.001) 
-0.103*** 
(0.001) 
ROA - -0.002 
(0.553) 
-0.002 
(0.564) 
LEV + -0.015 
(0.967) 
-0.006 
(0.987) 
FMLBOCD + -0.193 
(0.654) 
-0.176 
(0.682) 
ACCIT_C - 0.102 
(0.906) 
0.936  
(0.531) 
ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD + - -1.189 
(0.496) 
Constant  1.278 
(0.158) 
1.259 
(0.163) 
    
Nagelkerke R
2
  0.115 0.118 
Classification accuracy (%)  62.3 63.6 
No. Observations  162 162 
Notes: p-value in parentheses; *** denote significance at the level of 0 0.01; ACCIT_c= 
audit committee compliance index total (centred); ACEFEC_c=audit committee 
effectiveness index (centred); FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family 
members on the boards; BOC=proportion of independent commissioners; BCS=board 
of commissioners size; AGE=listing age; ROA=return on assets; LEV=leverage. 
 
 
As depicted in Table 6.26, the results of the logistic regression analysis of Model 13 and 
Model 14 are consistent, in general, with the results of the previous analyses. The audit 
committee effectiveness (ACCIT_c) variable and its interaction with the family control 
variable are insignificant predictors. Listing age (AGE) is still the most significant 
predictor among the control variables. In sum, the reduction of the sample to avoid the 
potential effect of IFRS convergence on restatements did not significantly change the 
result. 
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e. Endogeneity 
It is assumed that the audit committee compliance index total (ACCIT_c) is likely 
endogenous. As explained in Chapter 4, the audit committee compliance index total 
(ACCIT_c) in this second research stage serves as the dependent variable in Research 
Stage 1. The results from Research Stage 1 prove that ACCIT_c is affected by some 
factors. Meanwhile, some other independent variables in Research Stage 1 also serve as 
independent variables in Research Stage 2. These include the proportion of independent 
commissioners (BOC), board of commissioners size (BCS), leverage (LEV), and 
family-controlled company with family members on the boards (FMLBOCD). Hence, it 
is possible that restatements (REST) and ACCIT_c are determined by some common 
factors. In other words, this study assumes that audit committee effectiveness and 
restatements are jointly determined (possess simultaneous endogeneity). 
 
To check for potential endogeneity, this study adopted the method employed by Lisic et 
al. (2011). The Lisic study had adopted the approach of Carcello et al. (2011b) and 
Nikolaev (2010). Both approaches employed a two-step procedure. In the first step, a 
model that predicts the endogenous variable is developed. The residual is obtained, 
based on the analysis of the first step. In the second step, the residual is added to the 
restatements model. However, there is a slight difference between the process used by 
Carcello et al. (2011b) and the one used by Nikolaev (2010). Carcello et al. (2011b) just 
added the residual as an additional variable in the model, whereas Nikolaev (2010) used 
the residual to replace the endogenous variable in the model.  
 
For the first step in this study, the model to predict ACCIT_c was developed. As 
discussed above, ACCIT_c is likely endogenous. In this model, ACCIT_c was the 
dependent variable, while the independent variables were BOC, BCS, AGE, ROA, LEV 
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and FMLBOCD. This study added other variables that were significantly associated 
with ACCIT in Research Stage 1, namely, audit quality (AUD) and firm size (SIZE). In 
terms of results, only a few variables had a significant association with ACCIT_c. This 
finding is much different from the finding in Research Stage 1 where panel data was 
used. However, the different result is not the focus of this analysis. Importantly, the 
residual obtained from this step represents the uncontrolled determinants of the 
endogenous variable (Carcello et al., 2011b).  
 
Table 6.27 First Step in the Endogeneity Test 
Dependent Variable: Audit Committee Compliance Index Total (ACCIT_c) 
 
Variable Coefficient t Sig. 
(Constant) -0.468 -4.401 0.000*** 
BOC 0.043 0.430 0.668 
BCS -0.001 -0.159 0.874 
AGE 0.002 1.378 0.169 
ROA -5.996 -0.035 0.972 
LEV 0.004 0.857 0.392 
FMLBOCD -0.079 -2.749 0.006*** 
AUD 0.049 1.762 0.079** 
SIZE 0.035 4.556 0.000*** 
 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively; 
ACCIT_c=audit committee compliance index total (centred); FMLBOCD=family- 
controlled company with family members on the boards; BOC=proportion of 
independent commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; AUD=audit quality; 
LEV=leverage; AGE=listing age; SIZE =firm size; ROA=return on assets. 
 
 
 
In the second step, the residual obtained from the first step was added to the interaction 
models, which were named Model 15 and Model 16. As depicted in Table 6.28, the 
approach of Carcello et al. (2011b) was just to add the residual (Abn_ACCIT_c),  
whereas the approach of Nikolaev (2010) was to add the residual (Abn_ACCIT_c) to 
the model as a replacement for ACCIT_c. The results of both approaches were not 
significantly different. As can be seen for Model 15 and Model 16, the residual 
(Abn_ACCIT_c) and the interaction variable were not significantly associated with 
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restatements. This is consistent with the results for Model 2 in Table 6.25. Meanwhile, 
the other variables in Models 15 and 16 provided findings consistent with the results for 
Model 2 in Table 6.25. In terms of R
2
, the Nagelkerke R
2 
values for Model 15 and 
Model 16 were not much different from the value for Model 2, indicating the 
insignificance of model improvement. In sum, these findings evidence that audit 
committee effectiveness (ACCIT_c) is not endogenously determined. In other words, 
the results for Model 2 in Table 6.25 are robust enough to control for the endogeneity of 
audit committee effectiveness (ACCIT_c). 
 
Table 6.28 Second Step in the Endogeneity Test 
Dependent Variable: Restatements (REST) 
 
  Model 15 
(Carcello et al., 
2011b approach) 
Model 16 
(Nikolaev, 
2010 approach) 
Variable Predicted  
Sign. 
Coefficient Coefficient 
BOC - 0.229 
(0.825) 
0.201 
(0.844) 
BCS + 0.047 
(0.591) 
0.029 
(0.701) 
AGE - -0.080*** 
(0.000) 
-0.082*** 
(0.000) 
ROA - 0.002 
(0.406) 
0.002 
(0.360) 
LEV + -0.063 
(0.523) 
-0.063 
(0.485) 
FMLBOCD + -0.135 
(0.692) 
-0.067 
(0.818) 
ACCIT_C - -0.644 
(0.764) 
- 
ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD + -0.603 
(0.652) 
- 
Abn_ACCIT_c ? 1.317 
(0.510) 
0.218 
(0.716) 
Abn_ACCIT_c*FMLBOCD ? - 0.376 
(0.876) 
Constant ? 0.845 
(0.213) 
0.901 
(0.184) 
Nagelkerke R
2
  0.099 0.097 
Classification accuracy (%)  60.1 61.4 
No. Observations  316 316 
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Notes: p-value in parentheses; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and  
0.01 levels, respectively; ACCIT_c=Audit committee compliance index total (centred); 
Abn_ACCIT_c=residual; FMLBOCD=family-controlled company with family 
members on the boards; AGE=listing age; BOC=proportion of independent 
commissioners; BCS=board of commissioners size; LEV=leverage; ROA=return on 
assets. 
 
 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
The main research focus was the compliance of Indonesian public listed companies with 
audit committee rules, and the impact of compliance on restatements. The findings of 
Research Stage 1 confirm that different family control models result in different effects 
with respect to the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules. 
The negative significance of the family members on the boards (FMLBOCD) variable 
confirms that combined ownership and control held by a family might serve as a control 
mechanism that reduces the need for an audit committee. This finding is in line with the 
alignment theory. Furthermore, this negative association between family control and 
compliance also supports the entrenchment theory. The negative and significant 
association proves that a family might prefer to implement poor corporate governance in 
order to pursue private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. A family might 
not welcome the introduction of the Anglo-American corporate governance model as 
some of the model‟s structures are interpreted to mean a loss of family control (Storey, 
1994; Maug, 1996). On the other hand, the separation between ownership and 
management, which is represented by the family-controlled company with professional 
management (non-family members) on the boards (PROFBOCD) variable, has a 
positive and significant association with compliance with audit committee rules. This 
positive association is consistent with the argument that family firms with professional 
management might create agency costs, as the potential interests of professional 
executives and the family as owner diverge (Chua et al., 2003; Bhattacharya and 
Ravikumar, 2004). Furthermore, altruism is weakened due to a lack of family ties (Chua 
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et al., 2003). Thus, both professional management and the family are likely to rely on 
formal corporate governance mechanisms, such as audit committees. 
 
The results from Research Stage 1 provide empirical evidence that foreign institutional 
investors play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of formal corporate 
governance mechanisms in Indonesia. In general, foreign institutional investors serve as 
agents of change, or provide exogenous pressure that is resistant to the influence of 
local practice, in the improvement of corporate governance in developing countries 
(OECD, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Chevailer et al., 2006). The 
findings of Research Stage 1 also confirm that not all types of foreign institutional 
investors improve corporate governance in Indonesia. The attribute of genuineness 
(authenticity), and the amount of shares owned by foreign institutional investors are 
important in the Indonesian environment. As can be seen in Table 6.10, the genuine 
large foreign institutional investor (GLFRG) variable has a positive and significant 
association with compliance; this is in line with hypothesis H4. In contrast, foreign 
institutional ownership (FRGOWN), measured by the percentage of total shares owned 
by foreign institutional investors, is negative and insignificant. This implies that the 
measurement of foreign institutional investors based solely on the total shares owned by 
foreign institutional investors (FRGOWN) is not appropriate in the Indonesian 
institutional setting, as some of the investors might be owned by Indonesian offshore 
companies.   
 
As expected, the politically connected independent commissioner (POLIC) variable is 
negatively and significantly associated with compliance. The appointment of an 
independent commissioner who was/is a former/current bureaucrat or former army 
officer/personnel might not increase the monitoring function of the board as suggested 
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by agency theory. This type of independent commissioner is appropriate for playing an 
external role, as suggested by resource dependence theory. The results of the analysis of 
the politically connected independent commissioner (POLIC) variable are in contrast to 
those of the analysis of the independent commissioner with financial expertise (ICED) 
variable. The latter indicate a positive and significant association with the audit 
committee compliance index total (ACCIT). The presence of independent 
commissioners with an accounting education background, or who are CPA holders, 
might increase compliance with audit committee rules. This would be in line with 
agency theory. It seems that the appointment of an independent commissioner, whether 
a politically connected person or someone with financial expertise, is dependent on 
some other factors, such as firm size and family control. For example, larger family 
firms might need more resources and security for their business activities. In addition, 
the combination of control and ownership in the hands of the family reduces type 1 
agency costs, causing formal corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
independence and the presence of an audit committee to be less important. In this 
situation, the appointment of former bureaucrats or army officers/personnel as 
independent commissioners might provide the company with more benefits than 
appointing independent commissioners with financial expertise.  
 
Based on the results of the analysis of restatements, the audit committee compliance 
index total (ACCIT_c) variable has a positive coefficient sign and is an insignificant 
predictor of restatements. The sensitivity analysis produced a consistent result. This 
finding is in line with the Abdullah et al. (2010) Malaysian study. However, the finding 
is contrary to some prior studies in Indonesia that also employed an audit committee 
index to measure audit committee effectiveness. For example, Ika and Ghazali (2012) 
indicated that audit committee effectiveness was negatively associated with the 
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timeliness of reporting. Similarly, Sarumaha and Hermawan (2013) revealed that audit 
committee effectiveness was negatively associated with financial distress. It seems that 
a different proxy for financial reporting quality might yield different results for audit 
committee effectiveness. In addition, the insignificance of the association between audit 
committee effectiveness and restatements supports the argument that studies on 
corporate governance need to employ an “open system” approach (see Aguilera et al., 
2008). Hence, the insignificance provides justification for the need to explore the 
interaction of audit committee effectiveness with other corporate governance 
mechanisms, as opposed to simply examining the effect of each individual audit 
committee characteristic as advocated by some scholars (i.e., DeZoort et al., 2002; 
Turley and Zaman, 2004; Bédard and Gendron, 2010).  
 
The interaction of the family control and audit committee effectiveness (ACCIT_c * 
FMLBOCD) variables reveals a negative coefficient sign and an insignificant 
association, which is contrary to hypothesis H6. Hypothesis H6 predicted that family 
control will weaken the negative association between audit committee effectiveness and 
restatements. Instead of weakening it, the interaction of family control and audit 
committee effectiveness might strengthen it. Thus, hypothesis H6 is not supported.   
 
There are three plausible explanations with regard to the insignificance of audit 
committee effectiveness, and its interaction with family control. First, the insignificance 
might be evidence that the presence of an audit committee is just symbolic or for 
cosmetic purposes (Cohen et al., 2004; Haron et al, 2005). This is in line with the claims 
of some scholars (e.g., Backman, 1999; Peng, 2004; Rosser, 2003; Sam, 2007) that 
corporate governance in East Asia often resembles the Anglo-American model in form, 
but not in substance. The finding, therefore, supports institutional theory rather than 
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agency theory. Based on institutional theory, corporate governance mechanisms such as 
audit committees may be ceremonial, designed solely to enhance external legitimacy 
without being coupled to an actual oversight role (Cohen et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 
2009). Second, the insignificance of audit committee effectiveness as a predictor of 
restatements casts doubt on the validity of restatements as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality in Indonesia. To determine the effectiveness of the audit committee, 
this study examined whether the effectiveness of audit committees is associated with 
restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality. This is based on the argument 
that an effective audit committee will reduce the opportunistic behaviour of 
management, thereby improving the quality of the financial statements. In other words, 
a more effective audit committee will reduce type 1 agency problems (principle-agent 
problems), resulting in higher financial reporting quality. However, the agency problem 
in developing countries in Asia, including Indonesia, is a type 2 agency problem that 
occurs between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008; 
Jaggi et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011). As a result, different types of agency costs raise 
doubts about the validity of restatements. 
 
Third, investors and regulators in Indonesia might not perceive restatements as actual 
events with serious consequences. As discussed in Section 4.4 in Chapter 4, this study 
assumes that restatements are a good proxy for financial reporting quality. Reasons for 
this include: 1) they are a popular proxy for financial reporting quality in the US, and 2)  
actual events indicate a visible form of impaired financial reporting quality (Cao et al., 
2010; DeFond, 2010). However, the insignificance of audit committee effectiveness 
might indicate that restatements have not been perceived by investors in Indonesia as 
actual events that have serious consequences. Unlike in the US, investors in Indonesia 
are less reliant on financial information and are more likely to consider other factors 
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such as rumours, insider trading and market anomalies (Prabowo, 2000). In addition,   
they also tend to show irrational behaviour because their decisions are influenced by 
psychological factors such as overconfidence, loss aversion, cognitive dissonance, 
representativeness bias and self-attribution bias (Ady et al., 2013). These characteristics 
may affect their view of the importance of the restatements. Unfortunately, no prior 
Indonesian studies have examined this issue.  
 
In terms of the control variables, listing age (AGE) and audit quality (AUD) are 
significant predictors. Listing age is consistently associated with restatements in all 
models; it seems that older public listed companies tend to have better recording and 
record keeping, as well as long experience and learning processes that reduce the 
possibility of restatements (Alyousef and Almutairi, 2010). On the other hand, new 
firms might face greater pressure (including pressure to boost their earnings) when 
listed on a stock exchange (Carcello and Nagy, 2004b), and this might cause managers 
to restate the company‟s financial statements (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 
2011b). Audit quality is significantly associated with annual restatements, indicating 
that the Big Four accounting firms (as a proxy for audit quality) have an important role 
to play in detecting restatements in Indonesia. In this context, the external auditor plays 
a key role in independently ensuring sound financial reporting that is in line with 
resource dependence theory (Cohen et al., 2008). This finding supports the argument 
that external auditors (i.e., the Big 5 auditors) play a corporate governance role in Asia 
(Fan and Wong, 2005). 
 
The proportion of independent commissioners, as a control variable, produces an 
inconclusive result. In Research Stage 1, the proportion of independent commissioners 
variable is positive, and is significantly associated with compliance with audit 
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committee rules. In contrast, in Research Stage 2, this variable is not significantly 
associated with restatements. Like the audit committee, it seems that independent 
commissioners merely serve a symbolic purpose. There are two possible explanations 
for these results. First, public listed companies appoint independent commissioners 
solely to comply with regulations (Siregar and Utama, 2008). Second, the dominance of 
family-based controlling shareholders at listed companies might render the oversight 
function of the board of commissioners ineffective; independent commissioners might 
have a limited direct effect, as controlling shareholders will not allow commissioners 
any real influence on the board (Berglöf and Claessens, 2006). However, this finding 
supports prior studies in Indonesia (i.e., Parulian, 2004; Siregar and Utama, 2008).  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has presented the various statistical analyses for both Research Stage 1 and 
Research Stage 2.  The examination of the determinants of compliance of public listed 
companies with audit committee rules, the focus of Research Stage 1, used the FGLS 
method to test the hypotheses. Meanwhile, the examination of audit committee 
effectiveness and restatements, the focus of Research Stage 2, used matched pair 
logistic regression analysis to test the hypotheses. In addition, both research stages also 
employed sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the results. Based on the 
sensitivity analysis, the results of both Research Stage 1 and Research Stage 2 are 
robust. 
 
In Research Stage 1, there is evidence that the compliance and effectiveness of public 
listed companies with audit committee rules are influenced by other corporate 
governance mechanisms. The findings are consistent with the bundle of corporate 
governance theory which states that the effectiveness of corporate governance is 
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dependent on the effectiveness of a bundle of corporate governance mechanisms, rather 
than on the effectiveness of a sole mechanism. Even though the implementation of the 
audit committee is mandatory for all public listed companies in Indonesia, mimicking 
the US “one size fits all” approach, the level of compliance of public listed companies is 
unsatisfactory. Except for the aspect of audit committee membership, the level of 
compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules is relatively low. This 
indicates that Indonesia‟s public listed companies might practice their own bundle of 
corporate governance, based on a cost-benefit trade off, to achieve optimal efficiency 
and effectiveness. Thus, in adopting audit committee rules, companies might not 
necessarily be complying with all requirements, and might consider the interrelation 
between the audit committee and other corporate governance mechanisms, both formal 
and informal. By using multiple theories to develop the hypotheses, this study evidences 
that family control, board characteristics (i.e., politically connected independent 
commissioners) and foreign institutional investors affect compliance with audit 
committee rules.  
 
In Research Stage 2, the study found that audit committee effectiveness is not 
associated with restatements (as a proxy for financial reporting quality). The finding 
evidences that the level of compliance with audit committee rules presented in formal 
corporate documents might not indicate actual practice. This finding supports the 
argument that corporate governance mechanisms in emerging economies often resemble 
those of developed countries in form, but not in substance. Moreover, this study could 
not prove that the effectiveness of the audit committee in preventing restatements is also 
affected by other corporate governance mechanisms, namely, family control. This 
means that, in the context of restatements, informal corporate governance mechanisms 
might not affect audit committee effectiveness.  
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The following chapter summarises the study and the key research findings. Chapter 7 
presents a discussion of the study‟s implications on knowledge and for policy makers, 
and investors. The discussion is followed by the study‟s limitations, and 
recommendations for future research.    
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter comprises six additional sections. Section 7.2 summarises the study and 
key research findings. Section 7.3 discusses the implications of the study for knowledge, 
and for policy makers and investors in Indonesia. A discussion of the limitations of the 
study is presented in Section 7.4. This is followed by recommendations for future 
research in Section 7.5. The chapter concludes with Section 7.6.  
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 paved the way for the IMF and the World 
Bank to promote Anglo-American corporate governance in Asia. Specific features of 
the Asian business environment, such as poor corporate governance, high concentrated 
ownership with control in the hands of families, and close relationships between 
government and businesses (cronyism) were blamed as the root problems of the crisis. 
In response to the crisis, the IMF actively advised affected countries to reform their 
corporate governance systems, and advocated use of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model as a solution since the model had worked well and showed its 
superior ability to allocate resources and monitor corporate behaviour in the more 
developed Western economies. Consequently, corporate governance reform was made 
one of the prerequisites that affected Asian countries had to adopt in order to obtain 
IMF and World Bank assistance. 
 
Indonesia is an example of an affected country that reformed its corporate governance 
regime under the mandate of the IMF and the World Bank. While the country 
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implemented radical legal reforms to improve corporate governance, corporate 
governance reforms in Indonesia did not show satisfactory progress. Far too often, 
international surveys placed Indonesia at the bottom of corporate governance rankings. 
It was often commented that Indonesia had quite good corporate governance standards 
and regulations but that implementation of the standards and regulations remained a 
fundamental problem.  
  
Academic literature indicated a number of factors that contributed to ineffective 
corporate governance reform in Indonesia. The specific unique features of the 
Indonesian business environment were considered to have impeded the implementation 
of the Anglo-American corporate governance model. Such features include the 
predominance of relationship-based systems (guanxi) associated with highly personal 
networking, cronyism, high concentrated ownership by families, and special 
relationships between family businesses and political power. These features were 
deemed unsuitable for the implementation of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model. However, it was perceived that foreign investors, supported by international 
financial institutions and Western governments, supported the country‟s corporate 
governance reforms.    
 
In the extant literature, the effect of the Indonesian business environment (i.e., family 
control, collusion between politicians-bureaucrats and the owners of domestic 
conglomerates, and foreign investors) on compliance with corporate governance 
regulations has not been widely examined by prior studies. The dominance of agency 
theory in corporate governance studies was partly blamed for the lack of focus of prior 
studies on the institutional context within which such reforms occurred. In fact, agency 
problems in the Indonesian context are different from those in the developed countries. 
 282 
In the Indonesian environment, agency problems occur between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders; such problems are referred to as agency 
problems type 2. Furthermore, prior studies did not consider corporate governance 
practice as an interrelated mechanism that was affected by various actors. As a result, 
only a limited number of studies actually examined the relevant institutional factors 
such as family control, foreign ownership, and collusion between businesses and 
politicians in Indonesia.   
 
To date, stock exchanges around the world have widely adopted the establishment of 
audit committees by their listed companies. Historically, the audit committee is from the 
US and is one of the mechanisms in the Anglo-American corporate governance model. 
It is possible that the audit committee may be ineffective in Indonesia because the 
country‟s business environment is different from that of the US, thus the first part of the 
current research examined what factors influence the compliance of public listed 
companies with audit committee rules in Indonesia. As to whether audit committees 
actually work in practice, the second part of the research examined the association 
between compliance with audit committee rules and financial reporting quality (using 
restatements of financial statements as a proxy). It has often been argued that corporate 
governance compliance in emerging economies with weak legal enforcement was 
merely symbolic and not reflective of actual practice. Therefore, comprehensive 
research that simultaneously examines relevant factors affecting compliance and its 
association with accounting outcomes – such as financial reporting quality – is timely. 
 
The three objectives of the research were: (1) to examine the association between public 
listed companies with specific business characteristics (namely family control, 
politically connected independent commissioners, and foreign institutional investors) 
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and level of the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules; (2) 
to examine whether the compliance, which also indicates the level of audit committee 
effectiveness, is associated with financial reporting quality; (3) to examine the influence 
of family control on the association between audit committee effectiveness and 
restatements of financial statements. Thus, this research was divided into two 
interrelated stages: Research Stage 1 examined the determinants of compliance of 
public listed companies with audit committee rules, and Research Stage 2 examined the 
association between the level of such compliance and restatements of financial 
statements. In Research Stage 1, independent variables derived from business 
characteristics specific to the Indonesian setting were examined. These included family 
control, politically connected independent commissioners and foreign institutional 
investors. Meanwhile, in Research Stage 2, compliance with audit committee rules was 
adopted as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness, while financial statement 
restatements were a proxy for financial reporting quality. The effect of the interaction 
between audit committee effectiveness and family control on financial reporting quality 
was examined in this stage.  
 
Hypotheses were developed premised on multiple theories as complements to the 
dominant agency theory. These complementary theories included the bundle of 
corporate governance theory and the institutional theory. The use of multiple theories 
enabled the research to reconcile the conflicting findings of prior studies (which were 
based on agency theory), and helped to better understand the interrelationships among 
various actors and mechanisms affecting the Indonesian corporate governance system.   
 
The results of the hypotheses testing are summarised in Table 7.1. As can be seen, the 
results of the determinants of compliance of public listed companies (Research Stage 1) 
 284 
support all the hypotheses. On the other hand, the results of audit committee 
effectiveness and restatements (Research Stage 2) do not support the two hypotheses.   
 
Table 7.1 Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results 
 
Hypothesis Test used Result Supports/does 
not support 
hypothesis 
H1     Family controlled companies 
with family members 
represented on boards are 
less likely to comply with 
audit committee rules. 
FGLS Negative 
significant at 
p<0.01 
(Table 6.10) 
Supports the 
hypothesis 
H2    Family controlled companies 
with non-family members 
represented on the boards are 
more likely to comply with 
audit committee rules. 
FGLS Positive 
significant at 
p<0.05 
(Table 6.10) 
Supports the 
hypothesis 
H3   Public listed companies with a 
politically connected 
independent commissioner 
are less likely to comply with 
audit committee rules. 
FGLS Negative 
significant at 
p<0.01 
(Table 6.10) 
Supports the 
hypothesis 
H4   Public listed companies with a 
large genuine foreign 
institutional investor are more 
likely to comply with audit 
committee rules. 
FGLS Positive 
significant at 
p<0.05 
(Table 6.10) 
Supports the 
hypothesis 
H5    There is a negative association 
between audit committee 
effectiveness and financial 
restatements. 
Logistic 
regression 
Positive and 
not 
significant 
(Table 5.21) 
Does not 
support the 
hypothesis 
H6     The negative association of 
audit committee effectiveness 
and financial restatements is 
reduced when a company is 
controlled by family and the 
family members are present 
on the boards. 
Logistic 
regression 
Negative and 
not 
significant 
(Table 5.21)  
Does not 
support the 
hypothesis 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
   
The results of Research Stage 1 indicate the significant association between family 
control, politically connected independent commissioners, genuine large foreign 
institutional investors, and compliance with audit committee rules. It is not surprising to 
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note that family control and politically connected independent commissioners indicate a 
negative and significant association with compliance, whilst genuine large foreign 
institutional investors have a positive and significant association with such compliance.  
 
Most importantly, the research shows that different types of family control have 
different effects on the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee 
rules. Specifically, the presence of family members on the boards of family-controlled 
companies (meaning that combined ownership and control is in the hands of the family) 
significantly reduces the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee 
rules. In contrast, the presence of professional management (as opposed to family 
members) on the boards of family-controlled companies is positively associated with 
the compliance of public listed companies with audit committee rules. This finding 
implies that combined ownership and control in the hands of family members might 
serve as an alternative corporate governance mechanism that may make a formal 
corporate governance mechanism, such as an audit committee, less effective. The 
negative significance of the politically connected independent commissioner variable 
provides evidence that the role of the independent commissioner is to emphasise the 
harnessing of external resources (resource dependency theory) rather than to monitor 
(agency theory). This explains the decreased level of adherence to rules. Meanwhile, the 
significance of genuine large foreign institutional investors clearly shows that 
researchers must discern the authenticity of such investors; it is clear that while not all 
foreign institutional investors in Indonesia enhance corporate governance practice, the 
genuine ones do. Therefore, this research demonstrates that the corporate governance 
system in Indonesia tends to default towards a “family market-based system” (see 
Khan‟s 1999 schema in Chapter 2), although foreign institutional investors seek to 
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support the “equity market-based system” that has been formally adopted in the rules 
for audit committees. 
 
In Research Stage 2, the results reveal that audit committee effectiveness is 
insignificantly associated with restatements. It seems that the presence of audit 
committees in Indonesia is just symbolic or for cosmetic purposes. This finding 
supports institutional theory that audit committees are designed to enhance external 
legitimacy without being coupled with an actual oversight role. In addition, the study 
finds that family control does not significantly weaken the association between audit 
committee effectiveness and restatements. Therefore, the study was unable to provide 
evidence that informal corporate governance mechanisms might affect the effectiveness 
of formal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., the audit committee).  
 
In terms of the control variables, listing age (AGE) and audit quality (AUD) are 
significant predictors. Listing age is consistently associated with restatements in all 
models. It seems that older public listed companies tend to do a better job of recording 
transactions, and their long experience and learning processes might account for the 
reduced possibility of restatements (Alyousef and Almutairi, 2010). On the other hand, 
new firms might face greater pressure – particularly pressure to boost earnings – when 
listed on a stock exchange (Carcello and Nagy, 2004b), and this might cause managers 
to restate the financial statements (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2011b). Audit 
quality is significantly associated with annual restatements, indicating that the use of the 
Big Four audit firms (as a proxy for audit quality), plays an important role in detecting 
restatements in Indonesia. In this context, the external auditor plays a key role in 
independently ensuring sound financial reporting that is in line with the resource 
dependence theory (Cohen et al., 2008). This finding supports the argument that 
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external auditors (i.e., the Big 5 auditors) play a corporate governance role in Asia (Fan 
and Wong, 2005). 
 
7.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
7.3.1 Implications for Knowledge 
In general, this study provides empirical evidence that the establishment of audit 
committees by public listed companies is influenced by other corporate governance 
mechanisms. The establishment of audit committees as one of the mechanisms of 
corporate governance is not isolated or independent from other mechanisms; this is 
consistent with the view espoused in the bundle of corporate governance theory (Jensen, 
1993; David and Useem, 2002; Filatotchev, 2007; Ward et al., 2009). In a weak legal 
enforcement regime, even though compliance with audit committee rules is mandatory, 
public listed companies might consider the effectiveness and efficiency of their bundle 
of corporate governance practices in complying with the audit such rules. Briefly, the 
findings support the argument of Aguilera et al. (2008) that there is no one best way to 
achieve the effectiveness of corporate governance, and those governance arrangements 
are varied across companies and their environments.  
 
As corporate governance is considered as a bundle of practices and is affected by the 
organisational environment, the use of agency theory as the dominant theory in 
explaining the difference in corporate governance practice across companies is 
inadequate. The closed system of agency theory tends to focus solely on two actors (i.e., 
shareholders and managers), with little attention devoted to how agency problems may 
vary across diverse tasks and resource environments, the life cycle of organisations, or 
different institutional environments. Whilst agency theory continues to remain 
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applicable in certain jurisdictions, it merely presents a partial view of the world, 
ignoring the complexity of organisations. Therefore, by using multiple theories as 
complements to agency theory, this research demonstrated that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance is determined by a wider group of organisational-related actors. It 
also acknowledged the importance of exploring the interrelationships between various 
actors and the mechanisms that affect corporate governance systems in specific 
institutional settings. The complementary theories, such as the bundle of corporate 
governance theory and the institutional theory, were used as underlying theories to 
explain the determinants of the compliance of public listed companies with audit 
committee rules, and the association of compliance with financial reporting quality. The 
use of multiple theories extends the studies on corporate governance, particularly 
studies in Indonesia which have been dominated by agency theory.  
 
The study demonstrates that restatements, which were widely employed by prior studies 
in the US, might not be a valid proxy for financial reporting quality in Indonesia due to 
a different type of agency problem. This implies that selection of the proxy for financial 
reporting quality is critical. Financial reporting quality is an unobserved event and 
scholars employ various measures of quality depending on their research questions, as 
there is no measure of financial reporting quality that is superior for all decision models 
(Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). Thus, the validity of the proxy is one of the 
challenges in the selection of the proxy (DeFond, 2010).  
 
7.3.2 Implications for Policy Makers in Indonesia  
With respect to enhancing the audit committee, the research findings provide useful 
input for Indonesian regulators in three areas: (i) the efficacy of the mandatory approach 
of audit committee rules; (ii) the importance of the disclosure of foreign ownership and 
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the need to enhance enforcement of ultimate ownership disclosures; and (iii) the need to 
fine-tune the independence aspect of company directors and commissioners. These are 
elaborated next. 
 
7.3.2.1 Efficacy of the Mandatory Approach of Audit Committee Rules  
The research findings indicate that the effectiveness of the BAPEPAM-LK‟s mandatory, 
rules-based approach to the establishment and operation of audit committees is 
questionable. While this approach mimics that of the US and conforms to the 
international trend, study results cast doubt on its efficacy. The study demonstrates that 
the compliance of Indonesian public listed companies with audit committee rules varies 
among companies and is affected by Indonesia‟s unique institutional environment. In 
addition, the study found that company size matters: large and small companies have 
different characteristics that influence their compliance with audit committee rules. In 
fact, compliance with all audit committee requirements might be costly for smaller 
listed companies. A similar observation was made by US scholars (e.g., Holmstrom and 
Kaplan, 2003; Zhang, 2007; Smith, 2007) with respect to SOX (2002). This study‟s 
results imply that different public listed companies have different contextual factors that 
affect their compliance with audit committee rules, as well as the effectiveness of the 
audit committee itself. These findings support the view of Aguilera et al. (2008) that 
corporate governance practices are affected by organizational environments. Similarly, 
Globerman, Peng, and Shapiro (2011) argued that understanding the institutional 
framework in which organizations operate is important in achieving effective corporate 
governance reforms in Asia. As a result, this raises doubts as to the appropriateness of 
the mandatory approach as a solution for reforming audit committee rules in Indonesia.  
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In this respect, it is reasonable to suggest that the BAPEPAM-LK consider the 
introduction of a flexible approach in implementing audit committee rules. This 
suggestion is in line with that advocated by Aguilera et al. (2011), which urged policy 
makers to introduce flexibility in the corporate governance system, thus allowing 
companies to adopt governance practices aligned to their contingencies, but with clear 
enforcement mechanisms to guarantee desired outcomes. Similarly, Iskander and 
Chamlou (1999) argued that corporate governance reforms have proved most effective 
when they have focused on the fundamentals and when they have combined this 
approach with incentives for firms to take voluntary action. 
 
The flexible approach to compliance with audit committee rules may be considered by 
allowing public listed companies to comply with the requirements of the job duties of 
the audit committee that are deemed relevant by the companies. As noted in Table 6.1 in 
Chapter 6, examining financial information was the audit committee duty that achieved 
the highest level of compliance among committee duties. This shows that the 
standardization of audit committee job duties produces unsatisfactory results. It is thus 
arguable that the low level of compliance with other duties set forth in the audit 
committee rules may be because such duties may not meet the companies‟ needs. 
Therefore, the BAPEPAM-LK might consider allowing public listed companies to 
comply with selected audit committee rules that are the most appropriate to their 
organisational needs, with a more complete list of job duties in audit committee rules 
serving as a “best practice” guide. This approach will enable public listed companies to 
design efficient and effective job duties for their audit committees. On the other hand, 
membership and disclosure requirements should be mandatory for all public listed 
companies, as these two requirements are important elements of audit committee 
effectiveness (DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard and Gendron, 2010). In short, the flexible 
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approach is a mixed approach that combines both mandatory and voluntary 
requirements.  Mandatory requirements would consist of fundamental audit committee 
requirements (i.e., membership and disclosure), whereas voluntary requirements would 
include job duties that are selected by individual companies based on their unique needs. 
 
7.3.2.2. Foreign Institutional Investor and Ultimate Ownership Disclosures 
This study provides evidence that the genuineness of foreign institutional investors is an 
important element in considering the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Prior studies have not addressed this peculiar feature of the Indonesian business 
environment. The presence of this group of foreign investors obscures the application of 
the institutional theory, as shown in this study. The current study proves that this type of 
foreign institutional investor does not improve corporate governance practice; it is only 
when genuine institutional investors are taken into account that the utility of the 
institutional theory is supported. Therefore, it is recommended that the BAPEPAM-LK 
set a requirement for the disclosure of the ultimate shareholders of foreign institutional 
investors. The need for an ultimate ownership disclosure requirement is also advocated 
by the World Bank (2010). Furthermore, the Indonesian Tax Office (ITO) has had 
difficulties, to date, in preventing tax avoidance by Indonesians through the 
establishment of special purpose interests. Therefore, this study‟s method of identifying 
the ultimate ownership of foreign institutional investors might be adopted by the ITO. 
 
7.3.2.3. Independence of Company Directors and Commissioners  
The presence of politically connected independent commissioners reduces the 
company‟s adherence to audit committee rules, whereas the presence of independent 
commissioners with accounting education or who are CPA holders has a positive 
association with compliance. In effect, the lack of financial expertise amongst politically 
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connected independent commissioners has resulted in the low rate of corporate 
compliance with audit committee rules. However, considering Indonesia as an emerging 
economy, directors and commissioners play an important role in the provision of 
resources to the company (Young et al., 2001). Therefore, if a public listed company has 
only one independent commissioner, the BAPEPAM-LK needs to urge the company to 
appoint another person with financial expertise and the ability to develop wide 
relationships with external parties, as opposed to appointing someone solely on the basis 
of his/her political connections.  
 
7.3.3 Implications for Investors 
The research findings also provide useful insights for the investment community. 
Generally, investors are concerned with corporate governance practice when making 
their investment decisions. In assessing the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms of certain public listed companies, investors might consider the presence of 
family control, the type of foreign institutional investors that have already invested in 
the company, and the characteristics of company commissioners (i.e., the political 
connectedness and financial expertise of independent commissioners).  
 
Investors need to be more vigilant and do their homework in assessing the corporate 
governance practices of the investee/potential investee company. Clearly, company 
explications of their corporate governance practices in their annual reports cannot serve 
as the sole basis for assessing the quality of the company‟s corporate governance 
because what is written in the annual reports may not reflect actual practices. Investors 
need to confirm company information with other references, such as IDX 
announcements, announcements of public listed companies to the IDX and news in the 
media.  
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7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
As is common with all research studies, this research has a few limitations which are 
identified below. Future research may be able to extend this research and address its 
limitations.  
 
 
7.4.1 Unavailability of Data Prior to 2006 
Wooldridge (2009) argued that panel data is useful in evaluating the effect of certain 
policies by examining two periods: the period before and the period after 
implementation of the policy. However, in Research Stage 1 (the study on the 
determinants of compliance), the focus is on examining the immediate period of audit 
committee reforms because of the lack of complete data for the period before audit 
committee reforms were enacted (before 2006). 
 
 
7.4.2 Limited Data Sources to Trace Ultimate Controlling Shareholders   
Families in Indonesia might establish control over a firm through pyramid structures 
and cross-holdings among firms (Claessens et al., 2000). These types of ownership 
structures made it difficult to identify the ultimate shareholders of public listed 
companies. In addition, there was no regulation in Indonesia in the period of 
observation regarding the disclosure of ultimate controlling shareholders. As a result, 
the study simply relies on formal documents, such as annual reports and prospectuses, 
in tracing the ultimate controlling shareholders. This might provide unsatisfactory 
results. 
 
 
7.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This research sought to specifically examine the aspect of compliance with audit 
committee rules in the Indonesian corporate governance system. Future studies can 
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extend this research by exploring other elements within the context of emerging 
economies. Suggestions for future research are discussed next.   
 
 
7.5.1 Distinguishing Foreign Ownership Held by Financial Institutions and Non-
Financial Institutions 
 
Whilst this study examined the effect of large genuine foreign institutional investors, 
future studies may want to examine if ownership by different types of foreign 
institutional investors (e.g., financial institutions and non-financial institutions) has an 
effect on corporate governance. For example, these two types of foreign investors might 
have different investment philosophies and horizons (Douma, et al., 2006). They might 
also have different responses to corporate governance practices. Ananchotikul (2006) 
found that foreign financial institutional investors (not industrial joint ventures) had a 
significant effect on corporate governance improvement. In contrast, foreign corporate 
investors (joint venture firms) with large shares, have a negative and significant effect 
on corporate governance practice.  
 
7.5.2 Extending the Investigation of Politically Connected Independent 
Commissioners 
 
Given the utility of the resource dependence theory in this study, future research may 
consider examining the relationship between the presence of politically connected 
independent commissioners and firm performance. This study provides evidence that 
the presence of politically connected independent commissioners has a negative and 
significant association with compliance with audit committee rules. Whilst this suggests 
that this type of independent commissioner may not be appropriate to play a role in 
monitoring the company, the resource dependence theory shows that the presence of 
politically connected independent commissioners provides companies with benefits 
such as protection or special treatment, including access to outside capital, and 
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preserving monopolistic strategies (Husnan, 2001). It may be argued that such resources 
could possibly lead to better company performance.  
 
7.5.3 Extending the Study of Determinants of Compliance by Examining Sub 
Samples 
 
The study suggests that future studies make a comparative analysis of two sets of sub 
samples. One analysis might compare the level of compliance of state-owned 
enterprises and family-controlled companies with audit committee rules. In the current 
study, state-owned enterprises were excluded from the sample because they are subject 
to different audit committee regulations. In addition, state-owned enterprises are strictly 
monitored by the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises Indonesia, which serves as an 
additional corporate governance mechanism. As such, state-owned enterprises are 
assumed to have a high level of compliance with audit committee regulations. A second 
analysis in a future study might involve a comparison between public listed companies 
with high levels of compliance with audit committee regulations and public listed 
companies with low levels of compliance. The comparative analysis would include each 
component of the audit committee compliance index, as well as the effect of politically 
connected independent commissioners and their financial expertise. The analysis would 
provide further insight into understanding the determinants of compliance.  
 
7.5.4 Use of a Different Proxy for Financial Reporting Quality 
Future research may consider some other proxy for financial reporting quality that 
matches with agency problem type 2.  As discussed in Section 6.4, restatements might 
not be a valid proxy for financial reporting quality because the agency problem in 
Indonesia is different from that in developed countries. High concentrated corporate 
ownership in Indonesia leads to agency problems that occur between controlling 
shareholders (or families) and minority shareholders. In this situation, the controlling 
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shareholders have an incentive to engage in expropriation, which is defined as a process 
of using control rights or other controls to maximize private benefits by distributing 
wealth from other parties (Claessens et al., 2000). One method of expropriation is 
through related-party transactions (Munir and Gul, 2010). On the other hand, corporate 
governance mechanisms are supposed to constrain opportunistic behaviour. As such, a 
future study might examine whether audit committee effectiveness is associated with 
related-party transactions. 
 
7.5.5 Exploring the Consequences of Restatements 
The results of Research Stage 2 indicate that restatements might not be a good proxy for 
financial reporting quality because investors in Indonesia might not consider 
restatements as important enough to influence their decision making. However, no prior 
study has been conducted in Indonesia to examine this issue. Meanwhile, some scholars 
in the US have found that restatements are associated with serious consequences, such 
as market reaction (GAO, 2006), CFO voluntary turn over (Collins et al., 2009), audit 
committee compensation (Archambeault et al., 2008), auditor turn over (Hennes, Leone, 
and Miller, 2010) and litigation (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). Therefore, a future study 
might explore whether restatements in Indonesia cause serious consequences.  
 
7.5.6 Exploring the Qualitative Dimension 
This study employs a quantitative research approach in both stages. Some interesting 
findings in this study might benefit from further clarification using the qualitative 
approach. For example, this study uses archival data to reveal that family control affect 
the compliance public listed companies with the audit committee rules. In fact,  archival 
methods are not well suited for analysing processes (Carcello et al., 2011a). Hence, 
 297 
further studies using qualitative methods, such as field studies or interviews, might 
examine how family control influences the compliance.    
 
7.6   CONCLUSION 
This research investigated the determinants of the compliance of public listed 
companies with audit committee rules and their effect on financial reporting quality. 
The research found that family control, foreign institutional investors, and politically 
connected independent commissioners are associated with compliance, implying that 
the implementation of certain corporate governance mechanisms in Indonesia might be 
affected by other corporate governance mechanisms. Notwithstanding, the study 
supports the argument that the absence of strong legal enforcement results in informal 
institutions, such as relational ties, family connections and government contacts, playing 
an important role in shaping corporate governance in an emerging economy such as 
Indonesia. Valuable insights have been obtained that suggest that the adoption of the 
Anglo-American corporate governance model – a model predicated solely on agency 
theory without accommodating institutional differences and organisational factors 
evidenced in the Indonesian business environment and organisational practice – might 
impede further progress in Indonesian corporate governance reform efforts.  
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APPENDIX A: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Table A.1 Summary of the Prior Studies on Compliance with Audit Committee Regulation in Mandatory Regime 
 
Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or 
Significant Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Beasley and 
Salterio 
(2001) 
To examine the 
relationship of board 
characteristics and 
voluntary improvement of 
audit committee 
composition that is 
exceeded minimum 
mandated level.  
Board 
characteristics 
(outside director 
in the board, 
board size, CEO 
duality) 
Outside 
director in AC 
and AC 
experience. 
627 Canadian listed 
companies in 1994 
Multinomial 
ordered probit 
regression and 
multiple 
regression. 
Outside director in AC: 
outside director in the 
board (+), CEO duality 
(-). 
AC experience: outside 
director in the board (+), 
board size (+), CEO 
duality (-). 
 Sori  et al. 
(2001) 
(Malaysia) 
To examine the compliance 
level of listed companies 
with KLSE listing 
requirements on formation 
and structure of AC.  
- - 556 listed firms 
consist of 335 in 
main board and 
221in second board 
for period of 1991-
1998. 
Descriptive 
statistic 
 
Most companies comply 
with the requirements 
concerning AC 
formation, independence 
of member and 
chairperson, and low 
turn over. However, lack 
of activities report of AC 
is found. 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
 
Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Carcello et 
al. (2002) 
(US) 
(1) To examine the 
compliance of AC 
disclosure contained in 
AC charters and reports 
as mandated SEC final 
rule (1999). (2) To 
examine determinant 
factors of voluntary 
disclosure. 
AC meeting, AC 
independence, Big 
5, firm size, 
financial distress, 
exchange, industry 
AC voluntary 
disclosure 
150 
companies 
listed on the 
NYSE, 
AMEX, and 
NASDAQ 
(each 50) in 
2000. 
 Descriptive 
statistic 
 Logistic 
regression 
There is a high level of 
compliance with mandatory AC 
disclosures, but difference of 
content between charter and 
reports. Voluntary disclosures 
are   more common for 
depository institutions, larger 
companies, and companies with 
more independent ACs. 
Klein 
(2002b) 
(US) 
To examine economic 
determinants of AC 
independence as 
mandated by NYSE and 
NASDAQ listing 
requirements (1999). 
Board size and 
board 
independence, 
growth 
opportunities, 
consecutive losses, 
leverage, CEO on  
compensation 
committee, 
substitute 
monitoring 
mechanisms, and  
firm size.  
AC 
independence 
803 large US 
firms for 
period of 
1991-1993 
(before 
enactment of 
the 
requirement) 
Multiple 
regression 
Board size (+),   percentage of 
outsiders on the board (+), 
growth opportunities (-), losses 
(-), presence substitute 
monitoring mechanisms (-). In 
short, one size did not fit all in 
AC. 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
 
Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant Variables 
Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Rezaee et al.  
(2003) 
(US) 
To examine to what extent 
listed companies are in 
compliance with AC 
disclosure requirements as 
mandated by the SEC rule.   
- - 94 companies 
of  Fortune 
100 
companies in 
2002 
Descriptive 
statistic 
The majority of AC composition, 
structure, and meeting, and qualification 
are in compliance with requirement of 
SEC and the stock exchanges. 
Al-Mudhaki 
and Joshi 
(2004) 
(India) 
To examine the 
composition, focus and 
functions of AC, the effects 
of meetings and the criteria 
used in the selection of 
members by Indian listed 
companies. 
- - 73 Indian 
listed 
companies 
Descriptive 
statistic 
Even mandatory, only 56.2 percent 
companies establish AC. There is a lack 
of independent representation on the 
AC. The functions of ACs are still 
concentrated in the traditional area of 
accounting.  The main criteria used for 
membership of an AC are: experience 
and knowledge of business, experience 
of holding similar positions and 
accounting and finance expertise. 
Braiotta 
(2004) 
(US) 
To investigate whether the 
U.S. requirements for AC 
structure and composition 
provide incentives for non-
U.S. manufacturing firms 
to align their audit 
committee with U.S. 
requirements.  
- - 52 non-U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms in 1998 
Univariate 
test. 
ACs composition of the non-U.S. 
manufacturing firms is not closely 
aligned with the new requirements of 
the BRC for U.S. firms. Non-U.S. firms 
will need to exhibit greater alignment of 
their AC composition and AC 
qualifications with U.S. requirements. 
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Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant Variables 
Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Keinath and 
Walo   
(2004) 
(US) 
To observe AC oversight 
responsibilities through the 
annual report before the 
passage of SOX and new 
SEC rule. 
- - 98 domestic 
listed 
companies on 
NASDAQ 
100 as of 
August 2002 
Descriptive 
statistic 
 
The ACs are not fulfilling their 
oversight responsibilities for which they 
will soon be responsible. The ACs had 
to significantly expand their 
responsibilities to just cover practices 
required by SOX and NASDAQ. 
Utama and 
Leonardo 
(2004) 
(Indonesia) 
To provide empirical 
evidence of AC 
composition and AC 
effectiveness of listed 
companies in JSX. 
- - 33 listed 
companies in 
2003 
Descriptive 
statistic 
Majority of companies comply with JSX 
requirement about the minimum number 
of AC, their independence, and their 
expertise (finance or accounting 
background). However, ACs are not yet 
effective in their authority, resources, 
and efforts.   
Haron et 
al.(2005) 
(Malaysia) 
(1) To examine the extent 
of companies‟ compliance 
with KLSE listing 
requirement in relation to 
AC. (2) To examine 
differences of the 
compliance between 
distress companies and 
non-distress companies. 
- - 120 
companies in 
2002 
Descriptive 
statistic and 
univariate 
statistic. 
 
The level of compliance of listed 
companies with all AC listing 
requirements is satisfactory. There is no 
significant difference in the level 
compliance between financially 
distressed and non- financially 
distressed companies. 
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Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Pandit et 
al.(2005) 
(US) 
To examine whether any 
difference of content of  
AC disclosures  between   
period of before and after  
SEC rule (April 2003). 
- - 100 listed 
companies  on 
NYSE for the 
period of 
2003 and 
2004 
Descriptive 
statistic 
The mandatory disclosure mandated 
by SEC is satisfactory. However, there 
is a variation in the level of voluntary 
disclosures. 
Sori et al. 
(2005) 
(Malaysia) 
To examine the 
disclosure of AC report 
and the level of 
compliance with KLSE 
listing requirements 
(2001) regarding the AC 
requirements. 
- - 818 listed 
companies in 
2002 
 
Descriptive 
statistic 
The compliance is satisfactory; 
however, very few companies provide 
more than what is expected in the AC 
report by listing requirements. 
Companies in sector finance, 
technology, and infrastructure project 
companies as well as companies in the 
main board have greater initiatives to 
provide value added statements to 
users. 
Sori, 
Mohamad, 
and Saad 
(2007) 
(Malaysia) 
To examine the level of 
compliance of listed 
companies with newly 
amended KLSE listing 
requirements.   
- - 795 listed 
companies in 
2002 
 
Descriptive 
statistic 
 
  
High level of compliance in terms of 
composition, independence, and 
chairperson. However, Malaysian 
corporations are more likely to comply 
with the minimum requirements 
imposed by regulatory bodies rather 
than upkeep corporate governance.  
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Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Braiotta and 
Zhou (2006) 
(US) 
(1) To investigate the 
impact of the 
recommendations of 
the BRC on AC 
alignment. (2)  To 
investigate the impact 
of the SOX on AC 
alignment. 
AC size, director 
compensation, AC 
independence, AC 
meetings, AC financial 
expertise and 
governance expertise, 
earnings management. 
AC 
alignment 
129 listed 
companies in 
1999, 2000, 
and 2002. 
Logistic 
regression 
For the BRC period, firms with AC 
alignment have larger total assets, 
have higher leverage and are more 
likely listed in NASDAQ. For the 
SOX period, AC alignment is more 
likely to be associated with larger AC, 
higher directors‟ compensation, higher 
AC independence, and more AC 
meetings. Firms experiencing audit 
committee alignment in 2002 are 
associated with less earnings 
management. 
Carcello et 
al. 
(2006) 
(US) 
(1) To examine the 
extent of disclosures 
related to AC financial 
expert (ACFE) in the 
first year of the SOX  
take effect. (2) To 
examine determinant 
factors of  ACFE 
disclosures. 
- - 400 companies 
drawn from 
some stock 
exchanges in  
2003 
Descriptive 
statistic and 
logistic 
regression. 
Compliance with the SEC‟s financial 
expert disclosure rule is high, but 
transparency of the disclosure 
regarding the ACFE‟s background is 
limited. Most ACFEs does not have a 
background in accounting or finance. 
ACFE is positively associated with 
firm size, being in a litigious industry, 
and having an active AC. 
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Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Myers and 
Ziegenfuss 
(2006) 
(US) 
 
To determine whether 
ACs begin to accept 
more responsibility for 
corporate governance 
before such behaviour 
became mandatory (in 
the period of 
immediately preceding 
the Enron scandal). 
- - 296 different 
organizations 
from GAIN 
database 
Descriptive 
statistic 
ACs' responsiveness to each of eight 
effectiveness steps of BRC is 
surprisingly high.  
Pandit et al. 
(2006) 
(US) 
To examine AC reports 
of a sample of 
companies listed on the 
NYSE and to determine 
the extent to which 
these reports contain 
voluntary disclosures 
that would indicate 
compliance with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) and the rules 
imposed by the SEC 
and NYSE. 
- - 100 listed 
companies on 
NYSE in 2004 
Descriptive 
statistic 
The findings reveal a significant 
diversity in the form and content of 
AC report. The mandatory disclosures 
are also varied from minimum 
required compliance to more 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Smith 
(2006) 
(US) 
To measure the change in 
AC behaviour (and 
presumably 
effectiveness) subsequent 
to implementing the BRC 
recommendations.   
- - 200 firms listed 
on NASDAQ 
exchange 
listing for 
period of 1999-
2000 
Descriptive 
statistic 
AC frequency meetings 
increase after the BRC. It 
implies that the implementation 
of the BRC recommendations 
have improved AC 
effectiveness. 
Utama and 
Leonardo 
(2006) 
(Indonesia) 
To examine the impact of 
AC composition and the 
control of firm 
governance on AC 
effectiveness (ACE).  
AC composition, 
percentage shares 
owned by controlling, 
commissioner 
representing majority 
shareholders, directors 
representing majority 
shareholders, 
appointment chair of 
board and CEO by 
controlling 
shareholders, length of  
presence of AC. 
ACE 
(authority, 
resources 
and efforts) 
33 companies 
listed on JSX 
in  2003 
Multiple 
regression 
Significant results: AC 
composition (+), commissioner 
representing majority 
shareholders (-), appointment 
chair of the board and CEO 
being appointed by the majority 
shareholders (-), length of AC 
presence (+). 
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Author(s) and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
HassabElnaby 
et al. (2007) 
(US) 
(1) To investigate the 
trends in AC activities 
in the periods preceding 
and following the 
passage of SOX. (2) To 
examine whether ACs 
are effective in 
executing their assigned 
oversight 
responsibilities in the 
post-SOX era 
- - 681 firms listed 
on NYSE, 
AMEX, and 
NASDAQ in  
2004 
Descriptive 
statistic 
AC makes a substantial 
commitment to increase their 
assigned responsibilities over 
the period of 2001 to 2004. 
However, they need to do more 
to meet the many additional 
challenges facing them in a 
post-SOX environment. In 
general, the intent of SOX-for 
ACs to be more involved and 
active in the oversight role of 
an organization is becoming 
institutionalized. 
Raghunandan 
and Rama 
(2007) 
(US) 
To examine the 
determinants of audit 
committee meeting 
number.  
Firm size, firm growth, 
insider ownership, block 
holdings, leverage, loss,  
litigiousness, financing, 
AC size, AC expertise 
(accounting and non 
accounting), board size, 
CEO duality, board 
meeting, board 
independence. 
AC meeting 
number 
319 firms from 
the S&P 
SmallCap600 
in 2003  
Multiple 
regression 
Firm size (+), block holdings 
(+), litigious industries (+), 
board meeting (+), AC size (+), 
AC accounting expert (+). 
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Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant Variables 
Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Lin, Kang et 
al. (2009) 
(US) 
To examine whether or 
not the Blue Ribbon 
Committee 
recommendations in 1999 
and the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act requirements of 2002 
have a 
significant effect on the 
characteristics of the 
board of directors and the  
AC.  
- - 1400 firms for 
period of 
1996-2005 
Descriptive 
statistic 
Both BRC and SOX provide 
significant changes in many 
characteristics of AC and board 
director. However, the 
BRC‟s recommendations do not cause 
as many significant changes as the 
SOX requirements.  
Engel, 
Hayes, & 
Wang 
(2010) 
(US) 
To examine association 
of monitoring demand 
and AC compensation. 
Audit fee, post-
SOX, AC 
expertise, AC 
meeting number, 
ROA, leverage 
AC 
compensation 
3295 firm-
year 
observations 
of listed 
companies in 
US for period 
of 2000-2004 
Multiple 
regression 
Audit fee (+), post-SOX (+). 
Puri et al. 
(2010) 
(India) 
To examine the 
effectiveness of AC in 
the Indian corporate 
sector. 
- - 10 listed 
companies in 
India 
Descriptive 
statistic 
There is a high compliance of listed 
companies with audit committee 
requirements. AC plays effective 
corporate governance role. 
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Author(s) 
and Country 
Research Objectives Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant Variables 
Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Chatterjee 
(2011) 
(India) 
To examine the 
compliance of listed 
companies in India with 
audit committee 
requirements 
- - 50  listed 
companies in 
India 
Descriptive 
statistic 
Even though most companies have audit 
committee, their role is limited due to 
the lack of expertise and time. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Note: AC= audit committee 
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Table A.2 Summary of the Prior Studies on Compliance with Audit Committee Regulation in Non-Mandatory Regime 
 
Author(s) and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Pincus et al. 
(1989) 
(US) 
To examine the 
incentives for voluntary 
formation of AC in the 
US as recommended by 
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting (NCFFR). 
 
Agency costs of 
equity, agency costs 
of debt, board 
characteristics, 
auditor reputation, 
and participation in 
National Market 
System. 
Presence of 
AC 
84 listed 
companies on 
NASDAQ 
over-the 
counter 
companies in 
1986 
Logistic 
regression 
Percentage managerial 
ownership of the company's 
stock (-), leverage (+), firm size 
(+), proportion of outside 
directors to total directors (+), 
big eight auditors (+), and 
participation in the National 
Market System (+). 
Bradbury 
(1990) 
(New 
Zealand) 
To examine the 
incentives for voluntary 
formation of AC by using 
agency theory framework 
in New Zealand. 
Agency costs of 
equity, agency costs 
of debt, board 
characteristics, and 
auditor reputation. 
Presence of 
AC 
135 listed 
companies in 
1981 
Logistic 
regression 
Number of directors on the 
board and inter corporate 
ownership (+).  
Collier (1993) 
(UK) 
(1) To investigate 
whether audit committees 
were randomly 
distributed among major 
UK companies. (2) To 
identify possible reasons 
why some companies 
have formed ACS while 
others have not formed 
ACs.  
Agency costs of 
equity, agency costs 
of debt, economies 
of scale in 
monitoring costs, 
dominant CEO, 
auditor reputation. 
Presence of 
AC 
142 
companies in 
UK in 1991. 
Logistic 
regression 
Agency costs of equity (+), 
agency costs of debt (+), and 
director pressure to reduce 
information asymmetries (+). 
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Author(s) and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Menon and  
Williams 
(1994) 
(US) 
To examine factors 
associated with firms‟ 
reliance on ACs. 
Firm size, agency 
costs of equity, 
agency costs of 
debt, board 
characteristics, and 
auditor reputation. 
Reliance on 
AC (an index 
consist of 
meeting and 
composition)
.  
199 firms 
over the 
counter for 
period of 
1986-1987. 
Logistic 
regression 
Many of the firms do not appear 
to rely on ACs. Proportion 
outside director (+), big eight 
auditors (+).  
Goddard and 
Masters 
(2000). 
(US) 
To examine how the 
audit fee change with the 
existence of an audit 
committee and adherence 
to the Cadbury Code.  
Presence of AC, 
firm size, 
complexity of 
company, firm 
risk, auditor type, 
and ownership. 
Audit fee 233 listed 
companies in 
1994 and 223 
listed 
companies in 
1995.  
Multiple 
regression 
Size is the main determinant of 
the presence of an AC. There is 
no evidence that audit 
committees, whether adhering to 
the Cadbury Code or not, has 
any overall effect on audit fees.  
Al–Twaijry et 
al. (2002). 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
To examine the role of 
ACs in the Saudi Arabian 
corporate sector as 
recommended by 
Ministerial Resolve 903. 
- - Non random 
sample 33 
research 
interviews 
(academics, 
internal 
auditor, and 
external 
auditor) 
Qualitative 
method 
The requirements of AC as set 
out in Ministerial Resolve 903 
lack clarity regarding terms of 
reference and restriction on the 
scope of work, independence, 
and working relationship with 
internal and external auditor. AC 
is formed to comply with the 
rule by presenting favourable 
appearance instead of attempting 
to improve corporate 
governance.  
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Author(s) and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Carson (2002) 
(Australia) 
To examine factors 
associated with the 
presence of board sub-
committees, specifically 
audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees. 
Big 6 auditors, 
non-executive 
directors, non-
executive 
chairman, 
number of inter 
corporate 
relationships of 
the board and 
shareholder 
type, leverage, 
board size, and 
firm size. 
Presence of 
AC, 
remuneration 
committee, 
and 
nomination 
committee  
361 listed 
companies in 
Australia. 
Logistic 
regression 
For AC and remuneration 
committee: Big 6 auditors (+), 
and the number of inter 
corporate relationships of the 
directors of the board (+). For 
nomination committee: board 
size (+) and leverage (+).  
Joshi and 
Wakil  (2004) 
(Bahrain) 
To examine the extent to 
which listed companies 
in Bahrain have adopted 
and complied with the 
standard AC‟s practices 
as recommended by the 
BRC 
- - 30 listed 
companies on 
Bahrain stock 
exchange and 
7 audit firms 
Descriptive 
statistic 
 
Size, type of auditors and 
industry type influence the 
establishment of AC. Most of 
companies claim that they 
comply with large BRC‟s 
recommendations. However, 
audit firms negate that claim. 
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Author(s) 
and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Piot 
(2004). 
(France) 
To investigate the 
determinants of ACs 
formation in France. 
Agency costs of 
equity, agency costs 
of debt, investment 
opportunity set, 
board 
characteristics, firm 
size, auditor 
reputation, business 
complexity, 
institutional 
pressure. 
Presence of AC 285 listed 
companies in 
1997 
Logistics 
regression 
Insider ownership (-), quality 
financial reporting (-), whole 
corporate governance 
environment (-). Leverage (+) if 
company has high investment 
opportunity set, board size (+), 
firm size (+), auditor reputation 
(+), diversity company 
operation (+). 
Willekens 
et al. 
(2004) 
(Belgia)   
To investigate some factors 
that are associated with 
voluntary AC formation in 
a non-Anglo-Saxon 
environment where AC 
formation is voluntary, 
even for listed companies. 
Agency costs of 
equity, agency costs 
of debt, board 
characteristics, 
auditor reputation, 
firm size, industry 
effects. 
Presence of AC 70 listed 
companies in 
Belgian Stock 
Exchange 
matched with 
control 
companies for 
period of 2001-
2002 
Logistic 
regression 
Most Belgian-listed companies 
do not comply with the 
recommendations of the 
Brussels Stock Exchange 
regarding ACs.  Proportion of 
independent directors (+), 
external auditor reputation (+).    
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Author(s) 
and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Chau and 
Leung 
(2006) 
(Hong 
Kong) 
To investigate empirically 
the relationship between 
three major corporate 
governance attributes 
(family shareholding, non-
executive directors and 
independent chairman) and 
the existence of ACs. 
Family 
ownership, 
independent 
chairman, non-
executive 
directors. 
Presence of AC 397 listed 
companies 
at Hong 
Kong Stock 
Exchanges 
for in 2002 
Logistic 
regression 
Independent director (+).  At the 
medium level of family 
shareholding, the convergence-of-
interest effect is dominant and AC 
existence decreases. At a high 
level of family shareholding, the 
entrenchment effect is dominant 
and as a result, AC existence 
increases. 
Braiotta 
and Zhou 
(2008) 
(Europe) 
To examine determinants of 
AC alignment caused by 
European Directive 8
th
.   
AC size, AC 
independence, 
AC financial 
expertise, AC 
multiple 
directorship, 
board 
characteristics 
(i.e. 
independence 
and size), firm 
size, leverage. 
AC alignment European 
firms listed 
in US stock 
exchange 
consist of 
309 firm-
year 
observations 
for period of 
2002-2004. 
Logistic 
regression 
AC financial expertise (-), board 
size (-), board independence (-), 
AC multiple directorship (+). 
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Author(s) 
and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Rainsbury 
et al. 
(2008) 
(New 
Zealand) 
To  investigate demand and 
supply characteristics 
associated with firms that 
voluntarily established 
ACs meeting „best practice‟ 
membership guidelines in 
New Zealand.  
 
Demand factors: 
leverage, 
executive director 
shareholdings, 
block holders, big 
five auditors, 
growth 
opportunities. 
Supply factors: 
board size, 
independent 
board directors.   
Set of best practice 
membership 
guidelines 
recommended by 
New Zealand 
Securities 
Commission (i.e. 
all non-executive 
directors, a 
majority of 
independent 
directors, and  
financial expert 
member). 
56 companies 
which listed at 
NZX in 2001 
Logistic 
regression 
Supply factors: board size 
(+), board independence (+). 
Demand factors: no 
significant findings.  
Chen et al. 
(2009) 
(Australia) 
 
To examine the relationship 
between firm characteristics 
and incentives for the 
voluntary formation of ACs 
by non-top 500 firms listed 
on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX). 
Agency costs of 
debt, agency costs 
of equity, 
economies scale 
in monitoring 
costs, information 
asymmetry, 
dominant CEO, 
and auditor 
reputation. 
Presence of AC 224 non-top 
500 firms 
listed on the 
ASX in 2005 
Logistic 
regression 
Leverage (+), firm size (+), 
board size (+), the proportion 
of independent directors (+), 
independent board chair (+). 
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Author(s) 
and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Sharma et 
al. (2009) 
(New 
Zealand) 
To examine the determinants 
of the frequency of AC 
meeting in New Zealand. 
Agency costs of 
debt, board 
characteristics 
(size, 
independence, and 
shares ownership), 
AC characteristics 
(size, 
independence, 
expertise, and 
multiple 
directorships), 
ownership types, 
auditor reputation, 
and regulation. 
Frequency 
of AC 
meeting 
96 firm-year 
observations 
in the period 
of 2004-2005 
Multiple 
regression 
AC characteristics (chair is 
independent director, independent 
member, size, multiple 
directorship) (-), auditor reputation 
(-), management ownership (+), 
institution ownership (+). 
Baxter 
(2010) 
(Australia) 
To examine whether several 
indicators of AC quality are 
associated with a number of 
supply and demand factors. 
Supply factors: 
board 
characteristics. 
Demand factors: 
agency costs of 
debt, auditor 
reputation, and 
agency costs of 
equity.  
AC quality 
(independen
ce, 
expertise, 
size and 
activity) 
200 listed 
companies on 
ASX in 2001 
Multiple 
regression 
Many Australian listed companies 
are already complying with several 
of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council‟s recommendations 
relating to AC. Board 
characteristics (independence, 
expertise, activity and size) (+). 
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Author(s) 
and 
Country 
Research Objectives Main Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Research Method Main Findings or Significant 
Variables Sample Method of 
Analysis 
Greco 
(2011) 
(Italy) 
To examine the determinants 
of audit committee meeting 
frequency 
Ownership 
concentration, 
insider ownership, 
board size, CEO 
duality, board 
independence, firm 
size, leverage, age, 
ROA 
AC meeting 
frequency 
179 non 
financial 
listed 
companies on 
the Italian 
Stock 
Exchange in 
2007  
Multiple 
regression 
Insider ownership (-), proportion 
independent director (+), firm size 
(+). 
Source: Compiled by the author   
Note: AC= audit committee 
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Table A.3 Summary of the Prior Studies on Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality in Developed Countries 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Klein (2002a) 
(US) 
 
687 firms for the cross-sectional 
tests and 683 firms for the time-
series tests based on the Standard 
& Poor 500 as of March 31, 1992 
and 1993. 
AC independence AC independence (-)  
Anderson et al. 
(2003) 
(US) 
The sample consists of 1241 
firms in 2001 as covered by the 
Investor Responsibility Research 
Centre (IRRC).  
AC size, AC independence, 
AC meetings, interaction AC 
meeting and AC 
independence. 
AC size (-), AC independence (+), 
AC meeting (-). 
Xie et al. (2003) 
(US) 
 
282 firms based on the 500 
Standard and Poor‟s firms index 
in 1992, 1994, and1996. 
AC meeting, AC size, AC 
independence, AC corporate 
members, AC investment 
bank members, AC finance 
director members, AC bank 
director members, AC legal 
director members. 
AC corporate members (having 
outside corporate director position) 
(-), AC meeting (-). 
 
Bedard et al. 
(2004) 
(US) 
300 firms in 1996 representing 3 
groups of which 100 firms each: 
(1) the highest (+) (income-
increasing) accruals, (2) the 
highest (-) (income-decreasing) 
accruals, and (3) the control 
group, the group with the 
accruals closest to 0. 
AC financial expertise, AC 
multiple directorship, AC 
firm expertise, AC 
independence (50-99% 
independence, 100% 
independence, stock 
options), AC activity 
(mandate, meetings, 
members>2). 
AC financial expertise (-), AC 
multiple directorship (-), AC 100 
percent independence (-), AC stock 
options (+), AC mandate (statement 
contains a clear mandate stating AC 
responsibility of both financial 
statements and external audit) (-). 
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Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings 
management 
Davidson, 
Goodwin-
Stewart, Kent 
(2005) 
(Australia) 
434 firms listed on ASX in 
2000. 
Presence of AC, AC 
independence, AC meeting 
number, AC size. 
Presence of AC (-) 
 Peasnell et al. 
(2005) 
(UK) 
1271 firm-year observations of 
listed companies in UK for 
period of 1993-1996. 
Presence of AC, interaction of 
AC presence and pre-managed 
earnings. 
None 
 Yang and 
Krishnan (2005) 
(US) 
896 firms over 5 years, from 
1996 to 2000.                                                                                                            
AC independence, AC 
meeting, AC financial
expertise, AC stock 
ownership, AC multiple 
directorship, AC tenure, AC 
size. 
AC multiple directorship (-), AC 
stock ownership (+), AC tenure (-). 
 Gul et al. 
(2007) 
(US) 
1293 firm-year observations of 
listed companies in US for 
period of 2001-2002 
Presence of female director in 
AC 
Presence of female director  in AC(-) 
Earnings 
management 
and future firm 
performance 
Koh et al. 
(2007) 
(Australia) 
2259 firm-year observations 
listed on both the Connect 4 and 
Aspect Fin Analysis databases 
from 1998 to 2002. 
AC meeting, AC 
independence. 
 Abnormal accruals: AC meeting and 
AC member composition (-). 
 Future performance:  AC meeting 
and AC member composition (+). 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings 
management 
 
Piot and Janin 
(2007) 
(France) 
102 non-financial firms listed on 
the French Stock Market in the 
period of 1998-2002.  
Presence of  AC, AC 
independence 
Presence of  AC (-) 
Osma and 
Noguer (2007) 
(Spain) 
155 firm-year observations in the 
period of 1999–2001.  
AC independence (a majority 
of independent directors, a 
majority of institutional 
directors)  
None 
Qin (2007) 
(US) 
460 firms in the period of 
1998-2002 (prior to the 
implementation of SOX).   
AC expertise using two 
definitions of SEC initial and 
final rules (type I: the expert 
with previous positions such 
as public accountant, auditor, 
principal/CFO, controller, or 
principal/chief accounting 
officer; type II includes more 
eligible positions such as 
presidents/CEOs, 
professional financial 
analysts, investment bankers 
and venture capitalists), AC 
financial expertise.   
AC expertise as defined in type I 
(+), AC financial expertise (+). 
Braiotta and 
Zhou (2008) 
(US) 
European firms listed on US stock 
exchange consist of 309 firm-year 
observations for period of 2002-
2004. 
AC alignment AC alignment (-) 
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Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings management 
 
Baxter and Cotter 
(2009) 
(Australia) 
72 companies to test the 
presence of AC variable and   
309 companies to test the 
AC characteristics variables. 
Both samples were in 2001, 
in the period of before AC 
formation was made 
mandatory (in 2003) in 
Australia. 
Presence of AC, AC 
independence, AC expertise, 
AC meeting, and AC size. 
AC formation is significant (-), AC 
expertise (proportion of AC 
members with accounting 
expertise) (-). 
Earnings management 
and earnings 
informativeness  
Chang and Sun 
(2009) 
(US) 
 Earnings informativeness: 
96 cross-listed foreign 
firms in the period of pre-
SOX and 106 cross-listed 
foreign firms in the period 
of post-SOX.   
 Discretionary accruals: 89 
cross-listed foreign in the 
period of pre-SOX and 93 
cross-listed foreign firms 
in the period of post-SOX. 
AC independence, AC size, 
AC financial expertise.  
 Earnings informativeness in the 
post-SOX: AC independence (+).  
 Discretional accrual in the post-
AC: AC independence (-). 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study  
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings management and 
earnings informativeness 
Chang and Sun 
(2010) 
(US) 
 Earnings informativeness: 
1059 firms in the period of 
pre-SOX and 1098 firms 
in the period of post-SOX. 
 Discretional accruals: 
1006 firms in the period 
pre-SOX and 1052 firms 
in the period post-SOX. 
AC independence, AC 
financial expertise.  
 Earnings informativeness in the 
post-SOX: AC financial expert 
(+), AC independence (+). 
 Discretional accruals in the 
post-SOX: AC financial 
expertise (-). 
 
Earnings management 
 
Li et al. (2010) 
(US) 
6654 firm-year observations 
of listed companies in 2001 
(pre-SOX) and 2004 (post-
SOX). 
AC expertise, AC 
independence, and 
composite index consist of 
AC expertise and AC 
independence. 
AC independence (-) 
 Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) 
(US) 
770 firms in the post period 
of SOX (2004-2006) 
AC accounting expertise, 
AC finance expertise, AC 
supervisory expertise, AC 
independence, AC size, AC 
meeting number, AC shares 
ownership, AC tenure, and 
multiple directorships of AC 
member. 
AC accounting expertise (-), AC 
independence (-), AC tenure (-).             
Accounting experts who (a) are 
independent from the firm, (b) 
hold low levels of multiple 
directorships, and (c) have a lower 
tenure in their firms (-).   
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Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study  
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings management 
 
Kang, Kilgore, 
and Wright (2011) 
(Australia) 
288 low-and mid-cap firms 
listed on the ASX in 2006 
Presence of AC, AC independence, 
AC expertise, AC meeting number, 
AC size. 
AC independence (-), AC 
expertise (-), AC meeting 
number (-). 
 Marra, Mazzola, 
and Prenape 
(2011) 
(Italy) 
Pre-IFRS: 444 listed 
companies for period of 
2003-2004. 
Post-IFRS: 444 listed 
companies for period of 
2005-2006. 
Presence of AC, AC expertise, 
interaction of presence of AC with 
IFRS. 
Presence of AC (-), AC 
expertise (-), interaction of  
AC presence and IFRS (-). 
 
 
Sharma, Sharma, 
and 
Ananthanarayanan 
(2011) 
(New Zealand) 
224 firm-year observations 
of listed companies on New 
Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSX) for the period of 
2004-2005. 
AC best practice index (as 
moderating variable of the 
association between the 
economic importance of a client to 
the auditor and earnings 
management) 
AC best practice serve the 
moderating variable 
Sun et al. (2011) 
(Canada) 
525 firm-year observations  
for the period of  2003-2005 
Proportion female independent 
directors in AC 
None 
Thiruvadi and 
Huang (2011) 
(US) 
320 firms from the S&P 
Small Cap 600 in  2003 
Female director in AC Female director in AC (-) 
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Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Restatements  
 
Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) 
(US) 
A match pair of 159 restated 
earnings firms in 2000 and 
2001 and non-restated firms.  
AC independence, AC 
financial expertise. 
AC  financial expertise (-) 
 Baber et al. (2005) 
(US) 
185 restating firms in the 
period of 1997-2002 and 1487 
control firms. 
AC independence, AC 
financial expertise 
None 
 
 
Arthaud-Day et al. 
(2006)  
(US) 
A match pair of 116 firms 
filing a restatement from 
January 1, 1998, through 
December 31, 1999 and 116 
non-restated firms. 
AC turnover following the 
occurrence of restatements 
AC turnover (+) 
 Lin et al. (2006) 
(US) 
A match pair of 212 restated 
earnings firms in the first year 
of AC disclosures is made 
mandatory in the US (in 
2000) and 212 non- restated 
firms. 
AC independence, AC size, 
AC financial expertise, AC 
meeting, percentage of 
common stock shares held by 
the AC members. 
AC size (at least four 
members) (-) 
 Archambeault et 
al. (2008) 
(US) 
153 restating firms due to 
intentional or unintentional 
misstatements in the 
originally filed financial 
statements and 153 control 
firms in the period of 1999- 
2002. 
AC short-term stock option 
grant, AC long-term stock 
option grant, AC 
independence, AC expertise, 
AC meeting. 
AC short-term stock option 
grant (+), AC long-term stock 
option grant (+), AC 
independence (percentage of 
outside directors) (-). 
 
 362 
Table A.3 (continued) 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and Country 
of the Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Restatements Marciukaityte et al. 
(2009) 
(US) 
187 restated earnings firms 
over January 1997 to June 
2002, which comprise of 
130 voluntary restating 
firms and 57 forced 
restating firms. 
AC independence (log of the 
number of independent 
members, proportion of 
independent members),  AC 
meeting (at least four times), 
independent financial expert 
of AC. 
Determinants of restatements 
for full sample: proportion of 
independent members (+). 
Determinants of voluntary vs. 
forced restatements: log of the 
number of independent 
members (+), and proportion 
of independent members (+). 
 Romanus et al. (2008) 
(US) 
A match pair of 456 
restated earnings firms in 
the period of 1998-
2003and non-restated 
firms.  
 
AC size, AC independence, 
AC financial expertise, AC 
meeting.  
AC financial expertise (both 
continuous and dichotomous 
measurement of AC expertise) 
(-), AC meeting (-). 
Amoah and Tang 
(2010) 
(US) 
143 restating firms 
between January 1, 1997 
and June 30, 2002 of which 
41 firms announced 
restatements-induced class 
action (US).   
AC independence, AC 
meetings, AC accounting 
expert, AC financial expert, 
AC member‟s independence. 
None 
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Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Restatements Cohen et al. 
(2010) 
(US) 
606 public companies 
during 2005 of which 
136 companies 
announced restatements. 
AC industry expert (AC 
members who have experience 
with a company that is in the 
same two digit SIC code as the 
company where he serve as an 
AC member), percentage of 
AC financial expert, 
percentage of AC supervisory 
financial expert (member who 
has at least one of the 
following qualifications: CEO, 
chief operating officer, 
chairman of the board or a 
president of a company and is 
not an accounting financial 
expert), AC size, AC 
independence, the interaction 
between AC industry expert 
and auditor industry expert. 
AC industry expert (-), the combination 
between AC industry expertise and AC 
accounting or supervisory financial 
expertise (-), the interaction between 
AC industry expert and auditor 
industry expert (-).  
 
 Carcello Neal 
et al. (2011) 
(US) 
104 restating firms for 
period of 2000-2001 
AC independent, AC size, AC 
meeting, and AC financial 
expertise. 
AC independent (-), AC financial 
expertise (-), AC size (-). AC is 
effective when the CEO is not formally 
involved in selecting board members. 
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Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Restatements Cohen et al. 
(2011) 
18941 firms-year observation 
in period of 2001-2007 
AC industry expert, AC 
financial expert, AC 
supervisory financial expert, 
AC size, AC independence.  
AC industry expertise (-), interaction 
AC industry expertise and AC 
supervisory financial expert (-). 
Lisic et al. (2011) 1918 firms-year observation 
fro period of 2004-2005 
AC financial expert, AC 
size, AC number of meeting. 
Interaction AC financial expert and 
CEO power (+) 
Fraudulent financial 
statements 
 
Beasley (1996) 
(US) 
A matched pair of 75 frauds 
and 75 non-fraud firms in the 
period of 1980-1991. 
Presence of AC None 
 Dechow et al. 
(1996) 
(US) 
92 firms in US sanctioned by 
the SEC Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs) and 92 
non-sanctioned firms. 
Presence of AC Presence of AC (-) 
Abbott et al. 
(2000) 
(US) 
 
A matched pair of 78 firms 
sanctioned by the SEC 
AAERs for period of 1980-
1996 and 78 non-sanctioned 
firms. 
An index consists of AC 
meeting and AC 
independence. 
The combination of AC meeting (at 
least two per year) and independence 
(members are not insiders) (-). 
Beasley et al. 
(2000) 
(US) 
 
Fraud firms during 1987 to 
1997 in 3 industry sectors: 
25 financial service firms, 19 
technology companies, and 
22 health-care companies. 
Presence of AC, AC 
independence, AC meeting 
number.  
AC existence (AC formation) (-), AC 
independence (all members are 
outsiders), number of AC meetings  
(-). 
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Proxies for 
Financial Reporting 
Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of 
the Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Fraudulent financial 
statements 
 
Abbott et al. 
(2004) 
(US) 
A matched pair of 88 firms 
that restated financial 
statement in 1991 to 1999 
and 88 non-restated firms. 
AC independence, AC size, 
AC financial expertise, AC 
meeting.  
AC independence (all members are 
independent) (-), AC meeting (at least four 
meetings in a year) (-), AC expertise (at 
least 1 financial expertise) (-). 
 Farber (2005) 
(US) 
A matched pair of 87 firms 
sanctioned by the SEC 
AAERs in1997 and 87 non-
sanctioned firms. 
 
AC meeting number, AC size, 
AC expertise, AC 
independence. 
In a year prior to fraud detection, fraud 
firms have fewer AC independent members, 
AC meetings, and AC expertise.  In three 
years after fraud detection, fraud firms have 
similar AC independence member and 
exceed the control firms in the number of 
audit committee meetings. 
 Smaili and 
Labelle 
(2009) 
(Canada) 
107 firms identified as 
reporting issuers in default 
by the Canadian Securities 
Administrators and the 
Ontario Securities 
Commission is matched with 
107 other control firms. 
AC independence, AC 
financial literate, and 
composite index consist of AC 
independence and AC financial 
literate. 
AC financial literate (-), interaction between 
auditor and audit committee index (-). 
 Owens-
Jackson et al. 
(2009) 
(US) 
 
A matched pair of 50 frauds 
and 50 non-fraud firms in the 
period of 1994-2001. 
AC independence, AC 
expertise, AC meeting, AC 
governance experience 
(average number of boards of 
directors on which 
AC members have served), AC 
tenure. 
AC independence (the proportion of 
independent directors on the AC) (-), AC 
meeting (average number of AC meetings 
per year) (-). 
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Proxies for 
Financial Reporting 
Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Perceived financial 
reporting quality by 
the Association for 
Investment 
Management and 
Research 
(AIMR) of analysts 
Felo et al. (2003) 
(US) 
119 firms from the 1992-
1993 and 130 firms from the 
1995-1996 AIMR Review of 
Corporate Reporting 
Practices.  
AC independence, AC 
expertise, AC size. 
 Perceived score 1995-96: AC expertise 
(+)  
 Perceived score 1992-93: none 
Earnings 
informativeness and 
earnings 
transparency 
Bryan, Liu, and 
Tiras (2004) 
(US) 
 Earnings informativeness: 
1291 firm-year 
observations of companies 
listed on the 1996 Fortune 
500  for period of 1996-
2000 
 Earnings transparency:  
1295 firm-year 
observations of companies 
listed on the 1996 Fortune 
500 for period of 1996-
2000. 
AC independence, AC 
financial literate, AC 
meeting number, AC 
multiple directorships. 
 Earnings informativeness: AC 
independence (+), AC financial literate 
(+) 
 Earnings transparency: AC 
independence (+), AC meeting number 
(+).  
Level of interim 
financial disclosure 
(score of disclosure 
index) 
Mangena and 
Pike  (2005) 
(UK) 
Interim report of 262 UK 
listed companies 
Shareholding of AC 
members, AC expertise, AC 
size. 
AC expertise (at least one) (+), Percentage 
of shares owned by AC members (-).  
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Proxies for 
Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Poor earnings 
quality: small 
earnings increases 
and negative 
earnings avoidance 
Vafeas (2005) 
(US) 
252 firms between 1994 and 
2000 based on Fortune 500 
survey 
Percentage of AC insiders, 
percentage of  AC active 
business executives, 
percentage of members with 
other AC experience, AC 
size 
AC meeting, AC stock 
ownership, AC tenure, AC 
multiple directorships, AC 
multiple committee 
membership.  
Small earnings increase: percentage of AC 
insiders (+), percentage of active business 
executives (+), AC meetings (-), stock 
ownership of AC member (-), AC 
multiple directorships (-).  Negative 
earnings avoidance : AC stock ownership 
(-), AC tenure (+), AC size (-).   
Earnings 
informativeness 
Petra (2007) 
(US) 
765 firm-year observations 
of large firm based Forbes 
500 for period of 1996-1998. 
AC independence None. 
Qualified audit 
report 
 
Pucheta-Martinez 
and Fuentes (2007) 
(Spain) 
380 firm-year observations 
of listed companies in Spain 
for the period of 1999-2001. 
AC formation, AC size, 
percentage of AC 
independence member, the 
proportion of large 
shareholder representatives 
in AC. 
AC size (number of members) (+), AC 
independence (the proportion of 
independent members) (-) affected firms 
received qualifications for error and non-
compliance issues. 
Conservatism Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) 
(US) 
929 firms for period of 2000-
2002 
AC financial expertise, AC 
independence, AC size, AC 
meeting number 
AC financial expertise (+) 
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Proxies for 
Financial Reporting 
Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Account 
reclassification 
Flynn  (2009) 
(US) 
61 donors of non profit 
organizations (experiment) 
AC member personal ties to 
organization  
AC member personal ties (-) 
Companies subject 
to adverse rulings 
by the Financial 
Reporting Review 
Panel (FRRP) 
Song and 
Windram (2004) 
(UK) 
54 companies subjects to 
press notice of FRRP for 
period of 1991-2000 in UK . 
AC financial literate, AC 
meeting number, AC 
multiple directorships 
None 
Aggressive 
accounting choices 
(the total score of 
accounting choices 
that delay the 
recognition of 
expenses in 
comparison with 
other policies or 
estimates permitted 
within GAAP)  
Rainsbury et al. 
(2009) 
(New Zealand) 
87 New Zealand firms in 
2001 when no regulations or 
listing rules existed for ACs 
An index of AC best 
practice (comprises solely 
non-executive directors, the 
majorities are independent 
directors, and it includes an 
accounting expert)   
None 
Misappropriation of 
assets 
 
Mustafa and 
Youssef (2010) 
(US) 
 
A matched pair of 28 
companies experiencing 
misappropriation of assets 
from 1987 to 1998 in the US 
and 28 control companies in 
same size, industry, and time 
period. 
AC financial expertise, AC 
independence, AC 
independence members with 
financial expertise, AC 
independent members with 
non-financial expertise, AC 
tenure.  
AC financial expertise (-),AC 
independence (-),AC independence 
members with financial expertise (-), AC 
tenure (-). 
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Proxies for 
Financial Reporting 
Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Aggressive 
financial report 
decision (lease 
classification 
decision) 
Agoglia, 
Doupnik, and 
Tsakumis (2011) 
(US) 
Experiment with participants 
consists of 96 experienced 
financial statement preparers. 
The strength of AC When standard is precise, CFOs are less 
likely to report aggressively in the 
presence of a strong audit committee than 
a weak AC. AC has no effect when  the 
standard is less precise. 
Quality of analysts‟ 
forecast 
Liu and Zhuang 
(2011) 
(US) 
25667 firm-quarter 
observations of listed 
companies in US for period 
of 1998-2005 
Number of directors in AC 
divided by board size, AC 
independent, AC accounting 
expertise, AC meeting 
number. 
AC independence (+), AC accounting 
expertise (+), AC meeting number (+). 
AC has a moderating effect on the 
association between the issuance of 
management earnings forecasts and the 
quality of analysts‟ forecasts.  
 
Misstatement 
tolerance 
Norman, Rose, 
and Suh (2011) 
(US) 
76 Chief Audit Executives 
(CAEs) and deputy of CAEs 
(experiment) (US). 
AC financial expertise None 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Note: AC= audit committee 
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Table A.4 Summary of the Prior Studies on Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality in Developing Countries 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country of the 
Study 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings management Bradbury, Mak, 
and Tan (2006) 
(Singapore and 
Malaysia) 
271 listed companies in 
Singapore and 279 listed 
companies in Malaysia in 
2000 
AC independence AC independence   
 
 
Rahman and Ali 
(2006) 
(Malaysia) 
97 firms listed on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia 
over the period of 2002-2003 
AC independence,   AC 
meeting, AC financial 
expertise. 
None 
 Siallagan and 
Machfoedz (2006) 
(Indonesia) 
197 firm-year observations of  
listed companies on IDX for 
period of 2000-2004. 
Presence of AC The presence of AC (+) 
 Rachmawati and 
Triatmoko (2007) 
(Indonesia) 
181 firm-year observations of 
listed companies on IDX for 
period 2001-2005 
Presence of AC None 
 Chen et al. (2007) 
(Taiwan) 
2237 firm-year observations 
of  companies listed on 
Taiwan Stock Exchange for 
period of 2000-2003 
AC financial expertise AC financial expertise (-) 
 Fitriasari (2007) 
(Indonesia) 
93 firms listed on IDX in 
2004 
AC index, AC meeting, AC 
financial literacy. 
None 
 Jaggi and Leung 
(2007) 
(Hong Kong) 
 
523 companies listed on 
Hong Kong Stock Exchanges 
for period of 1999-2000 
Presence of AC Presence of AC (-) 
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Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings management 
 
Nasution and 
Setiawan (2007) 
(Indonesia) 
100 firm-year observations of 
banks listed on IDX for 
period of 2001-2005 
The presence of AC The presence of AC (-) 
 Saleh et al. (2007) 
(Malaysia) 
561 firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia in 2001 
AC meeting, AC size, AC 
accounting expertise, AC 
independence, interaction 
between AC expertise and 
AC meeting. 
AC independence (the 
presence of a fully 
independent AC) (-), 
interaction between AC 
expertise and AC meeting 
(the proportion of AC 
members with accounting 
knowledge multiply by 
frequency of AC meetings) 
 (-). 
 Siregar and Utama 
(2008) 
(Indonesia) 
 
144 listed companies on IDX 
for period of 1995-1996, and 
1999-2002 
Presence of AC  None 
 Al-Abbas (2009) 
(Saudi Arabia) 
78 joint stock companies 
listed on Saudi Stock 
Exchange for the period of 
2005-2007 
AC size, AC independence None 
Bukit and Iskandar 
(2009) 
(Malaysia) 
155 companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia in 2001 
AC independence, interaction 
AC independence and surplus 
free cash flow. 
AC independence (-), AC 
weakens the positive 
relationship between surplus 
free cash flow and earnings 
management. 
 372 
Table A.4 (continued) 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings management 
 
Lin, Hutchinson et 
al. (2009) 
(Hong Kong) 
208 firm-year observations 
of  listed companies on 
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange for period of 
2004-2008 
Presence of AC, AC financial 
expertise, AC meeting number, AC 
size, government officials on AC. 
AC independence (-), AC 
expertise (-), AC size (-), 
government official on AC 
(+). AC size is negatively and 
significantly associated with 
abnormal accruals only when 
there are government 
officials on the AC. 
Murhadi (2009) 
(Indonesia) 
384 firm-year observations 
of  listed companies on 
IDX for  period of 2005-
2007 
Presence of AC None 
Pamudji and 
Trihartati (2009) 
(Indonesia) 
168 firm-year observations 
of listed companies on  the 
IDX for period of 2005-
2007 
AC independence, AC financial 
expertise, AC meeting, AC multiple 
directorship. 
None 
Thoopsamut and 
Jaikengkit (2009) 
(Thailand) 
457 firm-year observations 
of listed companies on 
Thailand Stock Exchange 
for period of 2005-2006 
AC meeting number, AC tenure, AC 
financial expertise. 
AC tenure (-) 
Murhadi (2010) 
(Indonesia) 
384 firm-year observations 
of listed companies on the 
IDX for period of 2005-
2007 
Presence of AC None 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
 
Proxies for 
Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Earnings 
management 
 
Wardhani and 
Joseph (2010) 
(Indonesia) 
115 firm-year observations 
of  listed companies on the 
IDX for period of 2005-2008 
Age of AC chair, AC 
financial expertise, AC 
member experience as 
partner of public accounting 
firm, AC member education 
level, AC member 
experience as management.  
AC financial expertise (-), AC member 
experience as partner of public accounting 
firm (+). 
 Sahlan (2011) 
(Malaysia) 
276 firm-year observations 
of listed companies on the 
Bursa Malaysia for period of 
1994-2007 
AC independence AC independence (+) 
 Siagian and 
Tresnaningsih 
(2011) 
(Indonesia) 
80 listed companies on the 
JSX for the period of 1999-
2004 
AC independence AC independence (-) 
 Jao and Pagalung 
(2011) 
(Indonesia) 
112 firm-year observations 
of listed companies on IDX 
for period of 2006-2009 
AC meeting number AC meeting number (-) 
 Hermawan and 
Adinda (2012) 
(Indonesia) 
111 state-owned companies 
listed on IDX for the period 
of 2009-2010 
Presence of AC None 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
 
Proxies for 
Financial 
Reporting 
Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country 
Sample  
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Conservatism Susiana and 
Herawaty (2007) 
(Indonesia) 
280 firm-year observations 
of  listed companies on IDX 
for period of 2000-2003 
Presence of AC None 
Wardhani (2008) 
(Indonesia) 
235 firm-year observations of 
listed companies on IDX for 
period of 2003-2006 
Presence of AC The presence of AC (+) 
 Wulandari and 
Zulaikha (2012) 
(Indonesia) 
33 firm-year observations of 
listed companies for the 
period of 2008-2010 
AC meeting number; AC 
financial expertise 
AC meeting number (+); AC financial 
expertise (+) 
Restatements 
 
Veronica and 
Bachtiar (2005) 
Indonesia 
160 listed companies on IDX 
in the period of 2001-2002 
Presence of AC None 
 Abdullah et al. 
(2010) 
(Malaysia) 
31 restating firms during the 
period of 2002-2005 and 31 
matched control companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia  
AC independence (all AC 
members are independent) 
AC independence (+) 
Zhizhong et al. 
(2011) 
(China) 
880 restating firms during 
period of 2002-2006 and 
4347 matched control firms 
listed on Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Securities Markets. 
Presence of AC The effectiveness of AC depends on 
independence of the board 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country 
Sample  Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and Country 
Company received the 
financial report award 
(NACRA award) 
 
Ismail et al. (2008) 
(Malaysia) 
 
A matched pair of 54 
companies with good annual 
reports and with 54 
companies with poor annual 
reports in 2002 in Malaysia. 
AC financial literate, AC 
meeting, AC multiple 
directorships, AC 
independence, interaction 
between AC independence 
and external auditors. 
AC multiple directorships (+)  
Accuracy of unaudited 
year-end quarterly 
accounts 
Ibrahim et al. 
(2009) 
(Malaysia) 
261 listed companies on 
Bursa Malaysia in  2004 
AC financial expert ratio, AC 
multiple directorships, AC 
size, AC meeting number, 
AC independence. 
AC size (+), AC multiple 
directorships (+).  
Financial statement 
efficiency. 
Akarak and 
Ussahawanitchakit 
(2010) 
(Thailand) 
146 companies listed on Thai 
Stock Exchange 
AC effectiveness index 
comprise five dimensions:   
1) financial reporting 
preparation reliability, 2) 
internal audit effectiveness, 
3) business risk management 
efficiency, 4) regulation 
practices achievement and 5) 
independence auditing 
process. 
AC effectiveness index (+) 
Manipulation of transfer 
prices in related-party 
sales transactions 
Lo et al. (2010) 
(China) 
266 listed companies on 
Shanghai Stock exchange in 
2004 
Presence of AC, AC 
financial expertise 
AC financial expertise (-) 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
 
Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality 
Author(s) and 
Country 
Sample 
 
AC Related Variables 
 
AC Significant Variables 
Accounting irregularities Jaswadi, 
Billington, and 
Sofocleous (2012) 
(Indonesia) 
78 firm-year observations in 
the period of 2000-2009  
AC size, proportion of 
independent members of AC, 
AC leadership, AC financial 
expert , AC financial literacy, 
and interaction of AC with   
board of directors, board of 
commissioners, and auditor 
AC financial expert (-), 
interaction of AC and board of 
commissioners 
Profit quality Siahaan (2013) 
(Indonesia) 
181 firm-year observations in 
the period of 2006-2008  
Presence of AC None 
Fraud Dewi and Gudono 
(2013) 
(Indonesia) 
31 state-owned companies 
listed on IDX in the period of 
2007-2010  
AC member expertise, AC 
size , and AC effectiveness 
AC effectiveness (-) 
Timeliness of reporting Ika and Ghazali 
(2012) 
(Indonesia) 
211 firm-year observations of 
non-financial companies 
listed on IDX in 2008 
AC effectiveness AC effectiveness (-) 
Earning informativeness Hermawan (2009) 
(Indonesia) 
Listed companies on IDX AC effectiveness AC effectiveness (+) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Note: AC: audit committee 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF SAMPLE 
 
Table B.1 List of Sample of Research Stage 1  
 
No.      Code                  Company ACCIT Score 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  2006 2007 2008 
1 AALI Astra Agro Lestari Tbk 0.57 0.73 0.73 
2 UNSP Bakrie Sumatra Plantations Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.90 
3 CPRO Central Proteinaprima Tbk 0.00 0.80 0.80 
4 DSFI Dharma Samudera Fishing Ind. Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.63 
5 IIKP Inti Kapuas Arowana (Inti Indah 
Karya Plasindo) Tbk 
0.20 0.57 0.57 
6 LSIP PP London Sumatera Tbk 0.20 0.35 0.52 
Animal Feed and Husbandry     
7 CPDW Cipendawa Agroindustri Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
8 CPIN Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk 0.78 0.95 0.95 
9 JPFA JAPFA  Tbk 0.30 0.68 0.68 
10 MAIN Malindo Feedmil Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
11 MBAI Multibreeder Adirama Indonesia Tbk 0.35 0.68 0.68 
12 WAPO Wahana Phonix Mandiri Tbk 0.47 0.63 0.63 
Mining and Mining Services     
13 APEX Apexindo Pratama Duta Tbk 0.95 0.90 0.78 
14 ATPK ATPK Resources  Tbk 0.42 0.58 0.95 
15 BUMI Bumi Resources Tbk 0.95 0.95 0.95 
16 CTTH Citatah Industri Marmer Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
17 ENRG Energi Mega Persada Tbk 0.78 0.95 0.78 
18 INCO INCO Tbk 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Constructions     
19 PTRO Petrosea Tbk 0.78 0.95 0.95 
20 TOTL Total Bangun Persada Tbk 0.95 0.68 0.68 
21 TRUB Truba Manunggal Engineering Tbk 0.20 0.25 0.47 
Food and Beverages     
22 ADES Ades Waters Indonesia Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.15 
23 AQUA Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk 0.62 0.62 0.68 
24 CEKA Cahaya Kalbar Tbk 0.25 0.35 0.35 
25 DAVO Davomas Abadi Tbk 0.35 0.25 0.25 
26 DLTA Delta Djakarta Tbk 0.57 0.73 0.73 
27 FAST Fast Food Indonesia Tbk 0.25 0.25 0.25 
28 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 0.62 0.62 0.62 
29 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk 0.20 0.25 0.25 
30 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 0.62 0.78 0.73 
31 PTSP Pioneerindo Gourmet Int. Tbk 0.42 0.42 0.42 
32 PSDN Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk 0.35 0.68 0.68 
33 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk 0.25 0.52 0.52 
34 SIPD Sierad Produce Tbk 0.83 0.67 1.00 
35 SMAR SMART  Tbk 0.63 0.85 0.85 
36 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera  Food Tbk 0.40 0.40 0.52 
37 TBLA Tunas Baru Lampung Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.30 
38 ULTJ Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk 0.25 0.30 0.47 
Tobacco Manufacturers    
39 BATI BAT Indonesia Tbk 0.62 0.62 0.62 
40 GGRM Gudang Garam Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.52 
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No.      Code                  Company ACCIT Score 
Tobacco Manufacturers 2006 2007 2008 
41 HMSP HM  Sampoerna Tbk 0.57 0.73 0.78 
42 RMBA Bentoel International Investama Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.68 
Textile Mill Products    
43 ARGO Argo Pantes Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.90 
44 CNTX Century Textile Industry  Tbk 0.68 0.85 0.85 
45 ERTX Eratex Djaja Limited Tbk 0.57 0.57 0.62 
46 HDTX Panasia Indosyntec Tbk 0.37 0.37 0.37 
47 PAFI Panasia Filament Inti Tbk 0.37 0.37 0.37 
48 RDTX Roda Vivatex Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.52 
49 SSTM Sunson Textile Manufacture Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
50 TFCO TIFICO Tbk 0.37 0.90 0.90 
Apparel and Other Textile Products     
51 MYTX APAC Citra Centertex  Tbk 0.25 0.20 0.20 
52 ESTI Ever Shine Textile Industry Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.85 
53 FMII Fortune Mate Indonesia Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.78 
54 MYRX Hanson International Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.30 
55 SRSN Indo Acidatama Tbk  0.80 0.85 0.85 
56 INDR Indorama Syntetics Tbk 0.80 0.80 0.75 
57 KARW Karwell Indonesia Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
58 PBRX Pan Brothers Tbk 0.68 0.73 0.73 
59 BIMA Primarindo Asia Infrastr  Tbk 0.10 0.10 0.10 
60 BATA Sepatu Bata Tbk 1.00 0.95 0.95 
Lumber and Wood Products     
61 BRPT Barito Pacific Timber Tbk 0.37 0.35 0.35 
62 SULI Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Tbk 0.62 0.78 0.78 
63 TIRT Tirta Mahakam Resources Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Paper and Allied Products     
64 FASW Fajar Surya Wisesa Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
65 INKP Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
66 TKIM Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
67 SPMA Suparma Tbk 0.85 0.85 0.85 
68 SAIP Surabaya Agung Indonesia  Pulp Tbk 0.47 0.63 0.63 
Chemical and Allied Products     
69 AKRA AKR Corporation Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.83 
70 BUDI Budi Acid Jaya Tbk 0.30 0.63 0.80 
71 CLPI Colorpak Indonesia Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
72 ETWA Eterindo Wahanatama Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.52 
73 LTLS Lautan Luas Tbk 0.68 0.63 0.78 
74 POLY Polysindo Eka Perkasa Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
75 SOBI Sorini Corporation Tbk 0.57 0.57 0.68 
76 UNIC Unggul Indah Cahaya Tbk 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Adhesive     
77 DPNS Duta Pertiwi Nusantara Tbk 0.52 0.68 0.68 
78 EKAD Ekadharma International Tbk 0.42 0.68 0.68 
79 KKGI Resource Alam Indonesia Tbk  0.37 0.42 0.47 
 
 
 
 379 
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No.      Code                  Company ACCIT Score 
Plastics and Glass Products  2006 2007 2008 
80 AKPI Argha Karya Prima Industry Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
81 AMFG Asahimas Flat Glass Tbk 0.73 0.90 0.90 
82 APLI Asiaplast Industries Tbk 0.85 0.80 0.80 
Plastics and Glass Products    
83 BRNA Berlina Tbk 0.00 0.45 0.45 
84 DYNA Dynaplast Tbk 0.52 0.80 0.80 
85 FPNI Fatrapolindo Nusa Industri Tbk 0.42 0.58 0.95 
86 IGAR Kageo Igar Jaya Tbk   0.37 0.37 0.37 
87 LMPI Langgeng Makmur Industry Tbk 0.20 1.00 1.00 
88 LAPD Lapindo International Tbk 0.25 0.25 0.25 
89 SIMA Siwani Makmur Tbk 0.57 0.57 0.57 
90 TRST Trias Sentosa Tbk 0.58 0.58 0.68 
Cement    
91 SMCB Holcim Indonesia Tbk 0.73 0.78 0.78 
92 INTP Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Tbk 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Metal and Allied Products    
93 BTON Betonjaya Manunggal Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.85 
94 CTBN Citra Tubindo Tbk 0.85 0.80 0.80 
95 JPRS Jaya Pari Steel  Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.85 
96 LION Lion Metal Works Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
97 LMSH Lion Mesh Prima Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.30 
98 PICO Pelangi Indah Canindo Tbk 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Metal and Allied Products    
99 TBMS Tembaga Mulia Semanan Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.47 
100 TIRA Tira Austenite Tbk 0.85 0.85 0.90 
Fabricated Metal  Products     
101 KICI Kedaung Indah Canindo Tbk 0.20 0.68 0.68 
102 KDSI Kedawung Setia Industrial  Tbk 0.52 0.78 0.73 
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products     
103 ARNA Arwana Citramulia Tbk 0.95 0.90 0.95 
104 IKAI Intikeramik Alamasri Industri Tbk 0.52 0.85 0.90 
105 MLIA Mulia Industrindo Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.63 
106 TOTO Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk 0.20 0.52 0.63 
Cables     
107 KBLI GT Kabel Indonesia Tbk 0.47 0.73 0.73 
108 JECC Jembo Cable Company Tbk 0.68 0.73 0.73 
109 KBLM Kabelindo Murni Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.52 
110 IKBI Sumi Indo Kabel Tbk 0.95 0.95 0.95 
111 VOKS Voksel Electric Tbk 0.47 0.90 0.95 
Electronic and Office Equipment     
112 ASGR Astra Graphia Tbk 0.95 0.95 0.95 
113 MTDL Metrodata Electronics Tbk 0.75 0.75 0.85 
114 MLPL Multipolar Corporation Tbk 0.73 0.73 0.68 
Automotive and Allied Products     
115 ASII Astra International Tbk 0.57 0.57 0.73 
116 AUTO Astra Otoparts Tbk 0.63 0.73 0.78 
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No.      Code                  Company ACCIT Score 
Automotive and Allied Products  2006 2007 2008 
117 BRAM Branta Mulia Tbk 0.68 0.90 0.90 
118 GJTL Gajah Tunggal Tbk 0.37 0.37 0.37 
119 GDYR Goodyear Indonesia Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
120 HEXA Hexindo Adiperkasa Tbk 0.85 0.78 0.95 
121 IMAS Indomobil Sukses Int. Tbk 0.47 0.78 0.78 
122 INTA Intraco Penta Tbk 0.47 0.57 0.90 
123 LPIN Multi Prima Sejahtera Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
124 MASA Multistrada Arah Sarana Tbk 0.73 0.73 0.73 
125 NIPS Nipress Tbk 0.57 0.57 0.57 
126 ADMG Polychem Indonesia  Tbk 0.68 0.63 0.63 
127 PRAS Prima Alloy Steel Tbk 0.52 0.85 0.68 
128 SQMI Allbound makmur Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
129 SMSM Selamat Sempurna Tbk 0.80 0.80 0.80 
130 SUGI Sugi Samapersada Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
131 TURI Tunas Ridean Tbk 0.85 0.90 0.90 
132 UNTR United Tractors Tbk 0.95 0.78 0.78 
Photographic Equipment    
133 INTD Inter Delta Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
134 MDRN Modern Photo Film Company  Tbk 0.40 0.78 0.78 
135 KONI Perdana Bangun Pusaka Tbk 0.57 0.73 0.73 
Pharmaceuticals     
136 DVLA Darya-Varia Laboratoria Tbk 0.10 0.10 0.10 
137 KLBF Kalbe Farma Tbk 0.47 0.63 0.63 
138 MERK Merck  Tbk 0.20 0.68 0.63 
139 PYFA Pyridam Farma Tbk 0.47 0.52 0.52 
140 SCPI Schering Plough Indonesia Tbk 0.00 0.00 0.20 
Consumer Goods     
141 TCID Mandom  Indonesia Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
142 MRAT Mustika Ratu Tbk 0.83 0.83 0.78 
143 UNVR Unilever Indonesia Tbk 0.52 0.90 0.73 
Transportation Services    
144 APOL Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line Tbk 0.58 0.42 0.42 
145 CMPP Centris Multi Persada Pratama Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.68 
146 HITS Humpuss Intermoda Transp. Tbk 0.42 0.42 0.52 
147 IATA Indonesia Air Transport Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.35 
148 MIRA Mitra Rajasa Tbk 0.40 0.40 0.57 
149 TMAS Pelayaran Tempuran Emas Tbk 0.80 0.80 0.80 
150 RIGS Rig Tenders Tbk 0.80 0.80 0.85 
151 SMDR Samudera Indonesia  Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.30 
152 SAFE Steady Safe Tbk 0.00 0.45 0.78 
153 ZBRA Zebra Nusantara Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.52 
Telecommunication     
154 BTEL Bakrie Telecom Tbk. 0.78 0.78 0.83 
155 EXCL Excelcomindo Pratama  Tbk 0.95 0.95 0.95 
156 IATG Infoasia Teknologi Global Tbk 0.25 0.30 0.30 
157 FREN Mobile-8 Telecom Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.80 
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No.      Code                  Company ACCIT Score 
Whole Sale and Retail Trade  2006 2007 2008 
158 ALFA Alfa Retailindo Tbk 0.30 0.20 0.42 
159 TMPI AGIS Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.47 
160 AIMS Akbar Indo Makmur Stimec Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
161 EPMT Enseval Putra Megatrading Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.63 
162 FISH FKS Multi Agro Tbk  0.57 0.73 0.73 
163 HERO Hero Supermarket Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.62 
164 MPPA Matahari Putra Prima Tbk 0.68 0.90 0.78 
165 SDPC Millenium Pharmacon Int. Tbk 0.68 0.85 0.68 
166 MAPI Mitra Adiperkasa Tbk 0.52 0.68 0.68 
167 MICE Multi Indocitra Tbk 0.40 0.57 0.57 
168 META Nusantara Infrastructure Tbk  0.20 0.20 0.20 
169 RALS Ramayana Lestari Sentosa Tbk 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Whole Sale and Retail Trade 2006 2007 2008 
170 RIMO Rimo Catur Lestari Tbk 0.20 0.57 0.57 
171 TGKA Tigaraksa Satria Tbk 0.95 0.95 0.95 
172 TKGA Toko Gunung Agung Tbk 0.37 0.47 0.37 
173 WICO Wicaksana Overseas Int. Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Credit Agencies Other than Bank     
174 ADMF Adira Dinamika Multi  Finance Tbk 0.90 0.90 0.90 
175 BFIN BFI Finance Indonesia Tbk 0.68 0.85 0.85 
176 BBLD Buana Finance Tbk 0.90 0.90 0.90 
177 MTFN Global Financindo Tbk 0.80 0.80 0.73 
178 CFIN Clipan Finance Indonesia Tbk 0.00 0.68 0.68 
179 DEFI Danasupra Erapacific Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.52 
180 GSMF Equity Development Investment Tbk 0.15 0.68 0.68 
181 INCF Indo Citra Finance Tbk 0.42 0.42 0.42 
182 MFIN Mandala Multifinance Tbk 0.35 0.35 0.35 
183 MITI Mitra Investindo Tbk  0.30 0.30 0.30 
184 LPPF Pacific Utama  Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
185 SMMA Sinar Mas Multiartha Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
186 TRUS Trust Finance Indonesia Tbk 0.20 0.47 0.47 
187 WOMF Wahana Ottomitra Multiartha Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Securities     
188 ARTA Arthavest Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
189 AKSI Asia Kapitalindo Securities Tbk 0.25 0.25 0.40 
190 BCAP Bhakti Capital Indonesia Tbk 0.57 0.52 0.47 
191 BHIT Bhakti Investama Tbk 0.52 0.67 0.67 
192 HADE Hortus Danavest Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
193 KREN Kresna Graha Securindo Tbk 0.57 0.63 0.63 
194 LPPS Lippo Securities Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
195 UNIT United Capital Indonesia Tbk 0.15 0.15 0.25 
196 APIC Artha Pacifik Internasional Tbk 0.37 0.47 0.37 
197 PEGE Panca Global Securities Tbk 0.78 0.95 0.95 
198 PANS Panin Sekuritas Tbk 0.62 0.62 0.62 
199 RELI Reliance Securities Tbk 0.25 0.25 0.20 
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No Code Company ACCIT Score 
Securities  2006 2007 2008 
200 TRIM Trimegah Securities Tbk 0.73 0.73 0.78 
201 YULE Yulie Sekurindo Tbk 0.67 0.67 0.83 
Insurance     
202 ABDA Asuransi Bina Dana Arta Tbk 0.42 0.47 0.15 
203 ASBI Asuransi Bintang Tbk 0.75 0.75 0.75 
204 ASDM Asuransi Dayin MitraTbk 0.68 0.85 0.68 
205 AHAP Asuransi Harta Aman Pratama Tbk 0.35 0.68 0.85 
206 ASJT Asuransi Jasa Tania Tbk 0.15 0.15 0.15 
207 AMAG Asuransi Muti Artha Guna Tbk 0.47 0.52 0.57 
208 ASRM Asuransi Ramayana Tbk 0.40 0.40 0.45 
209 LPGI Asuransi Ramayana Tbk 0.63 0.80 0.68 
210 MREI Maskapai Reasuransi Indonesia Tbk 0.52 0.67 1.00 
211 PNIN Panin Insurance Tbk 0.47 0.63 0.63 
212 PNLF Panin Life Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.42 
213 POOL Pool Advista Indonesia Tbk 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Real Estate and Property     
214 ELTY Bakrieland Development Tbk 0.95 1.00 1.00 
215 BIPP Bhuwanatala Indah Permai Tbk 0.68 0.90 0.90 
Real Estate and Property 2006 2007 2008 
216 BMSR Bintang Mitra Semestaraya Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.30 
217 CKRA Ciptojaya Kontrindoreksa Tbk 0.20 0.25 0.63 
218 CTRA Ciputra Development Tbk 0.40 0.62 0.47 
219 CTRS Ciputra Surya Tbk 0.47 0.52 0.47 
220 KARK Karka Yasa Profilia Tbk 0.00 0.20 0.20 
221 DILD Dharmala Intiland Tbk 0.68 0.68 0.68 
222 DART Duta Anggada Realty Tbk 0.20 0.90 0.90 
223 DUTI Duta Pertiwi Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.68 
224 OMRE Indonesia Prima Property Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.85 
225 JIHD Jakarta International Hotels & 
Development  Tbk 
0.63 0.63 0.68 
226 JRPT Jaya Real Property Tbk 0.35 0.35 0.40 
227 JSPT Jakarta Setiabudi International Tbk 0.63 0.68 0.68 
228 KIJA Kawasan Industri Jababeka Tbk 0.57 0.57 0.57 
229 KPIG Kridaperdana Indahgraha Tbk 0.42 0.57 0.57 
230 LAMI Lamicitra Nusantara Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.30 
231 LPCK Lippo Cikarang Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.63 
232 LPKR Lippo Karawaci Tbk 0.85 0.63 0.63 
233 MAMI Mas Murni Indonesia Tbk 0.68 0.85 0.68 
234 MDLN Modernland Realty Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.52 
235 MTSM Metro Supermarket Realty Tbk 0.25 0.25 0.25 
236 PTRA New Century Development Tbk 0.30 0.57 0.57 
237 PWON Pakuwon Jati Tbk 0.62 0.85 0.68 
238 PWSI Panca Wiratama Sakti Tbk 0.47 0.30 0.47 
239 PNSE Pudjiadi & Sons Estate Tbk 0.30 0.52 0.52 
240 PUDP Pudjiadi Prestige Limited Tbk 0.42 0.42 0.42 
241 RBMS Ristia Bintang Mahkotasejati Tbk 0.42 0.42 0.47 
242 RODA Roda Panggon Harapan Tbk 0.20 0.20 0.20 
243 BKSL Sentul City (d/h Bukit Sentul Tbk) 0.42 0.58 0.53 
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Table B.1 (continued) 
 
No.      Code                  Company ACCIT Score 
244 SMRA Summarecon Agung Tbk 0.68 0.85 0.85 
245 SSIA Surya Semesta Internusa Tbk 0.80 0.80 0.80 
246 SIIP Suryainti Permata Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.47 
247 SMDM Suryamas Dutamakmur Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.85 
Hotel and Travel Services     
248 ANTA Anta Express Tour & Travel Tbk 0.63 0.68 0.90 
249 BAYU Bayu Buana Tbk 0.52 0.52 0.52 
250 SHID Hotel Sahid Jaya International Tbk 0.42 0.63 0.63 
251 PANR Panorama Sentrawisata Tbk 0.20 0.57 0.62 
252 PLIN Plaza Indonesia Realty Tbk 0.78 0.95 0.95 
253 SONA Sona Topas Tourism Industry Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Holding and Other Investment Companies  2006 2007 2008 
254 ALKA Alakasa Industrindo Tbk 0.73 0.73 0.73 
255 BMTR Bimantara Citra Tbk 0.57 0.52 0.57 
256 BNBR Bakrie & Brothers Tbk 0.57 0.73 0.90 
257 PLAS Palm Asia Corpora Tbk 0.30 0.30 0.25 
Others     
258 ABBA Abdi Bangsa Tbk 0.45 0.45 0.45 
259 ARTI Arona Binasejati Tbk 0.25 0.25 0.42 
260 ASIA Asiana Grain International  Tbk 0.25 0.20 0.00 
261 CENT Centrin Online Tbk 0.63 0.68 0.68 
262 CITA Cipta Panelutama Tbk 0.25 0.25 0.25 
263 CMNP Citra Marga Nusaphala PersadaTbk 0.73 0.73 0.73 
264 DNET Dyviacom Intrabumi Tbk 0.15 0.15 0.15 
265 FORU Fortune Indonesia Tbk 0.20 0.57 0.52 
266 GEMA Gema Grahasarana Tbk 0.00 0.80 0.68 
267 IDKM Indosiar Karya Media Tbk 0.90 0.90 0.90 
268 INDX Indoexchange  Tbk 0.37 0.47 0.63 
269 ITTG Integrasi Teknologi Tbk 0.57 0.42 0.42 
270 JTPE Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.63 
271 LMAS Limas  Centric Indonesia Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.52 
272 LPLI Lippo E-Net Tbk 0.63 0.63 0.63 
273 RAJA Rukun Raharja Tbk 0.47 0.47 0.47 
 
Note: ACCIT = audit committee compliance index total. 
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Table B.2 Detail Sample for Period 2006-2012 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  Total 
 I A I A I A I A I A I A I A   
Restating companies  17 23 14 24 13 20 37 59 74 66 83 65 89 74  658 
Less                 
 Annual report revisions - (5) - (7) - (2) - (16) - (16) - (21) - (10)  (77) 
 Bank - (3) (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (3) (7) (5) (10) (6) (8) (10)  (60) 
 State –owned enterprise - (1) - - - (1) - (1) (3) (3) (2) (3) (1) (4)  (19) 
 Multiple restatements (1) - - (1) (1) - (4) - (3) - (3) (1) (6) (1)  (21) 
 Unspecified - - (2) - (2) - (5) (12) (11) (8) (7) (4) (7) (7)  (65) 
 Non GAO  reasons                 
 Accounting policy change - - - - - - - - - (2) (2) (1) - (2)  (7) 
 Interrelated transaction - - - (3) - (1) - (5) - (2) (1) - - -  (12) 
 Revision or additional 
disclosure in notes of 
financial statements 
(1) (1) - (1) (1) - (6) (2) (3) - (2) (2) (5) (3)  (27) 
 Wording correction  (6) (7) (3) (4) (3) (2) (2) (8) (13) (7) (5) (5) (12) (9)  (86) 
 Mathematical correction - - - (1) - - - - - - - (1) - -  (2) 
 Problem in sending files (2) - - - (1) (2) (8) (3) (22) (13) (27) (9) (18) (19)  (124) 
Sub total 7 6 8 5 4 9 11 9 12 10 24 12 32 9   
 Interim                  98  
 Annual                60    
Total                158 
Note: I=interim financial statements; A=annual financial statements 
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Table B.3 List of Sample of Research Stage 2 (Annual Financial Statements 
Restatement) 
 
No  Restatement Company  Control Company 
 2006    
1 ELTY Bakrieland Development 
Tbk 
SMRA Summarecon Agung Tbk 
2 EXCL Excelcomindo 
Pratama  Tbk 
FREN Mobile-8 Telecom Tbk 
3 GJTL Gajah Tunggal Tbk INDR Indorama Syntetics Tbk 
4 TMPI AGIS Tbk ASGR Astra Graphia Tbk 
5 TRUB Truba Manunggal 
Engineering Tbk 
KIJA Kawasan Industri Jababeka 
Tbk 
6 SUGI  Sugi Samapersada Tbk 
Tbk 
KONI Perdana Bangun Pusaka Tbk 
     
 2007    
7 AIMS Akbar Indo Makmur 
Stimec Tbk 
INTD Inter Delta Tbk 
8 BMTR Bimantara Citra Tbk BNBR Bakrie & Brothers Tbk 
9 HADE Hortus Danavest Tbk PNIN Panin Insurance Tbk 
10 SIMA Siwani Makmur Tbk LMSH Lion Mesh Prima Tbk 
11 SONA Sona Topas Tourism 
Industry Tbk 
PANR Panorama Sentrawisata Tbk 
     
 2008    
12 BNBR Bakrie & Brothers Tbk UNTR United Tractors Tbk 
13 IGAR Kageo Igar Jaya Tbk  DSUC Daya Sakti Unggul 
Corporation  Tbk 
14 LCGP Laguna Cipta Griya Tbk BIPP Bhuwanatala Indah Permai 
Tbk 
15 OKAS Ancora Indonesia 
Resources Tbk 
MAMI Mas Murni Indonesia Tbk 
16 SMMA Sinar Mas Multiartha Tbk BHIT Bhakti Investama Tbk 
17 SSIA Surya Semesta Internusa 
Tbk 
CTRS Ciputra Surya Tbk 
18 ARTI Arona Binasejati Tbk APEX Apexindo Pratama Duta Tbk 
19 UNSP Bakrie Sumatra Plantations 
Tbk 
LSIP PP London Sumatera Tbk 
20 SHID Hotel Sahid Jaya Int. Tbk FAST Fast Food Indonesia Tbk 
     
 2009    
21 ARTI Arona Binasejati Tbk KKGI Resource Alam Indonesia 
Tbk 
22 BUMI Bumi Resources Tbk INCO INCO Tbk 
23 ELTY Bakrieland Development 
Tbk 
SMRA Summarecon Agung Tbk 
24 ITMA Sumber Energi Andalan 
Tbk 
GMCW Grahamas Citrawisata Tbk 
25 META Nusantara Infrastructure 
Tbk 
TMPI AGIS Tbk 
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Table B.3 (continued) 
 
No  Restatement Company  Control Company 
26 SHID Hotel Sahid Jaya Int. Tbk FAST Fast Food Indonesia Tbk 
27 SMMT Golden Eagle Energy Tbk DNET Dyviacom Intrabumi Tbk 
28 TRUB Truba Manunggal Engin.Tbk  APOL Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line 
Tbk  
29 BMTR Bimantara Citra Tbk MLPL Multipolar Corporation Tbk 
     
 2010    
30 BMTR Bimantara Citra Tbk MLPL Multipolar Corporation Tbk 
31 JTPE Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa Tbk TIRA Tira Austenite Tbk  
32 MFIN Mandala Multifinance Tbk TRIM Trimegah Securities Tbk 
33 MTFN Global Financindo Tbk HADE Hortus Danavest Tbk 
34 PNIN Panin Insurance Tbk PNLF Panin Life Tbk 
35 PNSE Pudjiadi & Sons Estate Tbk CLPI Colorpak Indonesia Tbk 
36 RAJA Rukun Raharja Tbk RIMO Rimo Catur Lestari Tbk 
37 SMMT Golden Eagle Energy Tbk INDX Indoexchange  Tbk 
38 TOTL Total Bangun Persada Tbk LPCK Lippo Cikarang Tbk 
39 DNET Dyviacom Intrabumi Tbk ASIA Asiana Grain 
International  Tbk 
 2011    
40 ARII Atlas Resources Tbk CNKO Central Korporindo Int. Tbk 
41 ARTI Arona Binasejati Tbk PTRO Petrosea Tbk 
42 BAPA Bekasi Asri Pemula Tbk RBMS Ristia Bintang 
Mahkotasejati Tbk 
43 BAYU Bayu Buana Tbk CLPI Colorpak Indonesia Tbk 
44 BPFI Batavia Prosperindo Finance 
Tbk 
ASDM Asuransi Dayin MitraTbk 
45 BRMS Bumi Resources Minerals 
Tbk 
BMTR Bimantara Citra Tbk 
46 KARW Karwell Indonesia Tbk BIMA Primarindo Asia Infrastr.  
Tbk 
47 LCGP Laguna Cipta Griya Tbk MTSM Metro Supermarket Realty 
Tbk 
48 META Nusantara Infrastructure Tbk TMPI AGIS Tbk 
49 PNIN Panin Insurance Tbk PNLF Panin Life Tbk 
50 TRIL Triwira Insanlestari Tbk PUDP Pudjiadi Prestige Limited 
Tbk 
51 DNET Dyviacom Intrabumi Tbk INTD Inter Delta Tbk 
     
 2012    
52 AMAG Asuransi Muti Artha Guna 
Tbk 
ABDA Asuransi Bina Dana Arta 
Tbk 
53 BIPP Bhuwanatala Indah Permai 
Tbk 
LCGP Laguna Cipta Griya Tbk 
54 EXCL Excelcomindo Pratama  Tbk FREN Mobile-8 Telecom Tbk 
55 LAPD Lapindo International Tbk TMAS Pelayaran Tempuran Emas 
Tbk 
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Table B.3 (continued) 
 
No  Restatement Company  Control Company 
56 LPKR Lippo Karawaci Tbk ELTY Bakrieland Development 
Tbk 
57 META Nusantara Infrastructure Tbk TGKA Tigaraksa Satria Tbk 
58 RUIS Radiant Utama Interinsco 
Tbk 
KKGI Resource Alam Indonesia 
Tbk 
59 ULTJ Ultra Jaya Milk Tbk SIPD Sierad Produce Tbk 
60 SIMA Siwani Makmur Tbk LMSH Lion Mesh Prima Tbk 
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Table B.4 List of Sample of Research Stage 2 (Interim Financial Statements 
Restatement) 
 
No  Restatement Company  Control Company 
 2006    
1 ASJT Asuransi Jasa Tania Tbk MREI Maskapai Reasuransi 
Indonesia Tbk 
2 CTRA Ciputra Development Tbk KLBF Kalbe Farma Tbk 
3 CTRS Ciputra Surya Tbk MDLN Modernland Realty Ltd Tbk 
4 ICON Island Concepts Indonesia 
Tbk 
BAYU Bayu Buana Tbk 
5 LTLS Lautan Luas Tbk AKRA AKR Corporation Tbk 
6 MFIN Mandala Multifinance Tbk TRIM Trimegah Securities Tbk 
7 PANR Panorama Sentrawisata Tbk WICO Wicaksana Overseas Int. Tbk 
     
 2007    
8 ATPK ATPK Reources  Tbk CTTH Citatah Industri Marmer Tbk 
9 CENT Centrin Online Tbk TKGA Toko Gunung Agung Tbk 
10 PKPK Perdana Karya Perkasa Tbk KKGI Resource Alam Indonesia 
Tbk 
11 RDTX Roda Vivatex Tbk GDYR Goodyear Indonesia Tbk 
12 SUGI Sugi Samapersada Tbk RIMO Rimo Catur Lestari Tbk 
13 TKIM Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia 
Tbk 
INKP Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk 
14 TRIM Trimegah Securities Tbk CFIN Clipan Finance Indonesia 
Tbk 
15 WEHA Panorama Transportasi Tbk CMPP Centris Multi Persada 
Pratama Tbk 
     
 2008    
16 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera  Food 
Tbk 
AQUA Aqua Golden Mississippi 
Tbk 
17 DSUC Daya Sakti Unggul 
Corporation Tbk 
TIRT Tirta Mahakam Resources 
Tbk 
18 FPNI Fatrapolindo Nusa Industri 
Tbk 
TRST Trias Sentosa Tbk 
19 MIRA Mitra Rajasa Tbk BTEL Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line 
Tbk 
     
 2009    
20 AKRA AKR Corporation Tbk PLIN Plaza Indonesia Realty Tbk 
21 ATPK ATPK Resources  Tbk CTTH Citatah Industri Marmer Tbk 
22 BISI Bisi International Tbk IIKP Inti Kapuas Arowana (Inti 
Indah Karya Plasindo) Tbk 
23 BPFI Batavia Prosperindo Finance 
Tbk 
ASDM Asuransi Dayin MitraTbk 
24 CKRA  Ciptojaya Kontrindoreksa 
Tbk 
TOTL Total Bangun Persada Tbk 
25 FMII Fortune Mate Indonesia Tbk PWSI Panca Wiratama Sakti Tbk 
26 LCGP Laguna Cipta Griya Tbk RBMS Ristia Bintang Mahkotasejati 
Tbk 
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Table B.4 (continued) 
 
No  Restatement Company  Control Company 
27 INVS Inovisi Infracom Tbk SAFE Steady Safe Tbk 
28 PSDN Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk STTP Siantar TOP Tbk 
29 TRUS Trust Finance Indonesia Tbk PEGE Panca Global Securities Tbk 
30 UNSP Bakrie Sumatra Plantations 
Tbk 
LSIP PP London Sumatera Tbk 
     
 2010    
31 ABBA Abdi Bangsa Tbk BAYU Bayu Buana Tbk 
32 ARTI Arona Binasejati Tbk KKGI Resource Alam Indonesia 
Tbk 
33 BAPA 
 
Bekasi Asri Pemula Tbk RBMS 
 
Ristia Bintang Mahkotasejati 
Tbk 
34 BIPP 
 
Bhuwanatala Indah Permai 
Tbk 
LCGP 
 
Laguna Cipta Griya Tbk 
35 BUVA Bukit Uluwatu Villa Tbk ASGR Astra Graphia Tbk 
36 CKRA 
 
Ciptojaya Kontrindoreksa 
Tbk 
LPCK 
 
Lippo Cikarang Tbk 
37 ITTG Integrasi Teknologi Tbk TMPO Tempo Inti Media Tbk 
38 KBLM 
 
Kabelindo Murni Tbk CNTX 
 
Century Textile Industry  
Tbk 
39 KICI Kedaung Indah Canindo Tbk PYFA Pyridam Farma Tbk 
40 MYRX Hanson International Tbk BIMA Primarindo Asia Infrastr. Tbk 
41 OMRE 
 
Indonesia Prima Property 
Tbk 
LAMI 
 
Lamicitra Nusantara Tbk 
42 RMBA 
 
Bentoel International 
Investama Tbk 
MYOR 
 
Mayora Indah Tbk 
     
 2011    
43 ATPK ATPK Resources Tbk PKPK Perdana Karya Perkasa Tbk 
44 
BAPA Bekasi Asri Pemula Tbk RBMS 
Ristia Bintang Mahkotasejati 
Tbk 
45 BCIP 
 
Bumi Citra Permai Tbk 
 
BMSR Bintang Mitra Semestaraya 
Tbk 
46 BIPP 
 
Bhuwanatala Indah Permai 
Tbk 
OMRE Indonesia Prima Property 
Tbk 
47 BRAU Berau Coal Energy Tbk ENRG Energi Mega Persada Tbk 
48 CSAP Catur Sentosa Adiprana MTDL Metrodata Electronics Tbk 
49 CTTH Citatah Industri Marmer Tbk CITA Cipta Panelutama Tbk 
50 DSFI 
 
Dharma Samudera Fishing 
Ind. Tbk 
IIKP 
 
Inti Kapuas Arowana (Inti 
Indah Karya Plasindo) Tbk 
51 ETWA 
 
Eterindo Wahanatama Tbk 
 
TIRT 
 
Tirta Mahakam Resources 
Tbk 
52 GOLD Golden Retailindo Tbk RAJA Rukun Raharja Tbk. 
53 GTBO Garda Tujuh Buana Tbk MITI Mitra Investindo Tbk 
54 GMCW Grahamas Citrawisata Tbk ITTG Integrasi Teknologi Tbk 
55 HRUM 
 
Harum Energy Tbk 
 
BIPI 
 
Benakat Petroleum Energy 
Tbk 
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Table B.4 (continued) 
 
No  Restatement Company  Control Company 
56 INPP 
 
Indonesian Paradise 
Property Tbk 
LPLI 
 
Lippo E-Net Tbk 
57 JTPE Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa Tbk TIRA Tira Austine Tbk 
58 KICI Kedaung Indah Canindo Tbk PYFA Pyridam Farma Tbk 
59 KKGI 
 
Resource Alam Indonesia 
Tbk 
RUIS 
 
Radiant Utama Interinsco 
Tbk 
60 MIRA 
 
Mitra Rajasa Tbk 
 
IATA 
 
Indonesia Air Transport Tbk 
61 PICO 
 
Pelangi Indah Canindo Tbk 
 
INAI 
 
Indal Aluminium Industry 
Tbk 
62 POOL 
 
Pool Advista Indonesia Tbk 
 
TMPO 
 
Tempo Inti Media Tbk 
63 SCMA Surya Citra Media Tbk TGKA Tigaraksa Satria Tbk 
64 SQMI Renuka Coalindo Tbk ALKA Alakasa Industrindo Tbk 
65 TRUS 
 
Trust Finance Indonesia Tbk 
 
PEGE 
 
Panca Global Securities Tbk 
66 WOMF 
 
Wahana Ottomitra 
Multiartha Tbk 
MFIN 
 
Mandala Multifinance Tbk 
     
 2012    
67 ABBA Abdi Bangsa Tbk BAYU Bayu Buana Tbk 
68 APOL 
 
Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line 
Tbk 
CMNP 
 
Citra Marga Nusaphala 
PersadaTbk 
69 APLN 
 
Agung Podomoro Land Tbk 
 
CTRA 
 
Ciputra Development Tbk 
70 ASRM Asuransi Ramayana Tbk LPGI Asuransi Ramayana Tbk 
71 BFIN 
 
BFI Finance Indonesia Tbk 
 
WOMF 
 
Wahana Ottomitra Multiartha 
Tbk 
72 BKSL 
 
Sentul City (d/h Bukit 
Sentul Tbk) 
DILD 
 
Dharmala Intiland Tbk 
73 BWPT BW Plantation Tbk SGRO Sampoerna Argo Tbk 
74 CMPP 
 
Centris Multi Persada 
Pratama Tbk 
WEHA 
 
Panorama Transportasi Tbk 
75 CPIN 
 
Charoen Pokphand 
Indonesia Tbk 
SMCB 
 
Holcim Indonesia Tbk 
76 DLTA Delta Djakarta Tbk SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk 
77 DSFI 
 
Dharma Samudera Fishing 
Ind. Tbk 
IIKP 
 
Inti Kapuas Arowana (Inti 
Indah Karya Plasindo) Tbk 
78 GLOB Global Teleshop Tbk LPLI Lippo E-Net Tbk 
79 GTBO Garda Tujuh Buana Tbk ARTI Arona Binasejati Tbk 
80 JPFA JAPFA  Tbk FASW Fajar Surya Wisesa Tbk 
81 KPIG 
 
Kridaperdana Indahgraha 
Tbk 
RODA 
 
Roda Panggon Harapan Tbk 
82 LMAS 
 
Limas  Centric Indonesia 
Tbk 
FORU 
 
Fortune Indonesia Tbk 
83 MDLN Moderland Realty Tbk SSIA Surya Semesta Internusa Tbk 
84 MICE Multi Indocitra Tbk LPPS Lippo Securities Tbk 
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Table B.4 (continued) 
 
No  Restatement Company  Control Company 
85 MITI Mitra Investindo CTTH Citatah Industri Marmer Tbk 
86 MTFN Global Financindo Tbk HADE Hortus Danavest Tbk 
87 MTLA 
 
Metropolitan Land Tbk 
 
CKRA 
 
Ciptojaya Kontrindoreksa 
Tbk 
88 PUDP 
 
Pudjiadi Prestige Limited 
Tbk 
PNSE 
 
Pudjiadi & Sons Estate Tbk 
89 RMBA 
 
Bentoel International 
Investama Tbk 
MYOR 
 
Mayora Indah Tbk 
90 SAFE Steady Safe Tbk ZBRA Zebra Nusantara Tbk 
91 SCCO Sucaco Tbk KBLI GT Kabel Indonesia Tbk 
92 SDMU Sidomulyo Selaras Tbk MIRA Mitra Rajasa Tbk 
93 TMPI AGIS Tbk MTDL Metrodata Electronics Tbk 
94 TOBA 
 
Toba Bara Sejahtera Tbk 
 
BIPI 
 
Benakat Petroleum Energy 
Tbk 
95 TOTL Total Bangun Persada Tbk LPCK Lippo Cikarang Tbk 
96 TRIL 
 
Triwira Insanlestari Tbk 
 
SDPC 
 
Millenium Pharmacon Int. 
Tbk 
97 TRUB 
 
Truba Manunggal 
Engineering Tbk 
HITS 
 
Humpuss Intermoda Transp. 
Tbk 
98 WICO 
 
Wicaksana Overseas Int. 
Tbk 
TKGA 
 
Toko Gunung Agung Tbk 
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APPENDIX C: INDONESIAN OFFSHORE COMPANIES 
 
Table C. List of Indonesian Offshore Companies 
 
No Code Year Name of Company Jurisdiction Source 
1 BUMI 2006-2007 Willow finance Ltd Cayman 
Islands 
Business 
magazine 
2 APEX 2008 Mira international 
holdings Pte Ltd 
 
Singapore 
 
 
PLC‟s annual 
report; PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
3 BAYU 2004-2007 ABN AMRO Bank 
N.V. Singapore*     
Singapore 
 
PLC‟s annual 
report 
4 SHID 2007-2009 Merchiston Group 
Ltd 
Singapore Judgment 
5 RBMS 2004-2009 Aussie Properties 
Ltd   
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
6 BNBR 2008 Long Haul Holding 
Ltd 
Charlestown, 
Nevis 
PLC‟s annual 
report 
7 INDF 2000-2009 CAB Holdings Ltd Mahe, 
Seychelles 
PLC‟s holding 
website 
8 SMDM 2009-2009 Asia Capital 
Holding Ltd 
Mahe, 
Seychelles 
Judgment 
9 LPGI 2002-2009 Pacific Asia 
Holding Ltd 
Cook Islands 
 
Business 
magazine 
10 JAPFA 2003-2009 Pacific Focus 
Enterprise  
Ltd 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s annual 
report 
11 MITI 2007-2009 Olive Crest 
Corporation Ltd 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
Business 
magazine 
12 MREI 2004-2009 ABN Amro Bank 
NV* 
Singapore 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
13 SIIP 2005-2009 Eastlion Worldwide 
Ltd 
Singapore 
 
Monthly shares 
announcement 
14 GJTL 2006-2009 Denham Pte Ltd 
 
Singapore 
 
Securities broker 
research  
15 ENRG 2005-2008 UBS AG* 
 
Singapore 
 
PLC‟s annual 
report 
16 ABDA 2004-2009 ABN Amro Bank 
NV* 
 
Singapore 
 
 
Monthly shares 
announcement; 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
17 RMBA 2008 Bella Sapphire 
Ventures Ltd 
                
Mahe, 
Seychelles 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
18 PTSP 2003-2009 Deutsche Bank* 
 
Singapore Monthly shares 
register 
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Table C (continued) 
 
No Code Year Name of Company Jurisdiction Source 
19 CEKA 2006-2009 Trade Sound 
Investment Ltd   
                    
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
20 ZBRA 2005-2009 Beautex offshore 
Inc. Ltd 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
 
Business 
newspaper; 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
21 DART 2006-2008 Quay Capital Ltd 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
Judgment 
22 PWON 2006-2009 BSL Investment 
Inc. 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
Judgment 
   Burgami 
Investments Ltd 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
Judgment 
23 OMRE 2006-2009 First Pacific Capital 
Group Ltd 
Hong Kong 
 
ICRIS document; 
Judgment 
24 CKRA 2008-2009 Citra Group Pte Ltd 
 
Singapore 
 
ACRA document 
25 TRIM 2007-2008 Demerara Limited Hong Kong 
 
Business 
magazine 
26 BKSL 2007-2009 Athena Offshore 
Holding Ltd 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
27 LMAS 2005-2009 
 
Cantaloupe Assets 
Ltd 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s Prospectus 
28 LPPF 2000-2009 Pacific Asia 
Holdings Ltd  
Cook Islands 
 
Business 
magazine 
29 SMMA 2004-2009 JBC International 
Finance Ltd 
Mauritius 
 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
30 LPPS 2001-2009 Pacific Asia 
Holdings Ltd 
Mauritius 
 
Business 
magazine 
31 RELI 2006-2009 Reliance Financial 
Holdings Ltd 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s prospectus 
32 ADES 2008-2009 Sofos Pte Ltd 
 
 
Singapore 
 
 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX; ACRA 
document 
33 PSDN 2006-2009 Innovest offshore 
Ventures Ltd 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
34 SKLT 2006-2009 Omnistar 
Investment 
Holdings Ltd 
Singapore Judgment 
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Table C (continued) 
 
No Code Year Name of Company Jurisdiction Source 
35 HDTX 2006-2007 Evercon Overseas 
Ltd 
Labuan, 
Malaysia 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
  2007-2009 Mercury Capital 
International Inc. 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
  2008-2009 Abernova Overseas 
Ltd 
 
Jersey, 
Channel 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
36 PAFI 2005-2009 Abernova Overseas 
Ltd 
 
Jersey, 
Channel 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
  2006-2009 Evercon Overseas 
Ltd 
 
Labuan, 
Malaysia 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
37 BRPT 2007-2009 Magna Resources 
Corporation Pte Ltd 
Singapore 
 
ACRA document 
38 TIRT 2006-2009 Eton Asset 
Management Ltd 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
Monthly shares 
announcement 
39 DYNA 2004-2007 HSBC Fund 
Services*  
Hong Kong 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
40 JPRS 2007-2009 International 
Magnificent 
Fortune Ltd  
Hong Kong 
 
Not registered at 
ICRIS  
41 KICI 2000-2009 DK Lim & Sons 
Investment Pte Ltd 
Singapore 
 
ACRA document 
42 IKAI 2007-2009 Best Achievement 
Investment Ltd 
 
 
Hong Kong 
 
 
ICRIS document; 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
43 KBLI 2003-2009 Javas Premier 
Venture Capital Ltd                              
Labuan, 
Malaysia
Judgement 
44 VOKS 2007-2009 Perfect Prospect 
Ltd 
 
Singapore 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
45 MLPL 2001-2009 Across Asia Ltd 
 
Cayman 
Islands 
Business 
magazine 
46 IMAS 2008-2009 Citibank* 
 
 
Singapore 
 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
47 ADMG 2005-2006 HSBC Trustee* 
 
 
 
Singapore 
 
 
 
PLC‟s annual 
report; PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
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Table C (continued) 
 
No Code Year Name of Company Jurisdiction Source 
48 INTA 2006-2009 Pristine Resources 
International Pte 
Ltd. 
Singapore 
 
 
ACRA document 
   Westwood Finance 
Inc. 
Mahe 
Seychelles 
Judgment 
50 MYTX 2004-2009 Growth Solution 
Ltd 
Samoa 
 
Judgment 
51 BMSR 2003-2008 Share haven 
finance Ltd 
 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
52 LPIN 2001-1009 Pacific Asia 
Holding ltd 
Cook island 
 
Business 
magazine 
53 PICO 2004-2009 Hammond 
Holdings Ltd 
Samoa 
 
Judgment 
54 MTFN 2003-2009 BFC CPV Ltd 
 
Labuan 
Malaysia 
PLC‟s web 
55 GSMF 2003-2009 Equity Global 
International Ltd 
Hong Kong 
 
ICRIS document 
56 MTSM 2001-2009 Bara Pte Ltd 
 
Singapore 
 
ACRA document 
57 ASIA 2005-2007 Wellstead 
Investment Pte Ltd  
 
Singapore 
 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
  2008-2009 Rich Achieve 
Enterprises Ltd 
 
Hong Kong 
 
 
PLC‟s 
announcement to 
IDX 
58 CITA 2007-2009 Richburg Enterprise 
Pte Ltd 
Singapore 
 
Short prospectus 
of PLC 
59 ITTG 2008-2009 Goodwill 
investment service  
Marshall 
Islands 
Tender offer 
document of PLC 
* Custodian bank or nominee on behalf of Indonesian 
Note: PLC= public listed company 
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APPENDIX D: RESULTS OF PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Table D.1 Results of Panel Data for Model 1 
 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Without Year Dummy With Year Dummy With Lag Dependent Variable GMM-
sys Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
ACCIT(t-1) + - - - - - - 0.758*** 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.674) 
0.569*** 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.920) 
FMLBOCD - -0.026 
(0.125)    
-0.178*** 
(0.000)    
-0.061*** 
(0.006)    
-0.025 
(0.134)    
-0.131 
(0.001)    
-0.055** 
(0.011)    
-0.005 
(0.694) 
-0.074* 
(0.071) 
-0.012 
(0.465) 
0.013 
(0.918) 
GLFRG + 0.020 
(0.304)   
0.015 
(0.657)     
0.024 
(0.291)     
0.017 
(0.363)    
0.014 
(0.649)    
0.017 
(0.434)    
0.013 
(0.348) 
-0.005 
(0.892) 
0.017 
(0.330) 
0.137 
(0.110) 
POLIC - -0.049*** 
(0.009)    
-0.018 
(0.495)    
-0.032 
(0.116)    
-0.049*** 
(0.007)    
-0.026 
(0.288)    
-0.032* 
(0.096)     
-0.024* 
(0.092) 
-0.025 
(0.474) 
-0.029 
(0.101) 
-0.024 
(0.739) 
Control variable           
ICED + 0.032* 
(0.080) 
0.026 
(0.238)    
0.035* 
(0.054)    
0.031* 
(0.082)    
0.032 
(0.114)    
0.035** 
(0.040) 
0.024* 
(0.077) 
-0.027 
(0.365) 
0.020 
(0.222) 
0.058 
(0.230) 
BOC  + 0.215*** 
(0.000)    
0.127** 
(0.045)    
0.166*** 
(0.002)     
0.202*** 
(0.000)    
0.069 
(0.238)    
0.124** 
(0.014)    
0.024 
(0.573) 
0.052 
(0.249) 
0.023 
(0.623) 
-0.014 
(0.913) 
BCS + 0.017*** 
(0.001)    
0.003 
(0.695)    
0.009 
(0.125)    
0.018*** 
(0.000)      
0.004 
(0.578)    
0.012** 
(0.030)    
-0.003 
(0.373) 
0.010 
(0.819) 
0.001 
(0.852) 
0.000 
(0.976) 
AUD + 0.073*** 
(0.000)    
-0.023 
(0.455)    
0.033 
(0.109)    
0.079*** 
(0.000)    
0.012 
(0.679)    
0.052*** 
(0.008)     
0.027** 
(0.039) 
0.007 
(0.234) 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
0.087 
(0.203) 
LOSS - -0.028 
(0.139)    
0.001 
(0.946)    
-0.006 
(0.683)    
-0.033* 
(0.076)    
-0.003 
(0.823)    
-0.012 
(0.352)    
-0.008 
(0.554) 
0.017 
(0.441) 
-0.010 
(0.478) 
0.025 
(0.398) 
Sqrt 
LEV 
+ -0.071** 
(0.037)    
0.004 
(0.935)    
-0.047 
(0.209)    
-0.073** 
(0.029)    
-0.030 
(0.507)    
-0.059* 
(0.092)    
-0.013 
(0.610) 
-0.034 
(0.441) 
-0.029 
(0.331) 
0.027 
(0.676) 
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Table D.1 (continued) 
 
 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign 
Without Year Dummy With Year Dummy With Lag Dependent Variable GMM-sys 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
SIZE + 0.027*** 
(0.000)    
0.068*** 
(0.000)    
0.043*** 
(0.000)     
0.024*** 
(0.000)    
0.026** 
(0.017)     
0.027*** 
(0.000)    
0.009** 
(0.018) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.045** 
(0.022) 
Year Dummy            
2007 + - - - 0.074*** 
(0.000)    
0.073*** 
(0.000)    
0.074*** 
(0.000)    
- - - - 
2008 + - - - 0.101*** 
(0.000)    
0.096*** 
(0.000)    
0.098*** 
(0.000)    
- - - - 
Constant  0.088 
(0.215) 
-0.290* 
(0.060) 
-0.055 
(0.534)    
0.075 
(0.280)    
0.217 
(0.151)    
 0.097 
(0.266)    
0.064 
(0.227) 
0.018 
(0.909) 
0.092 
(0.158) 
-0.068 
(0.773) 
F   19.71*** 
(0.000) 
6.84*** 
(0.000) 
- 20.05*** 
(0.000) 
15.22*** 
(0.000) 
- 107.50*** 
(0.000) 
2.63*** 
(0.0033) 
- 1.72* 
(0.068) 
R
2
  0.1944 0.110 0.175 0.228 0.1453 0.218 0.6865 0.0945 0.6738 - 
Wald chi2(10)        - - 115.09 - - - - - - - 
Wald chi2(11)        - - - - - - - - 562.66 - 
Wald chi2(12)        - - - - - 245.23 - - - - 
Prob > chi2  - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - 
N  828 828 828 828 828 828 552 552 552 552 
No. Instruments  - - - - - - - - - 45 
No. Groups  - - - - - - - - - 276 
AR(1) test   - - - - - - - - - 7.59*** 
(0.002) 
Hansen test of 
over-
identification  
 - - - - - - - - - 76.31*** 
(0.000) 
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Table D.2 Results of Panel Data for Model 2 
 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
With Year Dummy Without Year Dummy With Lag Dependent Variable GMM-sys 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled  
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled  
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
ACCIT(t-1) + - - - - - - 0.758*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.649) 
0.571*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.315) 
PROFBOCD + 0.028 
(0.231) 
0.033 
(0.424) 
0.025 
(0.374) 
0.316 
(0.168) 
0.048 
(0.209) 
0.038 
0.153 
0.000 
(0.982) 
-0.048 
(0.212) 
0.002 
(0.925) 
0.078 
(0.536) 
GLFRG + 0.031 
(0.098) 
0.024 
(0.492) 
0.039* 
(0.078) 
0.028 
(0.124) 
0.020 
(0.534) 
0.030 
0.154 
0.015 
(0.271) 
0.003 
(0.933) 
0.021 
(0.216) 
0.146* 
(0.056) 
POLIC - -0.048 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.689) 
-0.030 
(0.138) 
-0.048*** 
(0.008) 
-0.022 
(0.375) 
-0.031 
0.112 
-0.024* 
(0.095) 
-0.018 
(0.596) 
-0.028 
(0.108) 
-0.015 
(0.815) 
Control variable           
ICED + 0.032 
(0.080) 
0.022 
(0.323) 
0.033* 
(0.067) 
0.031* 
(0.080) 
0.030 
(0.143) 
0.034** 
(0.045) 
0.024* 
(0.080) 
-0.033 
(0.182) 
0.019 
(0.232) 
0.062 
(0.231) 
BOC  + 0.214 
(0.000) 
0.166 
(0.009) 
0.178*** 
(0.001) 
0.200*** 
(0.000) 
0.094 
(0.111) 
0.133*** 
(0.008) 
0.025 
(0.550) 
0.053 
(0.359) 
0.026 
(0.580) 
-0.030 
(0.813) 
BCS + 0.017 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.664) 
0.009 
(0.107) 
0.180*** 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.523) 
0.012** 
(0.024) 
-0.003 
(0.379) 
0.010 
(0.256) 
0.001 
(0.844) 
-0.005 
(0.776) 
AUD + 0.075 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.552) 
0.036* 
(0.076) 
0.081*** 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.555) 
0.056*** 
(0.004) 
0.027** 
(0.040) 
0.006 
(0.844) 
0.039** 
(0.017) 
0.070 
(0.350) 
LOSS - -0.027 
(0.149) 
-0.003 
(0.826) 
-0.007 
(0.615) 
-0.032* 
(0.082) 
-0.008 
(0.597) 
-0.014 
(0.289) 
-0.008 
(0.549) 
0.017 
(0.233) 
-0.010 
(0.466) 
0.020 
(0.466) 
Sqrt 
LEV 
+ -0.072 
(0.034) 
0.007 
(0.892) 
-0.045 
(0.227) 
-0.075** 
(0.025) 
-0.028 
(0.545) 
-0.058 
(0.101) 
-0.012 
(0.627) 
-0.035 
(0.437) 
-0.028 
(0.352) 
0.003 
(0.954) 
SIZE + 0.027 
(0.000) 
0.066 
(0.000) 
0.042*** 
(0.000) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.023** 
(0.037) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.009** 
(0.019) 
0.043*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.036** 
(0.044) 
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Table D.2 (continued) 
 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Without Year Dummy With Year Dummy With Lag Dependent Variable GMM-
sys Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Year Dummy            
2007 + - - - 0.074*** 
(0.000) 
0.075*** 
(0.000) 
0.074*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - 
2008 + - - - 0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.100*** 
(0.000) 
(0.100)*** 
0.000 
- - - - 
Constant  0.070 
(0.313) 
-0.416 
(0.007) 
0.100 
(0.246) 
0.059 
(0.385) 
0.147 
(0.330) 
0.057 
(0.503) 
0.059 
(0.250) 
-0.010 
(0.948) 
0.082 
(0.198) 
0.231 
(0.928) 
F  19.60*** 
(0.000) 
4.91*** 
(0.000) 
- 20.01*** 
(0.000) 
14.13*** 
(0.000) 
- 107.45*** 
(0.000) 
2.49*** 
(0.0061) 
- 1.48 
(0.138) 
R
2
  0.194 0.128 - 0.228 0.193 - 0.6864 0.0878 0.6743 - 
Wald chi2(10)        - - 108.63 - - - - - - - 
Wald chi2(11)        - - - - - - - - 564.60 - 
Wald chi2(12)  - - - - - 239.46 - - - - 
Prob > chi2  - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - 
N  828 828 828 828 828 828 552 552 552 552 
No. Instruments  - - - - - - - - - 45 
No. Groups  - - - - - - - - - 276 
AR(1) test   - - - - - - - - - 6.94*** 
(0.000) 
Hansen Test of 
Over-
Identification  
 - - - - - - - - - 84.01*** 
(0.000) 
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Table D.3 Results of Panel Data for Model 3 
 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Without Year Dummy With Year Dummy With Lag Dependent Variable GMM-
sys Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
ACCIT(t-1) + - - - - - - 0.759*** 
(0.000)    
-0.016 
(0.659) 
0.570*** 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.728) 
FMLBOCD - -0.033** 
(0.045)     
-0.180*** 
(0.000)    
-0.066*** 
(0.003)    
-0.032** 
(0.043)    
-0.138*** 
(0.000)    
-0.063*** 
(0.003)    
-0.007 
(0.551) 
-0.068* 
(0.097) 
-0.015 
(0.334) 
0.030 
(0.824) 
FRGOWN + -0.000 
(0.570)    
-0.000 
(0.860)    
0.000 
(0.876)    
-0.000 
(0.306)    
-0.001 
(0.116)    
-0.000 
(0.171)    
0.000 
(0.643) 
0.000 
(0.514) 
0.000 
(0.737) 
0.001 
(0.132) 
POLIC - -0.051*** 
(0.006)    
-0.019 
(0.486)    
-0.033 
(0.109)    
-0.052*** 
(0.005)    
-0.029 
(0.243)     
-0.035* 
(0.074)     
-0.024* 
(0.086) 
-0.026 
(0.452) 
-0.030* 
(0.090) 
-0.059 
(0.388) 
Control variable           
ICED + 0.030* 
(0.097)    
0.025 
(0.262)     
0.034* 
(0.062)   
0.029 
(0.101)    
0.028 
(0.169)    
0.033* 
(0.052)    
0.023* 
(0.089) 
-0.025 
(0.300) 
0.018 
(0.255) 
0.070 
(0.139) 
BOC  + 0.218*** 
(0.000) 
0.130** 
(0.041)    
0.167*** 
(0.002)      
0.207*** 
(0.000)    
0.074 
(0.203)    
0.127** 
(0.012)    
0.023 
(0.580) 
0.049 
(0.399) 
0.023 
(0.626) 
0.011 
(0.930) 
BCS + 0.018*** 
(0.000)    
0.004 
(0.654)    
0.009 
(0.110)    
0.019*** 
(0.000)    
0.006 
(0.416)    
0.013** 
(0.018)    
-0.003 
(0.400) 
0.009 
(0.327) 
0.001 
(0.812) 
0.009 
(0.569) 
AUD + 0.081*** 
(0.000)    
-0.024 
(0.441)    
0.036* 
(0.073)     
0.087*** 
(0.000)    
0.009 
(0.749)    
0.057*** 
(0.003)    
0.029** 
(0.025) 
0.008 
(0.794) 
0.042*** 
(0.009) 
0.070 
(0.415) 
LOSS - -0.026 
(0.168) 
0.001 
(0.933)    
-0.005 
(0.707)      
-0.030 
(0.100)    
-0.003 
(0.853)    
-0.011 
(0.403)    
-0.008 
(0.555) 
0.017 
(0.240) 
-0.010 
(0.489) 
0.012 
(0.653) 
Sqrt 
LEV 
+ -0.070** 
(0.039)    
0.004* 
(0.0942)    
-0.047 
(0.207)    
-0.072** 
(0.030)    
-0.032 
(0.484)    
-0.060* 
(0.088)    
-0.013 
(0.618) 
-0.034 
(0.441) 
-0.029 
(0.336) 
-0.069 
(0.208) 
SIZE + 0.027*** 
(0.000)    
0.069*** 
(0.000)    
0.043*** 
(0.000)      
0.024*** 
(0.000)    
0.031*** 
(0.006)     
0.029*** 
(0.000)    
0.009** 
(0.023) 
-0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.034* 
(0.066) 
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Table D.3 (continued) 
 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Without Year Dummy With Year Dummy With Lag Dependent Variable GMM-
sys Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Year Dummy            
2007 + - - - 0.075*** 
(0.000)    
0.074*** 
(0.000)    
0.074*** 
(0.000)    
- - - - 
2008 + - - - 0.103*** 
(0.000)    
0.098*** 
(0.000)    
0.101*** 
(0.000)    
- - - - 
Constant  0.097 
(0.170)    
-0.301* 
(0.055)    
-0.051 
(0.564)    
0.084 
(0.226)    
0.179 
(0.239)    
0.096 
(0.271)    
0.068 
(0.198) 
0.044 
(0.778) 
0.097 
(0.138) 
0.037 
(0.877) 
F  19.62*** 
(0.000) 
6.82*** 
(0.000) 
- 20.07*** 
(0.000) 
15.47*** 
(0.000) 
- 107.30*** 
(0.000) 
2.67*** 
(0.0029) 
- 2.37*** 
(0.008) 
R
2
  0.194 0.109 0.173 0.228 0.144 0.217 0.6861 0.0950 0.6735 - 
Wald chi2(10)      - - 113.86 - - - - - - - 
Wald chi2(11)      - - - - - - - - 560.14 - 
Wald chi2(12)      - - -   246.90   - - 
Prob > chi2  - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - 
N  828 828 828 828 828 828 552 552 552 552 
No. Instruments  - - - - - - - - - 45 
No. Groups  - - - - - - - - - 276 
AR(1) test   - - - - - - - - - 7.31*** 
(0.000) 
Hansen test of 
over-
identification  
 - - - - - - - - - 81.59*** 
(0.000) 
 
Note: p value is in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively; R
2 
for fixed effects and random effects are 
overall. ACCIT= audit committee compliance index total; FMLBOCD = family-controlled company  with family members on the boards; 
PROFBOCD = family-controlled company with professional management; GLFRG = genuine large foreign institutional investor; FRGOWN=total 
 402 
percentage shares held by foreign institutional investors; POLIC=politically connected independent commissioner; ICED= independent commissioner 
financial expertise; BOC = proportion of  independent commissioners; BCS = board of commissioners size; AUD = audit quality; LOSS = financial 
loss; LEV= leverage; SIZE = firm size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
